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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background, Research Gaps, and Questions 
 
In recent decades, the emergence and management of ‘dominant designs’ 
has attracted growing interest among scholars in the fields of strategic 
management (McGrath, MacMillan & Tushman, 1992; Schilling, 1998; 
Suarez & Utterback, 1995; Tegarden, Hatfield & Echols, 1999), technology 
management and industrial evolution (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; 
Henderson & Clark, 1990), and marketing (Hauser, Tellis & Griffin, 2006; 
Srinivasan, Lilien & Rangaswamy, 2004; 2006)1. By way of a definition, a 
dominant design emerges when the product design (i.e., its architecture 
and/or a set of individual features) of one firm or competitor in an industry 
becomes a de facto standard in the market or product category (Christensen, 
Suarez & Utterback, 1998). As such, a dominant design tends to be a 
commercial success for the firm whose product design achieves this position, 
and it also changes the competitive situation in that competitors also have 
the incentive to follow or adopt the design. Well-known examples of 
dominant designs include mobile phones that have become the industry 
standard such as Apple’s iPhone (O’Brien, 2010), the Xerox model in 
photocopiers, and the VHS vs. Betamax standard in videocassettes 
(Cusumano, Mylonadis & Rosenbloom, 1992; Rosenbloom & Cusumano, 
1987).  
However, although previous research has introduced a number of different 
perspectives on the emergence and management of dominant designs on 
industry and firm levels, four notable research gaps remain. First, there have 
                                                   
1 Closely related concepts, such as service-dominant logic (Vargo & Lusch, 2004; 
2006), or dominant service design (Lee & AbuAli, 2011) are also used. However, I 
concentrate on the more established concept. Still, offering can be understood as 
being dominant (a ‘de facto’ logic and structure). 
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been relatively few studies explicitly focusing on how multi-product firms 
attempt to create and/or adopt multiple dominant designs (a) across product 
categories as well as (b) over time. 
Indeed, incumbent firms in many industries (especially high-tech 
industries) have operations and/or development efforts in (1a) multiple 
product categories: these product categories and efforts are likely to be 
somewhat interlinked, as will be the related dominant designs. There is thus 
a need to study the particular motivations and processes of multi-product 
incumbent firms regarding the creation of dominant designs  – as 
preliminarily noted by Srinivasan, Lilien, and Rangaswamy (2006). More 
specifically, how a company can increase the odds of creating dominant 
designs, as they can only be verified ex post at industry level (McGrath, 
MacMillan & Tushman, 1992; Tegarden, Hatfield & Echols, 1999; Suarez, 
2004). Moreover, the (1b) sequential nature of the related development 
efforts over time is also a highly relevant issue for multi-product firms, 
especially those that are concerned about the long-term management of their 
overall product portfolio, including the transition from one dominant design 
to another. These issues pertaining to the management of dominant designs 
in multi-product firms comprise the explicit and primary focus of the present 
research. In this respect this study differs from previous research that has 
tended to rely on longitudinal case studies charting the development of one 
product standard on the firm level (e.g., Cusumano et al., 1992; Rosenbloom 
& Cusumano, 1987) and industry level (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; 
Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Utterback & Abernathy, 1975).  
Second, previous literature has paid little explicit attention to the 
distinction between life cycles pertaining to products and life cycles2 
governing overall industries, or (multi-product) organizations in industries. 
It is self-evident that dominant designs as a phenomenon are directly related 
to individual product life cycles in that, by definition, they emerge during the 
growth period of a product category, before the market reaches maturity 
(Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; Anderson & Tushman, 1990). Interestingly 
enough, many studies even seem to treat individual product life cycles and 
                                                   
2 Vernon (1966) states that product life cycles typically incorporate new products, 
maturing products, and standardized products, and that these stages follow each 
other. Different kinds of resources are required during the different stages: new 
products use scientific knowledge and are capital-intensive, whereas standard 
products are low-cost and are sold based on the cheap price. Abernathy and 
Utterback (1978) and Utterback and Abernathy (1975) draw a parallel between 
product and industry life cycles. Windrum (1998, p.1046) refers to these models as 
‘The Vernon-Abernathy-Utterback models”. 
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industry life cycles as somewhat synonymous (e.g., Anderson & Tushman, 
1990; Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Tushman & Murmann, 1998). However, 
it should be noted that there may also be evolutionary3  aspects pertaining to 
industry life cycles or the overall organizational structure – over and above 
individual product life cycles – that also influence the development of 
dominant designs within and across product categories. Earlier research 
implicitly recognizes some aspects of this kind (e.g., aspects of the industrial 
environment such as regulation and the evolution of the broader 
technological field; Suarez, 2004), but little explicit attention has been given 
to the issue. What are the (second-order) implications of aspects related to 
the industry’s and the firm’s overall life-cycle evolution in terms of how firms 
manage their dominant designs within and across (first-order) product life 
cycles? 
Third, despite the number of conceptual studies (McGrath et. al., 1992; Lee 
et al., 1995; Suarez, 2004; Schilling, 1998) and surveys (Srinivasan et al., 
2004, 2006) concerning the determinant factors or building blocks in the 
creation of dominant designs, there is a dearth of empirical research on the 
relative role of and linkages between the different blocks. This applies in 
particular in the case of multi-product firms, and the possible longitudinal 
evolution of the major building blocks over time in line with broader 
industrial and organizational evolution. 
Fourth and finally, most existing research on dominant designs focuses on 
relatively simple product businesses and isolated product categories. Yet, 
many (especially high-tech) industries concentrate on complex technological 
systems and solutions rather than simple one-off products or gadgets. Given 
the aforementioned factors related to multi-product firms and overall 
industry and organizational evolution (vis-à-vis individual product life-
cycles), it would appear that the study of dominant design and its 
development in complex technological systems is warranted in its own right. 
Namely, multi-product firms often face the additional challenge of deciding 
in what form to offer their basic technologies across market segments (e.g., 
product-oriented vs. service-oriented offerings vs. integrated solutions) – as 
well as over time. Thus, the present focus on a firm offering complex 
                                                   
3 At this stage I briefly define what evolution means on the general level. It is “a 
process of change in a certain direction” (www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/evolution, accessed 17th September 2013). According to 
Christensen (1997), evolution differs from product life cycles in that products are 
constituted as attributes (e.g., capacity, reliability, convenience and price). The basis 
of competition is evolutionary when there is a change in the appreciation of these 
attributes. 
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technological systems, the format of which changes over time, is an ideal 
setting in which to study how dominant designs and the firm’s technologies 
and product portfolio evolve across categories and over time. 
The overall research objective of this study is to advance the theory of 
dominant design by means of a longitudinal multiple case studies (cf. 
Danneels, 2010, p.2). The purpose of the study is to enhance understanding 
about the antecedents [the source of innovative ideas] and, related to this, 
the adaptation process on the company level intertwined with the industry 
level. I interpret the adaptation process to mean creating, modifying or 
simply adopting dominant designs. More specifically, the aim is to 
contribute to current knowledge regarding how the industry life cycle affects 
the management and adaptation of dominant designs, and how corporate-
level strategies affect their potential creation over time. 
In line with the aforementioned four research gaps and the research 
objective, I specify the research questions for the present study as follows: 
? RQ1: What sources of innovation and what processes are related to (a) 
a multi-product firm’s successful management of its dominant designs 
and (b) successful transformation from one dominant design to the 
next? 
? RQ2: What are the relative roles of the sources of innovation in the 
successful adaptation of dominant designs and their ‘building blocks’ in 
terms of a) the process, and b) how they change over time? 
? RQ3: What role does the nature of products as complex technological 
systems play in dominant-design adaptation processes and outcomes? 
 
 
1.2 Theories employed 
 
As is common in the field of dominant design studies, the present research 
evokes both the economics perspective on (industry) life cycles (e.g., Arthur, 
1989; Klepper, 1996, 1997), and the management and sociology of 
technology (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Tushman & Anderson, 1986; 
Suarez, 2004). According to the former, increasing returns and network 
externalities drive the industry, through economies of scale, to shakeout and 
maturity, whereas the latter focuses on the emergence of dominant designs 
through discontinuities in technology, regulation, customer preferences, and 
entrants from adjacent industries (see also Peltoniemi, 2011). 
I also refer to complementary theories from adjacent research streams. 
Most notably, the literature on dynamic capabilities in the area of strategic 
management is integrated into the dominant-design perspective in that 
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dynamic capabilities could be seen as key firm-level organizational 
capabilities related to successful product innovation, and thereby dominant 
designs (e.g., Tushman & Murmann, 1998; Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995). 
Dynamic capabilities are also potentially involved in bridging various 
building blocks of dominant design related to issues such as governance 
structure in companies and transformation processes (di Stefano et al., 2010; 
Teece, 2007). In particular, I apply Teece’s (2007) framework of the micro 
foundations of dynamic capabilities in my analysis of the management of 
dominant design in the case company: the sensing, seizing, and 
transformation of knowledge and capabilities. Furthermore, I refer to and 
build on the traditional literature on product innovation (Abernathy & Clark, 
1985; Henderson & Clark, 1990), as well as theories of exploration and 
exploitation (Gilsing & Nooteboom, 2006; Hauser et al., 2006; Simsek, 
Heavey, Veiga & Souder, 2009), given the inherent link between dominant 
design, innovation, and exploration–exploitation. 
It is evident from the above discussion that dominant design as a concept 
relates to both industry life cycles and strategic management in companies 
(e.g., Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; McGrath et al., 1992; Schilling, 1998; 
Suarez & Utterback, 1995; Utterback & Abernathy, 1975, cf. Miles & Snow, 
1978). 
 
 
1.3 Empirical methodology 
 
In terms of methodology, the essentially dynamic nature (development over 
time) of the research questions and related theories necessitated longitudinal 
empirical study. The research gap related to complex technological systems, 
in turn, warranted a focus on an industry in which such systems are perhaps 
the most prevalent: telecommunications and telecom operations. It is an 
industry that is well suited to the research questions, having faced several 
technological, regulative, and market-preference changes (cf. Athreye, Kale 
& Ramani, 2009; Henderson & Clark, 1990; Suarez, 2004; Tripsas, 
1997;2008; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000) throughout the study period. In 
addition, the telecommunications industry has been the focus of much 
previous research on dominant designs (Suarez, 2004). 
More specifically, the case industry focus is telecommunications, the case 
company being Sonera4 and its major businesses and products during 1980-
                                                   
4 Sonera is currently part of TeliaSonera following the merger between Telia, a 
Swedish incumbent telecom operator, and Sonera in 2002. 
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2010. Sonera is one of the largest telecom operators in northern Europe. It is 
an interesting company theoretically, having created and adopted numerous 
dominant designs during the 30-year period under analysis. It has held an 
incumbent monopoly position in specific markets, and has also been a 
market challenger. Furthermore, it represents a typical technology company 
with a rather silo-like organizational structure, which means that at the 
outset it may face challenges related to technology commercialization in 
particular. Yet, the company’s culture and strategy have also changed over 
time: from a closed monopoly firm to an open company, and from an 
entrepreneurial to a bureaucratic, more risk-avoidant enterprise. These 
changes bring a multi-faceted perspective to this investigation into dominant 
designs. 
Given this industry and case-company focus, I decided that a longitudinal, 
in-depth case study would be my primary methodology. The reasons for this 
choice were two fold. First, the emphasis in the research questions on the 
sources of innovations and processes of the firm and its management, as well 
as on ‘how’ questions, and the need for qualitative and historical data and 
materials, warranted it (e.g., Golder, 2000; Yin 2003; 2009). Second, I had 
unique access to data at a particular company in the industry, Sonera, having 
some 15 years of work experience there, which I believed would give me in-
depth insights. Specifically, I had the opportunity to utilize an extensive and 
qualitatively rich and robust set of industry and company material to 
investigate the research questions. 
 
 
1.4 The Structure of the thesis 
 
The thesis is structured as follows. 
Chapter 1. In this first chapter I have introduced dominant design theory 
and discussed the motivation for the research. Although the study has 
progressed in several areas and theoretical discussions, I identified four 
relevant research gaps. In order to find a way of narrowing the gaps I set 
three research questions. Finally, the study is positioned theoretically, and 
methodology is discussed. 
Chapter 2. In this chapter I discuss the theoretical background of my study 
and define four key concepts. I use these concepts later on as tools when I 
analyze dominant designs and their related life cycles in the case company, 
and more generally in the telecommunications industry. I discuss the classic 
models of dominant design, and vary the discussion by identifying the key 
building blocks that facilitate the creation or acquisition of dominant 
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designs. I also present two earlier theoretical studies (McGrath, MacMillan & 
Tushman, 1992; Suarez, 2004), and discuss the authors’ views on how a 
company and an industry as a whole can pursue dominant designs. At this 
point I connect the literature on dynamic capabilities to that on the creation 
or acquisition of dominant design, positioning the building blocks of the 
latter within the micro foundations of the former, in other words sensing, 
seizing, and transforming. I continue and chart the empirical case history, 
the evolutionary context in this study, at the industry level. I start with a 
historical analysis and tie together the classic frameworks of dominant 
design, industry evolution, and life-cycle evolution in the case company. The 
company went through seven different eras, which were dominated by 
different cognitive mindsets among management. I classify the eras and the 
cognitive mindsets based on input from the interviews, participant 
observation, historical industry analyses, and the company’s strategy 
materials. 
Chapter 3. I discuss my methodological choices in the third chapter. I use 
the case study as a research method, and therefore introduce my case 
company, telecom operator Sonera, and the related time period (1980-2010). 
The use of a Temporal Bracketing Strategy (Langley, 1999) enabled me to 
structure the case history in adjacent periods and to make sense of it. I 
adopted an abductive approach because I wanted to develop a dominant-
design framework to use in my investigation of the case company’s most 
important innovations, some of which turned out to be dominant designs. I 
argue that company and industry evolution should be studied in parallel. 
Next I describe the data-collection procedures and material, how the 
interviews were conducted and analyzed, and how I dealt with the other 
empirical material I collected. Finally, I discuss the reliability and validity of 
the study. 
Chapter 4.  In Chapter 4, the Analysis section moves from the company 
level to individual cases (i.e. the service offerings of the case company), 
which I analyze from the perspective of dynamic capabilities (sensing, 
seizing, transforming [Teece, 2007]). This chapter also comprises an analysis 
of the case and the industry and its corporate history in the light of the two 
theoretical frameworks constructed in Chapter two. I also present the 
dominant design adaptation framework in some detail. Finally in this 
chapter I develop a number of propositions, a manifestation of reasonable 
arguments, conclusions and theoretical contributions of the research (Muller 
& Wiener, 2009).  
Chapter 5. In chapter five I summarize my responses to the research 
questions, discuss the theoretical contributions and managerial implications, 
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and set out the limitations of the study. Finally, I suggest some avenues for 
future research. 
The Bibliography is organized as follows: 1) Theoretical sources; 2) 
Empirical research material (dissertations, books, company histories, 
newspaper articles, press releases, legislative regulator decisions, Business 
White Papers, industry studies, industry statistics, product-development 
documents (project set-up letters and follow-up studies), internal documents 
(strategy), internal documents (business plans), external documents 
(product material), electronic material; 3) Interviews and emails. 
The Appendix contains complementary corporate material, the interview 
questions, organization charts, Sonera’s strategic decisions, industry history 
events, and shows in detail the numerical values of the dominant-design 
building blocks that complemented the case study. 
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2. Towards a theoretical framework 
My aim in this chapter is to develop the theoretical framework of the 
study. First, the key concepts used in the study are defined. Second I 
explore two seminal ideas in the research on dominant design: (1) the 
locus of innovation in the design’s life cycle and (2) the technology cycle. I 
also explicitly link the concepts of strategy and dominant design in order 
to establish a connection between corporate-level considerations and the 
changing conditions in an industry over its life cycle. The discussion then 
moves to the more concrete firm level with a view to identifying the 
antecedents and building blocks in the evolution of a dominant design 
through the related phases of sensing, seizing, and transforming (Teece, 
2007). The end result is a two-part theoretical framework. The first part 
focuses on the intersection of the industry and corporate levels, and the 
second on the business-unit level within the corporation, thereby going 
deeper into the process of managing products and services related to a 
dominant design. The two parts are connected, as demonstrated in the 
empirical study in which they are applied from an historical perspective.  
Finally, the history of the industry and the case company (the 
evolutionary context) is applied to the theoretical framework, the 
emergence of the dominant design at industry and corporate levels. 
 
 
2.1 Key concepts 
 
The key concepts applied in this study are those of dominant design, 
innovation, complex technological systems, and dynamic capabilities. The 
importance of dominant designs and complex technological systems was 
discussed in the introductory chapter. The emergence of a dominant 
design is a manifestation of an innovation that has achieved significant 
success in the market and has become a de facto standard, used by the 
  Towards a theoretical framework 
16 
 
innovating firm and competitors alike. The literature on innovation has a 
long history, starting with the work of Joseph Schumpeter (see e.g., 
Malerba, 2006; Pepall, Richards & Norman, 2005; Tirole, 1989), who 
discussed the occurrence of technological competition and market 
renewal through innovations (in Van de Ven and Garud, 1989). 
Dynamic capabilities, in turn, are (second-order) organizational 
capabilities enabling renewal and change in current (first-order) 
capabilities. They are necessary for organizational survival and 
performance in that they contribute to achieving and maintaining fit with 
the changing business environment (Teece et al., 1997). The building 
blocks of dynamic capabilities (Teece, 2007) and dominant designs have 
similar elements: path dependence5, learning, appropriability, an 
installed base, technology, product and revenue architecture, control over 
bottleneck assets, the recognition of inflexion points and 
complementarities, demonstrable leadership, and well managed strategic 
fit so that asset combinations are value-enhancing (e.g., Suarez, 2004). 
The management and correct recognition of the building blocks, in turn, 
enhance the successful creation of innovations. 
 
2.1.1 Dominant design 
 
There are a number of definitions of dominant design. Abernathy and 
Utterback (1975) developed the first model. Complementing the strict 
definition of the concept, studies have also focused on how to create a 
dominant design, how the industry structure changes following its 
emergence, and what elements should be included in the research (Lee et 
al., 1995; McGrath et al., 1992; Srinivasan et al., 2004, 2006; Suarez, 
2004). 
The broad term ‘consolidation in innovation and learning’ (Nooteboom, 
2000, p.172), meaning that players in the industry start to act similarly in 
their innovation and learning activities, describes well the major view in 
the discussion on dominant design. Nooteboom (2000) states on the 
theme of consolidation (he also uses the term dominant design): “Across 
all these fields of technology, organization, knowledge, and language 
                                                   
5 A typical definition of path dependence is that ‘history matters’. I follow a 
more strict definition: “Organizational path dependence can be defined as 
rigidified, potentially inefficient action pattern built up by the unintended 
consequences of former decisions and positive feedback processes” (Sydow, 
Schreyögg & Koch, 2009, p.696). 
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novelty become consolidated in a standard practice, which provides the 
basis for efficient exploitation” (p.172). Table 1 below lists various 
definitions of dominant design. 
 
Table 1 Definitions of dominant design 
 
Definition 
 
Author 
The most strict selection mode is one 
in which one design emerges that 
accounts, over time, for over 50 
percent of new implementations of the 
breakthrough technology. 
 
Anderson and Tushman (1990) 
A dominant design in any market knoll 
is that design that lies the most 
northeast in that knoll’s product 
attribute space. 
 
McGrath et al. (1992) 
The distinctive way of providing a 
generic service or function that has 
achieved and maintained the highest 
level of market acceptance for a 
significant amount of time. 
 
Lee et al. (1995) 
A dominant design is one whose major 
components and underlying core 
concepts do not vary substantially 
from one product model to the other, 
and the design commands a high 
percentage of the market share. The 
rate of major product innovations 
decreases and emphasis shifts to 
process innovation and incremental 
innovation. 
 
Afuah and Utterback (1997) 
A dominant design emerges in a 
product category when one product’s 
design specifications (consisting of a 
single or a complement of design 
features) define the product category’s 
architecture. 
 
Christensen, Suarez, and Utterback 
(1998) 
A dominant design exists in a 
technological class when the majority 
of designs have the same 
technologies for the high-pleiotropy 
core components. 
Murmann and Frenken (2006) 
 
 
The definitions listed in Table 1 are the ones I find most useful, and 
capture the essence of the concept. Anderson and Tushman’s (1990) 
definition is pragmatic, based on the market share of the new technology. 
McGrath et al. (1992), in turn, introduce a product attribute space, 
implying that a dominant design has the maximum market share in any 
given segment (see also Lee et al., 1995). Afuah and Utterback (1997) 
stress the change in the nature of competition that a dominant design 
brings about. Namely, before its emergence the competition is largely 
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about exploring and finding the most acceptable overall product 
architecture (the major components, the core concepts, and the 
relationships therein), but afterwards the focus is less on major 
exploration and more on incremental product differentiation. Similarly 
according to Christensen et al. (1998), in the case of a dominant design, 
one product’s design specifications define the commonly accepted 
architecture of the product category. Murmann and Frenken (2006) 
further propose that dominance exists when the majority of designs have 
the same technologies in their core components. 
Reflecting the main notions in the above definitions, I use the following 
definition of dominant design in the present study – wherein the first part 
comes from Christensen et al., (1998), and the second part stresses the 
notion of commercial success, drawing from earlier studies such as Suarez 
and Utterback (1995), Anderson and Tushman (1990), Cusumano, 
Mylonadis, and Rosenbloom (1992), and Tegarden, Hatfield, and Echols 
(1999): 
A dominant design emerges in a product category when one product's 
design specifications (consisting of a single or a complement of design 
features) define the category's architecture. As such, it is typically a 
commercial success for the firm whose product design achieves 
dominance, and it also changes the competitive situation so that 
competitors also have the incentive to follow or adopt the design. 
 
2.1.2 Innovation 
 
Scholars have analyzed the concept of innovation from the following 
perspectives, inter alia: 1) by type (e.g., product innovations, process 
innovations, business-model innovations, or continuous streams of 
innovations, e.g., Pepall, Richards & Norman, 2005, p.562; Tushman & 
Smith, 2002); 2) innovations as changing and renewing the organization’s 
competitive advantage (Christensen & Rosenbloom, 1995; Henderson & 
Clark, 1990; for an overview of the effect of technical change on 
incumbent firms, see Chesbrough, 2001); 3) by source (the company, 
customers, macro-level institutions e.g., Drucker, 1998; Geels, 2004; 
Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008; Suarez, 2004); and 4) organizational 
motivations and capabilities (Teece, 1986; 2007).  
Most of the researchers mentioned above have a broad view of the 
concept, covering many of the types and aspects. According to 
Schumpeter (1934, p. 66), for instance, an innovation can be a new good 
(e.g., product), a new method of production, the opening up of a new 
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market or a new source of supply, or creating a new type of organization. I 
adopt the following general definition of innovation in this study (in 
Garcia & Calantone, 2002): “Innovation is an iterative process initiated 
by the perception of a new market and/or new service opportunity for a 
technology-based invention that leads to development, production, and 
marketing efforts to achieve commercial success” (ibid., p.112). 
In the context of dominant designs, innovations are seen as the 
(managerial) mechanisms utilized in trying to transform an innovative 
idea into a dominant design on the market, or in adopting or adapting an 
existing dominant design (Teece, 2006) – designed in-house or by 
competitors. Like any innovative activity, this involves non-trivial 
managerial effort and routines in terms of outlining the current situation 
and future opportunities: “In the course of innovation routines, people 
within the firm scrutinize what the firm is doing and why it is doing it 
with the thought of revision or even radical change” (Nelson & Winter, 
1982, p.17; see also Sastry, 1997). 
With regard to the effect of further innovations on the firm and its 
motivation to innovate, economists refer to the replacement effect, 
meaning that firms may well earn profits with their existing products and 
technologies (earlier innovations), but “introducing the new process 
displaces and therefore undermines that investment” (Pepall et al., 
2005., p.566, see also Reinganum, 1985). This replacement effect may 
demotivate or discourage firms from innovating. A counterpart of this 
effect is the efficiency effect: “What drives the efficiency effect is the fact 
that the cost of non-adoption becomes higher once we recognize that it is 
precisely in that case that a rival may adopt. Such an increase in the cost 
of non-adoption makes the monopolist more willing to pay for the 
innovation” (Pepall et al., 2005., p. 568). In sum, the firm faces a 
dilemma: should it keep the old technology or should it invest in new 
technology. It is a dilemma that also applies to dominant-design-related 
innovative activities. 
Of particular relevance to the present study is Abernathy and Clark’s 
(1985) innovation classification framework (see Figure 1). With its more 
fine-grained outline of the market/customer and technology/production 
aspects of innovation it elaborates on the replacement and efficiency 
effects mentioned above (see also Henderson, 1993), and introduces an 
innovation typology. Furthermore, it expands the notion of drastic 
innovations, dividing them into two types (revolutionary and 
architectural) and outlining the replacement vs. efficiency effects on both 
types. Most notably, in the case of architectural innovations the innovator 
may adopt new technology and new customers, or enter a new market 
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altogether due to competitive pressure. The key point is the concept of 
transilience, “the capacity of an innovation to influence the established 
systems of production and marketing” (Abernathy & Clark, ibid. p. 3). 
Different innovation types have either high transilience, meaning that 
linkages to existing markets and customers are no longer worthy (Tripsas, 
1997) or low transilience, i.e. in regular innovations. The model also 
summarizes well the challenges organizations face: should the firm 
engage in regular incremental innovations or riskier architectural, radical 
innovations, or both and in what proportion? (See also Nooteboom, 2000, 
p.189) 
 
 
Figure 1  Abernathy and Clark’s innovation typology (Murmann and Frenken. 2006; 
Abernathy and Clark, 1985) 
 
I build upon Abernathy and Clark’s (1985) innovation typology in this 
study (Figure 1). The basic proposition is that a dominant design tends to 
be established following revolutionary and architectural innovations. In 
the present case study I classify the firm’s new product and service 
projects according to this typology, after a careful interpretation of the 
case history and analysis. In general, the typology implies that the 
creation and renewal of industries start from architectural innovation 
(number one in Figure 1), after which market knowledge improves and 
there is a possibility to create niche innovations (number two in Figure 1). 
A dominant design will then be established, and after that technology and 
market knowledge will be entrenched in regular innovations (number 
three in Figure 1). Another technology shock will typically end the 
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incremental development (revolutionary innovation, number four in 
Figure 1). 
Henderson and Clark (1990) further specify the nature of architectural 
innovation, implying that it is the most difficult innovation type for 
incumbents. It will destroy the company’s previous architectural 
knowledge, in other words how the product components are connected – 
and thereby elicits the adverse consequences of the replacement effect 
(Pepall et al., 2005, p. 566). As a result, it is difficult for the firm to know 
what skills it should keep and why. 
In sum, the innovation concept (adopted here) and the Abernathy and 
Clark (1985) typology provide tools for analyzing companies’ biases and 
product types and, most importantly, offer life-cycle and path-dependent 
perspectives on innovation. 
 
2.1.3 Complex technological system 
 
In general, systems can be characterized as having parts or components, 
which are connected by a structure of relationships and interfaces that are 
usually rather complex (Davies, 1996, p.1146). In this study I adopt the 
definition of complex technological systems as open assembled systems 
that “contain complicated interface technologies to connect their closed, 
assembled systems” (Rosenkopf & Tushman, 1993, p.408). These kinds of 
systems are typical in the telecommunications industry, in which the 
firms’ main offerings to customers include telephone and data network 
products and services, for example. According to Davies (1996), the 
telecommunications system consists of the following components: 
terminal equipment, access technology, switching equipment, a 
transmission system, and a control component. Notwithstanding this 
definition, which is rather technologically oriented, telecommunications 
companies offer both products (i.e., the technical hardware) and services 
(related to the utilization of the hardware) to their customers, 
telecommunication companies (and the like). More specifically, the 
modern telecom operator typically offers managed services to its 
customers, in other words the delivery and management of telecom-
network-based services, applications, and equipment to enterprises, 
residences, or other service providers. Other typical industries involving 
complex technological systems include those related to energy and 
electricity, military equipment, and airplanes (Davies, 1997; Miller, 
Hobday, Leroux-Demers & Olleros, 1995; Rosenkopf & Tushman, 1993). 
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In contrast to ordinary, simpler products and services, such complex 
systems or systems offerings have the following special characteristics. 
First, they rely on complicated interface technologies to connect their 
closed assembled systems6 . Second, the system components interact and 
are interconnected. Third, they are often high-value-added, engineering-
intensive capital goods (Davies, 1997). These special characteristics stand 
out when contrasted with (1) non-assembled products such as cement and 
glass, which have no separable components in the first place; (2) simple 
assembled products such as guns or skis, which are constructed from 
components that are mechanically fitted together in an assembly process 
(rather than containing complicated interface technologies); and (3) 
closed assembled systems that require [comparatively simple] technology 
linking the components (Rosenkopf & Tushman, 1993). 
Despite their special nature as offerings, complex technological systems 
can be modeled in a somewhat similar way as other ordinary products 
(Christensen & Rosenbloom, 1995; Murmann & Frenken, 2006; 
Rosenkopf & Tushman, 1993). As implied by the name however, the 
component and interface structure is more diverse and complicated. 
Nevertheless, the analysis of products as systems and sub-systems is 
typical in the research on dominant designs, as is the notion that systems 
incorporate a hierarchical internal order.  
For the purposes of this study, it is indeed useful to delineate different 
context-specific explanations of product and technical development in 
separate layers, as is evident in Davies’ (1996) overview of the 
telecommunications system, for example. In a similar vein, Christensen 
and Rosenbloom (1995) and Abernathy and Utterback (1978), used 
hierarchical models as cases (i.e. electronics, car manufacturing, disk 
drive manufacturing, and corporate Management Information System 
[MIS] product architecture).  7 
                                                   
6 Automobiles and watches are examples of closed assembled systems, which 
require linkage technology between components for assembly. Open assembled 
systems, in turn, require interface technologies to connect many closed 
assembled systems together. (Rosenkopf and Tushman, 1993) 
7 The marketing literature distinguishes between systems selling and solution 
selling (Mattsson, 1973; Davies, Brady and Hobday, 2007). In the case of systems 
selling “the seller provides, through a combination of products and services, a 
fulfillment of a more extended customer need than is the case in product selling” 
(Mattson, ibid., p. 108). Solution sellers, in turn, provide managerial and 
strategic advice for customers (Davies et al., 2007). I focus on solution selling in 
this study, but also on simpler products or services that may have a complex 
technological system embedded in the production process. 
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2.1.4 Dynamic capabilities 
 
Dynamic capabilities are a paradigm in the research on strategic 
management. The concept has been used for over 20 years in discussions 
among authors such as  Teece et al. (1997), Teece (2007), Winter (2003), 
Martin (2011), and Augier and Teece (2008). The key notion is that 
competitive advantage is gained through focusing on organizational 
capabilities, and managing them in parallel with the changing 
environment. In turn, heterogeneous resources are deployed in 
companies, thus forming capabilities (and dynamic capabilities). 
I follow Wernerfelt (1984) and Barney (1991) in defining the concept of 
a resource, as follows: “The attributes of a firm’s physical, human, and 
organizational capital that enable it to conceive of and implement 
strategies that improve its efficiency and effectiveness are its 
strategically relevant resources” (Barney, 1991., p.102). Tangible 
manifestations of resources include specialized equipment, sales units, 
technological skills, financial resources, brand names, and organizational 
processes (Barney, 1991; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Wernerfelt, 1984). 
Capabilities, in turn, are activities, or routines (activities that are 
performed constantly), that use company resources and enable ‘the 
company to make a living now’ (Winter, 2003, p.992).  
In contrast to ‘normal’ organizational capabilities, which refer to the 
organization’s current skills and know-how in performing technological 
or market tasks (e.g., providing long-distance-call services to customers), 
dynamic capabilities are attuned to and needed in adapting to changing 
environmental conditions. The concept of dynamic capabilities is rooted 
in evolutionary economics (e.g., Nelson & Winter, 1982), in which the 
focus is on the internal processes when an organization adjusts its actions 
to changing market conditions. The unit of analysis is the organization 
and its dynamic interaction with the environment.  
A natural link between dynamic capabilities and the concept of 
dominant design is the fact that product development is often considered 
one of the most important dynamic capabilities of an organization 
(Danneels 2002; Eisenhardt and Martin 2000): it is through product-
development processes that the organization essentially adapts its 
technology and offerings to changing environmental conditions, thereby 
leveraging, reconfiguring, and building on its existing resources and 
capabilities. 
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Dynamic capabilities are also relevant to the management of dominant 
designs, the emergence of which fundamentally involves dynamic shifts in 
the industry environment. Indeed, their emergence or consolidation, by 
definition, marks a shift from a turbulent era in the industry in question 
(an era of ferment in the dominant-design terminology) to a more stable 
era (an era of incremental change) (Tushmann & Murmann, 1998). In 
order to master this shift the firm needs to tap into its dynamic 
organizational capabilities. The management of path dependence is also 
crucial (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000), and is related to learning processes 
that are specific to each company. The difficulty with learning processes is 
that they are idiosyncratic, and even ‘out learning’ is needed when the 
market is very dynamic (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000, p.1115; cf. Miller & 
Shamsie, 1996). 
Teece et al. (1997) also emphasize that the term ‘dynamic’ in this context 
refers to the organizational capacity to renew competences so as to 
achieve congruence with the changing business environment. In turn, 
“The term ‘capabilities’ emphasizes the key role of strategic management 
in appropriately adapting, integrating, and reconfiguring internal and 
external organizational skills, resources, and functional competences to 
match the requirements of a changing environment” (ibid., p.515). The 
authors also point out that the fundamental units of analysis in the 
dynamic-capabilities view are the strategic positions, paths, and processes 
(ibid., p.527): they describe (1) positions as assets and resources; (2) 
paths as path dependences (i.e., past decisions and investments that 
influence decision-making);  and (3) processes as the ways in which 
activities are carried out in companies.  
Teece (2007) further explicates dynamic capabilities with regard to their 
nature, identifying three key managerial processes: 
“coordination/integrating, learning, and reconfiguring” (p.1341). He 
also refers to sensing (and shaping) new opportunities as a key activity, 
involving sub-activities such as scanning and learning from and 
interpreting the environment. Thus, he essentially views the foundations 
of dynamic capabilities and business performance as: (1) analytical 
systems (and individual capacities) to learn and to sense, filter, shape, 
and calibrate business opportunities; (2) enterprise structures, 
procedures, designs and incentives for seizing opportunities; and (3) the 
continuous alignment and realignment of specific tangible and intangible 
assets. I apply Teece’s (2007) framework in my study, as specified later in 
more detail. 
In sum, the dynamic capabilities perspective provides a framework for 
process/historical analysis in companies (see also Harreld, O’Reilly III & 
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Tushman, 2007), which is the key objective in this study. I use the 
following definition: “A dynamic capability is the capacity of an 
organization to purposefully create, extend, or modify its resource base”  
(Helfat et al., 2009, p.1). Specifically, I focus on the processes, positions, 
and paths – as defined in Teece et al. (1997) – in my historical case 
(Chapters 2 and 4), studying the firm’s product-development projects in 
1980-2010 (cf. Martin, 2011; Adner & Helfat, 2003; Hodgkinson & 
Healey, 2911, Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997). My aim is to identify the 
changed competitive requirements that turn into new cognitive demands 
for management with regard to the adaptation of a dominant design. This 
is manifest in decisions as to whether for example, the firm should 
attempt to create new dominant designs (i.e. change the industry), or 
adopt dominant designs achieved by others. 
 
 
2.2 Emergence of dominant designs at the corporate and 
industry levels 
 
My discussion starts from the first pioneering works on the dynamics of 
product and process innovation (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; Utterback 
& Abernathy, 1975). These authors show that different innovation types 
exist when an industry and a company evolve, analyzing the innovations 
mainly from the firm’s perspective. Significantly, the term dominant 
design is used for the first time in this discussion, in connection with the 
management of technology from an organizational perspective. Abernathy 
and Utterback (ibid.) describe the evolutionary nature of innovations in 
terms of the change in competitive emphasis (functional product 
performance or cost reduction), the source of the innovation and the 
dominant type, and the nature of the production process and of 
organizational control. 
Next I consider two other seminal works (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; 
Tushman & Anderson, 1986) that establish the basis on which the effects 
of a dominant design on the industry structure are analyzed. The former 
article discusses technological discontinuities whereas the latter focuses 
specifically on dominant designs. The discussion is on the industry level, 
and the main questions cover issues such as the types of innovation that 
incumbents and entrants typically pursue, and how the industry structure 
changes after the dominant design has emerged. The authors also present 
their main argument that a dominant design emerges from technological 
discontinuities, although this is not always the case and describe 
  Towards a theoretical framework 
26 
 
situations in which no dominant design emerges. They further suggest 
that dominant designs evolve in sequential stages. I discuss more recent 
studies presenting the same cyclical view (e.g., Nooteboom, 2000). 
The previous literature covers the major perspectives in the discussion: 
how a company can initiate innovations and achieve a dominant design, 
and how, on the industry level, the dominant design affects competition. 
These perspectives are nevertheless intertwined. A firm can learn from 
historical regularity, for example, how dominant designs were established 
in an industry, and attempt to manipulate the factors, influences and 
forces identified in their emergence (e.g., Lee et al. 1995; McGrath et al., 
1992; Suarez, 2004). I briefly describe McGrath’s (1992) and Suarez’s 
(2004) models, and elaborate on my understanding of the evolution of a 
dominant design in the present study.  
Finally, I consider the building blocks, or success factors (Suarez, 2004), 
in the process of acquiring, managing, and transforming one dominant 
design to the next one in the marketplace. The success factors are 
typically present at the emergence stage. I also bring three closely linked 
factors into the discussion, all of which are theoretically highly relevant 
and assume importance in the present case study: technological 
brokering8  (e.g., Hargadon & Sutton, 1997), dominant logic9   (e.g., Bettis 
& Prahalad, 1986; Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002; Tripsas & Gavetti, 
2000), and convergence10  (e.g., Adner, 2002; Tushman & Romanelli, 
1985; Yoffie, 1997). 
I argue that increasing the odds of creating new dominant designs is 
more complicated when the company grows in size and scope and when 
the industry matures. This discussion leans on Reinganum (1983, 1985); 
Klepper (1996); Ettlie, Bridges & O’Keefe (1984), and Henderson (1993), 
for example. The basic premise is that an incumbent invests less than an 
entrant in new technologies. Moreover, according to Rosenbloom and 
                                                   
8 I adopt Hargadon and Sutton’s (1997, p. 718) definition: “the transfer of ideas 
to industries where they have not been used before and the creation of 
combinations of ideas that no one in any industry has seen before”. 
9 I adopt Prahalad and Bettis (1986, p.491) definition: “Dominant logic is a 
mind set or a world view or conceptualization of the business and the 
administrative tools to accomplish goals and make decisions in that business. It 
is stored as a shared cognitive map (or set of schemas) among the dominant 
coalition. It is expressed as a learned, problem-solving behavior”. 
10 Different technologies provide the same functionality and services 
(Fransman, 2000), and customers may find that different products serve the 
same need (Adner, 2002). 
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Christensen (1994), it is more difficult for incumbents to change 
strategies than technologies. The main point here is that innovation needs 
to be viewed separately from both the ‘organizational’ [i.e. strategic] and 
the ‘economic’ [i.e. technological] perspectives, bearing in mind the 
differences between incremental and radical innovations. 
The economics view refers to the classic underinvestment dilemma for 
monopolists (i.e. they do not invest in new technologies because old 
technologies have a good payoff; the aforementioned replication effect), 
and the organizational view to corporate incompetence, as Henderson 
(1993, p.249) suggests. Corporate incompetence means the failure to 
pursue radical innovations because incumbent inertia and ‘power games’ 
protect old business. Henderson (ibid., p.254)  combines both views in a 
four-square matrix in which the incumbent may also successfully pursue 
radical innovations (see also Anderson & Tushman, 1990, p.625 and 
Utterback, 1996, pp. 205-206). 
I will analyze the building blocks of dominant design in three steps, 
reflecting how such a design is created, retained, and then transformed 
into the next dominant design. Essentially, I derive the building blocks 
from Teece’s (2007) widely cited framework dividing the management of 
dynamic capabilities into sensing, seizing and transforming activity. First, 
I will briefly discuss the seminal works on dominant design and how they 
are linked to the research on strategic management. 
The main premise in the classic works on dominant designs is that 
innovations are patterned in and through the industry/product life cycle, 
in other words that technological and market development reflects the 
cyclical development of innovations. Closely related to this is the 
discussion on the tradeoffs between exploration (radically innovative and 
novelty-centered) and exploitation (incrementally innovative and 
efficiency-centered) activities, ambidextrous organizational forms, and 
the highly strategic nature of dominant designs in firms and industries 
(Anderson & Tushman, 1990; McGrath et al., 1992; Smith & Tushman, 
2005). This section addresses each of these themes. 
 
2.2.1 Patterns of innovation, the technology cycle, and 
exploration/exploitation (classic works on dominant designs) 
 
In the classic works on dominant designs, Utterback and Abernathy 
(1975) describe an empirically grounded pattern of innovation types and 
the firm’s or a production unit’s stage of development (ibid., p.645). They 
identified certain characteristic profiles as the industry or firm matures. 
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In other words, there is a ‘best way’ to innovate at each stage of the life 
cycle, and it is beneficial if management fully understands the nature of 
the competition. There is a further division into product vs. process 
innovation, with the same life-cycle mechanisms (i.e. the locus of 
innovation, the most appropriate type of innovation, and the barriers to 
innovation [ibid. p.646-647]) at work in both. 
The authors characterize the stages of the product life cycle as follows: 
the firm’s strategies are typically (product) performance-maximizing 
during the initial stage, sales-maximizing in the subsequent stages, and, 
typically cost-minimizing in the final stages. Abernathy and Utterback 
(1978) later labeled these stages as the ‘fluid pattern, transitional pattern, 
and specific pattern’.11   The key contribution of these early studies is the 
notion that at each stage there are different organizational motives for 
exhibiting or developing a bias in favor of a specific innovation type. 
Moreover, the forms of resistance differ at each stage, tending to 
emphasize the irrelevance of the product in the fluid stage, and the fear of 
existing product cannibalization in the specific stage. Figure 2 depicts 
Utterback and Abernathy’s (1975, 1978) model. 
 
 
 
                                                   
11 The industry’s and the (company's) evolution takes place in three different 
stages (fluid, transitional, and specific), each of which has specific 
characteristics:, a high degree of uncertainty and rate of change in the fluid 
phase; during the transitional phase, one technological implementation will 
typically turn into a dominant design, consequently demand will grow and the 
process will start to stabilize; and products turn into standards, and productivity 
and quality improve in the specific phase. 
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Figure 2 Innovation development in the life cycle of a dominant design (adapted from 
Utterback and Abernathy [1975], Abernathy and Utterback [1978]) 
 
Figure 2 traces the development of the various innovation types in the 
design’s life cycle. The patterns of change in innovation frequency are 
shown on the vertical axis, and those related to the developmental stage 
on the horizontal axis. Product innovation is stronger than process 
innovation in the fluid pattern stage (I), but the situation is reversed when 
the life cycle reaches the specific pattern stage (III). There is an evident 
trade-off between product and process innovations. This is highly 
significant with regard to organizational capabilities, or the lack thereof, 
as the firm may find it has developed well-established production 
processes but can no longer generate product innovations. New 
innovations may develop in more flexible organizational units, or in other 
industries, thereby making the company’s products obsolete. (Utterback 
and Abernathy, 1975) 
The firm’s processes are depicted as uncoordinated or non-routinized in 
the fluid pattern stage. These uncoordinated processes may be flexible, 
but the downside is that they may also be inefficient. The management 
style could be characterized as informal and entrepreneurial. During their 
move to the specific stage the processes become more systemic and rigid 
on the one hand, and more efficient and capital-intensive on the other. 
The management style could be characterized as structured, with clear 
goals and rules. However, there is also significant input from new 
technology in stage I, and the innovations are original, as opposed to 
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stage III when they tend to be adopted from material or equipment 
suppliers, on license or via imitation (Utterback and Abernathy, 1975, 
p.651) 
Utterback and Abernathy formulate seven hypotheses to test their 
model in their seminal article from 1975. The first two of these, which I 
describe in more detail below, are the most relevant for my study (1-2). 
First (1), the emphasis and priority given by the firm to [product] 
innovation as a competitive strategy will be the greatest in stage I and 
weaker in stages II and III (ibid. p.650). This means, for example, that if 
the basis of the innovation is a market need stimulated during the first 
stage then this effect and bias weaken later on (according to the authors 
[ibid.], market demand is not a source of innovation in the later stages of 
the life cycle). This point is significant but ignores two possibilities: there 
may be inputs into the innovation (such as R&D, suppliers or cost-
efficient processes) other than market need (this also applies to products 
at the same stage in the life cycle), and the initial choice of an innovation 
source may affect subsequent product management and the transitions 
from the fluid to the transitional and specific phases.   Furthermore, when 
the market matures the next innovation round (given that new successive 
dominant designs will emerge) may have the innovation sources in a 
different order than in the original Utterback and Abernathy (1975) 
model. Indeed, Utterback and Abernathy’s model has been challenged: 
Clark (1985), Barras (1986), and Windrum (2005), for instance, suggest 
that process innovations may also start the next (subsequent) innovation 
round, bypassing product innovations altogether. 
Second (2), as mentioned above, most stage-I innovations are original, 
whereas most of those occurring in stage III are adopted (Utterback & 
Abernathy, 1975, p. 651). This hypothesis raises an important question: Is 
it inevitable that the innovative activity of the original (innovative) firms 
will shift to other layers in the life cycle during the next innovation round 
(i.e. a new fluid stage followed by transitional and specific stages), and 
that the innovation will be imitation-led? I assume the other layers are 
embedded in the value chain12 , hence the innovative activity can shift 
                                                   
12 Porter (2001) defines the value chain as ”the set of activities through which a 
product or service is created and delivered to customers” (ibid., p.74). The 
activities include logistics operations, marketing and sales, and services, for 
example. Furthermore, according to Porter, the Five Forces in the industry define 
each participant’s share of the value chain (Fleisher and Bensoussan, 2003, 
p.106). 
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from the focal company to suppliers, subcontractors, adjacent industries 
or customers.  
Tushman and Anderson (1986) introduce a second major perspective on 
dominant designs, and on the technology cycle – the impact “of 
technological breakthroughs on environmental conditions” (ibid., p.439). 
They claim that a technological change can result from pure chance, the 
isolated action of a technological genius, or economic demand, but 
eventually acknowledge that it involves isolated incidents, managing and 
planning. The manageable aspects include technological, market, legal, 
and social factors (ibid., p.444). Tushman and Anderson (ibid.) further 
argue that technology progresses in stages through relatively long periods 
of incremental change, which elaborates a particular dominant design. 
These periods of increasing consolidation and learning-by-doing may be 
punctuated by competence-destroying discontinuities (i.e. through 
product or process substitution), or competence-enhancing technological 
advancement (i.e. through the revitalization of a given product or process 
with complementary technologies). 
Technological discontinuities (i.e., major technological shifts) typically 
trigger a period of technological ferment that culminates in a dominant 
design and, in turn, leads to the next period of incremental, competence-
enhancing technological change (Tushman & Anderson, 1986. p. 444). In 
sum, Tushman and Anderson (ibid.) refer to three types of technological 
shift: 1) niche opening, which leads to the opening of a new industry 
sector; 2) competence-destroying discontinuities, which lead to product 
or process substitution; and 3) competence-enhancing discontinuities, 
which lead to substantial product-improvement or process innovations. A 
dominant design may be established following a technological shift, but 
this is not self-evident. 
Tushman and Anderson (1986) also note that technology is the most 
important building block in terms of understanding how industries and 
organizations develop. They describe technology changes as product or 
process related, and as competence-destroying or competence-enhancing 
innovations, which is in line with the thoughts of Abernathy and 
Utterback (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Utterback & Abernathy, 
1975). Tushman and Anderson (1986) suggest a research agenda and the 
testing of hypotheses on the industry level concerning how companies are 
affected by technological changes. Further possibilities have since been 
identified that trigger the era of ferment: new design applications, 
changes in customer demand, and government policy (Abernathy & Clark, 
1985; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1997).  
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Although both incumbents and attackers can produce competence-
enhancing or competence-destroying innovations, it is still proposed that 
existing firms benefit if the discontinuity is competence enhancing: “A 
competence enhancing discontinuity builds on know-how embodied in 
the technology that it replaces” (Anderson & Tushman, 1990, p. 609). 
Furthermore, if the company has specific technological capabilities that it 
can apply, it has an advantage. In contrast, competence-destroying 
technological change, by definition, renders its existing assets and 
capabilities largely obsolete.  
In sum, Anderson and Tushman (1990) propose a cyclical model of 
technological change in their study of technological discontinuities and 
dominant designs. They focus more on dominant designs, thus extending 
earlier knowledge (Tushman & Anderson, 1986). Figure 3 below depicts 
their technology cycle. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  The technology cycle. (Anderson and Tushman, 1990, p. 606) 
 
The analysis in the technology cycle may be on the process or product 
level (Figure 3). Technological discontinuities start the era of ferment, 
when old technologies are substituted with new (competition between 
technical regimes), and rival designs vie for a position in the new (chosen) 
technology (competition within a technological order: Anderson & 
Tushman, 1990, p. 612). Technological discontinuity typically results in a 
substantial price/performance improvement and may later evolve into a 
new dominant design (see also Moore, 1990, 1995, 2005). During the 
cycle the dominant design matures as incremental product and process 
refinements are implemented. It is assumed that further technological 
discontinuities will emerge, starting the process again. It should be noted 
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that this is an industry-level process, and the phases appear to be more or 
less ‘external’ to the firm operating in the industry. 
Several points in the above discussion are relevant to my study. First, 
the authors note that it is uncommon to see successive competence-
enhancing discontinuities (Anderson & Tushman, 1990, p.623). In other 
words, competence-destroying discontinuities intertwine at some point in 
subsequent technology cycles. Incumbents seeking to protect their 
business should find out how these competence-enhancing discontinuities 
could be produced so as to prevent the occurrence of competence-
destroying discontinuities. Second, both incumbents and newcomers 
utilize competence-destroying innovations, and incumbents are not 
necessarily in a worse position (according to Anderson & Tushman, ibid.). 
Third, there are situations in which a clearly dominant design does not 
emerge, such as when there is low customer demand, no technological 
competition, or a high appropriability13  regime. The implication is that 
innovators can protect their innovations effectively enough (through 
regulation, for example) to prevent the transition of the new product or 
service into a dominant design. It is worth noting that, by definition, a 
dominant design must be a commercial success. Hence, de jure 
technological standards in a certain industry (specified by regulators, for 
example) are not necessarily dominant designs (albeit they sometimes can 
be) (e.g., Srinivasan et al., 2006). The Finnish telecom market provides an 
illustrative example of a de jure standard that did not guarantee the 
transition of a service into a dominant design. In the early 2000s, 
regulators forced telecom operators to create a new nationwide 
numbering system, namely the 071 prefix, as a viable substitute for 
corporate numbers. However, end customers did not see the need for the 
prefix due to the inadequate service and functionality, and the telecom 
operators were reluctant to develop the service given the unprofitability of 
the business model. 
In sum, the discussion on innovation and its context (the firm’s 
organization and capabilities) offers a perspective from which to analyze 
the creation of dominant designs. Complementing the concept of the 
technology cycle is the heuristic learning cycle and its associations with 
the cycles of 1) exploitation and exploration, 2) integration and 
disintegration, and 3) innovation and diffusion (Nooteboom, 1999, 2000). 
Heuristics refers to intuitive reasoning and ‘guessing’ how a theory or a 
                                                   
13 A regime of appropriability (Teece, 1986) refers to the environmental factors, 
excluding the organizational and market structure, that govern an innovator’s 
ability to capture the profits generated by the innovation. 
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model might work (Merriam-Webster, 2014). According to Nooteboom, 
the concept of learning is associated with the notion of how innovations 
are seen to emerge and consolidate. More specifically, he seeks to explain 
“how exploration and exploitation are mutually related and build on 
each other”, meaning that there is a research gap in terms of explaining 
the transition from current practice to novel practice (Nooteboom, 2006, 
p. 3). 
Evolution is presented as a cycle in which the end of one period is the 
starting point of the next. Nooteboom makes a major contribution in 
describing the logic of how new innovations are developed from existing 
ones. I describe the concept of the learning cycle in more detail below 
(Figure 4). 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Nooteboom’s cycle of innovation and diffusion. ( Nooteboom, 2000, p.238) 
 
Nooteboom (2000) applied the logic of learning to the cycle of innovation 
and diffusion as follows (see Figure 4). The processes of innovation and 
diffusion are polar developments. At the start, (1) reciprocation refers to 
the time when an old idea or practice no longer works but a new practice 
is not yet in place. This leads to the search for (2) novel combinations of 
ideas and practices, manifested in trials through hybrids, and later to (3) 
the consolidation of novel combinations in common knowledge. Selected 
innovations turn into dominant designs before consolidation, which in 
turn is followed by (4) generalization, referring to efficient (mass) 
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production based on the consolidated idea or practice. Finally, (5) the 
related products and technologies need to be differentiated.  
Nooteboom situates the cycle of innovation and diffusion in the cycle of 
knowledge, in which there are two kinds of tacit knowledge, tacit 1 and 
tacit 2 that referring to the two types of innovation logic (Nooteboom, 
2000, p.187). The former (tacit 1) resides in architectural restructuring 
and is more fundamental in nature: knowledge cannot be made explicit 
because it is incomplete or non-existent. The latter (tacit 2) resides in 
routinization, enabled by generalization. Routinization is efficient because 
there is no need to challenge what the organization is doing. I see this as 
parallel to incumbents developing incremental innovations (based on 
competence-enhancing discontinuities). One can also see a link to the 
firm’s dynamic capabilities here: when a firm is able to create new 
dominant designs from its existing offerings in response to new market 
conditions it is applying continuous learning in order to avoid 
technological lock-out (Gilsing & Nooteboom, 2006; Schilling, 2002; see 
also Fischer & Gebauer, 2010). 
There is also an evident link between the learning-involving innovation 
cycle and the dynamics of exploration and exploitation (March, 1991). In 
the context of organizational learning, March describes exploration in 
terms of search, variation, risk-taking, experimentation, play, flexibility, 
discovery, and the pursuit of new knowledge. Exploitation, in turn, 
connotes refinement, choice, production, efficiency, selection, 
implementation, and the application of existing knowledge (ibid. p.71). 
Thus, emergent dominant designs in the above innovation cycle are akin 
to March’s exploitation activities (occurring after periods of 
innovation/exploration).  
Adner and Levinthal (2008) argue that exploratory actions potentially 
generate new business and new metrics for measuring success, but these 
are difficult to foresee given the bounded rationality of organizations. 
Therefore, management needs cognitive shifts to provide a different 
topology (i.e. metrics and success measures) of the competitive landscape. 
In this way, management may enhance the organization’s ability to act 
exploratively. The authors effectively illustrate the idea of cognitive shifts 
by pointing out how ‘skunk works, retrofitting, and new dimensions of 
performance’ are (explorative) tools to use to substitute for existing 
success criteria, the established strategy. The ultimate target of these 
activities is, in fact, to overturn ‘dominant organizational logic’ (ibid., 
p.50). 
The discussion on exploration and exploitation is relevant to this study 
given that the aim is to analyze how a company can shift from exploitation 
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to exploration, thereby creating new or adapting old dominant designs 
(the same logic articulated by Drazin et al., 2004). A closely related theme 
is ambidexterity, which I discuss in the next sub-section. 
First, however, I will summarize the arguments put forward in this sub-
section regarding the extant theory and stylized facts about the 
relationship between innovation and the life cycle (which constitutes the 
core of the discussion on dominant design). According to Windrum 
(2005), the reasoning behind these facts differs, e.g., in Klepper (1996) 
and Utterback and Abernathy (1975). 
The six stylized facts about innovations and the life cycle are the 
following: 1) Product variants are abundant in the early life-cycle phases 
and then diminish; 2) New market entrants are numerous in the early 
phases and then diminish; 3) Product innovations are replaced with 
process innovations during the life cycle (or at least the product 
innovations become less radical and more incremental); 4) New entrants 
into the industry introduce dominant designs arising from competence-
destroying discontinuities, whereas (older) firms whose entry preceded 
the discontinuity bring in dominant designs arising from competence-
enhancing discontinuities (Anderson & Tushman, 1990, p. 617); 5) The 
numbers of producers stabilize during the life cycle; 6) Market shares 
stabilize and large incumbents dominate the industry during the life cycle 
(Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Klepper, 1996; Windrum, 2005). 
 
2.2.2 Ambidexterity 
 
The concept of ambidexterity is closely related to the balancing of 
exploitation and exploration practices in the firm. In the context of 
management, ambidexterity means doing contradicting things 
simultaneously (Smith & Tushman, 2004): it is about building 
management practices and organizational structures (i.e., ambidextrous 
organizations) to deal with different types of management problems at the 
same time. In the following I show how ambidexterity is linked to 
dominant designs in the literature, and discuss the relevance of the 
concept to the present study.   
It is pointed out in studies on ambidexterity (e.g., Tushman & O’Reilly 
III, 1996; O’Reilly III & Tushman, 2004, 2008; Tushman & Smith, 2002, 
2004) that companies aiming at continuing success need to implement 
both incremental and radical innovations, and from time to time they 
have to create innovations from discontinuous changes. Herein lays the 
link between ambidexterity (being able to do two things at once), 
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innovation cycles, and dominant design. Ambidextrous organizations are 
able to rise to this challenge, being attuned to creating both incremental 
and radical innovations, and to sustaining different kinds of processes 
and cultures at the same time (Tushman & O’Reilly III, 1996, p.297). The 
notion of ambidexterity also strongly reflects the logic behind portfolio 
management. Continying this theme, O’Reilly III and Tushman (2004, 
p.77) distinguish between new and existing customers, and between 
incremental, architectural and discontinuous innovations. The company 
should allocate its various resources to the new explorative business units, 
and at the same time shield the established units from the ‘distraction’ of 
launching new businesses. The resources comprise e.g., “cash, talents, 
expertise, and customers” (O’Reilly III and Tushman, 2004, p.77) 
My primary focus in the present study is on the creation of dominant 
designs in the focal firm, rather than on its portfolio management. 
Nevertheless, attempts to create and/or adapt dominant designs are 
inevitably made with its product and technology portfolios in mind – 
especially given the nature of its complex technological systems. Having 
such a complex system at its technological core indicates that the 
company’s units are interdependent rather than independent, in the sense 
that they and the projects share certain processes, production units, sales 
organizations, and customer needs. This phenomenon is driven, in a 
sense, by technological convergence. From this perspective I see the 
linkage to dominant designs in the discussion on ambidexterity as 
somewhat deficient, or incomplete. According to Nooteboom (2000)  
organizations evolve from exploration to exploitation and do not place 
equal importance on both activities at the same time. Product architecture 
and managerial cognition are frequently overturned in the creation of 
dominant designs, for example, possibly affecting whole industries. 
Inherent in ambidexterity, in turn, is considerable effort to shield old 
business units from change. 
My argument here is rather that an ambidextrous organization may 
actually inhibit the creation of individual dominant designs if the 
organization is cognitively split, as is often proposed (O’Reilly III & 
Tushman, 2008, p.195). I therefore adopt a view that a firm in the process 
of major change attempting to manage incremental and radical 
innovations at the same time (i.e. ambidextrously) may adversely affect 
the strategic focus on dominant design. The discussion in the next sub-
section focuses on the link between dominant design and firm-level 
strategy in general.  
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2.2.3 Dominant design and company strategy 
 
Dominant designs appear to emerge from strategic decisions on the 
shaping of technological progress: the fact that firms can systemically 
manage the factors that affect the emergence of a dominant design makes 
its design, creation and adoption highly strategic activities (Lee et al., 
1995; McGrath et al., 1992). 
Utterback and Abernathy (1975, p. 640) state in their pioneering work: 
 
 “The essence of our argument is that characteristics of the innovative process 
and of a firm's innovation attempts will vary systematically with differences in 
the firm's environment and its strategy for competition and growth, and with the 
state of development of process technology used by a firm and by its 
competitors”. 
 
 In other words, the innovative process, which I see as parallel to creating 
or adopting, or failing to create or adopt dominant designs, should evolve 
in line with the environmental conditions and the company’s strategy.  
The identification of an industry’s life-cycle stage and its matching with 
the company’s innovative activities are highly strategic matters, as 
Abernathy and Utterback (1978) point out. Illustrating the wide variety of 
innovation-related variables, the authors discuss the following facets in 
the product/industry life-cycle: the source and predominant type of 
innovation, the product line, the production processes, equipment, 
materials, plant, and organizational control (ibid., p. 154). The content 
and managerial challenges are assumed to change during the life cycle. 
The work of Abernathy and Utterback (ibid.) has much in common with 
that of Miles and Snow (1978) and Snow and Hrebiniak (1980). Miles and 
Snow (1978) provide a typology of company strategies. They stress, in 
particular, that the strategy types derived from the classification of major 
problem areas (and solutions) in management are of three types: 
entrepreneurial, engineering, and administrative. Entrepreneurial 
problems concern the choice of a product-market domain; engineering 
problems focus on the choice of production and distribution technologies; 
and administrative problems concern the selection of areas for future 
innovation or the rationalization of structures and processes. These 
dilemmas are clearly present in the creation and adoption of dominant 
designs. 
Afuah (2001), Utterback (1996), and Christensen (1997) add further 
insights on strategy and environmental change. Christensen (1997), for 
example, having found that the types of competitive advantage change 
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during the process of evolution, focused on which of the product’s success 
or performance components or attributes were highly valued by the 
market in the following successive product launches. According to 
Jacobides and Winter (2005), either customer preferences or external 
entities (such as industry players, new entrants, and players who develop 
the industry’s generic function [e.g., call-center management] to form a 
new sub-industry) guide the resource allocation. In other words, when an 
industry matures there is often a stage when external market inputs 
dictate the ‘scope for strategic change’. 
 
2.2.4 How can a company create/increase the odds of creating 
dominant designs? 
 
It is evident from the above discussion that creating a dominant design is 
enhanced by an understanding of the industry and the company’s product 
life cycle. These aspects are intertwined in that the firm may have an 
effect on the industry life cycle in terms of manipulating the industry so as 
to influence the factors that enhance the evolution of a dominant design 
(Lee et. al., 1995; McGrath et al., 1992; Suarez, 2004; Van de Ven & Poole, 
1995).  
According to Van de Ven and Poole (1995), (1) the units of analysis in 
evolution theory are multiple entities (organizations are groups of ‘black 
boxes’ on the industry level), in which variation, selection and retention 
mechanisms are at work, filtering out (ousting) organizations that do not 
adapt to the environment. On the other hand, (2) life-cycle theory 
concerns single entities such as organizations, and incorporates the start-
up, growth, harvest, and termination phases at the level of the firm.  
Variation, selection, and retention are elements that explain evolution 
on the company and on the industry level (Aldrich & Ruef, 2006; Durand, 
2001; 2006). Campbell (1960; 1969) made a fundamental contribution to 
organizational theory in introducing the notion of blind variation, 
meaning that variation is random and external to companies. More 
precisely, blind in this context means unintended and unplanned. 
However, proponents of the dynamic capabilities view, for example, have 
challenged this notion, suggesting that firms can also purposefully create 
variation (cf. Geels, 2002, who notes that firms can even influence 
selection processes in an industry). Aldrich and Ruef (2006) define 
variation as “change from current routines and competencies; change in 
organizational forms”, selection as “differential elimination of certain 
types of variations”, and retention as “selected variations are preserved, 
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duplicated, or otherwise reproduced” (p.17). What is particularly 
interesting is how variation, selection and retention activities are 
manifested on the firm and industry levels. 
 
2.2.5 The strategic shaping of technological progress - the McGrath, 
MacMillan and Tushman model 
 
McGrath et al. (1992) claim that population-level theories are in 
opposition to the strategic management view. According to traditional 
population-level theories, selection occurs at the industry level and affects 
individual firms – without being affected by them (e.g., Hannan & 
Freeman, 1989). McGrath et al., (1992, p.146), in turn, propose that a 
myopically purposeful firm is partly self-aware and conscious in its 
attempts to shape the processes of variation, selection, and retention. 
Lewin and Volberda (1999) coin the term “co-evolutional” when matching 
adaptation and selection together, defining co-evolution as “the joint 
outcome of managerial intentionality, environment, and institutional 
effects” (p.526). This suggests that the evolutionary processes of 
organizations and their environments are simultaneous and 
interdependent. 
McGrath et al. (1992) further ask the following question, “How do I 
create a dominant design in the industry for my firm?”(ibid., p.142). This 
perspective extends the analytical scope of earlier studies, in which it 
could be determined only ex post if and how the dominant design 
emerged. The authors develop a framework that both captures the 
construct of ex-post dominant design, and allows the ex-ante strategist 
(manager) at the firm level to think through the linkage between the 
firm’s technology strategy and the way it wishes to attack its markets 
(ibid., p.142).  
Table 2 lists examples of how the management team can create 
dominant designs as a process incorporating the phases of variation, 
selection and retention. 
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Table 2.  The influence of executive teams on dominant designs. (McGrath et al., 1992) 
 
Variation Selection Retention: Prevention 
of diffusion 
Process driving scope 
(Scope setting) 
*Search for opportunities 
*Screening 
*Evaluation 
*Progress reviews 
 
Processes driving 
intensity (Climate setting) 
*Expectation setting 
*Personal demonstration 
of support 
*Disproportionate 
resource allocation 
*Staffing and re-staffing 
*Managing 
disappointment and 
discontinuation 
*Internal path-clearing 
*Moderating internal 
conflict 
*Granting dispensation 
from policy 
Processes driving selection 
(evolutionary strategies) 
*Building switching costs 
*Drawing off and reinforcing 
existing infrastructure 
*Reinforcing existing 
standards 
*Using clout with 
transaction partners 
*Building technology links 
 
Processes driving selection 
(revolutionary strategies) 
*Forging market acceptance 
*Negotiating coevolution 
*Demonstrating 
commitment 
*Negotiating standards 
*Negotiated environment 
*Exploiting clout 
Processes delaying 
diffusion (evolutionary 
strategies) 
*Exploiting 
organization 
deliverables 
*Using specialized 
assets 
*Using co-specialized 
assets 
 
Processes delaying  
diffusion (revolutionary 
strategies) 
*Co-evolutionary 
contracting 
*Asserting product-
class prerogative 
*Influencing formal 
standards 
 
 
The actions described in Table 2 relate to how an executive team can 
influence the creation of dominant designs. Actions in the variation 
phase, for example, concern processes driving scope and processes 
driving intensity. Intensity refers to mediating the organization’s internal 
competition. In the selection phase, the associated processed are divided 
into evolutionary and revolutionary strategies. The most beneficial 
strategy in the retention stage is to delay the diffusion of the dominant 
design in order to capitalize on the organization’s assets and thereby 
prevent competitors from finding a match. This model is the first to 
expand the dominant-design theory to variation, selection and retention 
discussion by suggesting strategic actions of managers. I used this model 
when I was developing my framework for the present study (see Chapter 
7.2.3). 
 
2.2.6 An integrative framework for achieving technological 
dominance - the Suarez model 
 
The previous section introduced McGrath et al.’s (1992) model depicting 
the firm-level strategic-management factors that facilitate the creation of 
dominant designs – what I call dominant-design ‘building blocks’. In the 
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following I incorporate Suarez’s recent model (2004) into the framework. 
One advantage of his model is that it explicitly separates firm-level 
actions and environment-level factors, and groups these elements in 
theoretical domains. In other words it facilitates the more systematic 
study of dominant-design management in linking classic models with 
closely related theoretical factors from adjacent domains. Suarez’s (2004) 
framework thus addresses the management of dominant design, 
incorporating the different stages and domains (Table 3). 
 
Table 3.  The success factors in the dominance process. (Suarez, 2004) 
 
Factor 
type 
Dominance  
Factor 
I  
R&D 
Build 
Up 
II 
Technical 
feasibility 
III 
Crea-
ting the 
market 
IV 
Decisi-
ve 
battle 
V  
Post-
Domi-
nance 
Firm  
 
*Technological 
superiority 
 ***    
 *Credibility/ 
complementary 
assets 
***   ***  
 *Installed base    *** *** 
 *Strategic 
maneuvering 
 
  ***   
Environ
-ment 
*Regulation 
 
 ***    
 *Network effects 
and switching 
costs 
   *** *** 
 *Regime of 
appropriability 
***     
 *Characteristics 
of the 
technological 
field 
***     
 
 
In brief, Suarez’s model (2004), as outlined in Table 3, identifies the 
elements that associated with technological dominance and their overall 
importance in the life cycle (the asterisks in the Table 3). Phase I refers to 
R&D build-up, consisting of factors on the firm and environmental levels. 
Phase II typically involves the development of a working prototype, phase 
III is the market-creation stage and phase IV is when a critical mass starts 
to emerge in favor of the selected product. By phase V a dominant 
technology has been selected and competition is “within-standard” 
(Suarez, 2004, p.283). 
According to Suarez (2004), technological superiority, credibility and 
complementary assets, installed base, and strategic maneuvering are the 
most important dominance factors on the firm level. Technological 
superiority refers to how ‘good’ a technology is when compared with 
alternatives. However, it must be acknowledged that it is not sufficient in 
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itself. In the case of videocassettes, for example, Sony Betamax was 
considered technologically superior to JVC’s VHS, but in the end Sony 
lost the standard war (cf. Shapiro & Varian, 1999). Credibility and 
complementary assets refer to the previous knowledge of relevant 
technologies (Klepper & Simons, 2000), production resources, and other 
supporting functions (Teece, 1986) such as sales outlets that enable 
diffusing of an innovation and benefiting from it. The installed base, in 
turn, refers to the numbers of customers for current products: in general, 
a larger installed base facilitates the adoption of a technology (Suarez, 
2004; Schilling, 1998). Finally, strategic maneuvering refers to various 
actions taken and decisions made in relation to entry timing, pricing, 
licensing and relationships with complementors, and in promotion and 
public relations. 
Suarez (2004) lists regulation, network effects and switching costs, an 
appropriability regime, and the characteristics of the technological field as 
the most essential environment-level success factors. Regulation refers to 
the attempts of legislative bodies to impose a de jure standard in order to 
influence the technology selection in the market. Network effects and 
switching costs means a user (as well as a firm) has the bigger advantage 
the more other users adopt the service. When the network effects are 
strong, switching to another service or product is costly. An 
appropriability regime (Teece, 1986) refers to the environmental factors, 
excluding the structure of the firm and the market, that govern an 
innovator’s ability to capture the profits generated by an innovation. 
Finally, the characteristics of the technological field broadly refer to the 
amount of and relative power of each actor and the level of cooperation 
versus competition in the industry. Buyers may be concentrated in some 
industries, R&D may have a strong influence, and open-standard 
innovation may be appreciated, for example. (Suarez, 2004) These 
characteristics affect the success of the company’s strategic maneuvering. 
 
 
2.3 The creation of dominant design at the company level 
2.3.1 Towards a synthesized framework  
 
The following sub-sections (2.3.2–2.3.4) describe the components of 
Suarez’s model (2004) in more detail, and incorporate the key 
evolutionary and managerial elements from the other frameworks 
discussed above (e.g., McGrath et al., 1992; Lee et al., 1995; Schilling, 
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1998). This synthesis yields the preliminary research framework of the 
present study, outlining the relevant building blocks of dominant-design 
management, in other words the firm- and environment-level factors that 
can enhance or inhibit the adaptation process (i.e. the creation and/or 
adoption of a dominant design) in a firm. The factors can be managed, 
invested in, and manipulated – and affect both the creation/adoption of 
the dominant design, and the underlying motivation. Environmental 
factors also act as moderators in the management process (Suarez, 2004, 
p. 276). I use the term ‘building blocks’ throughout this dissertation. 
Interchangeable terms include ‘influences’ (McGrath et al., 1992) and 
‘factors’ or ‘forces’ (Lee et al., 1995; Schilling, 1998). 
With regard to earlier models, I find the following aspects 
underemphasized in McGrath et al. (1992) and Suarez (2004). First, the 
focus on top management as the main (or only) actors is too narrow given 
that innovative ideas stem from many sources, as discussed earlier. These 
sources include various business units and sub-units in the firm, 
functional units (R&D, marketing, sales), customers and vendors, and 
subcontractors. Second, Suarez’s (2004) model in particular does not 
explicitly refer to the cyclical nature of the phenomenon, although the 
technology cycle is integral to the traditional notion of dominant design 
(cf. Nooteboom, 1999, 2000). Third, the earlier frameworks do not specify 
the relative importance of the various dominance factors. The present 
research elaborates on these matters further. 
I also add to the synthesized framework three building blocks that are 
closely linked to the evolution and management of dominant designs, but 
are not explicitly included in the earlier discussions: (i) convergence, (ii) 
dominant logic, and (iii) technological brokering (Nooteboom, 2000). 
Convergence (i) reflects the potential need in the initial creation process 
for an integrated (i.e., converged) offering, as well as an integrated 
company structure within which to develop the new products, because 
architectural knowledge is still under-developed (e.g., Christensen & 
Raynor, 2003). Dominant logic (ii) is commonly used as a synonym for 
dominant design (e.g., Nooteboom, 2000). However, I distinguish 
between the two, the former referring to the organization’s own, internal 
(established) way of thinking about and commercializing a given product 
category, and the latter to the product design that is or becomes adopted 
in the industry (regardless of the focal firm’s earlier dominant logics). 
Technological brokering (iii) refers to a global search in the search for 
technological discontinuities (as opposed to only a local search), which 
may be a key mechanism for seizing dominant designs (Hargadon & 
Sutton, 1997; Teece, 2007).  
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Finally, I include in the synthesized framework Teece’s (2007) model of 
dynamic-capability-relevant organizational processes (see section 2.4): (1) 
sensing, (2) seizing, and (3) transforming (see also Augier and Teece, 
2006). Although these generic concepts as such do not specifically 
concern the management of dominant designs, they are useful in 
structuring the relevant building blocks into roughly distinct managerial 
stages, and the processes and capabilities they require. Another reason for 
integrating Teece’s (2007) three-fold framework into the building blocks 
under consideration is that it reflects the fluid, specific, and transitional 
stages in the classic discussion on dominant design, and some of the 
building blocks are the same (e.g., the notions of appropriability and 
complementary assets). 
 
2.3.2 Sensing 
 
According to McGrath et al., (1992), Teece (2007), Schilling (1998), and 
Suarez (2004), among others, sensing– in the context of dominant 
designs – refers to the source of and search for innovative ideas (Adner & 
Levinthal, 2008), as well as the environmental building blocks that frame 
this phase. Therefore, I outline both the firm- and environment-related 
building blocks to the extent that they appear to influence the early (i.e. 
fluid) stages of creation or adoption (see especially Suarez, 2004). 
Typically, the regulatory framework and scientific progression frame 
the initial sensing stage. The former includes issues such as licenses 
governing who can operate in the market, what technologies allowed, 
price regulation, and regulations are covering the kind of products that 
can be bundled.  
The source of innovation typically refers to the ideas, or managerial 
cognitions, on where to focus search efforts. Naturally, such sources are 
varied. The search may be local or global (e.g., Adner & Levinthal, 2008), 
for instance: local implies narrow, familiar, and competence-enhancing 
ideas, whereas global search is more explorative. Other sources include 
R&D and science, vendors in cooperation, customer needs, social and 
regulatory change, new technologies, competitors, standard-setting 
bodies, and the market (McGrath et al., 1992; Teece, 2007). Sensing 
market needs emphasizes the market aspect, and reflects the corporate 
culture or philosophy in implementing and enhancing the marketing 
concept (in other words, value for customers: Agarwal, Erramilli & Dev, 
2003; Jaworski, Kohli & Sahay, 2000; Han, Kim & Sristava, 1998, Narver 
& Slater, 1990). The marketing concept, in turn, defines goals related to 
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market share, customer focus and profitability, the achievement of which 
depends on identifying the needs of target markets (Agarwal et al., 2003; 
Kohli & Jaworski, 1990). In a broad sense, sensing market needs (market 
orientation literature) means learning about market developments, 
communicating the findings, and adapting innovations to changing 
market conditions (Jaworski et al., 2000). 
 
2.3.3 Seizing 
 
Seizing refers to the period during which a product is commercially 
launched (McGrath et al., 1992; Teece, 2007; Schilling, 1998; Suarez, 
2004, among others). 
During this phase the company starts the commercialization process 
from innovative ideas to product prototypes or pilot products. I have 
identified the following key themes in this domain on the basis of how 
they help in the commercialization process, and determine the nature of 
the commercial product and the company’s role in the larger ecosystem 
(i.e. selecting the internal structure). The themes are 1) network 
externalities, 2) standards, 3) the role of complementary assets, 4) 
modularity management, and 5) the firm’s internal structure (open vs. 
closed). Moreover, 6) ecosystem/partnership management, 7) innovation 
type and portfolio, 8) technological competences and technological 
brokering also belong to this phase. Finally, 9) an appropriability regime 
determines the innovator’s ability to capture the profits an innovation 
generates. 
1) Network Externalities are among the first macro-level factors that 
define the relative easiness (or difficulty) of creating a dominant design, 
and include the motivation for and ease in adopting such a design (even if 
created by others). Pepall et al. (2005, p.615) define the concept as 
follows: “when the value of a product to any one consumer increases as 
the number of other consumers using the product increases, we say that 
the market for that product exhibits network externalities or effects”. 
Arthur (1989, 2001) describes network externalities as a building block, 
the aim of which is to achieve increasing returns (in technology, product, 
or service usage).  In other words the “increased attractiveness caused by 
adoption” is central (Arthur, 2001, p.299).14   
                                                   
14 Other factors resulting in increasing returns include 1) learning by using (i.e., 
the more technology is used, the more is learned about it); 2) scale economies in 
production (i.e. the unit cost of a product will decrease as the production volume 
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Specifically, Srinisavan et al. (2006) and Baum, Korn & Kotha (1995) 
studied the emergence of dominant designs in new product categories, 
finding it more likely under conditions of weak network effects15.   
Srinisavan et al. (2004), in turn, consider the effects of network 
externalities in more detail, examining pioneer survival. Their main point 
is that “network externalities have a negative main effect on the survival 
duration of pioneers” (ibid., p. 41). The authors attribute this to the fact 
that customers do not want to commit to a product too early, preferring to 
wait for better products. Thus, a network externality effect may slow down 
the creation of dominant designs. In a similar vein, Windrum and 
Birchenhall (2005) note that in order for new successive dominant 
designs to emerge, both intrinsic and network utility must be substituted. 
In other words, the intrinsic utility of a new design must be so superior 
that it outweighs the higher network externalities of the old design ceteris 
paribus (ibid. p. 144). However, in the case of a technology-intensive 
product with network externality, when a large incumbent has knowledge 
and strong complementary assets, a dominant design will often emerge 
more quickly. In sum, the network effect is both an external condition and 
an internal manageable element. 
2) Standards have three meanings: conventions, codes, or practices 
(Arthur, 2001). In any case, they tend to be technological in nature. 
Illustrative examples include mobile network standards (e.g., GSM, 
CDMA) that have evolved in life cycles and may also differ across 
countries. However, these conventional standards do not guarantee that 
related dominant designs will emerge. Second, a technology may become 
‘standard’ (Arthur, 1989, p.305), in other words a dominant technology. I 
apply both of these meanings in this study. Standards often have the 
effect of enhancing, or speeding up, the emergence of a dominant design 
(Arthur, 2001, 1989; Srinisavan et al. 2004; Murmann & Frenken, 2006; 
Khazam & Mowery, 1994). 
Standards have also been classified as de jure and de facto. Garud and 
Kumaraswamy (1993) study both types in the context of network 
industries in a case study of Sun Microsystems. Sun had a strategy of 
                                                                                                                              
rises); 3) informational returns (i.e. adoption becomes more attractive if the 
product is well-known); and 4) technological interrelatedness, when  ’sub-
technologies and products’ are merged and or made compatible with the 
dominant technology (Arthur, 2001). 
15 Srinivasan et al. (2006) further state that weak appropriability, low product 
radicalness, and high research-and-development intensity enhance dominant-
design emergence. 
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connected open networks (as opposed to unconnected closed networks) 
and of shaping standards through sponsorship (i.e., giving rivals and 
firms in complementary markets easy access to technical knowledge). The 
current thinking is that de facto standards are more effective than de jure 
standards. 
According to Shapiro and Varian (1999), the ability to wage a standards 
war depends on the following assets: control over an installed user base, 
intellectual property rights, the ability to innovate, first-mover advantage, 
manufacturing capabilities, strength in complements, and brand name 
and reputation. It is evident that waging a standards war (i.e. de facto a 
dominant-design war) demands plentiful resources. 
3) Complementary assets can enhance the adoption of the initial 
product offering (Molina-Castillo et al., 2011). Various types of 
complementary assets exist, such as marketing capabilities, regulatory 
knowledge, and client lists (Stieglitz & Heine, 2007). What is important 
here is that technological innovations and discontinuities do not make the 
complementary assets obsolete. 
Complementary assets have been linked to large incumbent 
organizations, enabling them to leverage innovations or to act as a buffer 
when products and offerings are not otherwise competitive. Stieglitz and 
Heine (2007) note that vertically integrated firms should have an 
advantage in integrating complementary assets, and that incumbents 
seem to have more complementary assets than newcomers. As I see it, 
complementarities such as the existing customer base are also important. 
At its simplest, a firm can cross-sell its new products or services to its 
existing large customer base. Another example is a robust generic billing 
system based on which one can develop integrative services, in other 
words different services with the same billing application. 
4) Modularity Management is a recent notion in technology 
management. It refers to the degree to which the components of a system 
may be separated and recombined (Baldwin & Clark, 1997; Christensen & 
Raynor, 2003, p.128; Jacobides et al. 2006, p.1207). Baldwin and Clark 
(1997) put forward a view  that “modularity is a strategy for organizing 
complex products and processes efficiently” (ibid., p.153). Modularity 
management is also linked to the question of open vs. closed 
organizational structures. According to Christensen and Raynor (2003) 
and Matthyssens and Vandenbemt (2008), when the market is capable of 
modular production, firms should have more open structures. 
According to Baldwin and Clark (1997), modularity has enabled 
companies to handle complex technology by breaking up a product into 
subsystems. Modularity management, and thus the ability to define 
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architectures is seen as a tool for orchestrating a value network or web 
(Jacobides et al., 2006). Brusoni (2005), for instance, suggests that this 
manifests in how networks of suppliers are coordinated in a system-
integrator setting (Brusoni & Prencipe, 2001). 
Modularity may have more profound effects than is at first apparent. 
Matthyssens and Vandenbempt (2008), for example, state that 
modularization will start de-systematization, which leads to 
commoditization in the market or industry. Both product and service 
elements may be modular (Baldwin & Clark, 1997; Matthyssens & 
Vandenbempt, 2008). I argue that a modular company has more options 
and degrees of freedom in terms of production. The following discussion 
on the firm’s organizational structure further complements this 
discussion. 
5) The Firm’s Internal Structure (Open/Closed) explains, to some 
extent, how quickly products diffuse into markets. It has been argued that 
a closed and integrated organizational structure has drawbacks in today’s 
markets (e.g., OVUM, 2002; see also Kenney & Pon, 2011; Fransman, 
2000). According to OVUM (2002), this is partly due to a shift in 
managerial paradigms towards open-market thinking (such as 
partnerships and solution-based business substituting customer 
ownership and technological superiority, cf. Suarez, 2004). 
Afuah (2001) in his work on dynamic boundaries wonders whether 
firms are better off being vertically integrated in the face of technological 
change, thereby bridging the discussion about competence-destroying 
technological change in the context of dominant design and the notion of 
a preferred structure when change happens. Furthermore, companies that 
are vertically integrated into the old technology, which it is suggested 
perform worse than those that are not, face constant organizational 
challenges (e.g., Hauser, 2006) if competence-destroying technological 
change is expected to emerge over and over again. Afuah (2001) also 
argues that in the case of technological change that is competence 
destroying for firms and their suppliers, firms that are integrated 
vertically into the new technology will perform better than those that are 
not. This seems to resemble the SBU (strategic business unit) model with 
its integrated production, R&D, product management, sales and 
marketing. 
Christensen, Verlinden and Westerman (2002) studied modularity vs. 
integrated offerings as sources of competitiveness over time. They found 
that vertical integration was beneficial when customers did not find the 
products satisfactory in terms of functionality or performance, and that 
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modularity was beneficial when they did (see also Jacobides, 2005; 
Kenney and Pon, 2011). 
A closely related topic in the context of the firm’s internal structure is 
that of value creation and value appropriation, and the role of industry 
architectures (Jacobides, Knudsen & Augier, 2006, p.1200). Key aspects 
of this discussion include complementary assets and capabilities and their 
mobility. Specifically, the open vs. closed company mode has more 
variations depending on how “mobile” the complementary assets are. 
Integration is necessary in a closed and technologically early market, and 
if the mobility of complementary assets is working in an open market 
(during the growth or mature stage), a situation may arise that is 
described as “rule without assets” (ibid.). Intel Corp. for example, used 
complementary assets, i.e. subcontractors, and did not need to integrate 
into a closed company mode. Conversely, the assets may not be mobile, 
but local, and have no complementarity in the production process (ibid., 
p.1206). Jacobides gives the example of a local factory with unskilled 
labor. In this case the resources and capabilities are not transferable and 
therefore typically should be owned. 
6) Ecosystem Management concerns the linkages from a focal firm to 
its suppliers and producers that form a ‘technological community’ 
(Srinivasan et al., 2006): the larger the community, the greater the 
number of firms in the value net of the product category, and the shorter 
is the time to the emergence of a dominant design. What is also typical is 
that business in the ecosystem crosses a variety of industrial boundaries 
(Moore, 1993, p. 76). Ecosystems share certain characteristics, including a 
degree of common vision among the actors, a common platform and 
standards, and high interdependence. A functioning ecosystem may be 
more open or more closed. 
The level of technological progress partly defines the ecosystem 
(Jacobides et al., 2006; Christensen and Raynor, 2003). The type of 
ecosystem (or a variation of it) that might emerge depends on the 
organizational type (vertically integrated or modular), and the level of 
technological maturity (including the degree of knowledge 
standardization) determines which one is the preferred option. 
Cusumano, Mylonadis and Rosenbloom (1992) refer in their study on 
strategic maneuvering and mass-market dynamics to the triumph of VHS 
over Betamax video recorders: JVC won the battle through the formation 
of alliances, well-timed decision-making, and the strategic alignment of 
complementary products. Srinivasan et al. (2006, p.7) suggest that the 
greater the number of firms in the value net, the sooner the dominant 
design will emerge. Jacobides et al. (2006), in turn, discuss value 
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creation, value appropriation, and the role of industry architectures in 
their study on how to benefit from innovation. They conclude that firms 
could benefit by managing the industry’s architecture carefully so as 
become a ‘bottleneck’. 
7) Technological competences and technological brokering refer to the 
ability to create technologically superior products and services in-house 
or through networking. Teece (2007, p. 1326) uses the general term 
“technological competences”, Suarez (2004) prefers “technological 
superiority” (p. 276), and Cattani (2006, p.290) opts for “technological 
knowledge base”. 
Given that technological competences may not reside in the focal firm 
(i.e. local search) and are therefore external to it (global search, Adner & 
Levinthal, 2008; Hatfield et al. 2001), the need for technological 
brokering, in other words the use of networking ability to leverage 
products and solutions to different markets, may arise: “A technology 
broker introduces [these] solutions where they are not known and, in the 
process, creates new products that are original combinations of existing 
knowledge from disparate industries” (Hargadon & Sutton, 1997, p. 716). 
Hargadon and Sutton stress the importance of drawing analogies between 
current design challenges and the designs and solutions arrived at in 
other industries at different times. 
8) Innovation type and portfolio refer to the range of innovations that 
crystallize the productization process (see Chapter 2). Abernathy and 
Clark’s (1985) typology is appropriate in this context: innovations are 
either competence enhancing or competence-destroying for the firm and 
its business units. 
It should also be noted that end products may be intertwined 
technologically in line with a customer need. This is especially relevant in 
analyses of the industry life cycle. It also reflects the importance of the 
innovation portfolio (cf. Abernathy & Clark, 1985), meaning the product 
areas that share the company’s production, marketing, and product-
development and/or management resources. The same technological 
discontinuities affect these products in the innovation portfolio (Tripsas, 
2008). Abernathy and Clark (1985) also refer to the different managerial 
and organizational skills required depending on the innovation type. 
9) An Appropriability Regime (Teece, 1986) refers to the environmental 
factors, excluding the organizational and market structure, that govern an 
innovator’s ability to capture the profits generated by the innovation. 
Teece classifies these factors as legal instruments and the nature of the 
technology. Legal instruments consist of patents, copyrights, and trade 
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secrets, whereas knowledge about the nature of technology may be tacit or 
codified. These facets affect the imitation potential.  
The appropriability regime thus helps the company to protect its 
investment in innovations and at the same time to promote their 
diffusion. It also defines how profitable the innovation is.   
 
2.3.4 Transforming 
 
As noted in McGrath et al., (1992), Nooteboom (2000), Suarez (2004), 
and Teece (2007), among others, transforming in the context of dominant 
designs refers to the building blocks that trigger the transition to 
subsequent dominant designs, as well as to the environmental blocks that 
frame this phase. The building blocks outlined below, according to the 
literature, affect the transition stages of the creation and adoption process 
(as well as the fluid stage in subsequent dominant designs). 
I have identified customer preferences and market change (e.g., 
Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996), and technological change (Tushman & 
Anderson, 1986) as the environmental building blocks. On the company 
level, but closely intertwined with the environmental level, I see the 
dominant logic and convergence as the defining concepts in the 
transforming phase. It should be noted that transition could be 
incremental or radical, meaning that discontinuities either enhance or 
destroy competence (Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Tushman & O’Reilly, 
1996). Dominant designs emanate from both incremental and radical 
innovations. 
Customer preferences and market change: as companies (and 
industries) evolve, grow and mature the key managerial challenges, or 
‘dominant problems’ may change  (Greiner, 1972; Kazanjian, 1988; 1989). 
Thus, at the mature stage of the product category or industry, and thereby 
the transforming phase of the dominant design, the dominant problems 
are different than in the introductory or sensing stage (cf. Utterback & 
Abernathy, 1975). Customer needs are well articulated in the mature stage 
as the dominant design has emerged to the market, which incumbent or 
large established firms typically control. For these reasons, incumbent 
firms, which tend to be familiar with the current (dominant design) 
products and customers’ related preferences, typically focus even more 
sharply on current customers and serving their incremental needs, away 
from architectural and revolutionary innovations (which they may have 
pursued at the introductory life-cycle phase). (Christensen & Bower, 1996; 
Christensen & Rosenbloom, 1995; Henderson & Clark, 1990; Henderson, 
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1993; Reinganum, 1985, 1983) This reflects the discussion earlier in this 
Chapter concerning the sources of investment and R&D incentives for 
incumbents fearing new entrants (Abernathy & Clark, 1985; Henderson, 
ibid.). The transformation to subsequent dominant designs, which are 
based on either incremental or radical innovations, nevertheless requires 
the capability to sense the needs of emerging and not only current 
customers (Anderson & Tushman, 1986). 
Technological change refers to technological discontinuities that are 
either competence enhancing or destroying to incumbents and entrants 
(e.g., Tushman & Anderson, 1986) and start the fluid industry-life-cycle 
stage. Christensen and Rosenbloom (1995) and Christensen and Bower 
(1996) explain the circumstances in which entrants have an advantage 
over incumbent firms when they start the productization of emergent 
technology: entrants lead in developing and adopting technologies that 
address user needs in different, emerging value networks. Christensen 
and Bower (1996) found that new entrants initially had inferior 
technology, which as it matured invaded the incumbents’ market. 
Incumbents, in turn, had difficulty matching the technology because they 
did not invest in it during the initial stage, and did not see how it could 
better serve current customers’ needs (Henderson & Clark, 1990). 
Tripsas (2008) asks the question: “What factors cause a mature 
industry to re-enter a period of technological turbulence?” and develops 
a model of technological evolution that incorporates both technological 
trajectories and the new concept of preference trajectories, which are 
cycles of incremental and discontinuous change in preferences. 
Preference discontinuities turn out to play an important role in triggering 
technological transitions in an industry. Tripsas (ibid.) illustrates the 
model by means of an historical study of the typesetting industry, which 
underwent three major technological transitions16 . Each of these changes 
was driven by preference discontinuities, which complement the 
discussion on the limits of technology, and a supply-side emphasis: 
preference discontinuities in one particular industry (i.e. a demand-side 
emphasis) enable new radical technologies to enter the incumbent 
industry. 
I adopt Prahalad and Bettis’ (1986, p.491) definition of dominant logic 
as follows: 
 
                                                   
16 The transitions were: 1) From hot metal to analog phototypesetters, 2) from 
analog to CRT phototypesetters, and 3) from CRT to laser image setters. 
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”Dominant logic is a mind set or a world view or conceptualization of the 
business and the administrative tools to accomplish goals and make decisions in 
that business. It is stored as a shared cognitive map (or set of schemas) among 
the dominant coalition [i.e. the top management group]. It is expressed as a 
learned, problem-solving behavior”. 
 
The source and origins of dominant logic can be varied. Huff (1982) 
studied the influence of industry on strategy reformulation, which may 
include shifting to new or subsequent industry and product-category life 
cycles or dominant logics.  She also discusses the potential influences of 
strategic concepts17 (i.e. dominant logics) on deliberate strategy 
formulation. Single organizations, industry groups, and other industries 
are potential sources of strategic concepts, which tend to overlap. 
However, although there is potential in unique strategies, in practice the 
concepts are shared (ibid., p.127). All in all, the dominant logic is 
important, as it filters out ideas that are the source of innovation (see also 
Henderson and Clark, 1990). 
In essence, dominant logic reflects the process of filtering out ideas and 
innovations worth pursuing, a process closely comparable  to managerial 
cognition (see Adner and Helfat, 2003; Bettis and Prahalad, 1986; Bettis 
and Prahalad, 1995; Leonard-Barton, 1992; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000; 
and Tikkanen et al., 2005). In general, these authors propose that the 
conceptual basis of a dominant logic is the reinforcement of an 
established world-view derived from past market success, conventional 
wisdom, past experience and a possibly analogous solution to new 
situations, and cognitive bias regarding available vs. adequate 
information. 
The tasks of management are therefore to revise multiple dominant 
logics: to apply the dominant logic to the business in focus, assign 
business to an appropriate ‘sector’, and add to a variety of dominant logics 
when the new business is dissimilar from existing business. At any rate, 
altering the dominant logic challenges managers to change their world-
view. In later research, Bettis & Prahalad (1995) highlight the feedback 
loop that gives organizational learning some input into dynamic 
organizational intelligence, in other words organizational learning 
influences strategies, systems, values, expectations, and reinforced 
behaviors, which in turn shape the dominant logic (ibid.,  p.7). 
                                                   
17 Huff (1982) finds out that strategic concepts are born with shared beliefs, 
observations and theories. 
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Convergence means putting together, or uniting and mixing, technical 
and regulatory boundaries (OECD, 1992; Yoffie, 1997). The main point is 
that the technologies serve the same customer need (Fransman, 2000), 
and customers find that different products serve the same need (Adner, 
2002). In other words, as the technology converges, previously separate 
technologies are able to produce a multitude of services. For example, 
data technology can now be used to produce a voice application, which 
previously required proprietary telecommunications technology. 
Furthermore, which is relevant to this study, convergence is understood 
to lead to ‘horizontal’ (as opposed to vertical) management, which does 
not protect profit margins to the same extent (Hacklin et al., 2009, p.731; 
Yoffie, 1997, p.17). I interpret horizontal here to mean that different 
players can carry out functions that were previously the preserve of 
players with end-to-end responsibility for operations (Internet players, 
for example, can provide voice services that were earlier provided only by 
telecom verticals). There is a clear trade-off here between a vertical and 
an open horizontal management mode. 
Adner (2002), in turn, presents a demand-based view on the emergence 
of competition in his analysis of disruptive technologies. He identifies 
four different competitive settings in which to examine the demand-based 
view of technology competition (ibid., p.670): (a) competitive isolation, 
wherein technologies are separate throughout their life-cycle; (b) 
competitive convergence, wherein they serve the same customer segments 
(Fai & Tunzelmann, 2001; Fransman, 2000); and (c) disruption (see also 
Christensen, 1997; Anderson & Tushman, 1990), wherein new technology 
displaces the old. In sum, segment preferences matter, and offer a 
demand-side customer view on convergence. According to Teece’s (2007) 
more recent view on convergence in the transforming phase, one should 
develop integration and coordination skills and manage strategic fit so 
that asset combinations are value enhancing for companies and 
customers. 
Finally, Tushman and Romanelli (1985, p. 178) define convergence as a 
“process of incremental and interdependent change activities and 
decisions which work to achieve a greater consistency of internal 
activities with a strategic orientation, and which operate to impede 
radical or discontinuous change”. In their view, strategic reorientation 
and recreation bring about product evolution inside the company, as well 
as changes in strategy, power, structure and control. They point out that 
convergence occurs after the dominant design has emerged (see also 
Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008, p. 798), however, whereas in my view it is a 
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potential management tool or building block facilitating the creation of a 
dominant design. 
 
2.3.5 Overall shifting across changes – Evolution 
 
Rounding up the discussion on the three phases of dominant-design 
adaptation (sensing, seizing, and transforming) I now consider the overall 
process from an evolutionary perspective. 
Basically, evolution is about change, but the concept goes beyond a 
simple product or industry life cycle. Something more permanent 
emerges or changes, such as the competitiveness of the product attributes 
or “the basis of competition” (Christensen, 1997). Indeed, according to 
Christensen (ibid.), customers value different product attributes or 
families of attributes and the valuation criteria change in the process of 
evolution.  
Evolution is also about adaptation to the environment. As a concept it 
originates in biology, wherein species are assumed to adapt to the 
environment in the long term. In the present study, evolution may even 
incorporate what appears to be revolution: progressive evolution may give 
way to dramatic and sudden change. This is apparent in the theory of 
dominant design (especially the punctuated models; see Chapter 3.2.1) in 
the case of competence-disrupting discontinuity.  
In my view, evolution is associated to variation, selection and retention 
processes. Resources are limited, and competition is inherent (Aldrich & 
Ruef, 2006). In the current research, evolution is found and is of 
significance  in the elements:  1) complex technological systems, 2) 
innovations, 3) dynamic capabilities, and 4) dominant design and 
strategy. In the case of 1) complex systems, technological evolution is 
actualized through the interdependent evolution of subsystems. 
Murmann and Frenken (2006) conceptualize products as complex 
artifacts that evolve in the form of a nested hierarchy of technology cycles. 
The complex-system model of dominant design explains why artifacts 
evolve as a nested hierarchy of technology cycles, and why multiple causes 
can contribute to the emergence of a dominant design, in other words 
technological change. Of significance to 2) innovations (a factor of 
variation, Aldrich & Ruef, ibid.), is the type of innovation and how it 
changes in successive dominant designs. Of significance to 3) dynamic 
capabilities, is the change in resources and competences. Finally, with 
regard to 4) dominant design and strategy, the important questions 
include how change in the firm’s strategizing affects the creation or 
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adoption of dominant designs, and how the different players’ roles in the 
industry change. 
Specifically, the present study examines the process through which the 
firm adapts dominant designs, in other words their potential creation, 
modification and/or adoption (Durand, 2006). On the industry level I 
focus on the inputs into dominant design (e.g., new technologies, 
legislative regulation, changing customer preferences), and how the roles 
of these factors haves changed over time. Thus, in analyzing the 
company’s strategizing I incorporate an analysis of how it and the 
industry have changed.  
In line with the above discussion, I adopt the following definition of 
evolution, which is general enough to incorporate the company level and 
the industry level, and the intertwining of the two:  
 
“Evolution is a series of identifiable events causally linked together, which 
concern one or several entities at different levels of analysis that may or may not 
alter their essential characteristics, and may or may not proceed toward an 
anticipated ending” (Durand, 2006, p.16).  
 
Van de Ven and Poole (1995) and Langley (1991) also discuss this view of 
evolution in some detail. Van de Ven and Poole (1995) focus on 
organizational development and the change process (as opposed to 
variance theories18 , see Langley, 1991, p. 693). Theoretical approaches to 
change processes concentrate on why and how things evolve over time, 
enabling change to be studied on different levels of analysis (e.g., Langley, 
1991). As pointed out above, the following two levels of change or 
evolution are relevant to the present study: 1) evolution on the industry 
level, depicting the variety of industry players as a ‘black box’ of variation, 
selection, and retention logic, and 2) life-cycle analysis19 , which examines 
how and why individual units and companies change. I merge these 
                                                   
18 Variance theories refer to models in which strategic change or the outcome 
factor is explained in terms of the influence of the different attributes (e.g., the. 
environment, leadership, and decision processes). The model is in the form of a 
mathematical function. I adopt variance theory in a certain form or spirit, as I 
attach numerical values to individual product areas, and consequently to various 
building blocks, which together affect the potential emergence of dominant 
designs. 
19 Van de Ven and Poole (1995) use the term life cycle to explain the 
development of a single entity: the start-up, growth, harvesting and terminating 
stages. Other authors (e.g., Anderson and Tushman, 1986) associate the life-cycle 
concept with industry-level analysis. 
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viewpoints, reflecting Durand’s view (2006) that the borderlines of the 
levels need not be mutually exclusive. 
 
2.3.6 Product and industry life-cycle relations 
 
Product life-cycle (e.g. Cox, 1967) and industry life-cycle (e.g. Klepper, 
1997) theories are closely related. The industry life-cycle was originally 
developed by the product life-cycle (e.g. Vernon, 1966; Klepper, 1996, 
1997).  
Industry life-cycle studies concentrate on explaining the evolution of 
industries. Evolution is characterized by four industry life-cycle phases, 
which are introduction, growth, maturity and decline (Klepper, 1996, 
1997). The phases have clear profiles concerning market volumes, the 
maturity of technology, consumers articulated preferences, product 
architecture, and the number of players in the industry. Technological, 
legislative regulation and consumer preferences development drive the 
transition in the evolution of the industry, and also the possible transition 
of old industries to a new introduction stage. Klepper (1996) finds that 
“technologically progressive industries evolve from birth to maturity” 
and “this evolutionary pattern has come to be known as the product life-
cycle (PLC)” (ibid., p.562) 
Cox (1967) notes that the concept of the product life-cycle describes the 
evolution of a product, as measured by its sales over time. The product 
life-cycle stages are used in product marketing planning, e.g. in the 
amount of promotion and advertising. Like the Cox (ibid.) model, Vernon 
(1966) pioneers the product life-cycle research. Vernon identifies facets 
with management and conditions in the environment concerning product 
life-cycles: inputs, production process, communication of the product 
features between producers and end customers, price elasticity of 
demand, competitive situation and so forth. What is interesting, product 
life-cycle (new product, maturing product, standardized product) is used 
to explain international investment and trade patterns. This indicates 
product life-cycle as being inseparable or even a synonym with industry 
life-cycle. 
Indeed, in the seminal work of Abernathy and Utterback (1978) the unit 
of analysis is called a productive unit. This captures both industry level 
and product (corporate) level, integrating the product and industry life-
cycle. In Utterback and Abernathy (1975) model, the economics view at 
industry level, the management and engineering view at company level, 
and organization theory and behavior view at company level are 
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integrated. In the similar vein, Anderson and Tushman (1990) note that 
dominant design is the key event in the evolution of an industry. The logic 
is here, that dominant design is associated both with the product life-cycle 
and the industry life-cycle.  Also in a later overview (e.g. Peltoniemi, 2011) 
product life-cycle and industry life-cycle are not separated as distinct 
concepts.  
However, as the product life-cycle and industry life-cycle are closely 
related, it is possible to separate facets concerning product level and 
industry level. This is evident also based on Klepper’s (1997) findings that 
some industry life-cycles are not identical to the predicted development 
based on the product life-cycle. Entry, exit, market structure, market 
shares, and volumes are associated to industry level (e.g. Utterback, 1996; 
Klepper, 1996, 1997). In turn, facets such as changes in the nature and 
source of innovation, production processes, and company’s competitive 
emphasis are associated to product life-cycle level. 
In this research I separate the product life-cycle and industry life-cycle 
as follows. I am studying how new innovations (product life-cycle) are 
done 1) during industry life-cycle stages, and 2) at the start of the new 
industry life-cycle.  I am interested in the changing context in new 
product and service innovations in life-cycles, especially when I have 
identified new industry or sub-industry introduction stage. The industry 
life-cycle (and sub-industry life-cycle)20 set the conditions for innovative 
activity and organizational action. I also refer to the previous Chapter 3.5 
(Overall shifting across changes- Evolution). The evolution of innovative 
activities and industry sets the context for studying dominant designs in 
this study. Put it in another way,  ‘the next waves of innovation’ meaning 
successive innovations is of strong interest (Utterback, 1996), that capture 
the evolutionary logic. 
 
 
 
                                                   
20 In this work industry life-cycle refers to 1) a telecommunications industry, 
and 2) ICT industry. In turn, these industries retain subindustries. In 
telecommunications, these subindustries are for example mobile 
communications, data communications, Internet and fixed voice. In the 
Appendix 13 there are shown to where subindustries the cases belong. Telecom 
industry and sub-industry classifications are found for example in 
Communications Outlook (OECD, 2007; 2009). 
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2.3.7 The Research Framework 
 
In the following I outline the research framework of the focal study 
(Figures 5 and 6), which crystallize the theoretical discussion in Chapter 
2. The framework has two distinct parts: the first covers events and 
evolution on the industry and firm levels (Figure 5), whereas the second 
focuses on the strategic process within the company or its business units 
(Figure 6).   
 
 
 
Figure 5.  A theoretical framework describing the emergence of a dominant design on the 
corporate and industry levels 
 
As Figure 5 shows, the emergence of a dominant design on the corporate 
and industry levels involves firm-level factors, macro-level factors, 
adaptation and corresponding units of selection, and the environment 
and corporate life cycle. The firm-level and macro-level factors are in 
interaction, the end result of which is the adaptation process (i.e., the 
creation or adoption of the dominant design). As an outcome, the firm- 
and macro-level factors and the consequent adaptation change in a life-
cycle type of evolutionary process (Environment and corporate life-cycle). 
The firm-level factors could be broadly described as corporate 
strategizing, which I address along with company discontinuities. 
Specifically, I use Abernathy and Utterback’s (1978) and Miles and Snow’s 
(1978) typology (items 1-3): 1) product/market segment, 2) technology 
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selection, and 3) company governance processes (see Chapter 3.2.3 
Dominant design and strategy). The typology explicitly addresses the fit of 
the firm’s strategic choices with the environment – which is relevant to 
my research as I wish to explore the intertwining firm-level and macro-
level environmental factors. Company discontinuities (i.e., major strategic 
changes) are also positioned in the framework, representing major 
changes in managerial cognition (or dominant logic), or in other major 
developments such as mergers. 
In terms of macro-level factors, items 1-3 represent the building blocks 
and theoretical views of how a dominant design emerges. The building 
blocks may involve standards, network effects, regulation (institutional 
discontinuities), appropriability, technological change, and 
market/customer preferences. The intertwinement of firm-level and 
macro-level factors means, for example, that a company may benefit from 
or try to influence legislative regulation. 
The end result of this interaction is the overall adaptation (i.e. 
evolutionary) process. The following units are selected on the market 
level: dominant players, and dominant designs widely adopted on a grand 
scale such as the Internet and mobility (i.e. mobile phones as de facto 
communication devices). Processes of Variation, Selection, and Retention 
(VSR) also influence overall adaptation. The arrow in Figure 5 signifies 
environmental and corporate change.   
The second part of the framework describes how dominant designs are 
adapted within the company and its business units (Figure 6). 
 
 
 
Figure 6.  The creation of a dominant design on the company level 
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Figure 6 classifies the building blocks of dominant design in terms of 
transformation, sensing, and seizing phases. The end result is the design 
that the company has created or adopted, as well as its characteristics. 
Although the elements are on the company/business-unit level, they also 
intertwine somewhat with the industry-level elements (here 
market/customer preferences, technological change, appropriability, 
regulation, standards, and network effects). I discuss transformation first 
in the empirical part, given that dominant designs emerge as a cycle and 
there is typically earlier knowledge and a technological basis (e.g., Poole & 
Van de Ven, 2004, p.381; O’Reilly III & Tushman, 2008, p.202; Tripsas, 
2008). 
Specifically, in the transformation phase a certain (old) dominant 
design has an effect on the mindset of the company’s executives, typically 
resulting in a rather strong idea – a dominant logic – of how business is 
being and should be done. This dominant logic may have to be managed 
or changed (even abandoned) by the company in order to start the 
productization of new innovative ideas and, possibly, the rejection of old 
dominant designs. At the same time, changes in customer preferences and 
technology may be taking place on the industry level.  
The source of innovation in the sensing phase tends come from outside 
the focal company. Among the environmental conditions, legislative 
regulation are particularly important. Finally, the seizing phase is the 
laborious productization period. The most relevant building blocks to be 
managed are complementary assets, modularity, firm structure, 
ecosystem creation and partner management, the innovation portfolio, 
technological competence, and technological brokering. Among the 
environmental conditions, standards, network effects and the 
appropriability regime are among the most important. 
The end result (and unit of selection) of one cycle of these phases is the 
dominant design, and its nature and characteristics. It should be noted 
that unsuccessful innovations do not turn out to be dominant designs. 
 
 
2.4 The evolutionary context- industry and company history 
 
In this chapter, the empirical case history will be structured as follows. I 
will go through the history of the industry and case company applying the 
theoretical framework, the emergence of the dominant design at industry 
and corporate levels, as presented in Figure 5 in this Chapter. 
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I have organized the history into periods, but there is a certain 
discontinuity between them that stems from the environmental 
conditions (technology, regulation, competition, customers, and markets) 
and the case company’s structural changes and strategic decisions. 
The history of the industry and the case company is organized as 
follows. First, I describe the development of the telecom industry and 
Sonera from 1980 to 2010 including a general description of the broader 
telecom landscape. I then review the history of the market in Finland, the 
performance trends observable in the case company and finally depict the 
organizational history of Sonera. I then proceed to outline the historical 
eras and finally summarize these in Chapter 2.5.8. In Appendix 1 and 2, a 
detailed chronological history of environment’s key events and Sonera’s 
strategic decisions are presented. 
 
2.4.1 General- Telecom industry, Finland and Sonera 
 
Telecommunications is an important area of technology and has been at 
the heart of the most recent waves of technological (and subsequent 
societal) change. Indeed, after the eras of electricity and steel (1890s–
1940s) and steam power and railways (1840s–1890s), the mass adoption 
of telecommunications (1940–1990) has been a key driver of 
technological change (Fransman, 2001; Freeman & Soete, 1997, p. 19). 
Finland has been very progressive in the technological development of 
telecommunications. As early as the 1990s, the penetration rates of 
telecommunication services were high, partly due to the strong role of 
Finnish industry leaders such as Nokia and Sonera—the case company 
under study. In the area of mobile business the diffusion of mobile phones 
in Finland was also at a world record level: in 1999 Finland was ranked 
first in terms of the mobile penetration rate in western European 
countries, and mobile phone penetration had developed from 3% in 1988 
to 63% in 1999 to 91% in 2003 to 96% in 2004 (Sonera Annual report, 
1999, p.60; Telecom Statistics). 
Sonera has a history in Finland spanning more than 200 years (MINTC, 
2003; Turpeinen, 1996). It is thus a robust example of a 
telecommunications operator, and one that has experienced multiple 
industry changes and contributed to the changes in its industry. 
Especially in the 1990s, Sonera produced novel product and service 
  Towards a theoretical framework 
64 
 
categories (DataNet21, FastNet22, MobiCentrex23, Privatel24, premium rate 
service numbers25, Corporate number CID26) successful products and 
services (VPN27, Vipgate28), and world-class operating processes (e.g., 
GSM29 network planning that manifested to 50% EBITDA rates). Sonera 
was a top operator in the world and vendors and other operators in the 
world used Sonera as a ‘tele laboratory’ (e.g. Siemens and AT&T). In 
addition, Sonera incorporated and developed all the tele technologies at 
that time (e.g. SS730, ATM31, First international GPRS32/UMTS33 roaming 
and connectivity service (GRX), VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol), 
WLAN (Wireless Local Area Network), IMS (IP Multimedia System) and 
more generally interfaces between data, PSTN34  and mobile networks. 
Sonera also had symbiotic relationship with Nokia, and its own 
                                                   
21 DataNet combines a customer’s local area networks (LANs) in different 
locations into one single managed network entity, a VPN. 
22 With the help of FastNet, the customer could integrate their different offices 
into a joint network, which was controllable by network management. The 
network operated at transmission layer. 
23 Sonera MobiCentrex was a PBX Attendant [Switchboard operator] service 
that was implemented in the mobile phone network in such a way that the 
customer receives it as a service 
24 Privatel service integrates a company’s mobile phones into the company’s 
fixed telephone network and numbering. 
25 Premium service numbers make it possible for service providers (tele lawyers 
or hotlines provider) to do business in the telecom network. 
26 The service made it possible for B2B company customers to have one 
national (telephone) number. 
27 VPN created virtual networks to voice communication, also enabling a 
numbering solution to a company beyond the PSTN numbering. 
28 Vipgate was a new service concept, it was formed to design and create the 
comprehensive communications solution to companies, who had many sites. The 
concept included incoming traffic, internal traffic and outgoing traffic. 
29 Global System for Mobile communications 
30 Signaling System No. 7, a set of telephone signaling protocols. 
31 Asynchronous Transfer Mode. A multiplexing and routing technology for 
high-speed digitalcommunications that permits data, text, voice, video and 
multimedia signals to be transmitted simultaneously between 
network access points at speeds of up to 155 Mbps or more. 
32 General packet radio service (GPRS) is a packet oriented mobile data service 
on the 2G and 3G cellular communication systems. 
33 Universal Mobile Telecommunications Service 
34 Public Switched Telephone Network. A term for all the publicly available, 
interconnected telco networks. 
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technologically talented professionals and Professors (to name a few, 
Matti Makkonen, Esa Kerttula, Arto Karila, Olli Martikainen, Juha 
Heinänen, Mika Uusitalo). 
Broadly stated, the telecommunications industry incorporates carrier 
services (i.e., landline and mobile technologies to carry voice and data), 
end-user communications equipment, Private Branch eXchange (PBX) 
and key systems, circuit switching equipment, cellular mobile radio 
infrastructure, and transmission and other network equipment (EITO, 
2007, p. 249). From 2007 onwards, the telecommunications industry has 
increasingly merged with the Information Technology (IT) industry 
(including e.g., data processing equipment, data communications 
equipment, software and services) to form the ICT industry (EITO, 2007). 
This development is often referred to as industry and technological 
convergence. 
The telecommunications industry offers infrastructure, products, and 
services. The offerings have a layered systemic nature (for example, the 
widely used Open Systems Interconnection [OSI] is an effort to 
standardize computer networking), and the offerings are provided to end-
customers through a network of different players, that is, a value web 
(e.g., network and end device vendors, network and service operators, 
content creators; see, for example, TeliaSonera Annual report, 2007, p.13; 
TeliaSonera Investor Day, 2009; Suarez, 2004, p.272). The tasks of a 
telecommunications operator like Sonera have been network capacity 
planning and investment and prioritization of traffic. These tasks have 
been carried out by means of purchasing and developing the hardware 
and software in network and customer premises.  
In Finland market history, next, I review the usage of telecom industry 
services. 
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Figure 7 summarizes the usage of telecom industry services. The right axis 
depicts the number of subscriptions, and the left scale the number of service 
usage minutes. In 1997, mobile subscriptions overtook fixed subscriptions 
and later in 2004, the minutes used on mobiles was also higher than those 
on fixed subscriptions. Fixed broadband (i.e., a communication service that 
delivers communication channels with a bandwidth of 1.5Mbit/s or more) 
and currently mobile broadband have been, and remain, the growth areas. In 
early 2000, fixed broadband started to grow, continuing the emerging 
Internet usage in the late 1990s with a new technology (replacing the dial-up 
Internet usage, i.e., internet in a Public Switched Telephone Network [PSTN] 
telephone network). Yet, it took almost ten years, before mobile and Internet 
broadband truly converged; this is shown in the emerging growth of mobile 
broadband. Mobile data traffic is increasing at a rapid rate and will continue 
to do so with the advent of 4G/LTE35  mobile technology and ongoing 
developments in mobile smartphones (e.g., Apple’s iPhone). Voice over 
Internet Protocol (VoIP) call minutes also present the new growth, 
representing the unified communications36 (often carried out with Cloud 
Computing37 technology) dominant design era. VoIP minutes substitute the 
traffic originated from ISDN or standard access lines (also in Martikainen, 
2006b). 
The Finnish telecom operator field has throughout its history had three 
almost equal players. This is unique in the world, as there have been local 
monopolies, and not one monopoly in all business arenas (e.g., MINTC, 
2003). The players are the case company Sonera, Elisa (formerly HPY, 
Helsinki Telephone Association), and the Finnet Association. Elisa was 
earlier part of the Finnet Association before separating in 2001. 
Traditionally, the number of fixed voice subscriptions was split into three. 
In 1998, Sonera had 33% of the subscriptions. These subscriptions were in 
rural, sparsely populated areas and at the time Sonera had only 16% market 
share in fixed landline business in its competitor’s core geographical area, 
Southern Finland (Annual report, 1994, pp.12-13, Telecom Statistics, 1998). 
Sonera’s competitors have benefitted from their geographical location in the 
                                                   
35 Fourth Generation Mobile Technology, Long Term Evolution is a standard for 
wireless communication of high-speed data for mobile phones and data terminals. 
36 Unified Communications (and Collaboration), UC is the name given to the 
attempt by enterprises to bring all their disparate modes of communications 
together in a managed way, with one client by software communications 
applications (Gartner). 
37 Cloud Computing is the use of computing resources (hardware and software) 
that are delivered as a service over a network (typically the Internet). 
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big cities that gave access to the population and businesses during the 
history of telecoms. In the 1980s–1990s, the arrangement was that Sonera 
was a united national entity, but the local operators had actual monopolies in 
their areas. Before commercial competition started (after the founding of 
Datatie in 1985, a privately owned company), Sonera had monopolies in the 
mobile phone business, the trunk and international call business, and telex 
operations. 
Lately, new types of competitors have been emerging in the 
telecommunications sector. Traditionally, the access business and related 
carrier services formed telecom operators’ core business. More recently, 
Internet players such as Google started to target the access business, and 
consequently to affect the profitable traditional carrier services (also in 
OECD, 2007, p. 23). A second trend was that hardware players, such as 
Apple, Nokia, and Cisco, were entering the applications business, the same 
field where operators have an interest (TeliaSonera Investor day, 2009). 
These new types of competitors are also currently the top spenders in R&D 
investment terms, surpassing telecom operators (OECD, 2007, 2008). This 
industry evolution had consequences also to Sonera: it was no more 
innovating and introducing products and services first in the world. 
In terms of Sonera performance trends, Figure 11 presents the product 
portfolio development at Sonera, which also reflects the trends discussed 
earlier at industry level. Sonera’s revenues have stagnated and its 
profitability decreased despite the streamlined mode of the company 
(number of personnel). Figure 8 presents the product portfolio development 
at Sonera, which also reflects the trends discussed earlier at industry level. 
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Figure 8. Sonera revenue breakdown, EBITDA and personnel 1980–2010, Finland. (Annual 
report, 1998, TeliaSonera investor material, 2005, internal reports, Lukkonen, 2004). 
(Personnel, right scale, Revenues and EBITDA, million euro left scale) 
 
Sonera’s turnover increased sharply in the 1990s, but has stagnated since 
then (see Figure 8). Most notably, there was an increasingly strong role for 
mobile services, a decline in fixed voice, and a gradually increasing share of 
Internet and Data (i.e., the business area where data technology and data 
communication is used). The latter includes the growth of Unified 
Communications and Cloud Computing. 
In terms of organizational history of Sonera, Table 4 shows the dominant 
organization types at Sonera in 1985–2010, classified by whether the 
organization was primarily structured in Strategic Business Units (SBUs), or 
functional areas (F). The organization charts are shown in Appendix 3. 
 
Table 4.  Organization types in Sonera 1985–2010. 
 
 
Year 85-86 87-00 2001-05 2006-07 2008 2009-10 
SBU  *  *  * 
Functional *  *  * * 
 
 
In 1984, Sonera was organized by geographical numbering areas (Lukkonen, 
2004, p. 52). This organization type had no product or profit and loss 
structure (SBU) and consequently Sonera’s Chief Director was tasked with 
solving the product group division in tele-operations and with responsibility 
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for profit and loss. Consequently, the central administration was terminated 
and the telecom, telecommunications technical department, and radio 
departments were closed. Gradually, profit center thinking was introduced 
into Sonera. However, the culture was for a long time production-oriented 
(functional areas based), as the actual products were productized only at the 
beginning of the 1990s. 
Subsequently, in 1987 the organization was changed to reflect profit 
centers. In 1988, a Corporate Networks unit was founded, in order to attack 
competitors’ areas with B2B products. Later, in 1990, new business units 
(business services, mobile communications, and basic networks) were 
created along with regional units (Turpeinen, 1996, p. 363). In 1991, Sonera’s 
regional business organization was reorganized: from ten regional profit and 
loss units to six national units. The reason for the reorganization was cost-
cutting and the need for more efficient units (Annual report, 1991). In 1994, 
customer segments were added to product area management. In 1995, the 
SBU form of organizing was enhanced with the introduction of a separation 
between the network operator and service provider interfaces. The split also 
enhanced customer needs-based thinking in productization (while the earlier 
focus was largely on producing basic carrier services (e.g., traffic) as much as 
possible in separate technological organizational units). 
In 1998, Sonera was listed on the stock exchange. In the same year, a 
Sonera Solutions unit was established (i.e., a single organization for B2B 
products, except mobile services). This reflected the desire to provide 
complete and integrated offerings and product bundles instead of individual 
products for the business segment. 
In 2000, Sonera was divided into two separate and large SBUs: Mobile & 
Media and Telecom, but the split decision was overturned in 2001, when a 
convergent corporate model was established (see Appendix 3). This was an 
organization type that created a uniform customer interface (‘One Sonera’) 
across unit boundaries (Annual report, 2001, p.8). However, an expert from 
the time observes: 
 
“The SBU way of organizing Sonera has been the only model, where the 
management of one entity could be done in the smart way, because also the 
commercial product management had a big role. One time Sonera had a model 
where the sales had the idea that they were “a business responsible entity.” That 
meant they bypassed product management [One Sonera, Appendix 3, 2001 
organization structure]. This proved to be wrong and didn’t work in practice” 
(Informant 2, Quote 1). 
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After the merger with Telia in 2002, there was a shift to technology-based 
product management. R&D resources were downsized, and the company 
communicated its fast follower strategy (cf. Markides and Geroski, 2005). 
Customer service resources were increased (Annual Reports, 2003-2008). 
The organization had two corporate functions: (1) Marketing, Products and 
Services and (2) Networks and Technology. Profit centers were based on 
geography, not on business units. 
The merger enhanced the functional organization further, an example of 
this was the Focused Service Portfolio (FSP) project undertaken in 2004. It 
was a Group policy to migrate and end selected products based on 
technology meaning that SBUs played a minor role. Finland Country 
management felt the product streamlining criteria were wrongly based on 
technology, instead of on the customer need. Consequently, there were few 
resources to create new offerings, because of the time-consuming FSP 
project. In 2007, Integrated Enterprise Services (IES), a TeliaSonera 
headquarters unit focused on B2B customers was founded. The aim was to 
strengthen the position in the B2B segment and create a truly converged ICT 
offering and, thereby, new growth (Annual report, 2006). The founding of 
IES again marked the shift towards an SBU-based organization (where there 
was one organization for all B2B products). But there was once again a 
change back to a functional organization in 2008, when the IES organization 
was abandoned. Strong country organizations, especially in Sweden, did not 
want to provide resources and power to this IES organization. At the same 
time, the R&D and sales functions were centralized in Sweden. 
In 2009–2010, the business was organized into business areas, but the 
concentration of activities at headquarters and in Sweden continued, and 
Finland’s independence has been reduced further. 
Experienced interviewees explained the major trends in Sonera’s 
organization in the following way. 
 
“I think in management there has been big change when we merged Sonera and 
Telia. Starting from the 1980s, we have had profit and loss accountable units 
irrespective of the organizations, where sales, R&D, and production have been 
somehow under our control. Then the first mistake—the One Sonera organization 
restructuring [2001]—was made…That meant, for example, on a fixed voice business 
we didn’t speak of this kind of “Decision Point” [DP] joke. We had a real customer 
need, and it was said during the 1990s that the best way was to sell directly to 
customers. That way the organization starts to do real work; that was enough of “this 
sort of DP-process!” On the contrary, currently in TeliaSonera we have portfolio 
management and managerial layers, and you have no commanding control from 
product to customers. This new management culture leads to all the energy going 
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into the prioritization of projects, DP processes and reallocating of resources”. 
(Informant 5, Quote 1) 
 
 “We had no timetables in the 1990s and products were just started in management 
groups and we had no formal procedures, things were just invented and 
implemented” (Informant 58, Quote 1). 
 
 
2.5 The evolutionary context - historical eras 
 
In this section, I review the historical eras that emerged from the 
periodization of the data. I first discuss the critical events in the environment 
(regulation, technology, competition, customers, and market) (see Appendix 
2). After that, I review strategic actions of Sonera (Appendix 1), namely the 
structural changes to the company, and strategic decisions concerning 
technologies, products, and investments. By investigating Sonera’s actions, I 
also preliminarily discuss the changes in the cognitive mindset of the 
company’s management in different eras. 
 
2.5.1 The era of telecom monopolies (1980–1986) 
 
Telecommunications is a regulated industry. The legislative regulative bodies 
have traditionally addressed a variety of issues, and continue to do so. 
However, the regulatory issues have also changed dramatically during the 
period under scrutiny (from 1980 to 2010). Pressure to change legislative 
regulation was a key theme in the era of telecom monopolies (from 1980 to 
1986). 
Regulation and Technology. In 1919, a telegraph law was enacted granting 
the Government a monopoly over the provision of telegraph services. This 
law was very unclear, and became more so as services such as teletext, 
videotext, telefax, and data communications emerged subsequently. Sonera 
was of the opinion that provision of these services should be a monopoly. On 
the other hand, Sonera did not have permission to operate data business in 
competitors’ areas. Consequently, the period between 1970 and 1986 was 
time of local and national monopolies granted by legislation in Finland 
(Häikiö, 1995; Turpeinen, 1996; Nyström, 2008; Mäenpää& Luukkainen, 
1994). The monopolies concerned data communications, mobile traffic, and 
fixed voice (i.e., local calls, national calls, and international calls). 
Fundamental progress was made in technology development in all sectors: 
fixed voice and data, mobile technologies, and even ICT. In fixed voice, 
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signaling protocols between switches (i.e., Signaling System No. 7 known as 
SS7) were developed in 1980, in order to create rich call-related services. 
Accordingly, a new service area emerged in the industry: value-added voice 
services and manifesting this development, American Telephone and 
Telegraph Company (AT&T) implemented toll-free service numbers in the 
USA in 1982. A closely related technology, Direct In Dialing (DID), was also 
developed in 1983 in the USA. This was used in the emerging Call Center and 
Toll-Free service number business. 
In data technology, X.2538  was an emerging standard protocol for data 
communications (1977), which replaced circuit switched data transfer. 
However, as early as 1982, the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and 
Internet Protocol (IP) (TCP/IP a foundation of the ICT era) as an emerging 
standard was seen as a challenger. In March 1982, the US Department of 
Defense declared it as the standard for military computer networking 
(Fransman, 2001, 2002a, 2002b). However, though the development was 
rapid in data technologies, a significant amount of traffic and infrastructure 
was in fixed voice networks. In order to rationalize the usage of voice and 
data infrastructure, multiplexer (MUX)39  technology emerged, and Sonera 
(at that time Posts and Telecommunications of Finland), also pressed by 
competitors such as Elisa (at that time HPY), was active in MUX technology. 
The local telecom firms in Finland also started to have their own MUX-
networks, and Sonera felt it was losing the battle with them. Consequently, 
Sonera needed to get the MUX-network ready, and eventually did so in 1981. 
In MUX technology, the fixed data lines’ usage was rationalized using 
telephone networks, while broadband trunk lines were used with time-
divisioning techniques to separate caller lines. 
In mobile technology, Nordic Mobile Telephone Service (NMT-450 MHz) 
(1982) was a standard developed by Nordic incumbent operators. Sonera 
had an active role in this development. NMT-450 was an automatic network, 
contrary to the earlier Radio Car Phone [ARP 150 MHz] manual network. In 
1986, the NMT-900 MHz standard was in use, complementing the earlier 
standard. An important point in the development of the NMT-900 standard 
occurred when Sonera ordered an NMT-900 switching center from Nokia. 
Sonera had previously ignored the Nokia option, although the firm had 
competency in fixed DX200-switches. This also meant competition in the 
                                                   
38 An ITU-T standard protocol suite for packet switched wide area network (WAN) 
communication. (Wikipedia). 
39 Multiplexer, In telecommunications multiplexing is a method by which multiple 
analogue message signals or digital data streams are combined into one signal over a 
shared medium. 
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vendor business of Finland (earlier Ericsson, a Swedish vendor, had a 
monopoly in Finland), and for many years the relations between Sonera and 
Nokia were symbiotic. 
A reform bill affecting the telecommunications legislation was presented to 
the Finnish parliament in 1984. Among its important elements were 
proposals to allow the operation of new tele services by third parties, to 
liberalize end-user terminals or end-devices40  , to enforce a separation of 
authoritative regulation and telecommunications operations by Posts and 
Telegraphs of Finland (later Sonera), and to create an interconnection 
obligation to transfer traffic among operators. The interconnection 
obligation was important to Sonera and local telecoms; the local telecoms 
could transfer traffic more widely, and Sonera would also gain access to local 
monopolies and their customers. However, the legislative proposal was 
unclear and did not address the most important question at the time, namely 
the license to run data business. Consequently, Sonera’s competitor Elisa (at 
that time HPY) founded, de facto illegally, the Datatie Company, in order to 
embark on data transmission business and later landline trunk call business 
(Häikiö, 1995). 
Competition, Customers, and Market. During the era in question, 
competition was increasing in the telecommunications sector. One 
manifestation of this was the digitalization of the telecom network switches 
and the usage of fiber cables in 1985, which made local telecom operators 
(e.g., Finnet Association) more competitive. A time and data usage based 
business model was used in the market, and this was profitable for telecom 
players. Nevertheless, the telecom services were proprietary and no adjacent 
industries were then entering the market to compete. 
Customers and the market also reflected the development in data and 
mobile technology. In 1984, new trends emerged: microcomputers (for 
example Nokia MikroMikko, IBM PC), a new networking need in data 
services (where the purpose was to connect separate networks, such as 
corporate networks), networked personal data processing, and decentralized 
data processing (Hewlett-Packard, in Ficom, 2005). In addition, the mobile 
phones started also to diffuse to the B2B segment in Finland in 1985. 
Sonera’s structural changes and strategic decisions. In the era of telecom 
monopolies, it was still possible for Sonera to develop, investigate, and invest 
                                                   
40 It was a common practice that telecom operators bundled the end-device with 
services (e.g., in Helsinki, Elisa had Ericsson’s end devices) and end-devices were a 
monopoly business and restricted competition. 
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in some technologies (e.g., videotex41  and service numbers) and standards in 
a somewhat secure way, initially without competition. In addition, the firm 
had ample time to start transforming the state-owned entity into a real 
business. A manifestation of this was the decision to transform the Regional 
Tele districts into profit centers in Sonera in 1985. The most severe threat to 
Sonera was the advent of data competition. 
Pekka Tarjanne was appointed Director General of Posts and Telegraphs of 
Finland in 1977 (later becoming Secretary General of the International 
Telecommunications Union [ITU] in 1989). He wanted Sonera to help 
develop Finland into an information society. The previous Director General, 
Oiva Saloila commented that during Tarjanne’s period, the relations with the 
private telephone operators were, however, worse than ever. The 
deteriorating relationship culminated in the so-called tele wars, over the 
division of work between Sonera and local telecom operators (Turpeinen, 
1996). Kurt Nordman, the CEO of Elisa (then HPY), commented that “the 
attempt of Posts and Telegraphs of Finland to stop HPY’s business in data 
communications, was also a stimulus to Elisa to start its journey to a 
business organization from bureaucracy and establishment” (Häikiö, 1995, 
p. 50). 
Even when Sonera was a public sector organization, it had strong 
ambitions. For example in 1981, a separate telephone laboratory was 
founded: the Telecom Research Center. Sonera played an important role in 
national-level R&D through the Telecom Research Centre and later through 
other ‘tele-laboratories’ for mobile, fixed voice, and data communications 
areas. It also explored new technology-based businesses, for instance, 
Videotex, a system that provided interactive content and displayed it on a 
television set. Experimentation was encouraged by the legislative regulators 
having a liberal attitude to competition between manufacturers in Finland 
(foreign manufacturers were allowed to operate in Finland), which also 
created a lively telecommunications ecosystem in the country. A 
characteristic of the market in Finland is the ample number of different 
signaling protocols between telecom networks and technologies. 
Consequently, vendors and telecom operators need to develop hardware, 
software, and services capable of working in this heterogeneous 
environment. More specifically, “If it [the telecom service] works in Finland 
with tens of operators, then it is safe for worldwide deliveries” 
(Telecommunications Policy, 2003, p. 14). 
                                                   
41 Videotex is any system that provides interactive content and displays it on a 
television. (Wikipedia) 
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Sonera had decided to start building its own data transfer network in 
February 1975, thus also restraining private telecom companies from 
building their own networks and limiting overcapacity. Sonera had also 
progressed on other fronts. It adopted the digital DX200 switch in Korppoo 
town, in 1980. This was important in terms of digitalization, as it gradually 
made new services possible in the telecommunication network. 
Furthermore, Sonera continued the planning of Integrated-Services for 
Digital Network (ISDN)  in 1985, which made available new data services on 
circuit switched technology in telephone networks. In addition, in the same 
year, Sonera started to digitalize local switching centers on a greater scale, 
which permitted new services and the rationalization of operations 
(Turpeinen, 1996). 
Sonera was also a pioneer in mobile technologies and services, developing 
the NMT 450 standard in 1982 and the NMT 900 standard in 1986 together 
with other Nordic telecom operators. Sonera subsequently built these 
networks in Finland. In the area of mobile business development, Sonera 
took part in the design work on the Global System for Mobile 
communications (GSM), a new digital mobile system, and made the decision 
to transition to GSM in 1983. 
 
2.5.2 The era of the liberalization of telecommunications and data 
business (1987-1992) 
 
A new telecommunications law was implemented in Finland in 1987, and 
after that, competitive licenses to operate telecommunication businesses 
were granted in stages (MINTC, 2003). The opening up of competition had 
its roots in Datatie (the aforementioned company established by Elisa/HPY) 
and in Yritysverkot (Sonera’s subsidiary for the corporate sector) and 
eventually in the birth of Radiolinja in 1992, which was the new subsidiary of 
Elisa in mobile communications. Datatie and Yritysverkot were first granted 
country-wide licenses in 1988. Due to the competitive pressures in 1987–
1992, Sonera was able to sow the seeds of its later major successes. 
Regulation and Technology. In technology development, breakthroughs 
were made in all sectors: fixed voice, data communications, and mobile 
communication. In 1988, the Comite Consultatif International des 
Radiocommunications (CCITT, a telecom standard making body) had 
defined the ISDN protocol. ISDN was a digital standard for carrying data and 
voice simultaneously. In line with this, Sonera productized the 2 Mbit Voice 
access in 1987. This was a more efficient digital subscriber connection line to 
customer premises. Over and beyond the progress in the fixed voice area, 
  Towards a theoretical framework 
77 
 
there was new technology emerging in data transmission technology, namely 
routing42. In 1988, a new routing technology was jointly manufactured by 
CISCO and Sonera. The third breakthrough was in the mobile 
communications area, as the digital mobile technology GSM was 
implemented in Sonera’s new network in Finland in 1992. In the GSM 
period, the interest of the top management in R&D was evident; Sonera was 
involved in high-profile GSM standardizing committees. GSM was the first 
mobile network technology to introduce competition to the mobile business. 
Earlier, in NMT periods, the business was operated only by ‘backbone 
operators’.43 
In legislative regulation, one further event was important. After the 
telecommunications law came into force in 1987, the selling of end-terminals 
was liberalized in 1988, as part of the policy of reregulation and 
liberalization. The development of services was easier when the operator 
obtained a hold on the sales of end-terminals. Therefore, Sonera started its 
own import of end-terminals (consisting of NMT phones, videotex end-
terminals, and PBXs) in 1990. 
Competition, Customers, and Market. Competition started gradually 
between telecom operators in the data business. A byproduct of competition 
soon emerged, in the mobile communications business. With the advent of 
the new GSM mobile technology, HPY’s General Director Kurt Nordman 
began the process of establishing a new operator in the Finnish market in 
1988. The new operator was also financed by Finland’s private banks, 
insurance companies, and franchising groups (Häikiö, 1995, p. 103). Despite 
Sonera trying to block Radiolinja’s mobile operator license for GSM in 1989 
(on the grounds that local telecom operators would gain too strong a 
position), Radiolinja was granted the license and entered the mobile 
communications market in 1992 with a new GSM network. GSM was thus 
the first technology to open up competition in mobile communications. 
In the customers and market areas, there was a need to develop the call 
center business in 1989. The business was important due to growing 
customer businesses and consequently the need to network company sites 
with telecom services and infrastructure. 
                                                   
42 Routing is a process of selecting the best paths in a network (Wikipedia) 
43 Backbone operator refers to i) Backbone network, and ii) Bit pipe. i) is 
associated to the part of a network used as the primary path for transporting traffic 
between network segments (distinct from the access portions of the network) and ii) 
to a way of expressing a telecom company offers only capacity, not value-added 
services. 
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Sonera’s structural changes and strategic decisions. In summary, in the 
era of liberalization of telecommunications and data business (1987–1992), 
Sonera was active in all areas: reorganizations and internal processes, 
technology development, and investments. 
To start with, the period from 1987 to 1992 was active in terms of internal 
management, and early signs of scaling up operations and economies of scale 
were seen. In the early 1990s, a more customer-oriented working mode 
started to emerge. This appeared in the form of, for instance, solution sales 
(tailored services to large companies), IP design (Internet Protocol 
architecture planning), and close relations to top companies in service 
development and piloting of new services44 , and roadmap plans. This 
customer-oriented working mode, or these best practices, were used and 
diffused to nearly every SBU in Sonera in the 1990s. The new 
entrepreneurial SBU product units were created along with a new marketing 
concept TeleGate, in which the products for the TOP 3000 segment (the 
3000 largest companies in Finland) were combined, especially for datacom 
and B2B fixed voice and value added services (see Appendix 3, organization 
charts). In addition to new SBUs, a Service Development Unit was founded 
in 1991 to design and develop the firm’s B2B services and complex systems 
management. A key Sonera employee recalls that time: 
 
“Innovation was definitely a key point in the late 1980s, the time was right for 
alternative offerings. If we remember the early 1990s and the fixed customer 
network, we could quite easily create this kind of total offering, where we could 
integrate all customer services through one platform. The benefit was the 
manageability of the whole value chain—voice and data—and the model was also 
cost effective. Elisa’s rented copper lines were expensive; we replaced this model” 
(Informant 16, Quote 1). 
 
At that time, however, a threat was also perceived, that there would possibly 
be a total collapse of Sonera’s business, potentially caused by its losing the 
data business and trunk business. Consequently, a project labelled “Star 
Wars” was announced in Sonera (Informant 55). Star Wars was a reference 
to the epic American movie, and its themes of fighting against an evil empire 
(in this case, the competitor Elisa). The target was to attack the local 
                                                   
44 An example of piloting appeared in 1989, when Sonera created an internal 
corporate network, combining the proprietary “IBM-network” and the emerging IP-
network. This was an important project for the future, because it created resources 
and knowledge in the company that could be employed to productize corporate 
networks for customers in the future; for example the world’s largest ATM network 
was built in 1996 for the Finnish National Insurance Establishment [KELA]. 
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telephone companies with the best possible technology. The most important 
competitor, Elisa, chose a different path: obtaining private financing to buy 
state-of-the-art products from Nokia. Sonera used companies like Cisco in 
order to attack its competitors, which used closed and expensive telecom 
products. In Sonera’s business model, the target was to offer effective and 
fast data connections with the expensive local access playing a minor role in 
the whole offering. Sonera’s business model was seen as a managed service 
concept targeted at the system integrator market: 
 
“The system integrator market was born at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s when 
Personal Computers [PCs] diffused. PCs were the trigger to plan and reorganize the 
business. System integrators were not present during mainframes and stupid 
terminals, because there was not actually anything to be integrated” (Informant 36, 
Quote 1). 
 
In Finland, Sonera also equipped itself to compete with local telecom 
companies in the fixed voice communications market. One tool it employed 
to do so was a new corporate subscription model. The decision to productize 
this model was made in 1987. It was the first attempt in the voice area to 
attack competitors’ areas. The operative way to attack competitors’ switches 
was progressive. With 2 Mbit technology (and also due to liberalization), it 
was possible to enter the competitors’ corporate segment, first in the region 
of the capital, Helsinki, and then other competitor areas (e.g., other major 
cities in Finland, Tampere and Turku). A key manager at Sonera recalls: 
 
“In the mid-1980s, I got the job to create sales organizations at Sonera, which I did 
and which took form in different settings. One was linked to regulation at that time; 
we got permission to offer company subscriptions in competitors’ areas, and offered 
company subscriptions in former local telecoms areas and it was a really a 
revolutionary thing. The local telecoms held that against us for years. With those 
company subscriptions, we attracted companies to a “kind of total solution. The 
subscription was based on the “corporate subscription bypass phenomenon.” This 
meant we could bypass competitors’ expensive local access lines and offer Sonera’s 
comprehensive services to competitors’ customers. Consequently we moved into a 
positive spiral: The market fed us and if we think of innovations and organization’s 
operative capability, this era was actually a fundamental prerequisite for Sonera 
being an innovative company. These events happened in the early 1990s; in the late 
1990s the situation changed” (Informant 20). 
 
Furthermore, on the technology side, Sonera invested in a trunk network of 
optical cables in 1987. It actually started using these in competitors’ areas as 
well, after a decision to invest 158 million Finn marks into the area around 
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Helsinki 1992–1996. In 1991, the company also invested in an Intelligent 
Network (IN), and in this way, the physical infrastructure and management 
layer of telephone networks could be separated. The adoption and nurturing 
of IN technology was seen to be very important from the perspective of 
economies of scale and the possibility of creating new services from software. 
 
2.5.3 The era of intense competition and growth in mobile business 
(1993-1998) 
 
A typical feature of this era was the emerging technological convergence with 
mobile and Internet technology. This was seen as the growth driver for the 
future, along with mobile business, and was envisioned as having an effect 
on a global scale. In addition, the liberalization of the market continued in 
Finland, which intensified competition and brought pressure to find more 
flexible and cost-efficient production methods. 
Regulation and Technology. In terms of legislative regulation, the 
liberalization of the Finnish market continued apace. In 1994, national and 
international long distance telephone calls were fully deregulated. The 
legislative regulator also required that geographical numbering areas should 
be harmonized into larger entities in 1995, and operators were obliged to 
lease network capacity to other operators in 1996. The abandoning of the 
numbering areas meant that Sonera could compete as a national player. The 
obligation for operators to lease network capacity, in turn, offered more 
opportunities for local area competition for Sonera. In line with this, in 1996 
a new divisional split was implemented in Sonera, at the request of the 
legislative regulator. Specifically, the basic network business area was split 
into a network operator (NO) business division and voice service operator 
(SO) division. A similar split was carried out for mobile business. One 
interviewee (Informant 12) described this as important, because there could 
now be two earning logics: standard bulk-based volume business (network) 
and a new customer-based service operator model; earlier there was merely 
one vertical product organization. 
Another key event in 1994 was the granting of the first licenses to service 
providers. This marked the first time a new kind of competitor entered the 
telecom sector. At first, there were quite exotic players entering the market, 
for example Telivo (a spinoff of the state-owned power company Imatran 
Voima [IVO]), using the power grid as a backbone network platform. They 
started offering limited fixed, national long distance and international 
services in 1993, and mobile services in 1998. (Telecom Policy, 11). However, 
the most visible in the market were the new Internet Service Providers 
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(ISPs); the first commercial, consumer-focused mass market ISPs were 
launched (Eunet, Scifi) (Suhonen, 2002, p. 141). 
In technology itself, there was development in fixed voice, mobile, and data 
communications, as well as a new event: the emergence of Internet 
technology. In fixed voice and later also in mobile, Intelligent Networks (IN) 
were used and developed actively in Sonera. The related standards were 
documented in the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). In the 
mobile communications business, Intelligent Networks were also used and 
new services such as Short Messaging Service (SMS) were possible due to 
newly introduced digital mobile communications technologies (especially 
GSM). With the help of IN technology, adapted and developed from Bell 
Laboratories (formerly a R&D unit of AT&T in the USA), the physical 
infrastructure and management layer of telephone networks could be 
separated. This subsequently enabled the management of volume mass-
produced products, and the technology diffused to many other product areas 
in Sonera (e.g., Vipgate, service numbers, value added mobile products in 
B2B segment). In general, before the new technology such as IN, the telecom 
industry was seen as a closed or vertical system (e.g., Yoffie, 1997, p.18). An 
expert from Sonera’s mobile business explains this in the following way: 
 
“On the consumer and corporate side, this mobile environment has progressed in 
evolutionary way from a closed ecosystem to an open platform enabling system; if 
we look at the old telecommunications environment, there you must define all 
products as a network feature” (Informant 37). 
 
A head of R&D in Sonera at that time also explained the importance of IN. 
However, the situation was not so black and white, as another mobile expert 
in Sonera explains: 
 
“I saw that the services are software and we must develop the software competence 
in our company in order to develop products and services instead of only bulk traffic 
in network. The first IN solution, enabling service creation, we made with Nokia 
Data which became later ICL. In 1996, we succeeded in everything; we had IN and 
Telecommunications Management Network [TMN] and interfaces to GSM, we were 
the first operator in Europe who owned all the interfaces with computers, mobile 
networks, and telecom networks”. “And actually the bit pipe is good for an operator 
in this oligopolistic situation if we don’t spoil the pricing” (Informant 7, 37) 
 
In this era of emerging, intense competition, and growth of the 
communications mobile business, the cost structure also changed 
dramatically. Further, for the first time there was productization within the 
company. Before that, functional and regional units merely produced bulk 
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traffic under the constraints of the Finnish state budget. Gradually, a closed, 
dedicated production infrastructure was opened up and products were easier 
to manufacture. In the data business, for example, the new routing 
technology (Cisco in 1988) was a manifestation of this: 
 
“This telecom infrastructure is somewhat more complicated than the computer, but 
there has been the same development in the telecom production machine as in 
computers. If we begin in 1985, then the telephone exchange was mainly dedicated 
technology, it was the world’s largest computer planned to be a telephone exchange. 
These datacom datacenters were built by a couple of telephone exchange vendors, 
big dedicated mills, which cost some 10 million Finn mark a piece. Then in parallel 
came Nokia, the first to start building telephone exchanges on top of a computer. 
You could buy this hardware from a store, dispersed automatic data processing to a 
telephone network. Cisco in particular has been a forerunner in data networks, 
which started to bring miraculous cheap hardware and dispersed routing to the 
network. This is seen in our whole infrastructure, there the infra changed at the 
same time as Cisco’s routers etcetera appeared. The production costs have been 
going down dramatically, it is totally different when you are developing software to 
serve readymade standard hardware. The new capabilities have been created in the 
doing of these first products, FastNet, Privatel, Corporate number service and these 
have not been known as a concept either, because earlier you could just move 
information from place A to place B”. (Informant 5, Quote 2) 
 
In 1994, Cordless Telephony [CT2-CT3] technology was a pre-stage of 
mobility in PBX and later DECT (Digital Enhanced Cordless 
Telecommunications)45 system, meaning that wireless calls were planned to 
run with a cordless telephony standard. However, CT2-CT3 and DECT were 
not a success due to limited mobility and functionality but caused a boom in 
the PBX business area. Actually, in Finland NMT and GSM standards 
overrode CT2-CT3 and DECT. A similar kind of embryonic development was 
in Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) technology in 1995, a sign of later 
convergence of voice transmission and data networks. In turn, the Internet 
technologies in 1996—Hypertext Markup Language (HTML), Hypertext 
Transfer Protocol (HTTP), and Uniform Resource Locator (URL)—were an 
immediate success that created a new business, a pressure on the current 
Videotex business, and to the whole vertical telecom infrastructure. They 
also foreshadowed the later period of IT hype (1999–2000). 
In mobile technology, the 3G-UMTS (a third-generation mobile 
technology) standard introduced in 1997 represented efforts to integrate 
                                                   
45 DECT is used primarily in home and small office systems, but is also available in 
many PBX systems for medium and large businesses 
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mobile and the Internet. In the same year, another working technology 
introduced was the GSM Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) standard. It 
was a technical standard for accessing information over a mobile wireless 
network; it was built on GSM technology in order to create telecom operator-
led convergence between mobile and the Internet. 
Competition, Customers, and Market. In the competition, over and above 
the development of service providers, Finnet International received a license 
to start an international calls business in 1993. HPY (Elisa) entered the 
Internet business with the Kolumbus brand in 1994. Elisa’s operations were 
privatized in 1994, and in 1996, the Finnet alliance (local landline telecom 
operators) was established. In 1997, Elisa entered the market with new GSM 
1800 technology enabling wireless Cityphone. In 1998, Radiolinja and 
FinnetCom became subsidiaries of Elisa. In the market arena, fueled by the 
technological developments of the Internet, a boom occurred, and was 
accompanied by the founding of Netscape (US internet company; web 
browser). In the same vein, in Finland, a mobility boom started to emerge in 
1995, with the advent of GSM applications for the consumer segment. 
Sonera’s structural changes and strategic decisions. At Sonera, Aulis Salin 
was appointed as the Managing Director in 1993. Organizational 
restructuring, new ways of segmenting markets, the seeking of growth, 
technology development, and new services were the most important aims in 
this period. 
Aulis Salin had clear visions about the elements important for markets and 
thereby for Sonera in the future. Specifically, looking towards the turn of the 
millennium, the following were seen as key elements: flexible billing, 
reachability of customers, customer satisfaction and the quality of services. 
In addition, telecommunications was a key element of companies business, 
substantial resources for marketing were needed, and Sonera needed to be 
growth oriented and aggressive (Turpeinen, 1996, p. 13). 
In 1996, organizational changes were made: seven divisions, and sales and 
marketing units were introduced, and network and service layers were 
separated in Sonera. Earlier in 1994 there had already been a renewed focus 
on segmentation: it was now done in four key areas: the industry, public 
administration, banking, and trading sector. 
Three issues stand out as the most important for Sonera in this period: 
Further attacks on competitors’ geographical and business areas, R&D 
investments in the emerging mobile and media sector, and seeking new 
growth through globalization. 
In 1993, Sonera decided to invest in the local network covering the 
competitor’s major cities. This was a counterattack on the activities and 
concentration of forces of the main competitors, Elisa and Finnet Group. 
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In the growth of the mobile business, starting from 1994, Sonera benefited 
from its assets. These assets were identified as follows: marketing power; a 
broad customer base; good profitability; a wide outlet network (delivery 
chain policy); strategic and operative network planning supporting a cost-
efficient network, building and management; well managed network 
modernization; competitive network coverage and quality; CAPEX-
management; cellular planning; and roaming contracts. 
In 1997, Sonera’s R&D investments were directed toward mobile 
communications and multimedia, IN technology, software-based 
management, and information systems. In retrospect, these investments 
were not very productive, but did give rise to some (rather marginal) new 
services, such as a GSM Postcard, and ordering Coca-Cola by phone 
(Informants 6, 45, 22). Top management, consultants, and financial backers 
were the source of activity, which led to product and service development. 
One example of seeking global growth was the early investments abroad. 
These included a minority share of Turkish telecom operator, Turckell. Here, 
Sonera’s target was to become a Turkish GSM operator, and in 1993, the firm 
offered to build a GSM network in Turkey (Turckell). The decision was 
difficult, as Sonera was a state-owned company and the investment was seen 
as risky. In addition, there was also pressure on the Finnish mobile business 
sparked by aggressive competition with Elisa (Radiolinja) (Marttila, 2002). 
While Sonera’s investment in Turkey proved successful, at that time it had 
even more opportunities to grow and leverage its technological excellence. In 
1994, Cisco Communications was investing in VoIP technology, but, in that 
time, the VoIP technology needed to be integrated into PBX’s with the SS7 
signaling technology. Sonera was an expert at this, and Cisco wanted to buy 
Sonera’s knowledge and cooperate, but Sonera’s top management team was 
reluctant at that time. In the same vein, Nokia wanted Sonera to develop the 
maintenance and management of Nokia’s IN networks and switches. Sonera 
also turned that opportunity down. 
However, the focus was clear: it was internationalization. To that end, 
Sonera even started two subsidiaries in Germany for data services and 
electronic payment in 1997. Global mobile Internet was also a focus, 
although still embryonic. 
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2.5.4 The era of IT hype - the convergence of mobile and Internet 
business (1998-2000) 
 
This period was characterized by minor developments in technology and 
legislative regulation. Technologies introduced in the earlier eras were now 
used effectively in order to grow profitably. Sonera’s technological expertise 
sparked over confidence among the top management, which sanctioned 
investment in 3G/UMTS and mobile portals such as Zed46 . In turn, there 
was activity in the Finnish competitive landscape. Even more importantly, 
Sonera undertook international activity on many geographical fronts and 
product and technology areas. The stock market valuation of telecom 
operators and Internet service providers skyrocketed in this period, and 
Sonera was no exception. Consequently, Sonera’s top management took big 
business risks and totally changed its strategy and organization (see 
Vesterinen, 2009, p.138). 
Regulation and Technology. In technology, the mobile General Packet 
Radio Service (GPRS) standard was introduced in 2000 to substitute for 
UMTS technology, because UMTS was not yet running operatively. GPRS is 
a packet based mobile data service, which enhances the mobile data 
transmission speed. In the regulation area, minor mobile communications 
technologies (Autonet, ARP and paging service) were deregulated from 
license obligations. In addition, global telecommunications were fully 
deregulated in 1998. 
Competition, Customers, and Market. In competition terms, in 1998, 
global and local mobile service operators entered the Finnish market and 
Elisa abandoned the Finnet Group in 1999 to gain freedom to pursue market 
opportunities. In 2000, Sonera was a market leader in Finland in all major 
businesses, and number two in local landline voice. 
The stock market valuations of the companies operating in the 
telecommunications market were soaring, as investors anticipated 
extraordinary business growth from the new IT and mobile services. Sonera 
was a case in point. In November 1998, Sonera’s share price was EUR 17, and 
by March 2000 had climbed to EUR 97. The HEX general index at the same 
time period was not as volatile as Sonera’s share price development (Annual 
report, 2000, p.79). One informant recalled that in Sonera’s internal meeting 
                                                   
46 Sonera Zed, a global wireless portal, which links a mobile phone with Internet 
services, was launched in 1999. By means of the Zed mobile portal, the customer 
could personalize the mobile phone menu that is loaded on his or her phone, and 
pick the desired services from a selection predetermined for the phone (Sonera 
Annual report, 1999, p.58). 
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for personnel, the Head of Communication presented PowerPoint slides 
showing how valuable Sonera was, stating that with Sonera’s market 
valuation one could buy six British Airways companies. 
In 1998, the name of the case company was changed from Telecom Finland 
Ltd to Sonera Ltd, before the company was taken public in the same year. 
The rationale for going public was to permit larger operations globally that 
would enhance the credibility of the company. At that time, the Finnish 
Government sold 22% of its Sonera shares. As the Managing Director, Kaj-
Erik Relander, stated in 2000, the duty of management was to increase the 
value of the company, and this was no longer possible as a national state 
business. 
In order to go public, Sonera needed a story to be sold to international 
investors. To put it briefly, Sonera pinpointed that it was concentrating on a 
customer focus, R&D, and the business opportunities resulting from the 
convergence of telecommunications and information technology (Annual 
report, 1998; Relander, Sonera international growth strategy, 1999). What 
was new compared to the earlier, approach was the statement that Sonera 
would also focus on the system integrator market. As a result, Sonera was 
sold to investors as a “global and profitable first-mover in mobile world” 
(Marttila, 2002, p. 70), with promises that Sonera’s services like the Zed 
“will be the Yahoo! of the mobile world” (Yahoo being the most successful 
Internet portal of the time). 
Sonera’s structural changes and strategic decisions. The period 1998-1999 
was a very active time with regard to strategy: the top management group 
was analyzing industry maps, opportunity domains, different scenarios, 
Sonera’s current and future competences, and discontinuities (Sonera 
strategy versions, Project Reason; Scenarios, 1999, Appendix 10, 11). The 
following discontinuities were taken as examples, thereby creating a new 
basis for competition analysis: new types of competitors and from a different 
industry would enter, the barriers to entry would disappear, cost structures 
would change, owning the customer versus access to the customer would 
become a key question, channel management would be important, and 
branded services marketing would grow in importance. A related 
development plan was developed for the company, whereby Sonera would 
have a leading role, but with a different emphasis than it had had earlier 
(Appendix 11). Specific targets for the global projects were to “identify and 
prioritize a limited number of business areas, where Sonera can reach a 
global market leader position.” In this regard, the Annual report 1999 
states: 
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“In the spring of 1999, Sonera Corporation’s Board of Directors sharpened the 
Group’s strategy toward an emphasis on achieving growth within global service 
operations. Sonera estimates that over the next three years it will spend a total of 
EUR 500 million on developing new services. As part of the implementation of its 
strategy, as of January 1, 2000, Sonera has also introduced a new business 
organization in which the businesses of mobile communications, media 
communications and new services comprise the new Mobile and Media business 
area, whereas the fixed network businesses and other operations comprise the 
Telecom business area.” 
 
Overall, ambition was high in Sonera: The earnings from new service 
businesses were zero in 1998, while the target set in 1999 for 2005 was EUR 
2000 million, including such services as Zed which was a mobile portal. In 
turn, the Mobile business was seen to be worth EUR 1000 million even in 
1998, but EUR 7000 million was targeted for 2005. This target was to be 
achieved by acquisitions, expansion, and creating partnerships. In addition, 
the fixed network operator businesses were worth EUR 1000 million in 1998 
and the target was EUR 2000 million in 2005, to be achieved by being more 
effective, through restructuring or divesting. 
The top management team and the consultant firm Strategos analyzed 
Sonera’s competencies and identified groups that would be valuable in the 
new industry domain (EMT [Enterprise Management Team] Project Reason, 
Sonera 1999). The groups identified were skills and knowledge, technologies 
and systems, culture and values, processes and structure, and strategic 
assets. In addition to the old components, new critical components (shown 
in italics in figure 12), were also seen as new core competencies and new 
success products to be developed (shown in a lighter shade in the figure). On 
top of the previous customer value proposition (rapid, reputable, and 
responsive) a new one was created. This was termed Smart Partner, which 
meant 1) a global reach (focus on services and solutions for selected 
industries globally); 2) life and business management services (services and 
solutions adding value to the lives of end users/ consumers, a new earnings 
logic producing strong margins and increasing returns); and 3) increasing 
connectivity (gaining access to a much larger set of service customers; 
customers who increasingly rely on Sonera’s services and solutions).
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Figure 9 hence depicts the critical components that were considered 
important at the time the product portfolio was created. These 
components were bundled into four core competences (the old ones being 
to maintain leadership in emerging technologies and to manage system 
complexity; the new ones being to extract maximum value as a minority 
partner and to build customer solutions on a global scale). The four core 
competencies were seen as having the potential to create successful 
products in the new mobile world, the target segment of the company. 
That message was manifested when the company was sold to investors. 
The new core competencies were seen as preconditions needed to create 
the new products and the new strategy the company pursued (shown as 
the light shade in Figure 9). The top management saw radically new kinds 
of knowledge demands in the future. 
The past competences were not seen as sufficiently aligned with creating 
a new market (also in Vesterinen, 2009, p.139), and challenges were 
identified even regarding the maintenance of the old core competences. In 
the internal analysis, it was stated that  
 
“lessons from the failure to fully exploit leading technical solutions commercially 
suggest that [former] “gurus” [technology experts in Sonera especially in the data 
business] cannot mix technical and business leadership” and further that “Sonera 
therefore cannot sustain the former ‘guru’ core competence of data 
communications and must switch to the collective core competence of mobile”. 
(Sonera strategy versions,1999b). 
 
There was a need to change the skill profile throughout the life-cycle, 
which comprised the phases of imagine, test, launch, and grow. In the 
imagine phase, technical dominance was seen to be Sonera’s strength, and 
in the growth-phase, business dominance was seen as Sonera’s weakness. 
The industrial and growth market logic in the new strategy that Sonera 
adopted is seen in the management visions in 2000 presented in Figure 
10. They envision the official target of the company: becoming a market 
maker and a winner in the 3G mobile communications business. The 
stock price development made global acquisitions feasible and for the 
firm to enact its distinctive and global footprint visions. According to the 
interviews, the most important growth logic was to increase the stock 
price, and the focus was on calculating multiples.47 This exercise was done 
                                                   
47 An equity valuation multiple refers to the price-to-earnings ratio. It is defined 
as market price per share divided by annual earnings per share. In Sonera, the 
target was to have a price-to-earnings ratio as high as possible. 
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in “the goat” division, mobile and media, and also in “the sheep” division, 
telecom, where artificial businesses were put, that were thought to be 
lucrative in the eyes of investors (also in Vesterinen, 2009, p.150). 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Sonera’s two-path strategy (Annual report, 2000, p. 4). 
 
As is apparent in Figure 10, global acquisitions and industrial growth 
logic were seen as a dual path strategy. Both services and distribution are 
pictured in the strategy, on vertical and horizontal axes accordingly. The 
global presence aimed at industry consolidation, services distribution, 
and UMTS licenses. The operative steps were demonstrated in terms of 
success in Baltic mobile, Turkcell, the US 2G [Second Generation Digital 
Mobile Technologies, e.g., GSM], and finally in European 3G. A value-
added differentiation strategy was pursued, with the help of innovation 
and the execution of new services, wireless Internet acquisitions, and 
partnerships; manifesting itself in the branded services of Sonera Zed 
[Portal for mobile and Internet], Sonera SmartTrust and Across Wireless 
and iD2. 
The strategy and thoughts that emerged from that time are evident from 
the interviews with staff. In the 1990s, the firm sought a new value-added 
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role arising from systems integration and convergence. The then head of 
R&D remembers the situation: 
 
“I remember 1996 when new people were coming to Head Office, and the 
discussion started around the fact that we now have this technology competence 
others do not have which we can use as a tool for increasing value to customers 
and valuation for Sonera. The talks went so that we should be a global service 
developer and vendor and it also turned out that way. And then came these Smart 
Trust and Zed, Zed being a service platform; thousands of people were employed 
but it could never be managed.” (Informant 7) 
 
The following figure 11 shows the “New Internet” vision Sonera had. 
 
 
 
Figure 11.  The new Internet. (Annual report, 2000, p.13.) 
 
The integration of mobile communications and data transfer was 
presented in Sonera as a future megatrend—the new Internet—with the 
telecom operator orchestrating the development and content (See Figure 
14). The vision of the new Internet featured Sonera as the market maker. 
In hindsight, only mobile data technology in the new Internet through the 
technological path from GSM (including services such as SMS) to GPRS 
and UMTS (3G) proved successful for Sonera, and mostly only in the 
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Finnish market. The content services (such as Zed) and applications did 
not evolve into a viable business led by operators and, in turn, the 
wireless data technology came to be dominated by US-based operators. 
The ICT boom of the late 1990s (see e.g., Fransman, 2004) divided the 
Sonera into two areas: the traditional telecom area and a global new 
mobile and media area (Informants 6 and 55 among others). The new 
organizational structure came into effect in 1999. There were investments 
in the mobile and media areas and the product innovations were led by 
investors’ attention, a search for technological convergence and attempts 
to profit from convergence. Below, an interviewee comments on the era 
from the viewpoint of the traditional organization and the difficulties of 
the industry accepting the mobility trend: 
 
“Sonera’s situation changed when the management group in 1998 got the task of 
privatizing Sonera. When the team realized the mobility message would be 
accepted in the market, they started to behave in a quite dictatorial way. For 
example, in the sales unit, we had rules that when you go to customers you must 
not talk about anything else but mobility. Then we had a customer meeting with 
UPM-Kymmene (a Finnish forestry company), and when we entered the 
workshop the customer warned us right from the start; “If you mention the word 
mobility, you can leave right away!” However, the stories by the Top 
Management Group about mobility were reasonably sensible, but the problem 
was the stories didn’t have any reality and knowledge in Sonera, it was more 
important to grow the value of the company than use the current core capabilities 
to progress internationalization. Without this industrial capital logic, the 
internationalization of the company would have been perfectly possible” 
(Informant 45). 
 
Sonera’s actions focused more on market making than developing 
technology (Sonera’s core asset in NMT-GSM period). The Zed-product at 
Sonera illustrates this: 
 
“The director of Zed gave a presentation to the company management group in 
which he emphasized the need to continue with the capital market leveraging 
tactic. The most important topic in this tactic was ‘eyeballs’ in the consumer 
market, which would determine the value of providers, while the market would 
determine the value of each customer. These would then create pressure and 
leverage for operators to make deals with Zed (Laaksonen, 2007, p.136)”. 
 
The activities in Sonera and in the market proceeded very quickly 
between 1998 and 2000. First, Sonera was listed on the NASDAQ stock 
exchange in 1999. That same year, Sonera acquired many companies in 
the USA and also partners for its planned big businesses (Zed, 
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SmartTrust, and Plaza Internet Portal). Sonera also took part in UMTS 
auctions in Europe. In addition, in 1999 Sonera sold its Primatel 
subsidiary, which was seen to represent an old core competence area, 
fieldwork and maintenance activities. Sonera also envisioned entering the 
broadcasting industry, as it planned to buy 34% of Digita in 1999, a 
subsidiary of the Finnish Broadcasting Company. 
The culmination of the aforementioned actions in the year 2000 was a 
new departure for Sonera, the decision to begin developing and offering 
new services for other operators and service providers. In fact, this meant 
that Sonera was willing to sell all its networks, whether mobile or fixed, if 
it had a buyer and if there was a sufficiently competent operator from 
whom Sonera could buy capacity. This was a total different idea than any 
mooted before. 
At the same time, these activities raised the sentiment in the (stock) 
market very high and Sonera was rushing to meet the expectations loaded 
onto its market capitalization value. The expectations came from 
investors and banking firms. To meet these expectations, Sonera saw it 
needed to be at the forefront of European mobile leadership. In 
particular, Sonera saw that the need for scale was driving mobile 
consolidation in an increasingly global industry and that the initial 
positioning for 3G broadband had started. In 2000, 3G/UMTS license 
auctions were organized in Europe, and Sonera considered it must 
participate to create new mobile Internet services. Consequently Sonera 
purchased 3G network licenses (more specifically, UMTS frequency 
bands) from Germany and Italy, for a significant price of EUR 4 300 
million, three times Sonera’s turnover at the time. 
However, the sentiment also plummeted rapidly in markets after a 
while. One consequence was that the vast investments Sonera made in 
UMTS licenses as part of its new strategy proved to be worthless, because 
the new mobile Internet ecosystem was not established in time and, for 
example, the 3G mobile phones did not come to the market in time. For 
this reason, Sonera even considered making its own 3G phones through a 
subcontractor. In summary, in the boom period, Sonera oversaw the 
largest investment failure seen in Finnish economic history, the EUR 
4300 billion investments in buying a UMTS operating license from the 
German government. The investment proved to be worthless, and 
Sonera’s own capital diminished almost totally. 
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2.5.5 The era of the IT sector bust (2001) 
 
Typical features of the IT bust period were that market sentiment was 
low, customer investments decreasing, and cost cutting programs were 
being introduced in the case company and across the whole telecom 
industry sector. The great expectations of Sonera’s new business model 
during the IT boom period did not materialize. Consequently, the strategy 
of the company changed to focus on internal processes and downgrading 
businesses, as it absorbed huge losses, especially costs arising from the 
pursuit of 3G/UMTS licenses in Germany. 
Regulation and Technology. In the environmental conditions, there was 
only one significant event. On the national regulatory front, a third mobile 
network operator, DNA, was granted a license in 2001. This caused an 
overcapacity in the bust market and subsequent price wars brought 
further instability to the mobile communications market. The 
incumbents, especially Sonera, objected to the regulatory authorities that 
the unbalanced mobile termination fees48  were a direct income transfer 
to DNA. In addition, in 2001, the new Communications Market Act was 
being prepared. Its target was to regulate converging networks and 
services equally regardless of the underlying technology. 
Competition, Customers and Market. Instability characterized the 
telecommunications and information technology industry in 2001, and 
UMTS license auctions caused many telecoms firms in Europe to become 
deeply indebted. The situation was worsened by the lack of GPRS 
terminals, UMTS services, and related technology. Consequently, 
equipment manufacturers, operators, and service providers all faced 
profitability and sales challenges (Sonera, Annual report, 2001). 
Sonera’s structural changes and strategic decisions. In 2001, Sonera 
appointed a new CEO, Harri Koponen, who followed a temporary CEO, 
Aimo Eloholma, who had stepped in after Kaj-Erik Relander had been 
fired. Sonera focused on internal management and on scaling down its 
operations in 2001–2002. The first task undertaken was an 
organizational restructuring: One Sonera (see Appendix 3, Organization 
Units), which also meant that the role of many product/service areas was 
downgraded, and the Service Businesses were radically downsized. The 
business areas affected included Zed, Smart Trust, Juxto, Plaza, and 
Sonera Service Media. Some of these areas had barely begun to trade, 
                                                   
48 Operators pay fees to other operators when their traffic is carried in 
competitors’ networks. A legislative regulator can set those fees to operators in 
order to subvent smaller players. 
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including some embryonic services, such as a speech recognition service 
named ‘Sonera Say It’. 
In addition to downgrading the service businesses, Sonera sold assets to 
cover its 3G losses, and focused on projects that could exploit its domestic 
customer solutions. The goal was to be a Finnish 3G operator. However, 
the company still believed wireless Internet was on its way (Annual 
report, 2001). Consequently, in an EMT strategy study conducted 
somewhat later in 2002, there were signs of Sonera’s new major 
ambitions. These included MyLife (converged mobile and home 
communications solutions for the consumer segment), ICT (mobility-
enabling services and process solutions for the business segment) and 
East (Mobile and business communications in high growth markets). 
Sonera did not totally abandon the knowledge and capabilities in 
network R&D, which it had come close to outsourcing in the boom of the 
late 1990s. Sonera had begun carrying telephone traffic via its new IP-
based backbone network and there was a plan to make a network 
migration to Ethernet-IP based transmission, this would have meant 
abandoning the previous ATM49  -solution (2001). 
Despite the rehabilitation programme, Sonera desperately needed new 
capital to cover its 3G losses, and in 2001 it made an offering, where each 
pair of existing shares entitled their holders to subscribe to one new share 
at a price of 2.70 euro. This price contrasted with the stock at the height of 
the IT boom, when a single share was listed at 97 euros. The new capital 
raised was, however, not enough, and the next step in Sonera’s history 
was its merger with Telia. 
 
2.5.6 The era of streamlining and cost cutting (2002-2005) 
 
This era was marked by typical business and cultural merger conflicts. 
This led to difficult discussions on how to organize the newly founded 
TeliaSonera Company. In addition, in Finland, Sonera faced a challenging 
market situation, as vendors and low-price mobile operators entered the 
market. 
Regulation and Technology. In technology development, the telecom 
market started to see the true nature of the ICT market. As early as 2003, 
                                                   
49 Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM). A multiplexing and routing technology 
for high-speed digital communications that permits data, text, voice, video and 
multimedia signals to be transmitted simultaneously between network access 
points at speeds of up to 155 Mbps or more. 
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Skype [software and a company] had emerged onto the market as an IP 
voice provider, threatening telecom operators’ PSTN (Public Switched 
Telephone Network) network earnings. In a similar vein, Cisco Systems 
entered the IP-PBX (Internet Protocol Private Branch Exchange) market 
in 2004. The same year Microsoft and Nortel declared a strategic alliance 
governing work on an IP/ PBX communication server. These activities led 
to vendors entering the PBX market, and they were seeking a share of the 
telecom operators’ value-added services. 
In Finland, a regulatory decision was made in 2003 about mobile 
number portability. A customer could now change its operator and keep 
the old mobile number. This lowered the switching costs and set the 
churn in Finland to record-high levels when customers switched 
operators in search of lower prices. This also led more newcomers to enter 
the mobile sector like the firm ACN in 2003. The mobile market was 
overheated and consequently the price level plummeted. 
Competition, Customers, and Market. Regarding competition, virtual 
mobile service providers50  had entered the market, meaning that one 
could enter the market with minimal investments, and the result was 
overcapacity. The situation grew even worse for Sonera in 2004, as 
Saunalahti—one of the largest of these players—stopped licensing and 
using Sonera’s network. Consequently, a price war erupted between 
virtual service providers and incumbents. 
In the customers and markets fields, there were two kinds of events 
from the telecom operator’s view. First, a full mobility trend emerged in 
companies in 2004, and the usage of mobile data started to increase. This 
was, in principle, a positive development for Sonera. Second, tight SLAs 
(Service Level Agreements) and ITIL (Information Technology 
Infrastructure Library, a way of organizing buying behavior) practices 
entered the telecommunications sector. These events put pressure on 
Sonera to formalize processes and IT development. 
In March 2002, Telia and Sonera announced they were to merge. Tapio 
Hintikka, a Finn, would be the chair of the board; and Anders Igel, a 
Swede, the new CEO. The Swedish government would own 45% of the 
new company, while the Finnish government would own 19%. 
                                                   
50 A virtual mobile service provider that does not own the wireless network 
infrastructure over which it provides services to its customers. It enters into a 
business agreement with a mobile network operator to obtain bulk access to 
network services at wholesale rates, then sets retail prices independently. It may 
use its own customer service, billing support systems, marketing and sales 
personnel. (Wikipedia, accessed 23.5.2014) 
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Sonera’s structural changes and strategic decisions. When Anders Igel 
became CEO, he stated in the Annual report (2003) that Sonera’s 3G 
investments made a huge loss, but also that Telia’s past investments in 
international network capacity services had been a mistake. This 
statement marked the focus of the company for a long time: the era of 
streamlining and cost cutting. The same annual report stated that 
profitability would be achieved through synergy benefits and by 
increasing cost efficiency. However, industry analysts (OVUM: 
TeliaSonera merger analysis, 2003) were of a different opinion, 
suggesting that synergy gains would flow from size advantages (i.e., more 
efficient buying bargaining power), not business advantages (i.e., creating 
new innovative services). It soon became very apparent to the Finnish 
organization how different Sweden and Finland were, and business 
synergies were difficult to identify. In particular, mobility was highly 
diffused to Finnish consumers and especially to the business segment, 
which was not the case in Sweden. Thus, there was no common culture 
and understanding about different countries spearhead services and if 
and how to develop those. 
 
“Sweden is lagging at least ten years behind Finland, and the situation is even 
worse now when all decisions are made in Sweden and the R&D function in 
mobility is in Sweden. Also, the Swedish decision process and culture is much 
slower than we have in Finland. In addition, our competitor, Elisa, has all its 
resources and decision processes in Finland and does not have to send a proposal 
to 50 boards as we now have to at Sonera. For these reasons, we have lost for 
example Rovaniemi city, Sonera’s own traditional business heartland, where we 
should have all the resources and telephone networks. Whereas Elisa has no 
infrastructure there, not even a single copper line, but despite that they win the 
bidding contest and their solution was ‘all mobile’ to the municipality. Mobility is 
overlooked in TeliaSonera and we have an “only over my dead body” attitude in 
Sweden, you need to have the permission to offer these kinds of all mobile 
solutions. Furthermore, then we have an internal battle if the solution is fixed or 
mobile silo’s property, and if we are offering this kind of integrated solution, that 
means if we get one euro from the customer, it is then split between divisions 
inside Sonera.” (Informant 58) 
 
The merger with Telia in 2002 brought changes in management models. 
Telia changed the models to multilayered matrix organizations, 
technological silo management, and new emphasis was placed on what 
kind of R&D to pursue. What was also new, the strong role of central 
management in running local businesses, both considering Finland and 
Sweden. The important point is that the Finnish organization thought 
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that B2B specific business needs were not understood and appreciated by 
the Swedish organization, which was seen as treating B2B products and 
customer needs the same as consumer products. In contrast, the Finnish 
organization had produced converged, service integrator type of 
customized solutions for the B2B market—which was also a source of 
pride for Sonera’s Finns. 
 
“In Finland, all telecom operators have a managed service layer…I recall as a case 
example, DataNet. The idea was the so-called active hardware was no longer 
bought by the customer, instead it was offered as a service. In Finland, system 
integrators (IT players) don’t have this layer, while telecom operators have. 
Whereas, on the other hand in Swedish markets, IT players offer that service, an 
example was TietoEnator which sold the voice services to the city of Stockholm. If 
this happened in Finland, somebody would get fired at Sonera, whereas in 
Sweden it would mean a celebration, because IT players provide that service. In 
Finland telecom operators have targeted the next layer in the value chain and in 
Sweden they haven’t, and that job has been done by system integrators [such as 
TietoEnator] case by case.” (Informant 32) 
 
In 2002, TeliaSonera declared itself a fast-follower, in practice this meant 
TeliaSonera would choose only large established vendors, would reduce 
its own R&D activities, and would focus on customer service and 
becoming a service company. This was a new focus, and Sonera Finland 
tried to implement it. However, at the same time, managers at Sonera 
Finland also attempted to adopt new technologies as soon as possible (i.e., 
to be a first-mover), in contravention of the new group policy (discussed 
later in cases and in the analysis section). A key person in Finland 
comments in retrospect on that period 1980–2010: 
 
“We could now be right in this standard global way of working, no risk taking. On 
the other hand, we have no opportunity to acquire big fortunes as we could 
earlier when we had a risk taking attitude. Now we are playing the big operator 
game, which could be a 100% right way of acting” (Informant 20) 
 
The fast-follower strategy pursued from 2003 to 2005 was evident in 
many decisions. In 2003, Anders Igel commented that the Nordic areas 
and the Baltic States were TeliaSonera’s home market and the plan was to 
defend that home market. In 2004, a part of R&D activity was transferred 
from in-house development to cooperation with customers, suppliers, 
universities, and research institutions. Such decisions led Tapio Hintikka 
to resign as chairman of the board in 2004. The disputes at top 
management level between Sweden and Finland also began in this period. 
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Hintikka criticized Igel for being too cautious and went on to say, “I 
thought I was in business, but I ended up in Swedish politics.” In 
particular, the slow decision making around TeliaSonera’s investments in 
Turkcell in Turkey, and in Russia, stymied growth. “TeliaSonera would 
have majority shares in Turkcell and MegaFon, if it had acted faster” 
commented Hintikka. 
One important event was also, in line with the fast-follower strategy, 
that Sonera defended its market share by introducing a cheap mobile 
service provider of its own, Tele Finland, in 2004. Because of activities in 
the Finnish mobile market, Sonera suffered a 20% price erosion. In the 
annual report of 2005, Anders Igel singled out Finland as one country 
that exemplified failures in business management out of the 13 different 
markets TeliaSonera operated in. 
In the early years following the merger between Telia and Sonera a joint 
organization and headquarters unit was established. This operated above 
the country organizations and especially the strong broadband 
organization in Sweden. Harri Koponen was the Head of the joint 
Marketing, Products, and Services (MPS) unit. Koponen tried to create a 
common product offering, a new telecom firm to replace the former 
organizations (‘bit pipes’) marked by their silo constructions (fixed voice, 
fixed data, mobile). His vision was to introduce a new customer-driven 
telecom operator (convergence), based on horizontal customer-oriented 
operations. 
According to the interviewees, the plan to create a new telecoms 
operator by the MPS organization actually progressed. However, Koponen 
wanted the change to happen in Sweden in six months, whereas in reality 
it would have taken much longer, and as much as 10 years according to 
one informant (Informant 55). This was claimed to be the reason why Igel 
fired Koponen, officially stating “the attitude to business strategies and 
Government’s corporate governance principles has not been consistent” 
(also referring to Sonera’s Turkcell affairs, which were led by Koponen). 
 
2.5.7 The era of convergence – ICT (2006-2010) 
 
The most notable characteristic of this period was the strong growth in 
mobile data usage in the market. In addition, new ways of producing, 
bundling and buying telecom services, Cloud Computing, Unified 
Communications and ITIL standards (Information Technology 
Infrastructure Library, a set of practices for IT service management) 
emerged. These events posed a challenge to telecom operators’ business 
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models. Internally, Sonera made changes to its organization, and to its 
R&D policies. 
Regulation and Technology. In the field of regulation, the market had 
already been opened up to competition, but now in the era of 
convergence, competition and technology adoption assumed a role in the 
evolution of the industry. 
The technology development focused on ICT. In 2007, Apple (a US- 
based technology company) introduced the iPhone51, an intelligent mobile 
phone particularly suited for mobile data and internet usage. The main 
event in legislative regulation in Finland at the time was the lifting of a 
ban regarding the bundling of mobile subscriptions and mobile handsets 
in 2006. This increased the sales of Apple iPhones, sold in a bundle with a 
mobile subscription. To continue, in 2007, the LTE/4G standard was 
introduced. This meant that higher data speeds and mobile voice would 
be also carried in the data network alone. This posed a threat to circuit 
mobile network earnings (namely GSM), as the traffic would be 
transferred to the IP network (LTE/4G). 
The technology used in the B2B segment also made rapid progress. Most 
importantly, computing power had progressed so that telecom services 
could be provided by IT and Internet players. Internet players, such as 
Google, introduced Google Wave—a software framework for real-time 
collaborative editing online—in 2009. It represents an offering to Unified 
Communications made by players other than traditional telecom 
operators, and bypassed the latter. In turn, according to Gartner (2011), 
“while clearly maturing, cloud computing continues to be one of the most 
hyped subjects in IT today”. Cloud computing means consuming and/ or 
delivering services from the cloud, manifesting to technologies as SaaS 
(Software as a Service), PaaS (Platform as a Service), and IaaS 
(Infrastructure as a Service) (ibid. p.3), where services are provided 
virtually. 52 
                                                   
51 Apple iPhone marked a true convergence period in seamless, easy to use 
mobile Internet services, which increased mobile data usage significantly. Sonera 
licensed the usage of the iPhone and retained proprietary rights as the sole 
licensor of iPhone in Finland for a limited time. 
52 This is basically what telecom operators had done earlier with Virtual Private 
Network (VPN) services, but the difference is that now the customer companies 
are offering more and more services and infrastructures to be managed by others, 
and not necessarily by telecom operators any more. There are currently many 
standards on which to offer services. The operator is, however, still dependent on 
  Towards a theoretical framework 
101 
 
Competition, Customers, and Market. In the market field, service 
offerings were typically service packets and bundles, meaning that many 
types of products and services were sold together and with a fixed price, 
often based on euros/month to consumers or euros/user in the B2B 
segment. However, these packets and bundles were not profitable for 
telecom operators, who preferred simpler time and volume-based billing. 
The situation was worsened by the fact that services were becoming more 
complex, consequently requiring sales, marketing, and customer service 
investments. In addition, SaaS/UC service providers began entering the 
telecom market, which further threatened their business model by making 
it possible to make content with control gateways in the network, for 
example, with players like Google. Therefore, while B2B voice (fixed 
voice) was still seen as important in the client companies, there would be 
less willingness to pay for it. 
The foundation in this latest era is convergence; both in networks and in 
the end customer offering (e.g., the business segment and the consumer 
segment). The attraction of IP was seen to lie on the convergence side, as 
services could be offered more freely and without taking a stance on 
hardware and the network layer as such, as an expert from Sonera stated: 
 
“Technology disruption is one way to look at industry development. The 
disruptions work through competencies, one area which could traditionally make 
large changes is that some technological innovation makes the change in a value 
network. For example, with IP voice, you can produce an IP service over mobile 
data without having a mobile center or base stations on your property. The roles 
are also changing in that way, the investment based business is surprised when 
some service provider buys and needs only some usage center, for example, 
buying Amazon usage center time and running some application there, which 
performs the same operation as a telecom operator does” (Informant 29, Quote 1) 
 
In 2007, it was clear that operators were not driving the market (the 
opposite idea was prevalent in the hype of the late 1990s) as Sonera 
communicated that  
 
“mobile handset browsers and increasing functionality are driving content 
services, handsets are also more capable of using different networks: e.g. GSM, 
GPRS, EDGE, 3G, WLAN [wireless local area network]”… Furthermore, it was 
stated that “also the value chain has more players than telecom operators” and 
                                                                                                                              
turnover and is facing a competitor capitalizing on market hype and investor 
capital. 
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“technology drivers are IP telephony and higher network speeds in mobile, 
increased capacity of devices.” (Annual report, 2007). 
 
Sonera’s structural changes and strategic decisions. In 2007, Sonera 
made a proprietary agreement with Apple and bundled the Apple iPhone 
and Sonera’s 3G services. The success of the Apple iPhone demonstrated 
the ability to build customer intimacy, ease of use and a rich ecosystem. 
Customer Average Revenue per User (ARPU) and profitability were 
higher than in competing solutions, meaning that Sonera earned more in 
mobile data usage per customer when Apple’s iPhones were used, 
contrary for example to Nokia’s smartphones. Horizontal services such as 
Google and Skype became feasible because of the IP-based network 
(Martikainen, 2006b). Sonera also identified this opportunity, when it 
licensed the iPhone. This period saw network hardware vendors’ role 
diminish, and end device and application builder’s roles increase. The 
importance was not found in the technology alone; but in a way of doing 
business and in the customer centric design. This transition to a new kind 
of service usage went noticed, and consequently Sonera created a 
partnership with Apple to resell their iPhones, in order to boost mobile 
data usage. 
Internally the iPhone way of working gave the organization further 
inspiration to develop new products and services: Now it targeted (once 
again) developing easy-to-use services, even in B2B. 
 
“In our own B2B segment, in the internal investigation of our own processes, we 
noticed that we are competitive technologically, but we have a knowledge gap in 
key customer service processes. IT has slowed down the competence creation in 
customer service. IT influences customer intimacy; we have even currently for 
example 26 self-service portals.” (Informant 16, Quote 2) 
 
Finally, in 2010 the business service portfolio was further developed with 
an emphasis on cloud-based functions and a convergent offering. In 
addition, an important change from previous vendor policy was to choose 
Telepo, a new kind of agile vendor, to provide Unified Communications 
(UC) in 2007. The firm also came to view partner management as more 
important than it had previously: 
 
“In UC, innovation and good partners are important. For example, we cooperate 
with Microsoft and IBM. In this area, we also develop our own technology on the 
SME side; UC will bring big vendors into play, we must know what they are 
offering and have good relations and cooperation. We could say that Microsoft 
has their contacts with customers and possibly some sort of dominant design, but 
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they don’t have the network and connections, they always need a partner. Who 
wins the game is the player who can influence the customer with a good partner 
network. Thus, the winning player could be Google, too” (Informant 16, Quote 5) 
 
Convergence management in general was seen as a tool for creating 
dominant designs53  and it was recognized that “the company that leads 
the convergence can shape the market in a desirable way.” This 
sentiment appeared in an internal strategy plan in 2009. Operators would 
have faced a challenge if an IT player had defined the dominant design 
with convergence, and consequently taken the customer interface for 
themselves. One tactic used to counter this scenario was to have an 
aggressive migration from the operators (leading the convergence, 
Appendix 8.) In addition, a more tangible example of convergence 
management was seen, the challenge in management was seen to have 
mobile services included in the convergent offerings (see Appendix 4). 
At the same time, owing to globalization and IP technology development 
and IP services applications, TeliaSonera radically increased the 
utilization of open platforms from vendors, third parties, and software 
oriented solutions; the solutions were demanded by market, partners, and 
end users. The intention was to obtain early proof of the viability of new 
concepts and reduce time to market. In addition, in order to gain 
expertise in ICT, the Finnish-managed hosting services company, 
Crescom was also acquired (2007). 
Moreover, in R&D, to reduce risk and ensure easy-to-use services, a 
proactive engagement of end users in all R&D phases became mandatory 
(2008). In company M&A policy, the goal was for TeliaSonera to 
participate in European telecommunications market consolidation—a 
move motivated by the desire for economies of scale and growth (2006). 
In the same vein, distribution of additional capital to shareholders 
through an extraordinary dividend and an increase in the ordinary 
dividend (2006) was implemented. 
On the organizational front, the company made mixed decisions as it 
had on the technology front. In 2007, Lars Nyberg was appointed CEO. 
The Integrated Enterprise Services organization was established in order 
to construct the leading Nordic and Baltic IT and telecom system 
integrator in 2006, but that model was discontinued as a separate 
business area in 2008. The number of Finns in the management group 
was reduced to just one. The company had downsized its own R&D 
operation. In turn, Cygate, a leading supplier of secure and managed IP 
                                                   
53 Managers used the term ‘dominant design’ literally in strategy plans. 
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network solutions and system integration in the Nordic market was 
acquired in 2006. Focus areas were communicated that included the 
migration of Swedish fixed voice customers; participation in growing 
markets to improve cash flow; improvement of the B2B sales process; 
becoming a world-class service company; and the reduction of costs 
(2006). R&D and sales functions were centralized to Sweden in 2007. 
 
2.5.8 Summary of historical analysis: The telecom industry and 
TeliaSonera 1980–2010 
 
Telecommunications is a high technology industry, but the intensity of the 
R&D in the sector, especially that conducted by telecom operators, has 
diminished in the period under scrutiny. New entrants from different 
industries and from a different area of the value chain (e.g., vendors in the 
areas of hardware, the Internet, and applications, such as Apple, Google 
and Microsoft) have taken a stronger role. The competitive situation in 
Finland has changed from one dominated by telecom operators to a new 
landscape where IT and Internet players want a share of value-added 
services, both in the consumer and B2B segments. Thus, by 2010, the 
telecommunications industry was experiencing negative organic growth 
compared to the 1995–2000s period, when the growth in the mobile and 
internet business areas, in particular, were strong. 
The major technological, regulatory, market, company critical events, 
and company strategy are summarized in Table 5. The empty cells 
represent areas where no major relevant issues that affect the context of 
this study emerged. 
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Table 5.  Discontinuities and dominant designs in industry and the Sonera Corporation: a 
case study. 
 
Time Technological 
critical events 
Regulative 
and market 
critical events 
Company 
critical 
events 
Company strategy 
1982
-
1986  
Networking idea, 
TCP/IP as a 
standard (1982); 
Nokia in Mobile-
PBX (NMT-900) 
(1986) 
Data 
Competition 
(Datatie 
founded) 1985 
First profit & 
loss and 
sales units in 
Sonera. 
Defending national 
and local 
geographical assets 
(local and national 
networks); R&D 
focus. 
1987
-
1992  
Analog to Digital/ 
ISDN/ 2Mbit Voice 
Access (1987); 
GSM (1992); Cisco 
enters to routing 
technology (1988) 
Liberalization 
starts (1987); 
Radiolinja 
enters the 
mobile 
business 
(1992) 
Focus to be 
a company; 
First profit 
centers 
(1987) 
Equip one to 
compete with 
innovations (own or 
locally adopted) 
1993
-
1998 
IN(1993); 
Microcomputers, 
HTML, HTTP, URL, 
Netscape (1996); 
UMTS (3G) 
standard (1997) 
Trunk calls 
competition 
(1994); Option 
to buy access/ 
Abandoning of 
numbering 
areas (1995); 
NO /SO split 
(1996) 
TSF gone 
public 
(1997); 3G 
auctions 
(1998); three 
large SBUs 
emerge 
Quality, 
technological 
excellence and 
early commercial 
thinking/  SBU way 
of working 
1999
-
2000  
 3G auctions, 
the market 
value of 
operators- 
inflated 
expectations 
Global SP 
mindset (99-
01) 
Lifting the market 
capitalization value 
high/ M&A's to 
insource 
knowledge; network 
independent 
services; industry 
creation with 
convergence 
2001   3rd mobile 
network 
operator 
(DNA) (2001) 
 Portfolio cleaning/ 
Networks core 
assets; Focusing to 
be a local 3G 
Finnish operator 
2002
-
2005  
IP-PBX (2004) Mobile number 
portability 
(2003) 
TSF-TS 
merger 
(2002); R&D 
downsizing 
(2002); 
different 
managerial 
cognition in 
FIN/SWE 
Process excellence, 
functional 
management and 
customer service; 
Portfolio mgt.; 
Service Orientation 
2006
-
2010 
All-IP(2007);iPhone 
(2007);Consumeri-
zation (Skype, 
Google Wave) 
200309;SaaS(2010) 
4G (LTE) 
3G handset 
bundling 
(2006); US vs. 
Europe mobile 
ecosystem 
wars 
IES 
organization 
(2007); IES 
organization 
was closed 
down (2008) 
Partner mgt. 
importance; 
Customer 
experience/ 
Easiness of use/ 
Service and product 
adoption from third 
parties to boost 
network usage, bit-
pipe production 
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3. Methodology 
 
3.1 The case study as a research method 
 
According to Stake (2003;, see also Easton 2002, p.118), it is essential by 
definition to investigate particular phenomena as integrated systems in 
case studies, given the multifaceted nature and specific character of a case 
organization that is subjected to many forces. Gibbert, Ruigrok and Wicki 
(2008, p. 1466) also stress the need to study phenomena in their real-life 
contexts. The main aim of this study is to provide an empirically 
grounded framework illustrating how companies adapt to dominant 
designs, thereby enhancing understanding of the interdependency 
between the industry and the company level (including both the corporate 
and the SBU level). 
Case studies typically address how and why questions (Yin, 2003, p.5). 
The broad research questions of this study concern how dominant designs 
are adapted to on the company level in complex technological systems 
during the life-cycle evolution of the industry (in a potentially successful 
way). These questions are addressed through the construction of a 
framework (i.e. the research framework) for adapting to dominant 
designs, and its application in a longitudinal case study carried out within 
the Sonera Corporation.  
The aim is to explore possible causal descriptions (Easton, 2002) and 
“in fact, getting closer to constructs and being able to illustrate causal 
relationships more directly are among the key advantages of case research 
vis-à-vis large-sample empirical work” (Siggelkow, 2007, p.22). However, 
such causal descriptions must be understood as possible (or at the best, 
likely) relationships that arise from an in-depth description of the 
evolution and adaptation of the multiple dominant designs that under 
investigation in the case company. Still, this description should still 
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enable theory development, i.e., the building of a dominant design 
adaptation framework. Case studies, as such, do not provide conclusive, 
fully generalizable, or ‘quantitatively objective’ evidence of the precise 
causalities. 
Indeed, case studies can be used for descriptive purposes (the case 
histories in this study), to test theory (in this case in terms of how well 
dominant design and related concepts reflect the development of the 
telecom and ICT industry, and the case company’s attempts to adapt to 
dominant designs), and to generate theory (this study further develops 
earlier dominant-design models).  “Cases are chosen for theoretical, not 
statistical, reasons” according to Eisenhardt (1989), citing Glaser and 
Strauss (1967). The theoretical logic behind the choice of the 
telecommunications company Sonera as the case company (or the case in 
general) relied on the following reasons. Telecommunications and the ICT 
industry (represented by Sonera) are theoretically interesting in that they 
are 1) high-technology based (an implicit assumption in much of the 
literature on dominant design) with 2) a hierarchical systemic model 
(interdependent components forming an integrated whole), and 3) 
manifest identifiable technology cycles. The case company Sonera and the 
time period of the study (1980-2010) allowed in-depth investigation of all 
these facets. Moreover, Sonera has introduced new technologies, and has 
adapted technologies created by others, thereby allowing the study of a 
fuller spectrum of dominant-design process (i.e., creation, modification 
and adoption/copying). 
The theoretical logic and reasons for case selection are described in the 
following section (3.2). The individual cases form a life-cycle continuum: 
in other words, I study and analyze product areas and their new releases 
and versions over time, including their interrelationships. 
Methodologically, “the fact that subcases were not independent increased 
their individual contribution to the total case” (Dubois & Gadde, 2002., 
p. 558). The majority of the cases in the present study are indeed 
interdependent: the businesses of the case company in the voice, mobile 
communications (described in the empirical history of the industry and 
the case company), and Datacom areas are studied in order to find out 
how dominant design management changes as the industry evolves. 
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3.2 Case selection 
 
I used theoretical sampling (Eisenhardt, 1989; Suddaby, 2006, p.638) in 
choosing the individual cases within the company. As Eisenhardt and 
Graebner (2007) state, “Theoretical sampling simply means that cases 
are selected because they are particularly suitable for illuminating and 
extending relationships and logic among constructs” (p.27). I investigate 
the relationships between the building blocks of dominant design 
identified in my research framework, and therefore selected cases that 
would shed light on these constructs and their relationships (theoretical 
frameworks in chapter 2).  
The selected cases represent product-development projects within the 
complex technological systems of the case company Sonera. In addition, 
Sonera’s corporate level strategizing and management are included in the 
case study. They all relate to the ICT and telecommunications industry, 
which is a traditional and frequently studied area in the research on 
dominant designs (Suarez, 2004). It is worth pointing out that not all the 
case projects led to the successful adaptation (i.e. creation, modification, 
copying/adopting) of a dominant design: some of them did, some turned 
out to be dominant designs later on, and some failed. Yet, selecting a 
variety of cases along these (adaptation) dimensions was theoretically 
purposeful given that the theoretical focus of this study is on not only the 
creation of dominant designs but more broadly on their adaptation 
process, which includes both in-house creation, modification and the 
adoption/copying of designs created by other players.   
The seven cases ultimately selected for analysis (Table 4) represent 
substantial variation along the theoretical dimensions and constructs 
under study (see the theoretical framework in Ch 2). For instance, the 
Vipgate concept and the Cid company number service represent the era of 
incremental change and elaboration in the development of dominant 
designs. On the other hand, Sonera’s Communications Solution is an 
example of technological discontinuity, but at the same time it represents 
the elaboration of many earlier dominant designs in combination. The 
cases also differ on the company level in terms of how the building blocks 
are used. These details are discussed more fully in the case histories, and 
in the analysis and discussion sections. 
An additional reason for selecting the specific product-development 
projects was that they formed continuums regarding the customer needs 
addressed. Consequently, it was possible to study the extent to which the 
longitudinal changes in the industry facilitated the creation and adoption 
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of individual dominant designs. Such an analysis would not have been 
possible if the cases had been totally independent of each other. 
Moreover, many of the projects were flagship projects in their time, which 
meant that they consumed substantial amounts of management time and 
resources (almost all of them attracted top-management [CEO] interest). 
This is also reflected in the fact that they eventually came to constitute 79-
85 percent of the case company’s turnover (in 1994-2000). I discuss 
mobile business on the general level, although pointing to the role of 
GSM, Zed and iPhone cases in the industry and Sonera’s history. Table 6 
below shows the selected cases.   
 
Table 6.  Selected cases 
 
Cases (including the sub-cases) 
*Service numbers (Call Center Toll Free, Premium) 
*Vipgate (VPN, Privatel, Cid Company number, Vipgate Concept) 
*DataNet 
*FastNet 
*Mobile business (GSM, Zed, iPhone) 
*B2B Mobile (MCX, Sonera Communication Solution) 
*Unified Communications 
*Sonera Company business case 
 
 
Table 6 lists the cases selected for and analyzed in the present study. 
Service Numbers & Telematics Services was the first product/service 
concept at the case company to offer value-added services beyond basic 
telecommunications traffic. The Vipgate concept as a whole defined the 
offering structure to the large business segment, in the fixed voice and 
integrated value-added business area. DataNet and FastNet were 
counterparts to Vipgate, but in data business. The Mobile business as a 
whole, in the Finnish market, currently makes the biggest and most 
significant contribution to the case company’s Finnish operations. B2B 
Mobile represented specific offerings related to the value-added services 
that the business segment needed. Unified Communications brought 
together many earlier offerings and, it is proposed, also started a whole 
new dominant design cycle. 
 
3.3 Data collection 
3.3.1 Interviews 
 
I started the data collection by studying the history of the telecom 
industry globally and in Finland (histories, annual reports, previous 
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studies; see the empirical Bibliography). I kept the theoretical literature 
on industry life cycles (technology discontinuities, regulation, and usage 
patterns of products, their related volumes and values) in mind while 
reading and interpreting the data. 
During the first interview stage I went through the case details 
(products, product areas, key organizational events, key industry 
discontinuities in technology, regulation and customer preferences) with 
the interviewees. The first questions (Appendix 14, Interview Questions) 
related to the facets of dominant design in different life-cycle stages, as 
well as to how the products/services had been developed within the 
company. 
The interview process (starting in 2009 and ending in 2013) comprised 
three stages, with between one and three interviews per interviewee. The 
first stage focused on the industry, customer and technology trends in the 
time period 1980-2010. The first interview was a consultative discussion 
about what study objects (mainly products) to include in the analysis in 
order to get the best grip on the B2B Communication business and its 
evolution (there was also talk about the whole business including B2C and 
operator segments and overall corporate strategic choices).   
The second interview stage focused on the theme of dominant design 
and the implications and emergence of the concept from a product 
perspective. The objective in the final stage was to obtain direct answers 
to the questions: “How do you understand a dominant design?” and “How 
should one create a dominant design?” 
Almost all the interviews were tape-recorded (73 were taped and 8 were 
not taped), and notes were taken. I informed the interviewees beforehand 
about the themes and questions (see Appendix 14). The interview 
procedure was semi-structured (Kvale & Brinkman, 2009). Not all the 
questions were discussed, and there was ad hoc improvisation depending 
on what themes were more fruitful and proved to be ‘in the comfort zone’ 
of the informants. 
More focused questions needing clarification arose during and at the 
end of the interview process, which were dealt with by e-mail (26 emails). 
I also returned to themes that seemed to need more clarification or 
corroboration. 
All the transcripts (59 in all, 81 interviews) were sent to the respective 
informants, who gave their views and made factual corrections if needed. 
Informants 22 and 7 requested caution when publishing sensitive facts 
and in conveying some strong opinions they had expressed, and 
informants 4 and 5 made small factual corrections to the text. The other 
informants verified that the transcripts were accurate. 
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In addition, the complete case descriptions (the history of the industry 
as well as all the product /service information) and the related analyses 
were sent to informants 12, 10, 55, and 6, who were ‘Senior Vice 
President-level’ individuals with profit and loss responsibility in their 
business areas. We went through the industry and case analyses in 
separate discussion meetings, and the informants accepted my 
interpretations. 
Separate product/service-area analyses were also corroborated. The 
analyses of the mobile case went to ‘Senior Vice President-level’ 
individuals [informants 22 and 31], who also had profit and loss 
responsibility in the mobile business as a whole, and in the production 
networks. The case description and analyses were accepted, although 
informant 31 also wanted to discuss Unified Communications (UC) in 
relation to the mobile business. In fact, this increased the robustness of 
my analysis of, indicating the central role of UC found in this study (see 
Chapter 4). In the case of TeleSampo, informants 51 and 52 verified that 
my analysis was correct. Beyond these product areas I corroborated 
extensively [case description and analysis] with informants 2 and 24 in 
Vipgate and Unified Communications. The former informant had a long 
business career in the Vipgate, Mobile and Unified Communications 
business areas, whereas the latter was the best expert in Sonera on 
production and network issues (Sonera’s network layer and technologies). 
 
3.3.2 Supportive archival materials 
 
Archival data complementing the interview data included business plans, 
strategy reviews (on different organizational levels and in different 
organizations), product-development pre-studies, sales material 
(products, concepts, concept development), memos about strategy 
processes, data on turnover and costs, consultant studies (also on the 
industry level on various topics), product plans, technology reviews, 
business white papers, electronic mail material, official investor material, 
and participant observation. The archival data is listed in the 
Bibliography. 
Table 7 below lists the supportive archival materials and indicates how 
they were used in drawing the main conclusions and tracing events in the 
case history. 
 
 
 
  Methodology 
113 
 
Table 7.  Data sources and their usage 
 
Theoretical 
concept 
Theme Inter-
views 
email, 
Parti-
cipant 
obser
vation 
Investor 
material 
Comp 
history, 
Annual 
reports, 
strategy 
papers 
Consultant 
and other 
studies, 
statistics 
Product 
and 
service 
descript
-tions 
Historical 
 eras 
Hype * * *  
 Streamlining *    
 Convergence * *  * 
Company 
strategizing 
Defending * *  * 
 Equip to face 
competition 
* *   
 Quality, tech 
excellence *   * 
 High market 
capitalization * * *  
 Portfolio 
cleaning *    
 Process mgt. *    
 Customer 
experience *    
 Fast follower *  *  
Technologi-cal 
change 
Networking 
idea *  *  
 All-IP *  *  
DD emergence Industry level, 
cases *  * * 
ILC stage Generic *  *  
Company 
governance 
Generic * *   
Transfor-ming, 
sensing, seizing 
Generic *   * 
Innovation type Generic *   * 
 
The table 7 lists the theoretical concepts of my case (see the theoretical 
framework in Chapter 2), and elaborates on them in the ‘Theme’ column. 
For example, with regard to historical eras I wanted to point out the 
importance of accurately reporting the source of information for my 
arguments. On the other hand, the ‘monopoly’ theme does not need an 
explicit explanation given that the era is well documented in the 
secondary sources (industry histories, for example). Consequently, 
‘Generic’ as a theme indicates that I draw conclusions from all the facets 
in that theoretical concept, such as on all innovation types. The other four 
columns list the type of empirical material: an asterisk (*) in the 
participant observation column means that I was personally involved in 
operative business in the related area. 
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3.4 Data analysis 
 
3.4.1 Preliminary analysis: temporal bracketing of the historical 
eras 
 
Langley (1999) describes temporal bracketing as a strategy (pp. 703-704), 
which I used in the initial analysis of the case company’s history (i.e. its 
evolution as a whole). Temporal bracketing is a way of structuring the 
description of events into phases. It enhances sense making in that 
processes are “stable or linear” within the phases, but on the other hand, 
discontinuities divide the history into phases that can be examined in 
relation to each other. In other words, it allows the constitution of 
comparative units of analysis for the exploration and replication of 
theoretical ideas. (ibid., pp. 703-704) 
In my case description, evolutionary context of the industry and 
company, (Chapter 2) I structured the major events in the case company’s 
history, vis-à-vis the industry so as to identify separate historical eras, and 
to make sense of the events as well as regimes of action within them. 
Regimes of action (e.g., Geels, 2002, 2004) here refer to ‘the rules of the 
game’ guided by regulation and technology. Having conducted this initial 
analysis I was able later to observe patterns in the evolution of dominant 
designs on the company and industry levels. 
I used temporal bracketing, as defined above, in analyzing actions and 
change in the focal company, Sonera. The historical eras thus identified 
also overlap, and some of the effects persist when the new periods 
commence. I completed the periodization by studying the major strategic 
decisions in the company together with discontinuities on the industry 
level, which constitute a prerequisite in the adaptation of dominant 
designs. 
Having completed the periodization I corroborated it during the writing 
process as follows. I allocated the case products/services to the periods 
and analyzed the building blocks as well as their importance in the 
process of adapting the dominant design and in the industry’s evolution 
(e.g., the significance of regulation and standards in each period). I also 
showed the periodization to the interviewees in the second and third 
stages of the process. The outcome of this preliminary analysis was a 
picture of the overall change in management processes, mindset, and 
industry power positions, as well of other issues in the research 
framework (Chapter 2, Figures 5 and 6). I mapped the concrete actions of 
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the focal company onto the theoretical framework (i.e., the big picture) as 
emerging company mindsets. 
Across the periods I identified a total of 161 strategic decisions in the 
material. I also included the related industry’s key events in areas such as 
regulation, technology, competition, customers and markets, and 
appropriability (shown in Appendix 2 in chronological order). Strategic 
decisions were conceptualized in a similar vein as in Athreye, Kale and 
Ramani (2009), referring to a significant resource allocation, investment, 
or structural change (related to adopting, modifying or creating dominant 
designs). To this end I looked for concrete words and depiction of events 
in the interview and other material regarding the major product-
development areas in my study, such as discover, incentives, establish, 
partnership, develop, acquire, license, invest, piloting, and communicate 
(see case selection). 
In verifying the analysis of the temporally bracketed eras I consulted the 
industry reports on developments in business volume, usage data, and 
product/service pricing over time (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; Malerba 
et al., 1999), as well as reports on the key competitors’ market shares. The 
main information sources I used here were company histories 
(Turpeinen, 1996; Lukkonen, 2004; Häikiö, 1995), annual reports from 
1985-2010, and the interview transcripts. 
Table 8 shows a sample excerpt from the preliminary analysis based on 
temporal bracketing: it positions (1) the industry’s key events including 
the facets of regulation, technology, competition, customers and markets, 
and appropriability (Appendix 2) and (2) Sonera’s strategic decisions 
(Appendix 1) in each typologized era. 
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Table 8.  An extract from the preliminary analysis based on temporal bracketing 
 
Eras Year Deci-
sion 
Descrip-
tion 
Regulation 
Technology 
Competi-
tion,Custo
-mers & 
Market 
Appro
pria-
bility 
Mono-
poly 
19
77 
Pekka 
Tarjanne 
DG in 
Posts and 
Telegraph 
Office 
Telecom 
war began 
in this era, 
which was 
fed by 
Tarjanne. 
X.25 standard 
in industry 
 Time- 
based/ 
data-
usage 
based 
BM 
profitab
le 
Monop
oly 
19
82 
Sonera 
starts to 
develop a 
Videotex 
system. 
Value 
added 
data 
business 
starts to 
develop. 
TCP/IP as a 
standard; 
AT&T 
implemented 
toll free 
service 
number. 
  
Libera-
liza-
tion 
19
89 
The 
decision to 
apply for a 
license to 
offer 
regional 
services in 
competitors
’ areas. 
Sonera’s 
counterat-
tack,when 
local 
telecoms 
applied for 
a mobile 
business 
license   
Telecommuni-
cations law 
(1987) 
  
Comp
etition 
& 
growth 
of 
mobile 
busine
ss 
19
96 
Sonera 
took part in 
the 
implementa
tion of the 
world’s 
largest 
ATM 
network 
with IBM. 
Sonera 
gained 
compete-
tive 
advantage 
on the 
national 
level. 
HTML, HTTP, 
URL, 
Netscape 
Internet 
boom in 
the market 
 
IT 
Hype 
19
98 
Sonera is 
listed on 
the Helsinki 
stock 
exchange 
Sonera  
participa-
tes in lar-
ger opera-
tions. 
 Mobile 
services 
operators 
enter the 
market. 
 
Con-
ver-
gence 
20
07 
Sonera 
introduces 
exclusive 
iPhone 
sales 
contract. 
Role of 
partners 
increasing
. 
iPhone;Intelli-
gent mobile 
phone 
capacity 
increases. 
Large local 
telecom 
companies 
abandon 
Finnet. 
B2B 
Voice a 
major 
applicat
ion, but 
nobody 
wants 
to pay 
for it. 
 
 
Notably, the eras eventually identified from the temporal bracketing are 
also visible in the example shown in Table 8: 
 
? The era of telecom monopolies (1980-1986) 
? The era of the liberalization of telecommunications and data 
business (1987-1992) 
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? The era of intense competition and growth in mobile business 
(1993-1998) 
? The era of IT hype - the convergence of mobile and Internet 
business (1999-2000) 
? The era of IT bust (2001) 
? The era of streamlining and cost cutting (2002-2005) 
? The era of convergence – ICT (2006-2010) 
 
The discontinuities at the frontiers of the eras include changes in 
legislative regulation, new technologies and appropriability regimes, as 
well as in Sonera’s strategic decisions and the regimes of action on the 
industry level. Appendix 1 and 2 detail the temporal bracketing events, 
which were placed periodically at eras.  
 
3.4.2 Data analysis: the abductivist approach 
 
I adopted an abductivist approach (Dubois & Gadde, 2002; Kovacs & 
Spens, 2005) in this research in order to link the theoretical framework 
and development on the one hand, and the further analysis of the 
empirical data on the other. Dubois and Gadde (2002) broadly refer to 
the abductivist approach as one in which the empirical world (i.e., the 
chosen cases), previous theory, and the framework of the study are 
intertwined with the processes of matching, direction and redirection. In 
other words there is constant iteration between the data sources, the data 
analysis, and the initial theoretical framework, and in some cases a total 
(theoretical) redirection if new evidence and data are present. 
My target was theory development regarding the constructs in the 
theoretical framework and their relationships (e.g., dominant designs 
follow each other) in a longitudinal setting. I further classify this study as 
one of theory refinement (case-specific) (Keating, 1995), which further 
justifies the abductivist view: “Systematic combining builds more on the 
refinement of existing theories than on inventing new ones” (Dubois & 
Gadde, 2002, p.559). Nevertheless, testable propositions are often 
presented as an outcome of the final analysis in cases of theory 
refinement. 
Below I describe the abductivist research process as a whole. I started by 
asking how one could create a dominant design in a company, bearing in 
mind the industry conditions. I included constructs from classical studies 
(e.g., Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Utterback 
& Abernathy, 1975) in the initial framework, supplemented with more 
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recent models incorporating factors relevant to the management of 
dominant designs (e.g. Suarez, 2004). 
The first and second interview rounds yielded inductive findings about 
the cases: how innovations came into being in the company; whether or 
not they were dominant designs, and why; how they related to the 
industry life-cycle and the company’s historical eras; and whether they 
were developed in-house or adopted and modified from the innovations 
of other players in the market. 
The following general themes emerged during the first reorientation of 
the initial theoretical framework based on the interviews and other 
materials: convergence, dominant logic, and technological brokering (as 
major sources of innovation). It also seemed as if the variables that 
determine successful innovation strategies were no longer associated with 
“fluid pattern”54  facets in the creation of subsequent dominant designs. 
In contrast, new dominant designs were created in accordance with the 
industry-life-cycle view of “specific pattern” facets such as cost reduction, 
and an organizational emphasis on structure, goals and rules, bypassing 
entrepreneurship (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978). According to the 
traditional view (ibid.), new dominant designs start from the product 
(fluid pattern) rather than the process (specific pattern) stage of 
innovation. However, my initial findings indicated that many of them 
were rooted in the latter stage. Moreover, according to my initial 
empirical findings, the sources of innovation are more fine-grained than 
implied in the traditional assumption that dominant designs are rooted in 
the insights and decisions of (top) management (e.g., McGrath et. al., 
1992). 
During the third interview round I elaborated on the reoriented focus 
and articulated my initial findings to the informants. As a result I came to 
a conclusion that individual dominant designs are not pursued very 
systematically based on a clear strategy or roadmap, for example. On the 
contrary, ad-hoc problem solving was more prevalent, as was the 
management of a varied product portfolio (instead of following a clear, 
unified strategic direction). This further meant that the case products 
were mutually interdependent in terms of technology and commercial 
potential. The varied sources of innovation (and dominant designs) 
mentioned above were also reflected in the further stages of interviews 
and data analyses. During the later stages I also brought in Teece’s (2007) 
framework of sensing, seizing, and transforming phases given its 
                                                   
54 Fluid pattern facets are discussed in the theoretical section, Figure 2. 
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relevance in identifying and classifying the preliminary building blocks of 
dominant designs. 
The final reorientation of the theoretical focus concerned the shifts or 
transformations between subsequent generations of dominant designs. At 
this stage I concentrated more strongly on the theoretical discussion 
about changing customer preferences and the role of technological 
progression in enabling more players to come up with dominant designs. I 
also reframed Teece’s model (2007), making it more relevant to their 
evolution by starting (rather than ending) with the “transforming” phase. 
Likewise, I distinguished between sensing/seizing and transforming 
environmental conditions in their management. Thus, in a sense I 
returned to the classic discussion on dominant design in this last 
reorientation phase, although armed with new abductive findings 
concerning how subsequent dominant designs are created and what role 
the varying sources of innovation play therein. This shed light on the 
extent to which innovative activities are product or process led, and on 
whether they actually evolve in this [product/process] pattern (Utterback 
& Abernathy, 1975; Abernathy & Utterback, 1978), and if so, why. I also 
concluded that products seemed to constitute a converged portfolio in 
Sonera and in the telecom industry, meaning that they share the same 
(technological) production and process platforms, and tend to be 
marketed as solutions and systems (instead of individual products as was 
the case in the 1980s and earlier). 
However, although abductivist reorientation was significant during the 
research, the reporting of the case and the findings is presented in a more 
traditional, linear and chronological way (see e.g., Järvensivu, 2007; 
Moisander & Valtonen, 2006, p. 174). 
 
3.4.3 Data analysis in practice 
 
Table 9 summarizes the actions and steps that I undertook in the data 
analysis, as well as the rationale behind them and the outcomes. I 
describe this in more detail in the following text. 
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Table 9.  Analytical strategy and tactics 
 
 Action 
 
End result Rationale 
Step I Reading the 
interview and 
archival data, 
organizing the data 
and transcripts into 
1) interview themes, 
2) dominant design 
building blocks, and 
3) products/ 
services 
 
Mind maps, 
matrices 
Data is easier to 
analyze, 
patterns, 
commonalities 
are seen 
Step II Industry and case 
history narrative, 
dominant design 
existence, temporal 
bracketing strategy 
Dominant design 
fact tables, Case 
narrative and 
Industry history 
(historical eras- 
evolution of 
empirical context). 
 
Initial narratives 
(also to be 
discussed with 
the interviewees 
in the further 
rounds) 
Step III 
 
Inductive findings, 
conclusions, 
explanations and 
trends in the 
creation of dominant 
designs  
Two matrices 
analyzing how 
dominant designs 
were created in 
Sonera 
Dominant design 
creation profiles 
are identified, a 
necessary step in 
order to fix the 
analytical 
framework 
 
Step IV Teece's (2007) 
framework used to 
match and 
reorganize the 
building blocks of 
dominant designs 
as sensing, seizing 
and transforming 
 
Framework for the 
adaptation of 
dominant designs ( 
consisting of 
propositions) 
First answers to 
the research 
questions, linking 
them to the 
dominant design 
discussion 
Step V Elaborating on 
critical questions 
regarding change in 
dominant design , 
the VSR model and 
the role of complex 
technological 
systems in the DD 
adaptation process 
Five separate 
analyses: Source of 
innovation change 
in time, exploitation 
and exploration 
interchange, 
dominant design 
innovation type 
(Abernathy & Clark, 
1985), VSR 
(Variation Selection 
Retention) change 
in time- in Sonera 
and the industry, the 
networked systemic 
innovation path 
Crystallizing the 
answers to 
critical questions 
about dominant 
design change 
and how one 
company can 
create 
subsequent 
dominant 
designs and the 
role of 
technological 
complex systems 
on this (i.e. 
convergence of 
technologies and 
customer 
demand); 
elaborating 
theoretical 
contribution 
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The table 9 classifies the analytical phases in five steps. The steps build on 
each other and are explicitly linked to the empirical data and the 
theoretical framework (see Chapter 2, including the key constructs).  
However, by means of abductive logic I moved iteratively back and forth 
in these steps in the course of the analysis, and complemented earlier 
analysis when I gained a more thorough understanding of the cases. I 
explain these steps in more detail below. 
Overall, the data analysis and the drawing of conclusions follow Miles 
and Huberman’s (1994) steps: summarizing and packaging the data (here, 
first organizing the interview transcripts according to products and 
dominant-design building blocks), repackaging and aggregating, and 
finally developing propositions for constructing an explanatory 
framework. The framework is the dominant-design-management model 
(see Figure 23 in Chapter 4). 
Step 1. I started the analysis by reading the interview transcripts several 
times in order to become thoroughly familiar with the data. First I read 
them separately, and then in comparison with others, identifying 
common themes, as well as product areas (and dominant designs) that 
were linked in the same themes. Next I linked the empirical material 
(interview notes and transcripts, the material shown in the interviews and 
supportive archival materials) in order to find support, complementary 
information, or counteracting factors with regard to what other 
interviewees had said. The grand aim was to give meaning to the data in 
terms of the evolutionary processes related to the creation, modification 
and adoption/copying of dominant designs. Pettigrew (1990, p.269) puts 
this point well: “Causation of change is neither linear nor singular […]. 
Look for continuity and change, patterns and idiosyncrasies, the actions 
of individuals and groups, the role of contexts and structures.” This is 
reflected in my study in the many factors combined (on the company 
intertwined with the industry level) that shed light on how dominant 
designs are created and adopted. 
In drawing and verifying my conclusions I used the following tactics 
(adopted from Miles & Huberman, 1994): 1) noting change patterns and 
themes in the industry and how innovations had been created during its 
evolution; 2) finding out what building blocks were critical (and in what 
way) at different times; and 3) clustering the interview material and 
archival data according to the constructs of the theoretical framework. I 
coded all the transcripts and the related empirical material not only by 
product area (dominant design cases), but also according to these partly 
emergent theoretical themes (constituting a 71-page document). 
 
  Methodology 
122 
 
Table 10.  Example of emergent themes and product areas coding 
 
Theme Product area Quote 
Complementarities Vipgate The competitor did not have such a large 
operator at that time [1992], but had local 
telephone companies, and Elisa were 
forced to build the concept of nationwide 
one-stop shopping from bits and pieces. 
This explains ‘the process thinking’: the 
competitors had to engage in much more 
cooperation among the different actors and 
client companies. 
Complementarities Vipgate The background to the VipGate concept is 
the fact that we [Sonera] used an intelligent 
network, IN, to produce services. In 1995, 
competition was fragmented, and local 
telecom companies did not have the 
resources to provide intelligent network 
services. 
Modularity Unified  
Communications 
Transformation to the packet-switched 
transmission opens up the market, and 
there is no longer such a closed situation. 
This is evident in the arrival of new 
entrants, which in turn opens up the 
industry even more. 
Modularity Unified  
Communications 
Hybrid solutions will require different levels 
of efficiency and capacity in the processes 
that manage the complete customer view, 
in other words knowing how one client 
uses the services. Sonera has historically 
promoted strong product-based thinking, 
and the organization had its own 
information system for every product. Now 
you have to have total-solution-based 
thinking for a certain subset of products. 
Dominant logic IP Voice 
(Mobile) 
On the other hand, as Finland is a mobile 
[communications, speech in GSM network] 
land it has kind of slowed down this mobile 
IP voice breakthrough, when circuit-
switched voice [GSM] is used in the 
mobile, and in the way that no one except 
the traditional telecom operators can offer 
it. 
 
 
Table 10 gives examples of interview extracts and how I coded them by 
theme and case product (or product area). Thus I became familiar with 
the data and gained an understanding of the role of each building block 
(in the framework of dominant-design adaptation). For instance, Vipgate 
used complementary assets to its benefit, but this was not necessarily the 
situation with other products, as the overall role of complementarities had 
changed in the industry. 
Step 2. I then split the industry history into different eras and case 
histories with the help of the rich interview material. Here I took into 
account where the product-development projects were situated in the 
company’s product/service offering portfolio, and of the goals and 
resources in these projects. My aim was to tell a dynamic and holistic 
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story of transformation, discussing events in the past and present, to 
describe the context and the action, and to identify many causes of change 
(Pettigrew, 1990, p.269). I checked the various relevant factors in 
developing the dominant designs in all cases (including validation of their 
existence, in other words producing evidence that a dominant design had 
indeed been created). I also crosschecked the cases to find common 
themes and differing factors. 
I used the sensing, seizing, and transforming framework when I 
described the cases. The building blocks that trigger the transition to 
subsequent dominant designs are of interest in the transforming phase. 
Examples of such a trigger include poor company performance, a new 
technological or regulative event, and the early diffusion of some service 
in the market. It should also be borne in mind that the transforming 
phase is a situation wherein the company strategy and cognition (top 
management team, R&D, SBU, and sales management) must change. The 
focus in the sensing phase is on the source of innovative ideas, although it 
also requires action to generate ideas for and ways of changing products 
and services. With regard to seizing I looked at the resources, 
organizational structures and processes the case company used in its 
productization. The sensing and seizing phases also had their 
environmental building blocks, which I analyzed in the light of the 
dominant-design-adaptation process. 
Step 3. In order to get an overview of the cases and how they might 
differ in relation to the industry life cycle and sources of innovation, I 
prepared matrices analyzing the innovation types in the company. The 
general dimensions in the matrices are the stage of the industry life cycle; 
the closed, semi-closed or open industry structure; and if the innovations 
were created endogenously (by the case company) or exogenously (by 
external players in the industry). They made me think about whether 
there were some common patterns in the success factors and trends in 
terms of how innovation types evolve in the industry life cycle.  For 
instance, is a certain type (cf. Abernathy and Clark’s [1985] typology and 
the endogenous/exogenous distinction) inferior, and if so, why? What are 
the key antecedents of success in innovations? I also proceeded 
inductively, thinking in a more fine-grained manner of the interplay 
between R&D and top management, the customers’ role, and the 
company’s competences in creating dominant designs. 
  Step 4. Next I assigned the building blocks of dominant design to the 
sensing, seizing, and transforming phases in accordance with Teece’s 
(2007) dynamic capabilities framework. Within the sensing phase I first 
described the source of the innovation, which I scrutinized in more detail 
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in the analysis. Moving on to the seizing phase, I described the role of the 
company’s complementary assets and how modularity and the firm’s 
structure enabled or hindered the creation of dominant designs. The end 
result was the realization of an innovation in the market (a product or 
service) that could be considered a success or a failure, in other words a 
dominant design or not. The design could then 1) vanish / be terminated, 
2) be retained, or 3) modified in the transforming phase in order to 4) 
create a totally new dominant design for a new regime incorporating 
competence-disrupting technology. What also assumed significance here 
in terms of potentially determining whether there would be new 
dominant designs in the next sensing phase were the managers’ current 
dominant logic (of how business should be done), as well as their views on 
technological and business convergence. Thus, I also analyzed the 
disappearance vs. retention of old dominant designs and convergence. 
In this step I further assigned numerical values (Eisenhardt, 1989, 
p.543; Larsson, 1993; Mintzberg, Raisinghani & Theoret, 1976) to 
illustrate the importance of the different variables to each case (see 
Appendix 12 for details of the coding). The reasons for assigning 
numerical values were to cross-check the cases, find longitudinal 
evolutionary trends, and to identify the role of the building blocks in the 
adaptation of dominant designs, and how they related to each other. It 
was also then possible to identify further similarities, differences, and 
patterns across the cases – in a more systematic way than by relying only 
on verbal explanations. 
Step 5. In order to find more robust answers to the research questions I 
conducted five further analyses that are also implicit in the theoretical 
frameworks (albeit not referring to explicit building blocks). These 
analyses shed light on (1) the changes in the sources of innovation that 
occurred over time, (2) signs of collapse in current dominant designs 
(Nooteboom, 2000; Gilsing & Nooteboom, 2006), (3) the type of 
innovations pursued over the life-cycle (Abernathy and Clark, 1985),  (4) 
in broad terms, company- and industry-level variation in selection and 
retention activities with respect to dominant designs, (Durand, 2001, 
2006; McGrath et. al. 1992), and (5) the analysis of a networked 
innovation path, i.e. the simultaneous effects in technology, regulation 
and capabilities in dominant design creation. 
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3.4.4 Outcomes of the analyses: The structure of the case findings 
 
In sum, the case narrative and findings (including the theoretical 
propositions) emerged as follows. In Chapter 2 I described the company’s 
historical eras vis-à-vis the industry, using the theoretical framework 
describing the emergence of dominant designs on the industry and 
corporate levels (Figure 5 in Chapter 2). This analysis assessed the critical 
events: legislative regulative issues, changes in technological and 
market/customer preferences, and how these affected corporate 
strategizing and the competitive situation in the process of adapting a 
dominant design. The outcome factors in this narrative were players in 
the industry, and selected dominant designs in the case company and the 
industry. 
Chapter 4 describes and the historical cases pertaining to different 
products (or product-development projects) within Sonera. I have 
structured the case narratives according to the framework for creating 
dominant designs on the company level (Figure 6 in Chapter 2), depicting 
the transforming, sensing, and seizing activities related to each case. Each 
one was affected by Sonera-level strategizing during the historical era, 
and they also influenced Sonera as a whole.  
Chapter 4 further analyzes and interprets the case histories in 
conjunction with developing propositions derived from the research 
questions (Chapter 1) vis-à-vis earlier theories and literature. The 
propositions are based on the abductive empirical findings concerning 
how (the source of innovation, the relations between the building blocks) 
and why (regulative, technological, and customer needs) dominant 
designs were emerging on the company and industry levels. They also 
relate to the appropriability discussion: who are creating dominant 
designs, what capabilities are appreciated in the market, and what links 
the sources of innovation to the industry life cycle. The framework 
covering the management of dominant design adaptation summarizes the 
findings of the propositions and refines existing frameworks. 
 
 
3.5 Reliability and validity  
 
In the following I assess the overall reliability and validity of the present  
study in terms of methodology and philosophical assumptions. Gibbert et 
al. (2008) outline criteria for a rigorous case study, including its internal, 
construct, and external validity, and its reliability. 
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Internal validity requires acceptable causal arguments and logical 
reasoning in order to defend the research conclusions. This is achieved 
here through the construction of relevant theoretical frameworks for 
dominant designs. 
I have attempted to adhere to this principle in my study, especially in 
constructing two separate frameworks: one for the industry and corporate 
level, and the other for the business-unit level. I have also put effort into 
locating the evolution and events in terms of how and when the levels of 
analysis were intertwined. 
In an instrumental case study  such55 as this, “because the critical issues 
are more likely to be known in advance and follow disciplinary 
expectations, such a design can take greater advantage of already 
developed instruments and preconceived coding schemes” (Stake 2003, 
p. 8). Thus, the fact that many constructs and components have been 
validated in earlier studies on dominant design-related matters 
strengthens the internal validity of the present case. At the same time, I 
avoided making generalizations too early. To this end, the interviews, 
empirical material, feedback from the transcriptions, and conclusions 
were reflected upon throughout the whole research process as the 
analytical stage proceeded for as long as necessary (see the five analytical 
steps in the previous section). According to Yin (2009, p.41), such 
explanation building improves the internal validity of the research.  
Construct validity relates to the data-collection phase, referring to “the 
extent to which a study investigates what it claims to investigate” 
(Gibbert et al., 2008. p. 1466), and to “identifying correct operational 
measures for the concepts being studied” (Yin, 2009, p.40). From this 
perspective, it is useful to have many sources of data and to be able to 
build a chain of evidence within and across them. I sought construct 
validity by carefully checking the case objects (i.e. the cases and the 
corporate strategy), and the theoretical constructs and the related 
empirical material linked to them, choosing a variety of interviewees with 
different backgrounds (from senior managers to functional R&D experts, 
for example), and using my own work experience (akin to participant 
observation) in the company. The case histories were also peer-reviewed 
by the informants, thereby double-checking the validity of the theoretical 
constructs and the interpretations in the case context. 
Thus, my data sources added robustness through the triangulation 
process of using multiple data sources and cross-validating 
                                                   
55 According to Stake (2003), a case study is instrumental “if a case is examined 
mainly to provide insight into an issue or to redraw a generalization” (p. 4). 
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them:”Triangulation has been generally considered a process of using 
multiple perceptions to clarify meaning, verifying the repeatability of an 
observation or interpretation” (Stake, 2003, 15). The triangulation tools 
used in this study were as follows: multiple interviews about products, top 
management expressing their views on products and providing industry-
level views, rich empirical data collection, and structured and open-ended 
interviews. In total, there were 81 interviews and 20 follow-up questions 
through email. Many organizational units were embodied: SBUs, R&D 
organization, and top management. 
External validity requires that theories generated are also generalizable 
to other settings. In qualitative case studies such as the present one it 
typically refers to analytical rather than statistical generalization (Gibbert 
et al., 2008). To enhance the analytical generalizability I focused on 
details within the case-study context (interviews, strategy material) and 
took a nested approach (different case studies within one organization). 
Moreover, I considered both successful and failed cases. In addition, I 
analyzed a total of 17 cases as well as the seven eras of corporate history. 
Eisenhardt (1989) considers between four and 10 cases a good starting 
point from which to develop analytical generalization, which was 
exceeded in this study. 
Given the context, the findings of the present study are likely to be 
applicable and analytically generalizable to other business contexts that 
feature intertwining technological products and services, are capital-
intensive, and have a complex, systemic business nature. The case period 
is also of sufficient length, enabling observation of the different roles of 
the company in the development of dominant designs: at times it was a 
pioneer, and at times a challenger. This aspect also widens the analytical 
generalizability. 
Elaborating on the theme of external validity, Eisenhardt and Graebner 
(2007) further ask, “How can there be rich description of all cases and at 
the same time robust theory testing and formulation?” (p. 29), also 
proposing a solution: “develop a theory in sections or by distinct 
propositions in such a way that each is supported by empirical 
evidence”. To this end, the case histories constitute rich descriptions, and 
propositions are formulated based on empirical evidence in the analysis 
section. 
Finally, the reliability of the case study refers to transparency in the 
data collection and analysis. In other words, the empirical procedures 
should be apparent and understandable to other researchers (Gibbert et 
al., 2008; Yin, 2009). I sought to achieve such transparency by carefully 
documenting and explaining the data-collection and analysis procedures 
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(Chapter 3). I also followed the same procedures in all the cases, at 
different time periods. Moreover, I created a case-study database. 
In terms of transparency, real products and businesses were studied 
using real names. Thus, the case company and the set of dominant 
designs analyzed could also be assumed to be valuable as an identifiable 
case example in its own right (Siggelkow, 2007, p.20). In addition, 
corroboration is reflected in the fact that the respondents commented on 
the conclusions and answered various follow-up questions. 
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4. Analysis 
In this chapter, the empirical case history (products and services) and an 
analysis of the nature of dominant designs and their evolution is gone 
through in the following way. In this chapter, the empirical case history 
will be structured as follows. I will go through the cases by applying the 
theoretical framework of dominant design creation within the company, 
at the level of business units and their products and services (see Figure 6 
in Chapter 2). This empirical case history complements the industry and 
corporate level empirical account of Chapter 2 (which applied the 
theoretical framework regarding dominant design emergence at industry 
and corporate levels; see Figure 5 in Chapter 2). However, the historical 
descriptions at these two levels of analysis are naturally interlinked, as 
both theoretical frameworks share some facets (Figure 5 and 6). 
As outlined in the framework (Figure 6), each case is described in this 
chapter according to Teece’s (2007) framework of the modes of dynamic 
capabilities (sensing, seizing, transforming). Furthermore, as in the 
framework, the cases are structured through the relevant “building 
blocks” of dominant design management, that is, the firm and 
environment-level factors that can enhance or  inhibit dominant design 
adaptation process (i.e., dominant design creation and/or adoption) at a 
firm (also in Schilling, 1998). More specifically, the building blocks 
comprise the following dimensions: managerial and organizational 
processes, capabilities, environmental changes and conditions (e.g., 
technological change and appropriability), resources, and finally 
innovations. 
Thus, the case history is organized as follows. First, I describe the 
background of the product/service central to the case. Second, the 
transformation from the previous product generation is described. Third, 
I proceed to examine the processes of sensing ideas, and fourth, I describe 
the seizing phase activities and environmental conditions and the 
resulting dominant design characteristics. Finally, as the majority of cases 
in this study transformed to follow product generation, I describe this 
process and summarize the adaptation process (see Figure 6). That 
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description is organized around transformation, sensing, and seizing with 
identified building blocks in these categories. 
This Chapter further analyses and interprets the case histories, and their 
interlinking to the industry and corporate-level historical eras described 
in Chapter 2. These interpretations, vis-à-vis literature related to 
dominant designs and industry evolution, are used to set out the key 
findings of the study in the form of a set of theoretical propositions. 
 
 
4.1 Empirical case history (products and services) 
 
4.1.1 Service numbers 
 
Background 
Service numbers have two basic product families: Toll-free service 
numbers and premium service numbers. The numbers have been 
developed to meet different user needs, although they share similarities. A 
basic principle is that toll-free service numbers (launched in 1987 in 
Finland) are free to the end caller and premium service numbers 
(launched in 1988 in Finland) have a variety of prices. Toll-free service 
numbers are used for example in customer service (call center services). 
Premium service numbers have a different function; they make it possible 
for service providers (e.g., telelawyers or providers of hotlines) to do 
business in the telecom network. This also means the service providers 
can choose the service category according to their business: public service 
needs, information services (e.g., a distribution channel for companies), 
or entertainment. 
The technological solution in service numbers is to route incoming calls 
to an answering point specified by the company receiving the calls. An 
Intelligent Network is used in this routing procedure and billing of the 
service numbers. In general, the aim is to provide services related to 
intelligent information transmission and delivery, in the telephone 
network (Sonera service description, 2009; Takala et al. 1994) 
 
Transformation from previous product generations 
In the present case of the service numbers business, there was no 
previous dominant design solution (or even an idea of a solution) in toll-
free service numbers by the mid-1980s because of the absence of cost-
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efficient technology. Calls to a company were either forwarded via an 
operator or via some Direct Inward Dialing (DID) numbers. The term 
DID mean that an individual extension on a Private Branch Exchange 
(PBX) can be reached directly via its own standard outside number. Fixed 
voice business—such as trunk calls in the Public Switched Telephone 
Network (PSTN)56  network—was a predecessor of toll-free service 
numbers. For their part, premium service numbers had previously been 
more like separate services, the business was a closed vertical system. An 
example of this was ‘Neiti Aika’ (the speaking clock in 1986), but these 
were more like operators’ fully-owned and operated services (rather than 
services operated by third-party service providers). 
The development in the market and technology gradually allowed the 
service number business to develop. Companies wanted to offer free 
customer service and centralize their contact centers. In the premium 
service numbers arena, a need was outlined in the market for new kind of 
value added service business, and Sonera also noticed it could create a 
new kind of open business ecosystem. Technology, largely originating 
from the USA, made the realization of this need possible. The 
development of Intelligent Network (IN)57  at AT&T and Baby Bells (U.S. 
telecom companies) was rapid in the 1960s, accompanied with the 
invention of a voice response unit (VRU). VRU is a technology that allows 
a computer to interact with humans through the use of voice and Dual-
tone multi-frequency signaling (DTMF) tones input via keypad. 
Consequently, new convergent types of services could be generated in the 
telephone network. Convergence as used here means that new technology 
was integrated into a telecommunications network in order to create a 
new type of business (e.g., Customer Relations Management [CRM]58 ), as 
distinct from early voice transmission services. 
                                                   
56 A term for all the publicly available, interconnected telco networks. 
57 The Intelligent Network (IN) is the standard network architecture specified 
in the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). The intelligence is 
provided by network nodes on the service layer, distinct from the switching layer 
of the core network, as opposed to solutions based on intelligence in the core 
switches or telephone equipment. 
58 CRM can be understood as a customer service and marketing support 
system, which has same purpose as service numbers. Sonera pioneered these 
types of systems in the early 1990s.   
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Sensing  
Service numbers were a new business area and therefore it was natural 
that the area was not overly regulated, even in the consumer segment59.  
Only later, in the early 1990s, did business come to be regulated and an 
ethical code (including e.g., content of services and price levels) was set 
for running the business by the telecommunications operators 
themselves. 
The sensing of ideas, not constrained by legislative regulation, had two 
main sources. First there was the R&D capability to tap into, learn, and 
develop the products that were in use in Great Britain (premium service 
numbers with limited functionality) and the USA (toll-free service 
numbers). Second, the market need was identified in the company by 
listening to customers in Finland, as described below. 
The toll-free number idea was originally imported from the USA and 
was used in Finland to manage customer service operations. It was 
understood that customers of the telecoms companies wanted to improve 
customer service and to refocus and concentrate on their contact centers, 
and also to allocate their functions freely, or at least in a manner 
unrestricted by telecom infrastructure. 
 
“Service numbers, especially this freephone [toll-free service numbers] was 
exactly targeted to these big corporations’ customer service needs. This business 
was already happening in the USA in the 1980s with the freephone 800 number, 
and we wanted to help the customers by making it easier for their customers to 
call their customer service department” (Informant 34, Quote 1) 
 
A new department, a test-lab, was established in Sonera in 1987. It was 
called the trunk network’s value-added services. The unit was very 
entrepreneurial in nature, as evidenced by an acceptance that six out of 
ten projects would be failures. The unit was autonomous and enjoyed the 
support of senior management. It was found that the service numbers 
could be created in telephone centers, progressing from earlier Direct 
Inward Dialling (DID) solutions. Sonera’s premium service numbers were 
globally pioneering. 
 
                                                   
59 Typically in telecommunications, the B2B-oriented domain is not regulated. 
In turn, authorities pose strict demands for service levels, price levels, etc. for the 
consumer and wholesale segment. 
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“..The USA had freephone services and then we invented a system that let the 
trunk network’s ‘mechanical counter’60  functionality to be put onto the server, 
and then we could have different prices billed from each customer. This was the 
way the so-called premium rate services were modified and created in Sonera in 
Finland. The freephone was developed as a premium rate in Sonera.” (Informant 
7, Quote 5) 
 
“I remember there was one company called Super Call in London, it had these 
service numbers but there was only a day rate and an evening rate. My colleague 
then remembered that we already had these similar types of service numbers like 
a weather line aimed at farmers etc. in Telecom Finland. These calls were routed 
through international telephone centers. It was important there was price 
differentiation in them, already more diverse than in everywhere else. Then we 
thought about this business and my colleague was a telephone exchange expert, 
he remembered that we had 12 different price classes in these exchanges. The 
cheapest price class was one Finn mark and the most expensive was 17 Finn 
marks—and then we just routed 9700 calls through these international 
exchanges, and created the premium service number business” (Informant 39, 
Quote 1). 
 
Seizing 
Toll-free service numbers were the first service numbers introduced in 
Finland. The idea was that the caller could call from anywhere in the 
country to certain numbers so that the call receiver paid for the trunk call. 
The 9800- toll-free service was developed in close cooperation with 
Ericsson, and the telephone exchange’s own computer was used to create 
the service (Turpeinen, 1996). 
The progression in the billing method, complemented with Sonera’s 
technological expertise in managing the interactive voice response (IVR) 
process, aided the diffusion of the service business area. One example of 
this pioneering work was a CRM solution created for Postipankki 
(Postbank) as early as 1992. 
The 9800 toll-free service was developed to be cost free to the caller 
when calls originated from Sonera’s own local network area (earlier the 
caller had to pay the local network charge). This happened in 1991. Later, 
the calls also became free from competitors’ network areas, because it 
                                                   
60 The mechanical counter gives billing pulses in a  trunk network (i.e., the 
technical infrastructure used when billing foreign and trunk calls in telephone 
centers that time). 
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became possible for an operator to buy access61  capacity from a 
competitor, and consequently price their own service as an end-to-end 
service62.  
In turn, a new nationwide premium service called 9700-Teletori 
[TeleMarket] was launched on 6 September 1988. It was promoted as the 
world’s most developed information service, partly because service 
providers were given 12 different payment classes in the trunk network. 
The service providers created the content (the actual service) and 
promoted the service to their end users. Sonera charged the end user on 
their phone bill, deducted its own commission, and forwarded the 
remaining money to the third-party service providers (Takala et al., 1994). 
So, in a sense, Sonera learned ecosystem and modular processes 
management though it was a closed integrated company at that time. 
Prices varied from one Finn mark to 18 Finn marks per minute. The 
service was totally unique (Turpeinen, 1996). 
The initial technological solution relied on manual processes. IN was 
not used at that time for service numbers, and the calls were routed 
through telephone centers for foreign calls, which already had different 
tax classes and physical billing sections for calls to different countries. 
Only later were service numbers standardized in the European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) and ITU, and fully 
implemented with the IN. 
The innovation characteristics can briefly be described as follows in the 
service number business area: Service numbers served new customer 
groups with new a technology adopted and nurtured, and used for new 
applications (Abernathy & Clark, 1985). 
There was a strong appropriability regime and option to have a business 
risk-based fee to underpin pricing (as the legislative regulator did not 
control the prices). Thus, Sonera profited from its innovations and 
managed to diffuse the services. There was also encouragement inside the 
                                                   
61 The telecommunications network is divided into access, transmission (trunk) 
and termination networks. Access refers to the non-traffic sensitive part of a 
network. It provides subscribers with access to the core network. Access is often 
termed the ‘last mile’ to customers’ premises, where a customer has its end-
device, e.g., a telephone. A call (from a caller to a call receiver) is divided into 
outgoing, transmission, and downward traffic. 
62 Previously, a customer paid separate fees to the operator, who owned the 
network. For example, when calling in HPY’s network, a customer paid Sonera 
and Elisa. In this case (end-to-end pricing), service number calls are invoiced for 
on the same invoice as the other call types the customer has. 
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company to experiment with new businesses in premium service 
numbers. Importantly, the services were available at national level (a 
national number) regarding the possible billing mechanisms, which 
helped create a new service ecosystem. A new open-value network (a win-
win ecosystem) was created. 
At that time, Sonera still held the monopoly over trunk and 
international calls, a significant technological asset. Using their trunk and 
international telephone exchanges, Sonera added premium rate and 800 
numbers to that infrastructure. The competitors were local operators and 
they had no capability to create a national service. There were no actual 
bottlenecks in production and the investments were profitable as one 
respondent at that time explained: 
 
“We had no trade-offs in production so that the operator had quite a strong 
position. This meant that we could accomplish these pricing mechanisms with a 
good contribution margin for ourselves. On the other hand, we have had this 
telecom network infrastructure on our hands [IN and earlier trunk telephone 
switches]. This means that services can be used from all kinds of subscriptions 
and there is no bottleneck from traffic volumes that could place limits on these 
services. We also tried to develop this customer intimacy more than technology—
as long as it was reliable enough and we had enough capacity—but of course it 
must be admitted we benefited from the unique situation we had in the 
beginning. Sonera had the tools and the competitor did not, and we had the time 
to design the services thoroughly and in a timely manner.” (Informant 34, Quote 
2) 
 
The entrepreneurial spirit was also very strong at the time: 
 
“Service numbers were the biggest growth areas for Sonera at that time. In 
retrospect, I could note that the pricing policy and business risks taken by the 
telecom operator would not be allowed today, because the pricing must be a cost-
oriented wholesale price.” (Informant 39, Quote 2) 
 
The resulting dominant design characteristics 
Toll-free service numbers already had a dominant design in the USA in 
the 1980s. In Finland, Sonera developed the service and was the first to 
adopt it. In turn, Sonera was the first telecom firm in the world to develop 
and implement premium service numbers in terms of comprehensive 
billing solutions and ecosystem creation capacity (Laaksonen, 2007, p. 
223, interviews, Turpeinen, 1996). Sonera also held the leading market 
share in service numbers in Finland and the service was Sonera’s most 
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profitable business ever. Elisa (then HPY) also followed Sonera in this 
business area, adopting the same business model. In sum, the key 
dominant design features in service numbers (both in toll-free and 
premium) were that a customer could choose the fee rate of the service 
based on content, national coverage, pricing and income distribution 
model and the smooth management of the calls. 
 
Transforming (to following product generations)  
The growth curve of premium service (070063 ) numbers was very steep, 
pointing to the strong latent need for the service. The toll-free (0800) 
service had a different growth profile from that of the 0700 service: 
growth was steady but not so steep. 
The new 9800 toll-free number was a forerunner of services created in 
the Intelligent Network (IN). In 1988, the 9800-toll-free number was only 
the beginning of a wide IN development process, which would “connect 
telecommunications and information technology, also managing 
networks and services” (Turpeinen, 1996). The 9800 service itself enjoyed 
a 90% market share in Finland in 1993 (Annual Report, 1994). 
Eventually, there was product differentiation to meet new needs. In 1991, 
an automatic telephone system (APJ) was introduced along with 
interactive voice response systems (IVR) (Sonera Annual Report, 1992). 
1993 saw the introduction of 0600 numbers (e.g., online services, such as 
expert advice or taxi firm hotlines), followed by low-price service numbers 
that commenced with 0203 in 1995 (priced at the level of a local call). 
Sonera’s market share of the premium service number business was 70% 
in early 1995 (Turpeinen, 1996). Later on (in the 2000s), the 0700 service 
numbers were partly substituted by internet services and Short Message 
Service (SMS), but toll-free service numbers would still be used to operate 
customer service, and the service’s role has remained stable over the 
years. In addition, in the business area of toll-free service numbers, an 
Attendant (a switchboard operator) service was later created, in line with 
the earlier CRM pilot from 1992. 
Table 11 below summarizes the transforming, sensing, and seizing 
phases building blocks. 
 
 
 
                                                   
63 9700 and 9800 numbers were converted to 0700 and 0800 when the Great 
Numbering reform took place in Finland in 1995. 
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Table 11.   Transformation, sensing, and seizing phases in Service numbers. 
 
 
 
 
 
Building blocks   
Transforming 
from previous product 
generations 
Sensing  Seizing 
Previous Dominant logic 
in industry/company. In 
premium service numbers, 
there was a closed operator 
owned business model and 
services, and pricing was 
cost-based. Management 
discovered that pricing could 
be value-based and third 
parties could provide content 
to services. In toll-free 
service numbers (Call center 
type) firms arranged their 
call center function earlier so 
that customers called 
through telecom operator 
(attendant) or by some direct 
numbers (Direct In Dialing) 
to companies with an 
existing telephone network. 
Management discovered 
telecom operator could 
arrange the call center 
function so that it would 
separate place and time, i.e., 
so that call centers could be 
concentrated. 
Convergence creation in 
company. Capacity was 
created in Sonera to create 
a new value-added business 
in telephone networks. 
Processes were developed 
to integrate the telephone 
business and value-added 
services, and also service 
providers into Sonera's 
business model. 
Market change in industry. 
Premium service numbers. 
Service providers wanted a 
new business. Cultural 
change occurred because 
the telephone could be used 
to purposes other than 
talking. Toll-free service 
numbers. A call center 
function was needed in order 
to improve customer service. 
Technology change in 
industry. New cost-efficient 
technology that offered new 
functionality emerged in the 
USA, such as VRU and later 
IN. DID and telephone 
network (PSTN) were 
replaced. 
Regulation in 
industry. 
There was no 
regulation of the 
service number 
business creation. 
Source of 
innovation. 
The business area 
management 
sensed that new 
service 
opportunities had to 
be identified 
globally. To do, so 
an entrepreneurial 
business unit was 
founded. The 
business area 
management 
sensed that R&D 
capability was 
needed in order to 
learn about and 
develop services, 
accordingly. Tele 
Research Centre 
was used. For the 
first time, the 
emphasis was on 
creating new 
markets and 
shaping market 
behavior. 
 
Standards in industry. 
No de-jure standards existed. The 
Intelligent Network, Voice 
Response Unit and profit delivery 
mechanism were enhanced and 
developed further in Sonera. 
Network effects.  A process to 
manage service providers (a billing 
process) was successfully 
developed. Sonera's infrastructure 
helped to diffuse the service 
rapidly. End customers could use 
the service easily, and accordingly, 
customers could expand their 
business smoothly. 
Complementary assets. Sonera's 
key assets (capacity in network, a 
monopoly over trunk and 
international call business, 
switching centers, billing 
procedures, Intelligent Network) 
were used. 
Modularity management. 
Modular numbering management 
with IN was carried out. Sonera 
rented platforms and recording 
capacity, and offered financial 
services to service providers. 
Firm structure. Part of Sonera's 
closed infrastructure was also 
used by service providers. 
Ecosystem/Partners. A new open 
win-win ecosystem was created by 
creating a new type of value chain 
using active premium service 
numbers and marketing. 
Innovation type. New customer 
groups with new technology were 
adopted and nurtured and the 
technology was used in new 
applications. The ecosystem was 
important to service diffusion. 
Technological competences. 
The IVR process, billing, the CRM 
process, expertise in switching 
centers, and IN knowledge were 
the key technological 
competences. 
Appropriability for Sonera (and 
telcos). A business risk- based fee 
was approved to be included in 
pricing, no real substitutes for 
service numbers emerged. 
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4.1.2 Telematic services: TeleSampo 
 
Background 
The concept of telematics64  was born in France 1977, when the country 
started a considerable tele services development program (Kerttula, 
1987). TeleSampo was built on progressing the European telematics 
standards. 
TeleSampo was commercialized in May 1987 and it was terminated in 
2004. TeleSampo was a commercial name for the videotex network, a 
telematics service network, one type of telematics service, developed by 
Sonera. The network was implemented in a data network and was a 
dispersed gateway type based on the use of Sonera’s old DataPak network 
(i.e., its first packet switched network). The open system interconnection 
(OSI) model was used as architecture in the service. The dispersed nature 
of the network was a key element when trying to replace the earlier closed 
networks. The network enabled the use of videotex services (portal 
services to different databases, ordering services, bulletin board services, 
access to other videotex systems in Europe) and other services (for 
example e-mail, then named Telebox). 
Transformation from previous product generations 
Usage of information technology was increasing in the 1970s and this 
growth necessitated connections between computers and information 
systems. The earlier dominant logic was that there were separate 
information network applications for different purposes, for example in 
the banking, wholesale, and traffic business. These applications were run 
by the companies themselves, not by telecommunications companies 
(neither by offering managed infrastructure nor by offering platform 
services connecting the customer company and the end user together) 
(TIEKE, 2001). 
The earlier videotex applications in use, for example Minitel in France, 
were considered closed systems. Interactive services were clearly needed 
by telecom operators and customers, because there was extra capacity in 
data networks, and new business concepts were few and far between. 
TeleSampo developed into the same kind of market as Internet services 
ten years later. The new market was associated with dispersed online 
                                                   
64 Esa Kerttula (1987) defines telematics as communication enabled by 
computers. The concept of telematics was born in France in the late 70s. 
Telematics comes from the words ‘Telecommunication’ and ‘Information’, and 
their synergetic collaboration. 
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services (banking, e-mail, shops) as well as consumers’ end devices. 
Typical examples are visible in TeleSampo’s commercial slogans at that 
time: ‘TeleSampo – electronic marketplace’ and ‘With MicroPC to the 
World’. 
The promotion of convergence in TeleSampo was challenging. There 
was a need to integrate telephone business, datacom networks, value-
added services, and service providers in Sonera’s network and business 
model. In addition, TeleSampo’s services needed to be easy to use, well 
segmented, have a common network infrastructure, and moderately 
priced end devices. 
Sensing  
Standardization bodies and governments in Europe (especially France) 
were interested in telematics and advanced the plans to create 
information societies and technology in order to create a new kind of 
business in data networks. The public sector was also active in developing 
information society thinking in Finland and took telecommunications 
operators along, developing common information networks for Finland 
(e.g., TietoSampo [InformationSampo] project in Sonera). 
Prestel, one type of telematics application, was the starting point of 
videotext. Prestel was an information query tool developed by the British 
Post Office. In Finland, videotex was first used in Helsinki 1978. It was 
called Telset, being the second service of its type in the world after Prestel 
(Tarjanne, in Teletiedotuksia, 1987). 
Informants described the basic functionality of videotex and telematics 
and the reasons why these were developed. 
 
“Videotex was an innovation that arose when the British started to think about 
information services and then they invented teletext to utilize the spare capacity 
on TV channels for videotex services. The other reason was that the telephone 
was popular in the 1970s but its, and therefore a telephone network’s, usage was 
minimal. There was a need to increase the usage of the network; still the whole 
product (ultimately videotex) was too complex for users. The only thing which 
made the breakthrough a dominant design was this teletext.” (Informant 52, 
Quote 1) 
 
Prestel was, however, a progressive attempt to create videotex. A Finnish 
key person in Sonera’s telematics area comments. 
 
“TeleSampo has been called videotex before and it started already in the late 
1970s, at the time of Prestel in Britain, but the Prestel technology was totally 
different and it was managed with the TV. However, videotex and TeleSampo 
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used a normal end terminal, either home computers or VT100 or VT200 
terminals [a video terminal that was made by Digital Equipment Corporation 
(DEC)]. An important factor was that home computers only became widespread 
after 1981 and TeleSampo’s development actually gained momentum in the mid-
1980s.This TeleSampo started from the fact that we developed a smarter system 
than other videotex systems at that time. Germany had Bildschirmtext, which 
was sold to the Swedes for big money, but it didn’t work even once, while we 
launched our own TeleSampo service with VTT with smaller resources. There was 
only 10–20 million Finn marks for that TeleSampo project, it was technically 
very smart still had poor functionality…very clearly ahead of its time but it never 
achieved dominant design appeal with its ecosystem and marketing ideas” 
(Informant 51, Quote 1). 
 
The creators of TeleSampo considered the deficiencies of earlier videotex 
systems. Traditional videotex systems were developed from an application 
not with a larger communication mechanism and infrastructure in mind. 
In contrast, TeleSampo used many technology protocols, attracted service 
providers into Sonera’s network, and created portals and closed user 
groups. TeleSampo was compatible with the following end devices and 
protocols: ASCII (American Standard Code for Information Interchange), 
Prestel, CEPT, NAPLPS (North American Presentation Level Protocol 
Syntax), or a home computer that had an emulator. 
TeleSampo was considered a flagship product by top management. One 
manifestation of this was that when Esa Kerttula (the Director of the 
Unit) had the idea for the name of the service, and it was immediately 
accepted by Managing Director Aulis Salin. Telematics was also made a 
profit center unit in the company in the new value-added services area 
(Appendix 3). However, as the unit was pioneering technology-oriented 
SBU, other organizations in Sonera saw it as a ‘money hole’. 
Seizing 
The planning and implementation of the Finnish telematics access 
network, TeleSampo, was conducted in cooperation with VTT (the 
Technical Research Centre of Finland) between 1980 and 1986. The 
network, also called Videotex, was different from other telsets65  in that it 
could be nationwide. Moreover, it created its own standard, called 
                                                   
65 In Finland, in the Helsinki area, limited Videotex business and technology 
experimentations were made in 1978, based on the Prestel model. These projects 
were undertaken by Sanoma Oy, Nokia, HPY and Sonera. These businesses were 
called  ‘Telset’ (s); Sonera’s similar type of service was called Videotex service. 
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Telematic Access Point (TAP). However, the adoption was not rapid, as is 
expressed in the following quote. 
 
“Videotex did not reach the targets set; the exception being in France. France has 
today (1986) almost 2 million Minitel-terminals and at the turn of the century 
that figure is estimated to hit 8 million, covering 15% of the population. In 
Finland, we should have in the same proportions by 1990, 750 000 videotex 
terminals. [However], the forecast for terminals in Finland is 20–30 000.” 
(Tarjanne, 1986) 
 
The dispersed interconnection network used Datapak for the new 
videotext (Figure 12). Access was available nationwide, to different 
services (e.g. a Telebox-messaging service), and also to other online 
databases and information systems. 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Telematic access network architecture. (Kerttula, Esa. Yleinen 
tiedonsiirtoverkko käytännössä:TeleSampo, tietoa yhdeltä kanavalta. Lappi 
tietoyhteiskuntaan III-seminaari 1.2.11.1988). 
 
Figure 12 depicts the TeleSampo architecture in Finland. It describes the 
infrastructure type of the service. The Telematic Access Point (TAP) -
network (decentralized into telecom areas throughout Finland) 
infrastructure was used, in order to use various telematics services. 
However, it was already obvious in the planning stage, that the 
‘intelligence’ of the service must be located at the edge of the network, not 
in end terminals. This was a drawback when considering the case later 
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when the Internet with its related technology inventions appeared. It later 
became apparent that TeleSampo was a closed system after all. 
However, it was apparent even at the start of TeleSampo’s development 
that the sales function, a critical element in order to create a new 
infrastructure, was a bottleneck. In addition, interviewees reported the 
ecosystem growth in the data network was more difficult than in voice 
services (service numbers) due to the requirement for users to be able to 
use a micro PC. TeleSampo’s technology was based on telephone 
networks using modems, which were different from today’s data solutions 
(e.g., Digital Subscriber Lines (DSL) [a family of technologies that provide 
Internet access], servers, routers and the Internet). In addition, 
TeleSampo had a very small developer community compared to, for 
example, CERN (The European Organization for Nuclear Research) 
organization, which targeted developing a large dispersed system. 
The business model of TeleSampo was novel at that time in the sense 
that it integrated service providers into the system. Sonera made revenues 
from two sources: from its own traffic infrastructure and from service 
providers. However, it took a long time for the environment to accept the 
new kind of ecosystem: 
 
“TeleSampo had business targets from the beginning, the first was to create new 
services that bring traffic revenue to networks, because there was plenty of free 
capacity in telecom networks after automation. The other point was this kind of 
vision about interactive services, that people start to consume services through 
information networks and there will be information societies, also this kind of 
information society thing was present in the 1980s…TeleSampo was a new 
delivery channel for services and it takes time to establish a new channel to 
become a complete functionality channel. One example was SOK [the Finnish 
retail group] in the 1980s when it moved to videotex ordering channels.” 
(Informant 52, Quote 2) 
 
However, TeleSampo remained a relatively closed system, and did not 
manage to create a widely accepted infrastructure and user base, in other 
words, a strong ecosystem. 
The resulting dominant design characteristics 
TeleSampo was the nationwide and technological market leader in 
Finland. At its height, TeleSampo had 60–70% market share in Finland. 
In Finland Sonera’s competitor, Elisa, developed its own similar type of 
videotex called Infotel. The similarity of the services was evident, as there 
were plans to merge the two systems together when there was pressure to 
increase the usage of videotex by having a unified marketing message to 
  Analysis 
143 
 
consumers and industry. TeleSampo had an early, though limited, 
ecosystem (e.g., service providers, sub networks [currently called portals], 
and end device vendors). 
In addition, the potential of TeleSampo’s dominant design was evident 
as indicated by the considerations of licensing TeleSampo’s infrastructure 
type of technology globally. However, the dominant design characteristics 
of TeleSampo were limited. The following discussion of the differences 
between TeleSampo and the Internet (which eventually replaced it) 
clarifies this point. 
The Internet in its mature form (after 1990) was highly decentralized in 
that it was essentially a federation of thousands of service providers 
whose mutual cooperation made everything run. Furthermore, the 
various hardware and software components of the Internet are designed, 
manufactured, and supported by thousands of different companies. 
(Kavassalis and Solomon, 1997) TeleSampo had high networking targets, 
but some customers complained that Sonera did not offer a proper 
infrastructure to connect customers to databases (TeleSampo customer 
survey, 1990). In line with this, Sonera also analyzed TeleSampo against 
the Internet, and concluded that the Internet’s inventions (html language, 
http protocol, and URL links) would have helped TeleSampo to grow 
faster. The key point was though, that while TeleSampo was created for 
the same kind of market as internet services (decentralized online 
services), the technology was in its infancy at end terminals before the 
Internet (as the personal computer spread to consumers only in the mid-
1980s), and the TAP protocol was not in end terminals but at the edge of 
the network. The usability of the service might have been better if the TAP 
protocol, ‘the intelligence of TeleSampo’, was in the end terminals. 
Transforming (to following product generations)  
The slow diffusion of TeleSampo affected TeleSampo’s life-cycle 
development, in terms of (1) targets set by top management and (2) the 
Internet, with its global diffusion and new greater usability compared 
with earlier videotex type designs. 
The top management, business units, and consultants discussed 
TeleSampo’s future in 1990. One view expressed was that too much had 
been invested in TeleSampo because it was originally considered an 
infrastructure product. The top management view changed, and 
TeleSampo was later seen as merely a value-added service above normal 
data products. There were also arguments that in the corporate B2B 
segment, TeleSampo’s technology would become outdated while awaiting 
the new Local Area networks’ (LAN) connectivity and dynamic networks. 
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These new networks in customers’ use would replace TeleSampo (Source: 
Internal Report, 1990). 
Differing views about TeleSampo were presented in the business unit. 
 
“Strategic investment in TeleSampo is not possible through baby steps in a 
competitive environment without developing basic networks with infrastructure 
products. When Sonera’s organization was changed two years ago, also 
TeleSampo’s nature changed as it became a short-lived value-added service no 
longer having any strategic nature …We have clear backing for TeleSampo in the 
form of 700 000 terminals in offices and homes, we have services on computers 
and we have networks, there is a clear need to connect terminals, services and 
networks with TeleSampo. TeleSampo will offer ways to overcome the following 
current problems: different protocols and user interfaces, contract difficulties, no 
menus in services, difficult billing methods, and customers are served as a 
secondary function. In sum, as long as the strategies in telematics are part of 
monopoly telecom business and muddled international tele services and top 
customers selling strategies named “value-added services” there are no routes to 
success.” (Informant 51, Quote 2) 
 
The Internet spread quickly from 1994 onwards (Kerttula, 2004). Internet 
technology was different from that of TeleSampo. TeleSampo’s services 
(for example portals) were realized through Internet technologies with a 
larger volume. The global standards of the Internet’s html language, http 
protocol, and URL links enhanced the service diffusion globally to large 
volumes of people, and offered a true dispersed open network. One key 
here was the ease of use. 
TeleSampo was transferred to the Internet later, and the development of 
a graphical TeleSampo, for instance, was frozen in the face of the 
burgeoning Internet use. The public sector (TIVEKE-programme, 
TELMO-programme, in TIEKE, 2001) “was not…surprised about the 
advent of the Internet, but merely by the speed and nature, how the 
global network in the end was actualized” (TIEKE, 2001, p. 22). The key 
thing was the easy-to-use user interface compared with other 
technological standards. It had been thought earlier that there could not 
be a properly functioning information network without robust central 
control (by telecom operators), which the advent of the Internet proved to 
be incorrect.  
Table 12 summarizes the transforming, sensing, and seizing phases 
building blocks. 
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Table 12.  Transformation, sensing, and seizing phases in TeleSampo 
 
 
Building blocks   
Transforming 
from previous product 
generations 
Sensing Seizing 
Previous Dominant logic 
in industry/ company. 
The industry had limited 
(interactive) value-added 
data services, i.e. only text-
TV existed in Britain. This 
was not considered telcos’ 
business, because these 
value-added data services 
were run directly by 
companies. The Sonera 
management discovered 
interactive portal services 
(i.e., 'pre-internet') could be 
created both for consumers 
and companies. For 
companies, the purpose 
was to create data 
networks, i.e., 'intranets', as 
well as sales and ordering 
channels directed at third 
parties. 
Convergence creation in 
company. Efforts were 
made to create a new 
business in data network, 
in terms of customer 
service usage experience, 
integrating elements of 
telephone network, data 
network, and third parties' 
infrastructure. 
Market change in 
industry. Customers 
needed a new marketplace 
in data networks, as well as 
an ordering-channel, 
intranet. Logistics 
arrangements in 
companies were in flux. 
Technology change in 
industry. Free capacity 
emerged in the telephone 
network, and initial efforts 
were made to integrate 
telephone and data 
networks. Teletext and 
Videotex (i.e., interactive 
services) emerged as new 
technologies, also later EDI 
(Electronic Data 
Interchange). 
Regulation in 
industry. 
As TeleSampo 
was a business 
to business 
product, 
regulation was 
minor. 
Source of 
innovation. The 
business area 
management 
sensed that 
earlier standards 
needed and 
could be 
developed. Also, 
active scanning 
of ideas in CERN 
(European 
Organization for 
Nuclear 
Research, the 
birthplace of 
World Wide Web) 
was made in 
order to develop 
the service in 
Finland. The top 
management 
sensed that a 
new 
entrepreneurial, 
growth seeking 
business unit was 
needed. 
Consequently, a 
Telematics 
business unit was 
founded. The top 
management 
sensed the 
importance of 
telematics in 
creating a new 
Information 
Society for 
Finland, both to 
consumers as a 
digital 
marketplace and 
to companies as 
a logistics 
system. 
 
Standards in industry. 
Sonera enhanced Europe-wide 
Videotex standards in Finland. This 
was manifested in TAP (Telematic 
Access Point) innovation, which 
integrated telephone and data 
networks.  
Network effects.  
There were limited network effects due 
to issues over service usage (e.g., 
cumbersome directories, registration, 
and complicated billing procedures). 
Internally in Sonera, there were 
competing business areas, differing 
views about the service’s nature (top 
management vs. SBU). 
Complementary assets. Free 
capacity in networks was used in 
TeleSampo. The business area 
management thought there was 
insufficient usage of Sonera’s sales 
function. Later, conflict emerged 
between top management and the 
business units over whether the 
product should be an infrastructure 
product or only an add-on service in 
the data network. 
Modularity management. There was 
an aim to develop a service that would 
support many end devices and create 
an open system. Portals, access to 
online databases, e-mail (Telebox) and 
closed user groups were made. 
Firm structure. End user was linked 
functionally in a limited way to 
Sonera’s and the service provider's 
closed infrastructure. 
Ecosystem/Partners. Efforts were 
made to sell the idea of new delivery 
and logistic channels to companies, 
e.g., retail, wholesale and travel 
companies. Top Management 
concluded that effort was not 
successful, due to emerging 
competing solutions in the market (e.g. 
DataNet). 
Innovation type. TeleSampo served 
new customer groups with new 
technology. 
Technological competences. 
Development and implementation of 
Telematic Access Point, and 
enhancing earlier standards were the 
key technological competences. 
Appropriability for Sonera (and 
other telcos). Capacity in Sonera's 
networks could be fully used for new 
services. The business was, however, 
not profitable and needed 
infrastructure investments. In addition, 
substitute products continued to enter 
the market (e.g., companies’ own 
logistics systems, value-added 
services in the telephone network, i.e., 
service numbers.) 
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4.1.3 Vipgate VPN 
 
Background 
Vipgate was a service and a service platform for companies’ voice 
communication. Vipgate enabled companies to manage domestic and 
international, as well as internal and external, voice traffic with a better 
quality than using the traditional, public switched telephone network 
(PSTN) network. At first, direct lines were built between companies’ 
switches in order to build a switch network. With its Virtual Private 
Network (VPN), an Intelligent Network (IN) technology, Sonera could 
implement these switch networks more flexibly than with direct lines and 
competitors, and so offer communications solutions to companies. The 
key point was the ability to create virtual networks, also enabling a 
numbering solution to a company beyond the PSTN numbering. The 
numbering solution supported calling with short numbers, for example. 
The service was completed around 1990–1991. At that time, Vipgate was a 
product name for the VPN service. 
Transformation from previous product generation 
There was previously no solution to companies’ voice communication 
issues, as calls were traditionally routed through an operator (albeit that 
some direct in dialing [DID] numbers were in use). Trunk calls were used, 
which offered no functionality over and above basic phone calling. 
Previously, the networking service had been provided with expensive 
fixed leased line capacity, as calling a company’s office was executed 
through public network numbering. 
The first Vipgate product was a service called Vipgate VPN (Virtual 
Private Network). Through a virtual private (corporate) network, internal 
numbering was created to all sites connected to the network, thus creating 
convergence in creating a switch network and unified numbering. VPN 
could also be implemented by connecting small sites to the existing fixed 
switch network. At the same time, in the VPN, customers did not need to 
invest in their existing switching centers or build new ones. In the market, 
there was a need to create private networks, that is, voice communication 
networks by connecting the PABX’s (private automatic branch exchange) 
employed by a particular private company (Lynross, 1996). 
The competition started in this business segment in the mid-1980s. The 
local telephone companies feared Sonera would capture the corporate 
customers bypassing the local telephone companies’ area network and 
connecting directly to Sonera’s trunk telephone exchanges.  
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The Ministry of traffic estimated that about 6% of Finland’s 
telecommunications was exposed to the competition following the 
decision to grant operating rights to Yritysverkot and Datatie (Häikiö, 
1995, p. 92). Yritysverkot especially targeted these local telecom 
competitors’ profitable B2B areas that were now open to competition, also 
by creating the VPN product. 
This landscape describes the previous dominant logic in competition. 
Competition was not allowed on a large scale but at the same time, 
technology adoption occurred in Sonera and the firm considered how to 
take advantage of the regulative situation to attack competitors’ areas. 
Sensing  
People in Sonera sensed a transition from the earlier situation and new 
business opportunities, where there were no (virtual) corporate networks 
service or the subsidiary of Sonera, Corporate Networks was not active. 
Virtual corporate networks were important especially in the competitors’ 
areas. Sonera’s Managing Director, Aulis Salin, commented that it was 
necessary to have the option to offer corporate customers local 
subscriptions, in order to link the customers to Sonera’s national network 
services. Corporate networks, a newly founded subsidiary, got the chance 
to offer 2Mbit, mobile, analogue, and ISDN connection traffic for 
companies directly, but not to offer local switched traffic. This was 
important, as the business was now totally in the hands of Sonera, and 
there was no obligation to pay network compensation fees to Elisa, for 
example, for down warding/terminating traffic into Elisa’s local access 
network. 
A key antecedent to Vipgate VPN was top management’s interest in 
gaining access to the corporate segment in competitors’ local areas, which 
were previously local operators’ monopoly areas. All available technology 
was adapted (e.g., VPN, 2Mbit connection, approved by a legislative 
regulator) and developed to this end. Market need and opportunities were 
prioritized: The target was for Sonera to have Finland’s top 3000 
customers (by turnover) and to reap the associated large gains from the 
local market. The local telephone business was estimated to be worth 
4,000 million Finn marks (in comparison, the earlier key product was 
trunk calls, with only 700 million). 
It was felt that VPN could simulate fixed switch network connections. 
VPN technology made the same functions as cost-effective as if the 
customer had networked its own PBXs’ (Private Branch Exchange) with 
fixed connections. 
  Analysis 
148 
 
Seizing 
The corporate subscription product that Sonera used in VPN was created 
at the same time (TeleGate voice services, 1994, Sonera). By 1992, Sonera 
was also investing major sums in its trunk network and the local network 
in its competitors’ areas in order to run increasing traffic amounts. Much 
of that investment involved installing fiber-optic cables. 
Corporate subscriptions were finalized and the local telecom companies’ 
network was bypassed. Corporations’ internal switchboards were 
connected and company sites were networked. The concept of Vipgate 
VPN was the first communication service based on virtual technology in 
Finland, which shifted Sonera towards an offensive stance from one of 
defense. 
Below, three experts clarify the technical steps taken in 1991, also 
pinpointing the role of VPN in the development of the FastNet (i.e., 
Sonera’s integrative transmission capacity network) and TeleGate 
subscription, which was the spearhead subscription brand name at 
Sonera at the time: 
 
“FastNet was a transmission capacity service, which offered, from a technological 
operability point of view, a managed connection. It made the delivery of different 
solutions possible with a physical transmission capacity, for example voice/ 
Data… In Voice area, VPN on the other hand, was made together with FastNet, 
because the definition of capacity was easy with the FastNet concept. VPN 
connections were made as part of FastNet and were distributed through 
telephone centers in order to make the services work, and without direct lines 
from switching center to switching center.” (Informants 58, 13, 24) 
 
The industry was willing and able to accept new solutions. In addition, the 
earlier regulative steps allowed the use of the new technology in some 
areas. In summary, the VPN was a novel and a profitable way to arrange 
communication on company sites. Telecom companies’ proprietary 
technology was used, and Sonera’s customer traffic and subscriptions 
increased with the new customers it acquired. 
The resulting dominant design characteristics 
Vipgate VPN was a widespread technological cost-effective solution that 
offered totally new functionality for companies. The solutions adopted 
prompted the growth of Sonera’s internal market share in the corporate 
segment to over 60% in its competitors’ areas, whereas the average 
market share was 30%. As part of the VPN service, calls to company sites 
were implemented with extensions, i.e. customers’ telephone (numbers), 
and the clue was the numbering solution: The customers’ extensions were 
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seen as a united company (i.e., harmonized and planned numbering 
solution for a customer’s private network) while they could still be 
physically separate. Sonera’s competitor Elisa followed the lead later with 
a service called Diana66. 
Transforming (to following product generations)  
Vipgate VPN was developed incrementally to offer new product 
generations while the technical VPN solution was still in use. Vipgate VPN 
was developed into Sonera Cid Corporate Number service (1995) and 
Vipgate Concept (1995). 
As a backdrop to Vipgate VPN, the turnover from bulk products (e.g., 
trunk calls, international calls) started to stagnate due to legislative 
liberalization in 1995. While the bulk share was 70% of the whole fixed 
voice offering in 1995, in 1998 there was 50% in bulk and 50% in value-
added services (e.g., corporate network products). The pattern was that 
trunk call revenues declined (in addition to price reduction) when traffic 
moved to mobile calls and to internal VPN calls, amidst the networking 
trend in companies. The purpose of Vipgate VPN was to create voice 
communication networks and commit a customer to Sonera. The 
commitment was pursued by offering high quality services with national 
and international coverage. A customer could not access these kinds of 
services unless linked to Sonera’s network. At that time, Vipgate VPN was 
one solution to link and commit a customer to Sonera (called a solution). 
The other option could simply be a customer using products that were not 
part of a corporate network system (e.g., using only separate products, 
such as a mobile subscription that has no switching functionality—called a 
non-solution). 
From a commercial perspective, it was necessary for Sonera to sharpen 
and strengthen its image to portray its ability to provide comprehensive 
and reliable solutions. Moreover, there was need to increase the volume of 
transition to solutions like Vipgate VPN services, and Vipgate Concept 
(1995) offered a tool to do this. In turn, the Sonera Cid Corporate Number 
service (1995) was a forerunner of Vipgate Concept. Sonera Cid was also 
technologically more sophisticated way of implementing a VPN service 
and harmonized numbering to a company. 
                                                   
66 Diana was conceptualized in 1991, but at first it concentrated on data 
business, Häikiö, 1995. There are two versions how Diana’s name was invented: 
1) Dialled In Advanced Network Access (Häikiö, 1995, p.116) ,and 2) the HPY’s 
main office was located in Helsinki, near the Diana park, from where the 
management  took the name (Interviews). 
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Table 13.  Transformation, sensing, and seizing activities in VPN. 
 
 
Building blocks   
Transforming 
from previous product 
generations  
Sensing Seizing 
Previous Dominant logic 
in industry/ company.  
Earlier, dedicated leased 
lines (expensive access 
capacity) were used to 
network companies’ sites 
(i.e., telephone centers) 
together. Companies 
rented these lines from 
operators or built them 
themselves. Customers 
could only use local 
telephone operators’ 
services. The 
management discovered 
that virtual private 
networks could substitute 
for the leased line 
business model and also 
make available Sonera’s 
national services to local 
customers in competitors’ 
areas (e.g., in big cities). 
Convergence creation in 
company.  
Capacity was created to 
redesign a cost-effective 
switch network, and fixed 
separate leased lines were 
replaced with VPN. VPN 
integrated public 
telephone network and 
companies’ private 
switches, which offered 
new service functionality. 
Market change in 
industry. Customers and 
Sonera saw a need to 
have Sonera’s national 
services available to new 
customers in competitors’ 
areas, bypassing local 
monopolies. A networking 
need (to connect customer 
sites together) emerged in 
telephone services. 
Technology change in 
industry.  
Analogue technology was 
substituted with digital 
technology (including SS7 
signaling, 2Mbit 
subscription, IN), which 
contributed to the 
establishment of the VPN 
service. Sonera was a 
pioneer in adopting, 
nurturing, and integrating 
these new technologies. 
Regulation in 
industry. The national 
regulator allowed the 
productization of the 
2Mbit access line and 
consequently 
increased competition 
in the business 
segment. 2Mbit 
access had superb 
capacity/performance 
compared with 
previous solutions, 
(i.e. analog lines); 
2Mbit line was the tool 
create the VPN 
service. 
Source of 
innovation.  
The top management 
emphasized to 
legislative regulators 
and customers that 
VPN needed to be 
created for 
competition reasons. 
Global sensing was 
used (e.g., 
benchmarking AT&T & 
Baby Bells in USA 
about the VPN 
technology). 
Accordingly, a new 
SBU was founded in 
Sonera, which 
developed the 2Mbit 
subscription. The top 
management and 
business area 
management also 
sensed that marketing 
activities were 
needed. Accordingly, 
a new marketing 
brand, TeleGate, was 
founded, which was 
used in attacking 
competitors’ areas. 
Standards in industry. 
Sonera implemented a pioneering 
VPN standard for the corporate 
communications network and 
related technologies (SS7 
signaling, 2Mbit, IN). 
Network effects. Company sites 
were networked, i.e., they could 
communicate easily internally, and 
use Sonera’s other products. This 
increased customer productivity. 
Companies’ switches were 
separated into ‘Vipgate groups’ in 
Sonera’s telephone centers, and 
consequently, numbering was 
managed in switches and later 
centrally in an intelligent network. 
That meant there were also 
economies of scale in Sonera's 
internal production. 
Complementary assets. 
Emerging cooperation with 
network planning, numbering 
functions, and product 
management were seen in 
Sonera. Internally, VPN had the 
support of top management. Other 
products could also be used in 
marketing activities when selling 
VPN. 
Modularity management. N/A. 
Firm structure. A closed vertical 
production was partly replaced 
with a public telephone network. 
Ecosystem/Partners. Sonera 
offered comprehensive services 
that customers were committed to, 
and also volume-based price 
discounts. Sonera gained large top 
companies in Finland as its 
customers. Those firms bought the 
bulk of their telecommunication 
services from Sonera. The 
ecosystem appreciated Sonera’s 
national assets and 
comprehensive services.  
Innovation type. VPN was a new 
technology that was used to 
Sonera’s prevailing customers 
(also gained new customers). 
Technological competences. 
Network planning, switching 
functionality, numbering, and IN 
expertise were the key 
technological competences. 
Appropriability for Sonera (and 
telcos). VPN was a profitable 
business that enhanced usage of 
other services (subscriptions, 
traffic contracts). 
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4.1.4 Privatel 
 
Background 
Privatel integrates a company’s mobile phones into the company’s fixed 
telephone network and numbering. When Privatel is in use, the 
customer’s closed numbering is defined in a way that calling uses 
extensions between fixed network subscriptions and mobile phones. 
Privatel calls had special fixed-to-mobile and mobile-phone call prices. 
Privatel was a company ‘switchboard’, which enabled a calling mobile 
customer to use a four-digit internal company phone number in a similar 
way to a caller on a fixed intracompany call (Laaksonen, 2007, p. 224). 
Privatel was Sonera’s technology experiment, which was launched 
commercially in 1994. The key feature was that mobile phones were 
attached to a company’s switch’s extensions. 
Transformation from previous product generation 
There was no previous solution connecting companies’ mobile phones 
numbers; they were not integrated into the company’s switching function. 
A business switch functionality was separate in mobile and in fixed voice, 
and customers called mobile phones using their own, long numbers. 
People were difficult to reach, prices for companies’ internal mobile 
phones were high, and the work of a PBX (Private Branch Exchange) 
attendant was laborious. 
Gradually, there emerged a need in the customers to have mobile 
phones integrated into the company’s switching environment. In 
addition, expertise had increased with respect to B2B mobile business 
switching in Sonera, and there was the capability to create the Privatel 
service. Sonera created the world’s first industry solution. It created 
closed user groups to Nokia’s switches. These groups were given their own 
mobile numbers that ‘looked like’ an extension number in a company’s 
private voice communication network. 
In Sonera, management found out that similar usage preferences were 
present in the mobile and fixed calls business. What was also important 
was that pricing was converging, that is, volume discounts could be given 
for all calls (including mobile calls). 
Sensing  
Privatel, one of the company’s spearhead products, was proof of the need 
for companies to integrate mobile and fixed line communication (Annual 
Report, 1994). The sensing of ideas stemmed from the interest of the top 
management. The top management was involved when Sonera developed, 
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purely on its own, the Privatel functionality for Nokia’s switches. In fact, 
the Head of Sales at time, and later the head of the telecom unit, was 
selling the product himself to top customers. Sonera also used its own 
R&D capability to create new functionalities for mobile switches and was 
also listening to customer needs. 
Competition was seen to be intensifying by 1989, and Sonera recognized 
that its switching functionality was the most important existing dominant 
design in the B2B segment. Privatel was the first product to match this 
challenge to include mobile phones. Sonera also identified the needs of 
those companies that had a large amount of internal communication 
between fixed extensions and mobile phones to integrate mobile and fixed 
line communications. At that time, all companies had fixed phones, and 
placing mobile phones within the same functionality created added value 
for companies that was above the basic mobile offering. It was understood 
that better functionality of mobile and fixed phones together would have 
process benefits for end customers that would create lock-in effects. Thus, 
it could be an effective response to emerging competition with Radiolinja, 
for instance (i.e., Elisa’s subsidiary in mobile business). 
Customers would also find the new service to be economical. Moreover, 
the new service also brought fixed voice and mobile silos closer to each 
other within Sonera, fostering cooperation and creating the first 
convergence products across the fixed and mobile communications in the 
company. 
Seizing 
The target was to gain nationwide customers through the Privatel 
product, and an active B2B sales organization (Corporate Networks Ltd) 
was established at that time to sell the Privatel product. Commercially, 
the product also had a lock-in effect, as it improved peoples’ reachability, 
and enabled cheap calls and call transfers from fixed telephone 
subscriptions to mobile phones. 
Privatel was a technology experiment in 1994–95. Companies had a 
switch network before the time of Privatel and the private communication 
network was then an expensive investment. So costs should be 
minimized, and at the same time the service should offer top-class 
functionality. Privatel was one way of reducing customers’ costs. A head of 
the product unit recalls: 
 
“We had a quite tough competitive situation after the mid-1990s when companies 
started to use mobiles in volume. Radiolinja tried actively to acquire big 
customers and we had to resist this somehow and one way to do so was to create 
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a concept for the current switch network. With this network we could integrate 
mobiles into that and it was sold to a customer on the basis that you could call a 
short number with a lower price even it was mobile (the traffic could be 60–80% 
of traffic inside a company). I remember a case when the customer said that if we 
take your Privatel and currently we have 6000 mobiles and 2500 of those are 
yours [Sonera’s] but if we take Privatel then we will not take any more of 
Radiolinja’s mobiles” (Informant 27, Quote 1). 
 
The 1980s and 1990s saw the implementation of a great deal of 
technology management inside Sonera, and this was also the case with 
Privatel. The project was more like an ad hoc solution to different 
technological challenges that arose along the way, but it offered valuable 
information and also practices started to emerge relating to how to do 
project work. There was learning on both sides of the organization: the 
mobile communications business area learned from the processes of the 
fixed voice business area, and vice versa. Sonera created the Privatel 
service in-house through its knowledge and resources in switches and 
Intelligent Network (Privatel also used IN technology). Vendors did not 
have a role in IN applications67 (e.g., Nokia and Ericsson in the IN 
platform). 
Regulative liberalization made it possible to use the Privatel concept. 
One success factor of Privatel can be seen to be in understanding the 
primary role of switch functionality. Another was the active sales 
organization at that time (Corporate Networks). Furthermore, close 
relationships were developing with large customers, partly due to the 
Privatel product. Privatel was also profitable and it paved the way for the 
increase in corporate network products. 
The resulting dominant design characteristics 
Privatel was a market leader; it had a significantly high penetration 
among corporate mobile phone customers68. The strong market demand 
was capitalized upon with progressive piloting projects with customers. 
Competitors followed suit, but at first did not have the same kind of 
functionality.69 One informant noted: 
 
                                                   
67 See the Vipgate Concept chapter 6.6 showing the services where IN is used. 
68 The penetration rate is confidential. 
69 Sonera was progressing in patenting the Privatel concept. However, a ‘site 
accident’ occurred, the patent got published in one Diploma work in the patent 
application period. 
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“That short number concept might not be valid in the current world... But with 
the concept, we got the pricing to work, and this was important as the rival 
company Finnet found it impossible to make a similar kind of product due its 
dispersed structure” (Informant 27). 
 
The key to Privatel was the numbering service, making mobile phones 
look like extensions and that a specific internal call pricing could be 
achieved when calling customers’ internal mobiles. 
Transforming (to following product generations)  
Privatel was gradually transformed into the MobiCentrex service. In the 
long term, the basic need—the integration of mobile and fixed networks—
had changed, because there were now so few fixed phones, especially in 
small companies because they had been replaced by mobile phones. 
Consequently, substitute products had emerged in private voice 
communication networks, as MobiCentrex replaced Privatel for example. 
In 2008, there was more MobiCentrex services than Privatel installed in 
mobile phones. 
 
Table 14.   Transformation, sensing, and seizing activities in Privatel 
 
 
 
Building blocks   
Transforming 
from previous product 
generations 
Sensing Seizing 
Previous Dominant logic 
in industry/ company.  
Mobile phones were not 
integrated with a 
company’s switching 
functionality. Management 
realized integration of fixed-
line business and mobile 
was important, a change in 
the filtering out of which 
innovations to pursue. The 
top management and 
business area 
management created a 
new business model to 
boost fixed and mobile 
calling usage, they also 
created a new revenue 
source: fixed-to-mobile 
calls. 
 
Regulation in 
industry. The 
national regulator 
allowed competition 
with the 2Mbit 
subscription. This 
allowed the spread 
of Privatel into 
competitor’s areas, 
as well. 
Source of 
innovation. Privatel 
was a local 
technology 
experimentation and 
a tool for preventing 
customers’ switching 
to the competitor 
Radiolinja. Close 
relationships and 
piloting processes 
with large customers 
emerged. 
Standards in industry. 
Sonera made its ‘own standard’ -- 
the first of its kind in the world. 
Sonera consequently had a one 
year head start in the business. 
Network effects. In customer 
companies, internal communication 
usage increased, and all customer 
company sites wanted to join the 
service. Sonera created the brand 
value: "Sonera as an integrator" 
and diffused it. 
Complementary assets. Mobile 
and fixed voice business units 
cooperated for the first time in 
Sonera. Inside Sonera, billing, 
sales, product management, and 
delivery functions cooperated with 
mobile and fixed voice silos. The 
billing system in the mobile 
business was modified to meet the 
needs of the business segment 
(which had not been done earlier). 
A business sales organization 
disseminated market knowledge to 
the mobile consumer segment.  
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Table 14 Continued.   Transformation, sensing, and seizing activities in Privatel 
 
 
4.1.5 Company number: The Cid company number service 
 
Background 
Sonera developed a new national calling number for its customers in 
1995, which it called the Cid company number service. The service made 
it possible for B2B company customers to have one national number. This 
suited companies that had many offices (Annual report, 1995). The 
service was conceptualized as offering reachability (of companies, 
services, and people), service management (a web-based tool), permanent 
business numbering (Communications ID), and follow-up service usage 
metrics. Further, the service was independent of underlying technologies, 
networks, operators, and end-devices. 
Transformation from previous product generation 
The previous dominant design was Vipgate VPN, but that offered no 
unified numbering when calling companies from a public network. There 
were different numbers for offices (area code numbering) and different 
Building blocks   
Transforming 
from previous product 
generations 
Sen 
sin
g 
Seizing 
Convergence creation in 
company. 
The management found that 
the same kind of usage 
preferences were present in the 
mobile and fixed switching 
environments. Unified price 
plans for internal calling were 
implemented, which was also 
cost-effective for the customer. 
The fixed and mobile business 
units and the R&D and sales 
functions in Sonera cooperated 
closely. 
Market change in industry. 
Customers and Sonera both 
saw a need to have a 
customer’s fixed and mobile 
number extensions appear as 
one entity to external parties. 
Customers wanted cheaper 
internal mobile calls. 
Technology change in 
industry. Sonera developed 
internal R&D expertise to 
execute switching functionality 
to Nokia's switches. Mobile 
numbers worked as switch 
extensions. Sonera led the 
technological change in the 
industry. 
 Modularity management. Privatel was first 
defined and implemented in every switch, case 
by case. Later, functionality was gradually 
extended to the Intelligent Network, which 
increased reliability, cost-efficiency and quality. 
Firm structure. A closed vertical mode was 
used, no external partners were needed. 
Ecosystem/Partners. TOP 3000 customers 
ecosystem in Finland, a 'Sonera camp' started 
to form in the voice business area, because of 
Sonera's comprehensive and integrative 
services. 
Innovation type. Privatel was a convergence 
product, it was a technology application to new 
and old customers. 
Technological competences. Companies 
internal numbering, billing systems, IN 
knowledge, and knowledge about switches were 
the key technological competences. 
Appropriability for Sonera (and other telcos). 
Privatel was conceptualized as a profitable lock-
in product, as it improved reachability and 
enabled cheap calls. No substitutes in 
functionality existed. 
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prices for callers depending on which site they were calling (a local or a 
trunk call). The key point of the Cid company number service was that it 
enhanced the functionality of VPN, as a new server (Self-service 
application [Cid Manager]) was created; this enabled a dynamic 
numbering solution and it did not matter what kind of a physical 
connection the customer had. Cid Manager was a web-based self-service 
application for the management of the Cid company number service. With 
Cid Manager, the company could view their Cid numbering and the 
reachability services at their disposal. Cid Manager allowed the user to 
make changes to the numbering plan and services (Sonera Cid service 
description, 2010). 
Initially, at the beginning of the 1990s, local and trunk calls were 
expensive. In response, Sonera’s company number offered a new price 
plan—the same price nationwide when calling a company number. 
Reaching their workers was also challenging for companies in the mid-
1990s due to the many fixed and mobile numbers in service. Moreover, 
firms had to cope with telephone numbers changing when they changed 
their functional organization structure or geographical location. In 
addition, the management of a numbering plan was complicated and it 
was not possible for the end customer to manage and plan its numbering 
solutions. 
On top of the new functionality the Cid company number service 
introduced from a market viewpoint, was the consideration that Sonera 
could attack Elisa’s capital region with the service. Until then, Elisa had 
had a monopoly for all companies in that area. Sonera created a new 
technology application for the industry by modifying the IN (Intelligent 
Network) and creating a dynamic management server to operate 
numbering solutions. 
Sensing  
The previous challenges in reachability solutions, the management of the 
service, and changing numbering when there were alterations to the 
company’s activities, led to the ideas of developing the concept of the 
company number. Clearly, the market signals and R&D capabilities of 
Sonera led to the development of the company number. 
In addition, the regulative legislation made sensing the business 
opportunity possible. There was a new opportunity to price freely end to 
end70, which was not possible previously, when local telcos were not 
                                                   
70 Earlier, a customer paid a phone bill to all the telephone operators, whose 
network was used. Now customer could pay only to Sonera. Sonera bought the 
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obliged to lease capacity. The numbering reform71  in Finland in 1994 and 
the obligation to rent access lines also helped here. 
 
“Also the great numbering reform in 1994 was important for the success of 
Company number, because that lowered the barrier to changing numbers” 
(Informant 15, Quote 1). 
 
The  knowledge to use the virtual network switch (VPN) with the help of 
IN, in order to create unified numbering plans for companies, was 
understood to be important. More specifically, the following aspects were 
seen as resources when developing the company number. On the resource 
side, Sonera added and fixed the functionalities of different Intelligent 
Network (IN) platforms (Tandem, Ericsson) so it could conduct mass 
transactions. In addition, in terms of concept development, there was 
progress on understanding how external numbering and the services 
behind that number were separated. This was used as a competitive tool, 
because Elisa linked numbering directly to services at that time, which 
was laborious and expensive. Sonera had the benefit of having hardware 
that was centrally managed, but Elisa had to do ad hoc platform work and 
harmonization was not possible (Turpeinen, 1996). 
There was a need in the market to have products with superior 
functionality that could enable the freedom of place and time in terms of 
communications within customer companies. This would lead to 
productivity increases. Customer companies also wanted to have an 
advantageous brand, and unified numbering to external customers helped 
in that process. 
Seizing  
The business model and Sonera’s own standard in the form of the 
company number employed sophisticated concepts so as to fully exploit 
shrewd price plans. These were ready to be created when the buying of 
access was granted. Some of the phone costs were paid for by the 
                                                                                                                              
capacity from other telcos, and used that capacity in its own products and 
services, in this case in Cid company number service. 
71 Finland is divided into numbering (geographical) areas, each area has its own 
code. For example, Helsinki area has the 09-code. Before 1994, there were 
numerous numbering areas and each phone call had different price based on the 
area. In 1994, the numbering areas were reduced, and the codes were changed. 
Sonera now had opportunity to create more easily end-to-end priced calls and 
also customers were more willing to change numbers, as the codes changed 
anyway. 
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company and some by the consumer. The great numbering reform in 1994 
was used as a tool and prerequisite for the service: a new idea to develop a 
new national calling number. The profitability of the product was also 
important, and a clever technological idea was developed for that. A 
competitor’s switch would be directly connected to Sonera Corporate 
networks’ company switch, and every time a customer called a Company 
number in the competitor’s areas, the competitor had to pay access fees to 
Sonera. 
In terms of project management, production and product management 
worked closely together. There was a strong demand in the market and a 
unified growth atmosphere in Sonera facilitating this cooperation. 
Expertise on IN was used efficiently, and capabilities also grew to create 
self-service portals (Cid Manager) and numbering management to the 
masses. 
The industry accepted the new views about pricing in the Cid company 
number service (as the same logic in billing was as applied earlier in 
service numbers). In 2007, the business model for the Cid company 
number service was also considered for TeliaSonera’s Swedish 
organization (Finnish customers wanted that), but that proved difficult. 
In particular, the Swedish organization found it difficult to grasp the 
business logic and the lock-in role72  of large customers and, 
consequently, the potential of the Cid company number service was never 
thoroughly investigated in Sweden. 
The resulting dominant design characteristics 
The evidence of the fact that the Cid company number attained a 
dominant design position is its 59% market share gained by 2001 
(Internal estimates). The competitor, Elisa, followed later. The Cid 
company number service was also described as being a globally unique 
network IN based service, and a very profitable product. It had a pricing 
model that defined how end-to-end pricing should be performed, as well 
as how transfer prices with competitors should be negotiated. In addition, 
customer companies were content with the service and wanted it rolled-
out globally. 
                                                   
72 Cid company number’s lock-in role consisted of the following facets: 1) the 
number offered brand value, 2) area code numbering is not national level 
number, 3) Attendant service can be outsourced. In addition, implementing the 
Cid company number to customer’s private network numbering was a costly and 
tricky process. Abandoning Cid would bring extra costs to the customer. Also, at 
that time, the number portability in Cid was not allowed. 
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Transforming (to the following product generations) 
The Cid company number service was a corporate network product that 
created a convergent offering. Thus, it integrated ‘fixed’ and ‘mobile’ call 
functions in a company. However, later, in 2002, active substitution 
started, rather than convergence, in the realm of mobile solutions. The 
integrative use of all services was emphasized less than previously. 
The spearhead changed in 2002, as instead of going with an integrated 
managed total solution (fixed plus mobile), Sonera followed a policy of 
having one end device, which at that time was mobile. 
 
“We diluted the dominant design between 1995 and 2000 in Vipgate ourselves, 
because we proceeded to a one end device policy. And why was that? Mobile 
phones were already very widespread and we proved to customers that it was 
cheaper to have one infrastructure instead of two. The reason was that the cost of 
mobile phones dropped so low that nobody believed any longer that the fixed-line 
voice business would grow. Fixed voice was taken as a cost efficient component, 
which would be replaced by IP-based traffic or mobile traffic; and then there 
came the idea that small companies needed only mobile and big fixed 
switchboards would be replaced with IP-based subscriptions, like SBVA (Sonera 
business voice access)” (Informant 4, Quote 2). 
 
Between 2008 and 2010, Cid Company number service functionality was 
offered in Unified Communications. 
Table 15 summarizes the transforming, sensing, and seizing phases 
building blocks. 
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Table 15.  Transformation, sensing, and seizing activities in Cid company number service. 
 
 
 
 
Building blocks   
Transforming 
from previous product 
generations 
Sensing Seizing 
Previous Dominant logic 
in industry/ company. 
Earlier, companies’ external 
and internal numbering was 
not uniform and the calling 
functionality was 
cumbersome. The 
management did not see 
that VPN logic could be 
enhanced by Cid, which 
would be a dynamic 
numbering suitable to all 
connections. The Cid 
service was net-based, 
contrary to the majority of 
solutions in industry. Earlier, 
the majority of services 
were PBX (Private Branch 
Exchange) based.  
Convergence creation in 
the company. 
Convergence was seen in 
unified numbering 
regardless of technology. 
End-to-end pricing was in 
place regardless of the 
technological nature of the 
call. Call routing was also 
conducted regardless of 
technology (i.e., fixed or 
mobile). 
Market change in 
industry. Customers 
needed productivity in 
communications and brand 
value in external customer 
relations. 
Technology change in 
industry.  
Intelligent Network (IN) 
usage diffused to telecom 
services. Sonera adopted 
and modified technology 
change (IN) to B2B services 
in corporate numbers—a 
world first. 
Regulation in the 
industry. A 
numbering reform 
was used effectively 
as a tool when 
attacking 
competitors’ areas. 
The reform allowed 
Sonera to compete 
more effectively 
nationwide. In 
addition, the option 
to buy access from 
competitors 
enabled end-to-end 
call pricing, which 
was a key point in 
Cid. 
Source of 
innovation.  
The business area 
management 
sensed that 
customer brand 
value could be 
enhanced with the 
service. The 
development of the 
IN network was 
used to invent new 
price plans. 
 
 
Standards in industry. 
Different IN vendors’ products were 
analyzed, combined, and 
developed in Sonera (e.g., time-
based call routing). Sonera’s ‘own 
standards’ were used in the Cid 
service. 
Network effects. Unified external 
numbering for companies was 
created in Sonera. Inside Sonera, a 
platform innovation was made, as 
service numbers used the same 
platform. The firm learned how to 
separate external numbering and 
service elements because of the 
mass market scalable application 
related to Cid. 
Complementary assets. New 
successful marketing concepts 
were discovered, e.g., reachability. 
Production and product 
management, as well as different 
business units, cooperated in 
Sonera due to the integrative nature 
of the service. The top 
management supported the service, 
as it was a flagship product in 
integrated business voice solutions. 
Modularity management. A self-
service number management 
system and flexible process to open 
new 'number spaces' was 
developed, which helped to create 
new numbering solutions and 
attach new customers to the Cid 
service. 
Firm structure. A closed vertical 
mode was used, and no external 
partners were needed. Sonera in 
part used a common telephone 
network in its competitors’ areas. 
Ecosystem/Partners. TOP 3000 
customers ecosystem in Finland, a 
'Sonera camp' was enhanced in the 
voice business area. The major 
large customers needed 
management of their network sites 
(also globally) and internal and 
external numbering. 
Innovation type. Cumulative old 
technology was used for current 
and new customers. 
Technological competences. 
Intelligent Network development 
and numbering planning were the 
key competences. 
Appropriability for Sonera (and 
telcos). Profitable, clever pricing 
and superb functionality created 
high earnings for Sonera, no real 
substitutes emerged from 
competitors. 
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4.1.6 Vipgate concept 
 
Background 
Vipgate was a new service concept created in 1995, and it was formed to 
create a comprehensive communications solution for companies with 
many sites. The concept included incoming traffic, internal traffic, and 
outgoing traffic. In the early period, one spearhead was also billing and 
reporting services for large companies, because competitors could not 
provide that service to their customers. Vipgate’s building blocks were the 
earlier commercialized products Vipgate VPN, Privatel and the Cid 
corporate number service. 
The Vipgate concept was positioned as offering communications 
solutions (in the earliest setting mainly fixed voice) for large national 
companies often with many sites. Vipgate was at its strongest during 
1995–2000, however the earliest Vipgate product emerged as early as 
1992 (a product called Vipgate VPN- virtual private network, see Chapter 
4.1.3). 
Transformation from the previous product generation 
Earlier, there was little consideration of a solution for companies that had 
incoming, internal, and external traffic. The earlier products—VPN, 
Privatel, and the Cid company number service—offered solutions for a 
particular communication need, but the emerging need was to have these 
building blocks work together. Sonera soon also found that the total 
solution made it possible to use all the strengths of a big company; that is, 
complementary functions and other synergy-enabling products. In sum, 
the technological solutions were present, but the common sales and 
concept model had been missing, both in Sonera and among its 
competitors. 
Another important point was discovered concerning the transition of 
business: the old bulk business (namely traffic and subscriptions) was 
under price pressure and their usage was simultaneously decreasing. In 
this situation, it was important to offer new value added services. The 
value added services consisted of corporate network solutions, namely 
VPN, Privatel, and Cid. However, the corporate network solutions 
accounted for only 5% of Vipgate’s turnover in 1995. The Vipgate concept 
was considered appropriate, when trying to lock-in customers to Sonera’s 
solution. This was especially important, as half of Vipgate’s customers had 
a subscription with a competitor. Sonera needed its own 2Mbit 
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subscriptions and blanket agreements in order to increase Vipgate’s 
diffusion. 
Sonera was ready to level up its capabilities in terms of concept 
building, as the following strengths identified in an internal SWOT 
analysis describe: 
 
“We have experience in productizing total solutions and marketing to large 
corporation customers operating nationwide; We have technological 
forerunnership in various product areas (IN services, mobile); Sonera is “full 
service house” the total solution is extensive and components are good quality; 
Nationwide and international offerings are a strength; and Telequality is as a 
competitive advantage” [in the market] (Vipgate Business Plan, 1998). 
Sensing  
The sensing in Vipgate revolved around the top management interest in 
and anticipation of market needs for large companies. The commercial 
issues in the market effectively led to internal process development. 
Sonera tried to match the value concept communicated in the market, 
also working on internal processes, that is, an internal inspection 
procedure.73 The Vipgate SBU had a charismatic leader, who made a true 
difference in the commercialization of products and in process 
development in Sonera. Partly for that reason, the unit was on occasions 
quite independent of the production unit and other SBUs in Sonera. 
A customer-oriented way of working began to be important in the mid-
1990s, partly due the influence of Vipgate on Sonera’s processes. Most 
other processes were integrated piece by piece into B2B customer 
relationships with large corporate customers. These processes included 
sales, technical customer service, and allocated R&D resources. 
The development of the Vipgate concept was based on deregulation 
opening competitive arena for trunk calls and international calls. This 
brought new demand for substitute and complementary offerings. It was 
seen that the basic bulk products (trunk calls, international calls, local 
calls) no longer offered distinctive value added, and the revenues were 
falling in that sector. Therefore, there was a need to offer something new 
and value added; and a comprehensive functionality of communications 
solutions in Sonera’s network was seen as a potential offering that 
competitors would not be able to match. It was important to have 
customers in Sonera’s network one way or another, and not to remain 
                                                   
73 It was similar to stage-gate processes in product development, where project 
tasks with all stakeholders needed to be completed in order to proceed in the 
project. 
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captive to Elisa’s or other local telecoms’ local monopolies because they 
owned the last mile (access) to the customer. Ultimately, the target of the 
Vipgate concept was to sell traffic contracts (i.e., carrier services). The 
competitive targets of Vipgate are depicted in the following figure. Vipgate 
was positioned moderately as a forerunner and moderately preferred as 
the sole vendor by customers, but the target was for it to be the best 
placed forerunner and sole vendor (Corporate Communications “Gold”), 
in the Business Plan for 1999). 
 
Figure 13.  Vipgate positioning matrix 1999. (Vipgate business plans 1998-2008). 
 
Customers who purchased separate products are shown in the lower left 
corner of Figure 13. When moving higher up in the picture, the customers 
are more able to commit to one main supplier in the offering, for example 
to the NMT-GSM Centrex (i.e., a PBX-like service providing switching by 
a telecom company instead of at the customer’s premises). 
Forerunnership here is understood as the ability to create converging 
offerings; one example is the current Vipgate in the figure. 
IT houses74  and system integrators75  were already seen as competitors 
in 1999. They were placed in the business plans at top of the value chain; 
in ‘office solutions’ layers, competing in the Corporate Communications 
“Gold” sector. 
One important facet in Vipgate has been the role of the legislative 
regulator. The regulator did not sympathize with Vipgate’s market 
                                                   
74 Information technology companies. 
75 Davies et al. (2007) write “a systems integrator is the single prime contractor 
organization responsible for designing and integrating externally supplied 
product and service components into a system for an individual customer” (ibid., 
p. 188) 
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definition (the SBU defined the market as market share in B2B segment). 
Regulator often interpreted the market share based on traffic volumes as 
such, (e.g., international calls) where Sonera was a leading player in 
1990s. 
Seizing  
A new working culture emerged in 1995 in the internal R&D projects for 
Vipgate. In R&D projects, pre-studies, implementation, and quality 
checks were carried out. All the functions in Sonera—sales, product, 
billing, delivery, and production units—were involved. Sonera created a 
new competent sales culture and project/product development culture, 
starting with sales education (e.g., national sales tours, product 
catalogues, first product, and offering descriptions). There was also the 
formation of a firm profit center management structure, and growth and 
profitability targets were allocated to business units for the first time. It 
was also sensed that it was important to gradually start to standardize 
production regarding factors, such as quality, processes, and 
maintenance. 
Figure 14 depicts the Vipgate product family as it was in 1998. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14.  Vipgate product family. (Vipgate business plans 1998–2008). 
 
Vipgate’s building blocks at the time were the previous product 
generations VPN, Privatel, and the Cid company number. These three 
products had been forerunners in different periods of Vipgate and had 
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helped the basic bulk products at that time (fixed voice traffic) to grow in 
volumes and create corporate network communication solutions for 
companies, that is, value added services. The Vipgate product family 
became a common way of describing corporate communications. The 
solution was comprehensive and the functionality worked between the 
modules better than competitors’ solutions at the time (e.g., Elisa’s Diana 
Concept [Häikiö, 1995]). 
Vipgate was later built into IN, making Vipgate configured with and 
applying IN technologies. IN was used for different products in Sonera. 
The following table 16 illustrates the diffusion of the IN usage to Sonera’s 
services (1996). 
 
Table 16.  Fixed network IN services in Sonera. (Älyverkon palvelunkehitysvisio 1998–
2002. 1997. Telecom Finland. Internal report). 
 
Service 
 
Million Minutes 1996 Million Minutes 1997 
Privatel 78 131.6 
VPN 6.9 11.6 
Cid Corporate number 70.2 142.4 
Service numbers 41.6 44.6 
Intelligent network 
services 
79.3 96.4 
iNET (Tele Internet) 88.7 123.9 
TeleSampo 19.7 41.4 
 
 
Table 16 above presents the services using Intelligent Networks and the 
minutes used on the service. The Vipgate services, Internet, TeleSampo, 
and Service numbers among others used the INs. However, to clarify, note 
that the other fixed voice traffic (i.e., ‘the profitable bulk’ of local, 
national, and international calls) still dominated at that time to the extent 
that with 4.444 million minutes (Annual report, 1997, p.35), it still 
represented more than ten times the 0.608 million minutes that were 
routed through IN services. 
Vipgate was a great success, and that encouraged the company to use its 
national strengths to address the large business segment. In the corporate 
customer segment, Vipgate gained a larger share of customers in 
competitors’ areas than its average market share, which had been 
traditionally about one-third in Finland (Annual reports). In addition, 
Privatel and VPN as products grew at a faster rate than customers’ voice 
communication contracts, which indicated that companies wanted to 
commit to the solution. Vipgate was first (in 1997) targeted at big 
companies and especially those operating nationwide. Vipgate’s target 
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was not the small local group, but the large business segment, as the 
segmenting in the 1997 chart below clarifies (Figure 15). 
   
  
Figure 15.   Vipgate- strategic segments. (Vipgate business plans 1998-2008). 
 
The business planning chart from 1997 reproduced in Figure 15 segments 
business on the basis of company size and the way the companies are 
structured (i.e., local or national). The star segment represents local large 
companies but Vipgate also had the resources to operate in the national 
large segment, and to create a corporate communications network and 
therefore to provide value-added services. 
However, the transition to value-added services was challenging. 
Initially, in 1995–1997, profit levels were poor in comparison with the old 
bulk business. The threat was seen to arise from the fact that a profitable 
transition from profitable bulk business (local calls, trunk calls, 
international calls) to value-added services would not be not possible and 
Sonera would remain merely a network operator, while IT houses would 
gain credibility. Furthermore, if there was a rapid transition to all mobile 
in the market, Sonera’s comparative advantage in the challenging hybrid 
solutions would diminish. 
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The resulting dominant design characteristics 
As evidence of the fact that Vipgate gained a dominant design position, by 
1996 it had the leading market share in the corporate sector with 60%. 
Vipgate also gained comparatively more market share in the B2B sector in 
competitors’ areas than its overall market share in the business segment 
implied; reaching over 50% market share in competitors’ B2B areas, 
compared with its ‘natural’ market share that had averaged around 30% 
of fixed voice (and in some competitors’ areas, only 10%; Internal reports, 
Finnish Competitive Authority, 1999). The competitor Elisa followed later 
with the Diana concept. Vipgate was built as a whole package, and small 
players were in a weak position because customers were learning to buy 
the comprehensive offering. The key plan was to focus and set the value-
added requirements to serve companies that had many sites. 
Transforming (to following product generations) 
Vipgate was transformed first to the one phone concept in 2002, thus 
moving towards mobility. After that, it was transformed to Sonera’s 
communication solution in 2004 (Chapter 4.1.10) and finally to Unified 
Communications in 2008 (Chapter 4.1.11). The dominance of mobility 
was the reason for the first and second transition. The last transition, to 
Unified Communications, was driven by technological developments (All 
IP) and a market need to have a more web-based, outsourced and easy to 
use bundled services. 
In the area of technology, IP migration was seen as the most important 
thing leading the market and the competition, but that posed a challenge 
when the IT players role became more important, “IP Service layer is 
guiding the value a customer sees linked to vendor selection, and in 
internal resources investments [into services] are low” (Vipgate Business 
review). In line with IP migration, traditional standardization became less 
significant. 
Table 17 below summarizes the transforming, sensing, and seizing 
phases building blocks. 
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Table 17.  Transformation, sensing, and seizing phase building blocks in Vipgate concept.                   
Building blocks   
Transforming 
from previous 
product generations 
Sensing  Seizing 
Previous Dominant 
logic in industry/ 
company.  
Separate services 
were sold before 
Vipgate. No culture 
existed for one-stop-
shopping, nor did the 
idea that productivity 
could be achieved with 
communications ‘total 
solutions’. The SBU 
management found 
there would be 
synergetic effects in 
usage, when using 
Sonera's products, 
reconfiguring and 
redesigning those. 
Convergence 
creation in company. 
Sonera created 
convergence through 
marketing the brand. A 
uniform 
communication culture 
(a total solution) was 
marketed to 
customers: integration 
of fixed and mobile 
solutions, as well as 
pricing and volume 
discounts on product 
packages. A mindset 
favoring a 
‘standardized solution’ 
diffused. 
Market change in 
industry. Large 
customers learned to 
do one-stop-shopping, 
buying whole 
communications 
solution packages. 
Technology change 
in industry. No new 
technology emerged. 
Sonera was the first 
firm to adopt 
technologies to create 
a concept for 
Corporate 
communications 
solutions. Earlier 
technological products 
(2Mbit, Privatel, Cid, 
VPN), were integrated 
in a marketing brand. 
 
Regulation in 
industry. 
Legislative 
authorities set 
limitations on 
product bundling 
(i.e., volume 
discounts were 
not allowed on 
trunk/international 
calls, because 
Sonera was 
considered to 
have a 
monopoly). 
Source of 
innovation. The 
competition 
opened up in 
voice 
communications. 
Partly due to this, 
a marketing 
concept was 
constructed, 
which was 
necessary to sell 
traffic contracts. 
A new innovative 
growth-seeking, 
market-sensing 
business unit was 
founded, 
concept-creating 
and sales culture 
was established, 
The TeleGate 
marketing 
concept was 
devised, and pilot 
schemes with 
large customers 
were extended. 
The R&D, 
Solution sales, 
and customers 
cooperated. 
 
 
 
Standards in industry. 
Prior standards (IN, signaling, VPN, 
numbering) were used, which made 
the productization faster. 
Network effects. Sonera’s sales 
message pointed to elements that 
would create network effects in 
industry: 1) voice communications 
would be a value added component 
for customers, 2) reachability will be 
enhanced, 3) there would be an 
ability to master a large volume of 
contacts, 4) service would be 
manageable, reliable and efficient. 
The Vipgate brand was robust, and 
it served as a reference solution. 
Complementary assets. Inside 
Sonera, a unified growth 
atmosphere and cooperation with 
all functions existed. The only 
exception was that mobile solutions 
in the business segment were 
missing (as cross-selling and usage 
of customer lists were challenging). 
Inside Sonera a Solution Sales 
function was used. A productization 
and decision-point product 
development process was built. 
Modularity management. Vipgate 
business unit management found 
difficulties in fully integrating the 
mobile technologies into the 
offering. Different IT systems and 
also disputes over the ownership of 
business mobile products were 
challenges. 
Firm structure. In the big picture, a 
large vertical silo organization, 
‘product house' was used. It was 
successful in the productization of 
new services in voice business 
area. Ecosystem/Partners. TOP 
3000 customers ecosystem in 
Finland was at its peak; a 'Sonera 
camp' was enhanced further in 
voice business area, by using 
Sonera's brand and volume 
discounts on prices. 
Innovation type. Cumulative old 
technology was used for current 
and new customers. 
Technological competences. 
Sonera enhanced the competences 
in the earlier services and solutions: 
Cid, VPN, Privatel and VPN. 
Appropriability for Sonera (and 
other telcos). VG was a profitable 
business, and individual products 
(traffic and subscriptions) were sold 
with the help of the VG concept. 
Elisa’s (Diana concept) lacked 
national level services and some 
functionality. 
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4.1.7 DataNet 
 
Background 
DataNet (launched in 1989) and FastNet (launched in 1991) are some of 
the data communications products offered by Sonera. FastNet is a 
transmission level product (Basic Data); DataNet is higher in the layered 
technological system (Data WAN, Wide Area Networking; see Appendix 9, 
FastNet structure). The products have intertwined elements in light of the 
whole Sonera data communications offering. 
DataNet is a service bringing data and communications solutions into 
one network with IP (Internet Protocol). It builds on the earlier 
Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) and Frame Relay76  technologies. 
The service is a flexible IP Sonera Communications Solution for the 
business customer (Sonera, DataNet service description, p.3). It is a 
service that, assisted by VPN77 , supports client-server/ client-client 
applications, an intranet, and internet applications. DataNet combines a 
customer’s local area networks (LANs) in different locations into one 
single managed network entity, a VPN. The service concept is based on a 
secure, closed network architecture, and the principal idea is to create one 
IP-VPN for each customer, (or more if necessary). At each access point, 
the customer is provided with connectivity to the rest of the customer 
VPN and also to additional value added services. 
Transformation from the previous product generation 
The previous design was the X.2578  protocol in data communications, 
which used the landline telephone network as the physical link. The 
progress of technology and a market need fueled the transition to the new 
DataNet service type. The competitive solutions to DataNet started to be 
seen as inferior to the forthcoming DataNet at that time. 
A macro landscape shift emerged in the 1980s, which also describes the 
old dominant design paradigm in the industry before DataNet. New 
technologies, such as Local Area Networks (LAN), microcomputers, 
Transmission Control Protocol and Internet Protocol (TCP/IP), and the 
Internet in general created both needs and vehicles to change previous 
                                                   
76 Sonera used and implemented Frame Relay second in the world (interviews). 
77 Virtual Private Networks are used also in data communications (see the 
Chapter 6.3 Vipgate VPN). 
78 A standard protocol suite for packet switched wide area network [WAN] 
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forms of data communication (Kenney & von Burg 1999; Kavassalis & 
Solomon 1997). In particular, IBM’s System Network Architecture (SNA), 
a proprietary and dominant system at that time, was unable to cope with 
the increasing traffic (ibid.). The Internet based systems replaced the old 
paradigms. 
Indeed, IBM was seen as representing the ‘old world’. Kavassalis and 
Solomon (1997) state that IBM’s system network architecture (SNA) 
applied a relatively closed, proprietary solution to customers’ demands for 
interconnection. They concluded that “SNA, being proprietary, never 
could become the underlying standard for the interconnect market. 
Computers are too powerful and too multivariate for any one proprietary 
networking solution” (ibid., p. 386). 
A key person from Sonera described the situation like this: 
 
“Cisco (a technology company) made it possible to tunnel the IBM traffic and at 
that time also to route it. IBM in turn made the mistake of thinking that [Cisco’s 
routers] were toys. Still IBM had a reason to believe so, Cisco’s routers cost 100 
000 Finn mark and IBM’s data communications’ control system cost 1 000 000 
Finn mark, but IBM lived in their own religion. However, they started to build 
their own 6611 routers to match Cisco, but it didn’t help in the race with Cisco; in 
the end IBM lost that battle” (Informant 49, Quote 1). 
 
The prerequisite for DataNet’s success was technology progression (also 
stimulated by Sonera) and a vision of what could be done. Initial 
development of the service inside Sonera was conducted by talented 
individuals, who were trusted by the top management. Sonera was 
familiar with technological development in the USA in 1980s. At that 
time, universities in the USA had their own ‘Internet’ networks. Private 
companies, in turn, had their own closed expensive fixed-line TDM 
(Time-Division Multiplex[ing]) connections. There was clearly a market 
need and a technological opportunity to create a ‘managed network 
service’ (replacing TDM connections) with VPN to link customer local 
area networks provided by telecom operators, which had not been done 
before. 
Sensing 
The sensing centered on identifying customer needs with the active R&D 
focus on external vendors. In addition, the top management was open to 
exploring new ideas, and it let the R&D unit develop the DataNet service, 
even though it was cannibalizing the old X.25 data business. 
The customers were waiting for more cost-effective solutions to local 
area networking. The earlier fixed-line connections were very expensive. 
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The key idea was to use vendors’ switchboards to create a local area 
management that used the TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol [TCP] 
and Internet Protocol [IP]) typology. A key concept was to create this as a 
service business for customers too, rather than just for the operators’ own 
network. There was also a view emerging that the firm should move to IP 
networks, because the data traffic would increase, whereas previously 
voice traffic volumes had dominated. The data traffic would need more 
capacity than voice traffic, and it was sensed that only IP networks would 
have enough capacity. 
Seizing  
In seizing upon the new needs in the market, Sonera created the DataNet 
product―its own standard. There was a new need to have companies’ 
sites networked in the market. Sonera was active technologically, with 
new start-up suppliers, and with customers. The customers needed to 
think earlier about their own network topology, which was not their 
competence. In addition, they could not financially afford to have this 
backed up network, where most of the time, extra capacity was not used. 
Sonera created a progressive managed solution to networking, which had 
not been executed before. 
Heinänen (2009) describes the arrival of broadband IP and the spread 
of the Internet into Finland: 
 
“The use of the TCP/IP protocol in Finland started in the 1980s mostly in 
universities and research centers, [in the] late 80s, the use of TCP/IP expanded 
to trunk networks. The Internet was commercialized in Finland in 1993: DataNet 
had a connection to Ebone and the USA, and TCP/IP created a breakthrough in 
1994 with the aid of the Netscape browser. DataNet’s plan was to offer a 
connection of companies’ local area networks as a managed total service. The 
important technical steps were: a router trunk network in 1989 (Cisco), a frame 
relay trunk network in 1991 (StrataCom, Cascade), an ATM trunk network in 
1994 (GDC, Cisco), and SurfNet managing programme software (developed in-
house at Sonera).” 
 
One person responsible for DataNet describes the history of DataNet and 
the Internet in Sonera. The service was seen to be very different from 
earlier solutions: 
 
“The Internet was the backbone of DataNet and the first routers had just come to 
the market, and we started using the same devices to offer corporate services as 
well. This was not earlier done with the virtual private network [VPN] principles 
or by telecom operators, but of course on the other hand corporations and 
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universities in the USA had Internet subscriptions... In the USA, companies had 
rented their own leased lines TDM [Time Division Multiplex(ing)] connections 
and built a real private network that had its own routers and this had nothing to 
do with a telecom operator. Telecom operators only rented bit pipes to customers 
and we had this idea we could offer this as a service that had only one trunk 
network router. With those means, we could offer basic Internet subscriptions 
and VPNs to companies” (Informant 44, Quote 1). 
 
At that time, there was no internal bureaucracy in productization. The 
operator manually configured all routers itself. That was seen as a core 
competence. The next quotation illustrates the active partnership with 
new vendors and the entrepreneurial spirit in Sonera at the time. The 
partnerships were created by a few key people, as there was no official 
organization for managing partners at that time. This period marks the 
first time that an operator (Sonera) had adopted a managed service 
mindset in the data communications business area. 
 
“If we think about the background of technological development, universities had 
the need to connect sites in different towns. Then came these Ciscos, which were 
born with switching technologies and others such as Stratacom, information 
network companies, and in the 1990s there were more of these companies like 
Juniper etc. The companies were startups then; in this way technological 
thinking began to be commercialized. Companies had needs but we also could 
communicate to customers what they can do with the new technology. This was 
not only the ‘academic thinking’, listening to customers was a real dialogue” 
(Informant 48, Quote 2). 
 
Sonera was working with US universities to learn about internet 
networks, at the beginning of the TCP/IP time. For example, the idea to 
gradually use TCP/IP in Sonera’s network and later for Sonera’s 
customers originated at Stanford (Informant 43). In addition, the vendors 
were listening to what operators needed in their businesses at that time, 
and there was close cooperation and learning from each other, as well as 
early signs of partnering. A key informant remembers: 
 
“I remember Cisco was quite astonished that we used the router to connect to our 
customers directly. Cisco treated the product as for corporations, but I said we 
are a telecom operator and our customers want to use this product as a tool in 
VPN routing. The innovation was that we noticed the large price difference to 
different segments and only a minor variation in quality. When you have a 
consumer product, which is virtually cost free, and then you have a corporate 
grade, which costs ten times more and then you have a telecom-grade, which 
costs again ten times more, and then we have a military-grade, which comes with 
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more than its own weight of documentation and is ten times more expensive. 
Based on these grounds we took the advanced corporate grade stuff and made 
corporate network products and we got a tenfold cost advantage compared to 
these X.25 switches for example. The important thing was also that we took the 
responsibility of the service end-to-end and improvement of the service level to 
the computer network level. Kone was the first customer” (Informant 43, Quote 
2). 
 
DataNet was a very profitable service, and at first, there were no 
competitive substitutes for it. The customers had no resources and 
competence to manage their network topology and consequently, Sonera 
offered that service. In addition, customers could not afford to build a 
secured network where there was extra capacity in low usage times. 
However, it can be seen from the next quotation there was not instant 
support for DataNet in Sonera (and in the industry). Instead, the old 
technologies continued to fight back. 
 
“We had some internal conflicts in Sonera about this DataNet, because the X25 
world was so strong and even the CCIT [Comite Consultatif International des 
Radiocommunications] hadn’t defined DataNet. At that time everything needed 
to be a circuit switched, maybe X25 packet switched was okay but the idea that 
we would send packets without the point to point connections [earlier way to 
have packet-switched networks] to was like a crime against humanity” 
(Informant 43, Quote 3). 
The resulting dominant design characteristics 
DataNet’s market share was 67% in the initial years after the launch. It 
was a cost-effective leading solution in the Finnish market. DataNet also 
had a price premium of 20% over its competitors. DataNet’s service 
concept later spread to the USA, too (in the late 2000s). The top 
companies in Finland were all DataNet customers and they were also 
financing the service and were engaged in pilot projects and close 
cooperation and solution design planning with Sonera. The companies 
paid in DataNet’s piloting projects and in accomplishing the service the 
costs beforehand to Sonera. Full end-to-end responsibility for the 
customer was new and unique at the time. The competitor (Elisa) also 
followed Sonera with its own similar service (LanLink) one year after 
Sonera’s launch. 
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Transforming (to the following product generations)  
The development and running of the business was challenging in the era 
of DataNet. DataNet was earlier sold and marketed as being technology 
based, and it was transformed by acquiring different service levels (multi, 
basic, flex). 
 
“In DataNet, there were technology based variants (DataNet ATM, DataNet 
Frame relay), and then service bundling (multi etc.). These variants were also the 
segmenting base, but the dominant design is the same” (Informant 29, Quote 2). 
 
The overall technology theme in data business was the Internet Protocol 
(IP). The market need, networking, was accomplished with IP. In other 
themes, the large incumbent operator issues were common: Sonera had a 
large existing customer base, a significant market share, and a market 
maker position. There were also threats: 
 
“Price erosion continues and customers continue to move from Frame Relay to 
ADSL [i.e., from expensive company products to cheaper consumer-type 
products, e.g. Business Internet and Consumer Internet]; wireless access is 
replacing fixed access reducing our turnover and access market control; system 
integrators are coming to the market; IT players would take the application 
business” (Sonera, ENS Business Review, 2003, 2006; Appendix 7) 
 
In 2008, one challenge was to develop a modular and automated low cost 
offering for the SME (Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise) segment. In 
addition, the discussion related to finding a true value-added solution 
continued, as Sonera was aware that its products and services were still 
quite technical solutions that solved IT managers’ problems, but did not 
address customers’ business processes development very well. Therefore, 
Sonera introduced a new product, Sonera Business Internet. 
Table 18 summarizes the transforming, sensing, and seizing phases 
building blocks. 
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Table 18.   Transformation, sensing, and seizing phases building blocks in DataNet 
 
 
 
Building blocks   
Transforming 
from previous 
product generations  
Sensing Seizing 
Previous Dominant 
logic in industry/ 
company. Earlier, the 
X.25 technology was 
rigid and expensive. It 
represented the ‘old 
IBM world’ in industry. 
Earlier, telecom 
operators did not have 
the service layer. 
Sonera was the first 
firm in the world to 
identify this need and to 
recognize that this 
could create a new 
business. ISDN was 
also abandoned as a 
data solution [i.e. data 
solutions in telephone 
network]. 
Convergence creation 
in company.  
Convergence was 
created in marketing 
messages and 
technology. The 
TeleGate sales brand 
was founded and 
offered one network for 
data, voice and video. 
A service was created, 
which had only one 
trunk network router in 
a data network. 
Market change in 
industry. Changes to 
customer demands 
meant a managed 
service was needed. 
New types of vendors 
emerged (e.g., Cisco, 
and start-up companies 
from the USA). 
Technology change in 
industry. Sonera 
adopted technological 
innovations (the 
personal computer, 
local area networking, 
and routing) and 
created the world’s first 
managed service to 
data communications. 
A change of the router 
networks infrastructure 
and IP (Internet 
Protocol) was made. 
 
Regu-lation in 
industry. 
DataNet was a 
B2B product, 
so regulation 
was not highly 
relevant. 
Source of 
innovationUS 
origin 
protocols (e.g. 
TCP/IP) and 
new types of 
start-up 
vendors were 
used. 
Innovative 
partnering was 
conducted with 
vendors in 
order to create 
new business 
models for 
Sonera’s 
customers and 
develop 
technology 
Small 
entrepreneuria
l R&D unit, 
with business 
responsibility 
was founded. 
Pilot projects 
were run with 
customers 
(e.g. Finnish 
Forestry 
companies) 
 
 
 
 
Standards in industry. Sonera broke the 
old rigid standards. The old X.25 standard 
(defined in ETSI and CCIT) lacked the 
capacity to link local area networks. 
Sonera bought capacity from different 
network vendors, and routed the different 
protocols (IBM, Decnet, TCP/IP) to work 
together. Thus, Sonera implemented US-
based technologies. 
Network effects. Scalability, cost 
efficiency, availability, and usability were 
Sonera’s sales arguments in DataNet. 
These facilitated network effects in 
industry through learning by using, a well-
known product and the assurance that the 
product would have a future.   Sonera’s 
customers’ would benefit if all sites used 
DataNet. 
Complementary assets. Complementary 
assets were crucial sales arguments. IP-
design function was used. The IP-design 
function created the data solution 
architecture to a customer with Internet 
Protocol, and security of the network was 
built (separate control network and 
firewalls in virtual network). Solution sales 
unit was used extensively. 
Modularity management. Surf Manager 
(a self-service portal in network change 
management) and IP network design 
functions inside Sonera were built. These 
helped offer fast and robust product 
implementation and in visioning with 
customers. Middle management seized 
the opportunity to buy network hardware 
and maintenance from different vendors. 
Earlier, it was possible to buy only one 
vertical solution. 
Firm structure. A closed vertical mode 
was used, where products had a strong 
role in Sonera. 
Ecosystem/Partners. A robust ecosystem 
was created jointly by many interest 
groups. The commercialization of the 
Internet took place in Finland in 1993 
(TCP/IP in Internet). DataNet was 
developed with customers and vendors; 
the public sector was also active with its 
FUNET network in 1987–1988. The TOP 
3000 customers in Finland to Sonera 
camp was being formed in data business. 
Innovation type. DataNet used new 
technology applications to new customers. 
Technological competences. Router and 
IP technologies and network security 
management were the key competences. 
Appropriability for Sonera (and other 
telcos). Customers accepted the 20% 
price premium. No real substitutes existed. 
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4.1.8 FastNet 
 
Background 
The FastNet network added competition to the local connection data 
transfer business in August 1991. It made it possible to integrate services 
for the whole length of the connection [the customer network] and 
enhanced the manageability and reliability as a whole. FastNet was based 
on Tellabs Ltd.’s Martis DXX™ technology. (Sonera service description, 
2006). FastNet helped customers integrate their different offices into a 
joint network, which was controllable by network management. The 
network operated at the transmission layer (Appendix 9). FastNet served 
as a backbone to Sonera’s other services, such as switch networks, local 
networks, and packet and circuit switched network connections (products 
such as Vipgate, DataPak, and DataNet). 
FastNet’s technological setup is shown in Appendix 9. The illustration 
shows that other services are built on FastNet, and currently the most 
important feature is the link to a public telecommunications network, as 
the other services are increasingly based on direct IP functionality. 
Transformation from the previous product generation 
The previous design was leased lines or Datel. Datel was Sonera’s earlier 
product, it was cost ineffective but technologically cumbersome to 
manage. FastNet meant a customer could integrate its different offices 
into a joint network that was entirely controllable by network 
management in a cost-efficient way. The competitive situation in the 
FastNet era was characterized by MUX (Multiplexer) networks and the 
new Martis DXX node being central issues in the market. There was an 
active pursuit of new technological solutions, because earlier solutions 
were technologically inadequate and uncompetitive. Sonera co-created a 
new technology for the industry. 
 
“The technological change was not so radical in FastNet: there was a new way to 
produce a managed leased line or leased line service, an earlier product was Datel 
for fixed synchronic data connection. That time the main reason for the usage of 
the [Datel] service was to use IBM-connections. Other local telecoms firms 
started using MUX networks, and so did we, because Datel was too expensive and 
inefficient. We used the Martis Company’s DXX-technology [Digital Cross 
Connect, technology converts the communication signals from one 
communication device to another], which was the same as FastNet, meaning that 
when we put together the Martis DXX and the pricing concept, we had the 
FastNet product. The concept was so successful that we had 66.76% market share 
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by 1996. FastNet was efficient, we had earlier used an all voice channel at 64 
kbit/s, and now we could have four of those. That was important because trunk 
networks were at that time expensive to build. The other important thing was 
process innovation. In the new technology network, that is, FastNet, 
configuration was made automatically, whereas earlier you had to manually 
manage all switchboards, now the time reduced from 15 weeks at worst to 15 
seconds” (Informant 58, Quote 3). 
Sensing 
In FastNet, many sensing sources were used: customers were listened to, 
Sonera engaged in R&D with its vendors, and top management was active 
in setting targets for a new data business unit. Production and product 
management cooperated closely; there was strong demand in the market, 
and a united atmosphere of growth in Sonera. These facets created a 
newly competent sales culture. Sonera also listened to and learned from 
its customers and partners that included many large visionary companies 
(e.g., Kymmene, Kone). FastNet was an important product in entering 
competitor areas, as was explained in the VPN section (Chapter 4.1.3). 
In the B2B segment, data had been considered the most important 
spearhead in Sonera by top management that also helped in the creation 
of a successful growth SBU. 
Seizing  
In terms of seizing, technology management and customer relationships 
were closely connected in the 1980s and 1990s, and clear choices were 
made about the technology. 
 
“One thing I remember as linked to our competitive advantage was that we 
learned to listen to and learn from customers, we had these visionary customers, 
and I remember one was Kymmene that time. Choices and discussions with 
customers involved issues such as network technologies. In the early 1980s, a 
circuit switched technology was used, at ISDN with 64kbit/s capacity. There was 
then an aspiration to bring data communications into this ISDN and I realized 
that this circuit switched technology (ISDN) did not suit data communications. I 
refused to accept that ISDN was offered as a technology for data communications 
and I tried to put the brakes on ISDN development and therefore we lagged 
behind on development in Sonera. Instead we chose very fast managed 
connections for Datacom, which became FastNet and DataNet, where we got all 
the prizes in the 1990s because we were the only firm that had chosen that path” 
(Informant 20, Quote 3). 
 
Innovation in creating services and using the liberalization trend in 
markets was common to early technology management in Sonera. The 
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chosen new vendor, Martis, was important. Both DataNet and FastNet 
were managed services, and DataNet was built on FastNet’s base. In this 
way, Sonera had end-to-end manageability of the service. The important 
aspect of the Martis node was that it was co-created with Sonera, a new 
industry standard, and it had open network manageability to these MUX 
networks at the time. Sonera wanted to have this trunk network 
management to the node, a totally novel functionality. One key informant 
reported that this functionality actually turned out to be a dominant 
design79  for this open network manageability to MUX. 
Sonera’s key resources were deployed when implementing FastNet and 
DataNet. These also formed the barriers to entry to market. 
 
“Key capabilities are our own access network, own trunk network, own hardware 
premises and production capability and IT-processes” (Informant 58, Quote 4). 
 
The loose but supportive management style of the 1990s, was partially 
responsible for the success of the data products in Sonera and in the 
industry. The high prices in the market offered new target segments. New 
products, a new kind of image, and a new selling style for products were 
present. 
 
“[Regarding] the change in technology in the voice area: the main point is that 
Sonera was active with vendors, we sought solutions to customer needs. In 1991, 
we had this data services unit and the data and telecommunications units were 
restructured. We ended up with the FastNet technology choice and a product 
with Martis equipment, currently Tellabs, which made it possible for switching 
hardware to manage capacity with a time division, each domain, and interface in 
voice exchanges could be filled to the maximum. The consequence was 
technology could be offered efficiently and especially when we looked at how 
competitors had attempted the business: each voice connection was in the worst 
case made with rented copper. In this situation, if you bring in one integrative 
service whereby one fiber connection carries all data and voice you have a benefit. 
In this way, we created efficiency and the future-proof DataNet and FastNet 
(Informant 16, Quote 7). 
The resulting dominant design characteristics 
The dominant design actualization was the product’s market share 
(66.7%), it was a cost-effective transmission capacity leading solution, 
which offered a secured managed connection, and it had no challengers. 
The driver was that because 2Mbit was very expensive, when a customer 
                                                   
79 Informant used literally the term dominant design. 
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had data and voice subscriptions, 2Mbit offered too much capacity and 
copper too little, there were no products in the middle. FastNet allocated 
the 2Mbit resources to both data and voice. FastNet also carried a 20% 
price premium. 
Transforming (to following product generations)  
While the FastNet business model and technology was fundamental and 
robust, new technologies and a new customer usage culture were 
gradually also replacing FastNet. 
 
“Changes since FastNet have been minor; there was no revolutionary market 
changing technology to the basic infrastructure. Naturally, customers today are 
interested in Microsoft OCS [Microsoft Office Communications Server, an 
enterprise real-time communications server software, providing PSTN 
connectivity through a third-party gateway or SIP trunk] and instant messaging 
and presence: that will ease the communication, but the fundamental way we did 
things in the 1990s is still valid in terms of the technological solution and 
business model, albeit the techniques have changed” (Informant 16, Quote 7). 
 
At the time of the interviews (2010) FastNet was in the declining stage of 
its life cycle brought about by the IP phenomenon. There is currently a 
transition to DataNet and Business Internet. 
 
“The evolution of voice offerings through a call for customer bids could be 
summarized as first there was FastNet, today there is Sonera Business Voice 
Access, voice communications can be made with the help of DataNet and 
Business Internet [substituting FastNet]” (Informant 16, Quote 6). 
 
Table 19 summarizes the transforming, sensing, and seizing phases 
building blocks. 
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Table 19.   Transformation, sensing, and seizing phases building blocks in FastNet. 
 
Building blocks   
Transforming 
from previous product 
generations 
Sensing  Seizing 
Previous Dominant logic 
in industry/ company. 
Previously, Datel 
(expensive circuit 
switched technology) and 
leased lines were used as 
a data transmission 
solution. Management 
found that it was possible 
to create an integrative 
cost-efficient solution in 
the network layer. 
Convergence creation in 
company. Superior 
functionality (e.g., in 
security and automation) 
and low cost (standard 
hardware) created 
networked products... 
Market change in 
industry. Changing 
customer demand meant 
a cost-efficient managed 
service was needed. 
Technology change in 
industry. New types of 
vendors, e.g., Martis, 
developed MUX 
(multiplexing).Sonera co- 
created the market with 
Martis. In 
telecommunications 
multiplexing is a method 
by which multiple 
analogue message signals 
or digital data streams are 
combined into one signal 
over a shared medium. 
The aim was to share an 
expensive resource. 
 
 
Regulation in 
industry. B2B 
product, so 
regulators had no 
role. 
Source of 
innovation.  
A new type of start-
up vendor was 
employed in 
Sonera. Innovative 
partnering with 
vendors was put in 
place. Pilot projects 
were run with 
customers. 
Competition forced 
the organization to 
find cost-effective 
solutions. 
 
 
 
Standards in industry. 
Sonera used the MUX 
technology and enhanced that 
solution further. 
Network effects. All Sonera’s 
customers’ services were 
integrated in the trunk network 
with one platform (end-to-end 
manageability). Accordingly 
economies of scale emerged. 
Complementary assets. 
Flagship product considered by 
Top Management. Own access 
network, own trunk network, 
own hardware premises and 
production capability and IT-
processes were used and they 
were considered as barriers to 
entry. 
Modularity management. 
Functional efficiency was 
created with IT solutions for 
network management and 
consequently the ease of 
manageability of the service 
improved. 
Firm structure. Closed vertical 
mode was used, no external 
partners were needed. Sonera 
used partly common telephone 
network in competitors’ areas. 
Ecosystem/Partners. Active 
partnerships with vendors; 
solutions were sought to 
customers’ needs. A top 3000 
customers 'Sonera camp' was 
enhanced further by being 
future proof and confidence in 
Sonera's technological 
expertise. 
Innovation type. FastNet used 
new technology to serve current 
customers. 
Technological competences. 
Integration of data and voice 
networks, and network security 
management were the 
competences. 
Appropriability for Sonera 
(and telcos). A competitive 
price-point was found. 
Customers accepted the 20% 
price premium in service. No 
substitutes existed. 
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4.1.9 Integrated corporate segment Mobile business- MobiCentrex 
 
Background 
Sonera MobiCentrex was a PBX Attendant [Switchboard operator] service 
that was implemented in the mobile phone network in such a way that the 
customer received it as a service. It substituted for companies’ fixed 
telephone centers. Sonera MobiCentrex brought PBX features to mobile 
phones in a flexible and cost-effective way. The system required no 
investment in equipment (Source: Sonera sales material, MobiCentrex, 
2006). MobiCentrex was launched commercially in 1997. 
Transformation from the previous product generation 
The previous design to manage switching functionality for mobile calls 
was Privatel. With Privatel, one could make internal calls between mobile 
and fixed extensions but there was no switching function purely for 
mobile, as there was for fixed voice. Convergence thinking was directed at 
the need to talk and communicate in the same way despite the end 
terminal, but in the market there were no products to address this need, 
namely the attendant functionality of mobile phones. 
It was apparent in the market and Sonera that MobiCentrex would also 
decrease costs. In Nokia’s 2005 presentation relating to Western 
European markets the typical phone cost structure of a company was as 
follows: There was 100% fixed phone penetration and 50% mobile phone 
penetration, but the trend indicated that fixed phone penetration would 
reduce to 40% and mobile increase to 60%. In this situation, if people 
only had a fixed or mobile line (not both); the optimized phone cost 
structure would lead to 28% savings (Sonera sales material, MobiCentrex, 
2006). 
The functionality of the service was in PBX (Private Branch Exchange) 
functionality; it could be transferred to mobiles. For example, the basic 
functions of fixed PBX: the previously unavailable call transfer, internal 
numbering, conference calling, reachability profile, and call back on busy 
services became available on mobile phones. The technology development 
in computers, Intelligent network (IN) and in signaling technologies led 
Sonera to create a new technology application for industry, called 
MobiCentrex. 
Sensing 
The sensing aspect centered on R&D and science. Accordingly, the first 
version of the product was developed in an independent mobile B2B R&D 
unit. Sonera had very modern interfaces with an Intelligent Network for 
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different technologies at the time. The interfaces were between fixed 
voice, data and mobile. Sonera had started to develop all the interfaces 
with computers (IN, TMN [Telecommunications Management Network], 
TUP [Telephone-User Part] and INAP [Intelligent Network Application 
Part] and MAP [Mobile Application Part]-protocols) in 1991 and by 1996 
owned them. These interfaces were used to connect IN applications to the 
telecom network, and between mobile networks and telecom networks 
[SS7, Signaling System No. 7]). The interfaces enabled the management 
and control of the services. 
The R&D function in Sonera sought to develop a service that no one else 
had considered. The outcome was the GSM short number pilot, which 
later turned into MobiCentrex. There was also a sense of confidence that 
the infrastructure and platform created purely for a mobile PBX would 
work; the mobile switches had the required capability. A market need was 
also identified: pure mobility for the SME segment, which was seen as a 
service to customers where those customers did not need extra 
investments. In retrospect this need was overestimated, because the SME 
segment also needed some fixed voice infrastructure at the time. 
 
“At the time, we thought what kind of service would be one that no one had and 
there was then Elektrobit, our partner and we developed the GSM PBX service 
[i.e., MobiCentrex] from Elektrobit’s military exchanges, which was like a Linux-
box [Unix-like computer operating system]. We assembled the IN exchange from 
that and said we want this telephone exchange in Linux so we could manage that 
easily with these INs, these telephone exchanges. The first pilot we started to 
make was the GSM short numbering service, where companies can call and show 
only GSM as a switch. Then we had the features of PBX in the mobile, so we 
constructed this mobile PBX, Sonera MobiCentrex. I remember this was around 
1994” (Informant 7, Quote 7). 
 
The first version of the service was Sonera’s own research and platforms; 
in other words, it was not based on the Nokia or Ericsson IN (Intelligent 
Network) logic. 
Seizing  
MobiCentrex was implemented inside Sonera with Sonera’s own R&D 
resources, creating the firm’s own standard. The service was the first of its 
kind in the market and another manifestation of the firm acting as a 
technological forerunner. An expert clarifies: 
 
“The first version of MobiCentrex was in 1997, and we were 2-3 years too early on 
the market, but I don’t know if that was harmful or not… . We were somewhat 
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early and currently there are plenty of operators who implemented MobiCentrex. 
At the time the engineers just thought let’s make the PBX’s features for mobile 
and perhaps mobility would be seen to increase, but it was not envisaged that 
mobility would replace fixed phones totally” (Informant 2, Quote 3). 
 
However, despite the success in creating a new service, there was a lack of 
support in Sonera. The service was difficult to sell, and fixed voice was so 
profitable at the time, sales units had no incentives to add other products 
to their portfolio. Furthermore, there were only a few segments in the 
market that were interested in the product. 
MobiCentrex can be seen to incorporate more advanced thinking in 
terms of mobility post Privatel. The mobile switching functionality 
became a central feature. However, the macro trend toward mobility was 
overestimated at the time. 
 
“Maybe then when we started to make MobiCentrex, it was like 1997-1998, we 
had at first an idea behind of what the service could be; OK, Privatel was quite a 
heavy solution, let’s make something else for the SME segment. SME companies 
are going straight on to mobile and they didn’t have the wire line. We had to trust 
our own mobile extensions capacities, because it was a pure mobile concept. But, 
then it later turned out that it was the wrong vision at that time: quite few 
companies were already ready to migrate directly to full mobile” (Informant 27, 
Quote 2). 
 
The business model was to have PBX functionality in the mobile arena. 
However, as mobility was so important and there being different diffusion 
levels in countries, there were different product variants. Especially after 
the merger between Telia and Sonera who had different usage cultures in 
the market, the need for the MobiCentrex product had also been 
questioned (in Sweden all the calls are routed through fixed PBX, leading 
to a heavy, expensive and difficult to manage solution). A mobile expert 
from Sonera remembers: 
 
“It has been tricky to get the PBX’s functionality into mobile. In Finland, we 
made this MobiCentrex, but TeliaSonera Group decided there will be one 
common solution for all, ‘full mobile’, and we have found out since the merger of 
Telia and Sonera, it is like Isaac’s church80 ”(Informant 17, Quote 6). 
                                                   
80 A project that took a lifetime. 
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The resulting dominant design characteristics 
Evidence of the dominant design is provided by the very significant 
penetration of Sonera’s mobile subscriptions81, and in the longer term, 
competitors followed the firm’s lead. However, in the early stages the take 
up of the service was low. Interviewees commented that the reason was 
the limited tools for the attendant to switch calls between fixed and 
mobile; this worked in the laboratory but not in real life. Accordingly, the 
service needed to be more like a type of call center. In addition, at that 
time all of the financial resources went on developing the fixed voice PBX, 
Meridian [Nortel Company’s telephone type]. The sales people did not 
want to sell the MobiCentrex product (an interviewee speculated that the 
basic voice at time was so advantageous to the business there could not 
have been any extra earnings). So, in a sense, MobiCentrex was quite a 
stand-alone product in Sonera’s portfolio at that time, meaning that it was 
not widely accepted internally in Sonera. The MobiCentrex product was a 
global first (Sonera- world leader in mobile and IP integration and 
migration, 2004; Sonera internal material). 
Transforming (to following product generations)  
Transferring corporate PBX functionality to the mobile environment was 
the grand view in the mobility B2B segment. Privatel was the first step 
toward mobile PBX, and the transfer has taken 20 years. The inclusion of 
a large business segment in the offering base helped to grow the sales of 
the products. 
 
“It took a long time for MobiCentrex to start fast growth. Still the key was to have 
the large corporate segment as a customer: Then in 2003 the sales skyrocketed, 
there were a large number of mobile phones in MobiCentrex service; part were in 
the Sonera Attendant service, and part were full mobile solutions to SME 
segment which was the original intent” (Informant 2, Quote 4). 
 
During 1994–2006 there was constant fine-tuning and development 
activities for MobiCentrex. The sales messages centered on making 
operations more effective and flexible and on self-service management. 
These messages were not present at the time of the first launch of the 
service. Later, in 2004, Mobicentrex transformed into Sonera’s 
Communication Solution in order to develop the attendant switching 
functionality. 
Table 20 summarizes the transforming, sensing, and seizing phases 
building blocks. 
                                                   
81 The penetration rate is confidential. 
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Table 20.   Transformation, sensing, and seizing phases building blocks in MobiCentrex. 
 
Building blocks   
Transforming 
from previous product 
generations  
Sensing Seizing 
Previous Dominant 
logic in industry/ 
company. Earlier mobile 
phones had no attendant 
switching functionality 
and they were not 
integrated into a fixed 
PBX system. R&D 
management found 
technologies to support 
mobile switching and 
identified potential 
customers. 
Convergence creation 
in company. Sonera’s 
SBU management had 
an idea to have a fixed 
voice switching function 
in mobile phones. 
Market change in 
industry. A need 
emerged in the SME and 
IT (Information 
Technology) segment for 
a pure mobile switching 
solution, the need was 
not strong in other 
segments. 
Technology change in 
industry. Sonera 
created the technology 
change in the industry. 
Sonera created linking 
interfaces between 
mobile and fixed network 
signaling and IN and 
Linux computers. 
Signaling and IN 
technologies were 
developed and applied 
to enabling convergent 
services. 
 
Regulation in 
industry. Not 
regulated service, 
MobiCentrex was a 
B2B service. 
Source of 
innovation. 
MobiCentrex was an 
independent R&D 
experiment to 
mobile corporate 
segment. The idea 
was to develop a 
service that no 
telecom operators 
previously had. 
Technological 
expertise was found 
in Sonera in 
interfaces between 
computers, the 
Intelligent Network, 
mobile and fixed 
network. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standards in industry. 
Sonera created and applied 
computer, Intelligent Network, 
mobile, and network interfaces. 
Standards in combination were 
important to the birth of the 
service. 
Network effects.  Network 
effects were gradually emerging. 
A switching function was seen 
dominant also in mobile 
networks. Deficiencies in 
usability (attendant's tools) 
hindered the diffusion of the 
service. The more Mobile 
Centrex was in use, the better 
reachability was in place in 
customer companies. 
Complementary assets. 
Limited. No sales support in 
Sonera, because fixed voice was 
delivering significant profit at the 
time. R&D function did not 
manage to sell the product to the 
market and inside Sonera to top 
management and other business 
units at the time. 
Modularity management 
Technological interfaces were 
developed successfully. These 
were protocols linking 
computers, the telecom network 
and the mobile network together. 
They also separated services 
and their management. 
Firm structure. A closed vertical 
mode was used, though Sonera 
had outsourced some IT 
development (Linux computing) 
to a subsidiary. 
Ecosystem/Partners. There 
was limited ecosystem creation, 
IT houses and some small 
businesses were interested in 
the service. 
Innovation type. New 
technology to current and new 
customers. 
Technological competences. 
Interface technologies between 
mobile, fixed voice and computer 
systems were the competences. 
Appropriability for Sonera 
(and telcos). No substitutes 
existed for customers. 
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4.1.10 The integrated corporate segment mobile business: Sonera’s 
Communications Solution 
 
Background 
Sonera’s Communications Solution is a switching tool and information 
system for PBX attendants and employees, and mobile phones can be 
used as exchange components; there are also options to use an outsourced 
PBX attendant service. It was launched in 2004 under the name Sonera 
Attendant Solution, pinpointing the new functionality in call switching 
tools between fixed PBX and mobile. 
The service is a solution where switching happens at the workstation 
and no separate switchboards are needed. The system provides up-to-date 
information on the person being called and on incoming and returning 
calls. The most important feature is that mobile subscriptions are 
seamlessly integrated in the company exchange (or replace all fixed-line 
phones) meaning that calls switched to mobile phones return to the PBX 
attendant if they are engaged or unanswered. 
Transformation from the previous product generation 
The previous design was the Vipgate concept as a whole (integrated total 
solution with fixed and mobile). A spearhead was changing gradually to a 
one phone concept82  with the MobiCentrex product. However, there were 
no reliable and user-friendly tools for an attendant [a Switchboard 
operator] and the full functionality of mobile PBX was lacking. This was 
the reason why the large business segment was lagging behind in terms of 
mobility solutions, whereas the full mobile concept was gaining credibility 
in the SME segment. In the market there was also a situation that only a 
little over a half of the organizations in Finland had invested in employee 
reachability (Finnish voice systems, 2005, Netwise Oy, in Sonera’s 
Communications Solution product material), so there was room to 
improve reachability solutions. 
At the launch Sonera’s Communications Solution, management saw the 
following aspects to be important. The diffusion of mobile phones in 
Sonera’s B2B segment was perceived and enhanced in the market with 
Sonera’s Communication Solution. In addition, the transition to IP and 
getting rid of a circuit switched voice (PSTN) was seen as providing 
internal cost savings; there would be a transition either to mobile (small 
                                                   
82 It was beneficial for customers and eventually to telcos (due cost savings) to 
have either a mobile or a fixed phone, not both, though both phone types existed/ 
exist in companies. 
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companies) or IP-based traffic (large companies’ IP-based company 
subscriptions, e.g. Sonera Business Voice Access). Sonera created the 
technological change in the industry, when it created a robust switching 
tool for attendants, called a Merex service. Merex was Sonera’s 
homegrown product/service. 
Sensing 
The sensing was led by listening to customers and observing market 
needs. A marketing innovation took place (a service bundle), which was 
based on developing customer companies’ credibility and brand in the 
market, when their reachability was in order. Sonera’s middle 
management realized that separate products could acquire synergy if they 
were marketed as a bundle. Functional benefits also emerged. The focus 
was shifting from costs to effects (e.g., staff reachability, for example 
integrating electronic calendar systems into attendant services). The 
earlier products were also used when creating synergy. MobiCentrex and 
the Cid company number service were linked to the Sonera 
Communications Solution. Management also sensed that if Sonera’s 
Communications Solution were not started, it would not be credible to 
offer the customer a development path toward full mobility. The key plan 
for Sonera’s Communications Solution was to integrate an attendant 
service into the full mobile environment or if a customer had both fixed 
subscriptions and mobiles, to both of these environments. 
The customer need was clear and the industry needed the new 
functionality. 
 
“Sonera’s Communications Solution also made it possible for large companies to 
achieve full or near full mobilization. It fulfilled the promise of “full mobility” 
because mobiles could then be totally integrated into the company’s call 
switching functionality. Before that, the full mobile concept was credible only in 
the SME segment. But after the service a LCC [Large Corporate Customers] 
segment was truly going to be mobilized. The concept was good in the sense also, 
that it was difficult for competitors to copy. Sonera’s Communications Solution 
never got the attention it deserved because the Swedish didn’t understand that 
LCC would abandon the fixed subscriptions, and because they didn’t have it in 
Sweden, they didn’t want to understand it” (Informant 2, Quote 5). 
Seizing 
There was important technological progress in technology developed by 
Sonera (Linux based Merex technology), which evolved into improved 
usability of the service. 
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“Before Sonera’s Communications Solution attendant could switch a call to 
mobile but the calls never returned. This might sound a minor thing but actually 
it was a big issue because companies told us we can’t increase our mobility if you 
can’t fix this attendant functionality for mobile. After this service, the fixed lines 
amount reduced further and mobility increased” (Informant 2, Quote 6) 
 
Sonera’s Communications Solution was a strategic product in Enterprise 
Networking Solutions (ENS) (in the business unit, it was constantly the 
topmost of ten prioritized projects). The focus of the ENS unit was to 
create integrative B2B products, between the mobile and more consumer-
type bulk products’ units, such as consumer services units. The 
productization took two years and the product was launched in 2004. 
Challenges in creating the project were numerous, and included 
cooperation with product silos and the customer trainer not always 
having enough information about the integration world. In delivery and 
maintenance systems there was no single system where the product was 
manageable. Moreover, interest groups observed it was hard to 
understand different versions and the key differences between them. 
However, despite the previous challenges, the internal management 
environment at that time supported the creation of an integrated product 
offering (despite the merger with Telia). A new organization was created, 
where B2B mobile and fixed voice were housed in the same organization. 
In that way synergy emerged and a new “success application,” a product 
bundle (convergence product) comprising MobiCentrex, the Cid company 
number service and Sonera’s Communications Solution was introduced. 
 
“The business driver in Sonera’s Communications Solution was the integration of 
current fixed and mobile business worlds, the protection of fixed network 
profitability and increase in mobility, because at that time mobile voice was 
clearly profitable” (Informant 2, Quote 7). 
 
“MobiCentrex supported by Sonera’s Communications Solution was a radical 
technological transition” (Informant 4, Quote 3). 
 
In Finland, Sonera’s Communication Solution eventually became a 
significant success in the market. 
 
“In the late 1990s, MobiCentrex came but it didn’t take off. But, technology 
houses adopted the service in 2000s. Then came the big organization change— 
fixed and mobile came together and a marketing innovation was developed. That 
meant the cross selling of the Cid Company number service and MobiCentrex. 
This brought credibility for corporations, MobiCentrex suited a certain size of 
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company, but the attendant’s tools were missing. Then the innovation of how to 
combine current robust fixed-line attendants and MobiCentrex was developed as 
Sonera’s Communications Solution, which executed the integration” (Informant 
15, Quote 3). 
 
Sonera’s Communications Solution did not receive the appreciation from 
the Swedish organization, because in the Swedish market it was hard to 
understand that complete mobility was also an option for the large 
business segment. There were also fears in the Finnish organization, that 
the product’s strategic importance in Finland would be jeopardized. 
The resulting dominant design characteristics 
The manifestation of the dominant design was that there was significant 
penetration of Sonera’s Communication Solution integrated into Sonera’s 
mobile subscriptions; competitors tried to follow later. Moreover, strong 
convergence product innovation emerged between MobiCentrex, the Cid 
company number service, and Sonera’s Communications Solution. The 
key dominant design product specification was to have up-to-date 
information on the person being called, and on incoming and returning 
calls, and calls switched to mobile phones that were returned to the PBX 
attendant if unanswered. The specification that defined the architecture 
was Sonera’s Merex [Sonera’s software product] and Merex mobile 
products, which were an in-house development. At that time competitors 
struggled to copy it. In addition, the dominant logic in the market shifted 
with Sonera’s Communications Solution product, the new dominant logic 
turned out to be one end terminal policy. That policy meant customers 
could offer either mobile phones or fixed phones to their workers, and not 
necessarily both end terminals. 
Transforming (to the following product generations)  
New competences emerged during the product’s life cycle. 
 
“In Sonera’s Communications Solution new competences have emerged: how to 
integrate contact management and the MobiCentrex service platform. And from 
the sales side, how to communicate and rollout change projects, the identification 
of user groups and their profiles, and how to manage voice traffic” (Informant 15, 
Quote 2). 
 
During the period (2004–2010) the Sonera Attendant solution was 
developed into a marketing concept. That concept also involved other 
products being sold; namely Sonera IP (Internet Protocol) Voice 
solutions, terminal device services, and phone leasing. Currently the 
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service is in use, but it is also offered as an element of the Unified 
Communications service. 
 
Table 21. Transformation, sensing, and seizing phase building blocks in  Sonera’s 
Communications Solution. 
 
Building blocks   
Transforming 
from previous product 
generations  
Sensing  Seizing 
Previous Dominant 
logic in industry/ 
company. Earlier, hybrid 
products were not 
available; products were 
either mobile or fixed 
business. Sonera’s 
middle management 
believed that usage of 
mobile phones would 
increase in the business 
segment, if the usability 
and reliability of the 
mobile switching function 
increased to create a 
robust hybrid service 
(because large 
companies were not yet 
ready to give up fixed 
voice PBXs). 
Convergence creation 
in company. Sonera 
created convergence 
with Attendant 
functionality. The 
communication solution 
fully integrated mobile 
and fixed voice 
communication 
(including the crucial 
Attendant functionality). 
Market change in 
industry. Full mobility 
was starting to acquire 
the confidence of the 
market, i.e. mobile is as 
capable as fixed voice in 
attendant solutions. 
Technology change in 
industry. Sonera 
created the technology 
change in industry. 
Sonera had R&D 
capability that made 
possible the creation of 
Merex- an internal 
technology to bridge 
fixed and mobile 
switches and attendant's 
tools. 
 
Regulation in 
industry. A 
business 
segment service, 
so not a 
regulated 
product. 
Source of 
innovation. 
Market feedback 
was used. The 
business idea 
was the one 
phone concept, 
meaning 
customers could 
have either fixed 
phone or mobile, 
and switching 
functionality 
could exist in 
both concepts 
complemented 
with an attendant 
solution 
developed in-
house. The firm 
sensed that the 
switching 
functionality was 
inadequate in 
mobiles at the 
time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standards in industry. 
Sonera’s own in-house standard was 
developed, a crucial element in the 
service. Network effects.  Customers 
could also outsource the attendant 
management to third parties. In 
customer companies silo technologies 
(i.e., separate services) were 
integrated. Earlier usage of separate 
products increased. 
Complementary assets. Sonera 
created a successful marketing 
innovation to sell a product bundle: 
Cid, MobiCentrex and Sonera’s 
Communications Solution products. 
Production across product silos worked 
smoothly, despite the silo structure of 
Sonera at that time. 
Modularity management. A solution 
was built that had modules a customer 
could choose. No aggressive migration 
in customers' solutions were pursued, 
on the contrary customers could 
choose their own migration path to 
service releases, i.e., hybrids in this 
case. That policy was considered 
successful for the incumbent Sonera at 
that time. 
Firm structure. A closed vertical mode 
was used, though some parts of the 
service were provided by 
subcontractors. 
Ecosystem/Partners. Very successful 
product that helped to regain a brand 
and impart confidence to Sonera in the 
business segment. Sonera convinced 
customers of its capabilities in creating 
hybrid convergent services (the 
customer could use fixed, mobile, or 
both technologies). 
Innovation type. New technology to 
current customers. 
Technological competences. The 
competences demonstrated were 
internal technology development with 
interface technologies between fixed 
and mobile voice, attendant and 
company’s directories. 
Appropriability for Sonera (and 
telcos). A price premium was possible, 
no substitutes existed at first. Elisa 
followed two years later. 
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4.1.11 Unified Communications 
 
Background 
From a technology perspective, Unified Communications (UC) was driven 
by the adoption of Internet Protocol. UC is the name given to the attempt 
by enterprises to bring all their disparate modes of communications 
together in a managed way, with one client, through software 
communications applications (Gartner, 2007). Essentially, telecoms and 
collaborating software players would be merging telecommunications and 
Internet in this attempt (OVUM, 2007, Financial Times, 2010, Gartner, 
2007). 
UC was a mindset of integrating communication (telecoms) and the IT 
world―not just a single product: 
 
“Maybe the technological change could be that we are moving into packet-based 
transmission and it opens the market, we are not so closed anymore and there 
will be other players, which partly opens up the industry. The progress in packet-
switched technology enhances the development; there will be more value-added 
players besides a telecom operator, and it increases the risk that operators will 
drift toward or voluntarily move to the bit-pipe role” (Informant 2, Quote 8). 
 
Thus, UC was reflecting what the most challenging customers were 
demanding in the B2B market. However, at the outset, UC was not an 
area very familiar to telecom operators: 
 
“The most demanding customer case today is based on communication with 
presence information and communication as a total solution, what is then being 
sought? A mobile solution, fixed voice solution, customer service solution, voice 
attendant solution; Unified Communications brings demands with regard to 
what one wants to do, how one wants to communicate. Instant messaging, UC 
client to softphone, how e-mail is to be integrated, where one takes presence 
information. Microsoft is leading the discussion today; 80% of mail platforms are 
Microsoft’s, but there will be other platforms as well” (Informant 16, Quote 9). 
 
“These cases are difficult in a large business segment, for example CRM when we 
know that Sonera isn’t an application integrator, also new kinds of flat rate 
pricings are popular, but traditional billing processes are still the majority in 
Sonera” (Informant 40, Quote 1). 
 
Indeed, according to the OVUM (2007) report (p.8), the development of 
UC involved overlapping interests for telecom vendors and IT players. 
Telecom operators started producing IP-based voice in the 1990s, as well 
  Analysis 
192 
 
as audio and videoconferencing, but at lower quality than in their 
traditional PSTN networks. The IP-based voice was considered to be 
associated with Unified Communications. At the same time, IT players 
such as Lotus and IBM created and used the emerging collaboration 
techniques over the web, such as instant messaging or remote control of 
PCs. An example of a service that integrates both areas (IT and telecom) is 
IP-PBX and the related IP Voice. 
Transformation from previous product generations 
The previous design and logic in communications was a ‘one device 
policy’, which was manifested in Sonera’s Communications Solution. The 
UC development would mean a shift from end terminal based 
communication to user-based communication. Technological issues 
meant it was not previously seen as possible to integrate the voice traffic 
of the Microsoft OCS 2007 [Office Communications System] to the 
external PSTN network or—in a user-friendly way—to integrate different 
communication channels into one channel. Convergence was present in 
UC: new players, new sectors and new types of vendors entered the 
telecommunications’ value chain (Kenney and Pon, 2011; Sonera interim 
report, 2009). 
Convergence was present in UC: new players, new sectors and new types 
of vendors entered the telecommunications’ value chain (Kenney and 
Pon, 2011; Sonera interim report, 2009). 
Unified Communications can be explained as a continuum during the 
period 1992–2012, as shown in Figure 16. 
 
 
Figure 16.   Evolution of communications. (Reconstructed from interviews and case 
histories). 
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Figure 16 depicts the evolution of the offerings. They evolved from a 
product domain owned by customers to a service domain operated by 
service operators on behalf of customers. The important thing in product 
life cycle management was the transition from terminal thinking to 
service thinking. Eventually, UC would be described as the last part of this 
communications continuum or life cycle. 
 
“Now, in turn, it is so that with unified communication the user interface is 
unified, the relevant end user device is used, be it mobile phone, PC or laptop, or 
whatever” (Informant 15, Quote 5). 
Sensing 
The sensing sources of UC were centered on market feedback. UC was at 
the intersection of old and new offerings, and with old and new customer 
bases (Gartner 2007, 2008b, 2011c; OVUM, 2007). 
 
“UC product development has started from the needs of middle management and 
markets. Finland is above all dominated by Microsoft and it has had its own 
message of what is to be done, so we had this idea about UC facets and started to 
develop how we could integrate them into office communication. Companies 
think UC and they are interested, but whether there is the ability to fully move to 
total IP-services from networks is uncertain. There are the IT houses and telecom 
houses as the producers of the UC service. Nevertheless we must also remember 
that traditional PSTN networks are very large and still important. For example in 
Sweden there is a totally different situation in traditional voice services than 
there is in Finland and the customers are reluctant to put all their eggs in one 
basket. The situation today is a hybrid, we have fixed PBX and mobile and unified 
communications connected” (Informant 15, Quote 4) 
 
At a grassroots level, customers wanted better usability and UC 
functionality. Partner management was seen to be more important than it 
had been previously. IT houses, Microsoft and IBM were especially 
important, because the operator had to link the operator offering with the 
IT offering, which had up until then been provided mainly by IT houses. 
The most important thing in the sensing phase (2008) was the idea that 
“all will be converged.” This meant that first the circuit switched fixed 
voice would be integrated with mobile voice, and then this entity would be 
integrated with fixed voice IP (VoIP). Then this entity (VoIP) would be 
integrated with the company’s IT systems and index of persons. In 
addition, messaging (e-mail and instant messaging) would be needed in 
the same entity. Finally, an effective Unified Interface (UI) for the whole 
communications solution would be needed. The converged environment 
was challenging, and Sonera saw some benefit in terms of legislative 
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regulation, when it could offer the voice services with the required call 
ticketing (as this was not possible for players who had no telecom 
infrastructure). 
Seizing 
Different products were gradually productized in Sonera into the UC 
realm, under the name Sonera VIP. The technological solution behind 
Sonera VIP was as follows: a software client was added to the computer 
and mobile phones; a firm could influence the reachability of its workers 
and there were now attendant services in the mobile area. In this way, UC 
brought business benefits to customers in the form of cost savings and 
better cooperation. The most important thing from the user point of view 
is the service, not the network for data transfer or the technology. Sonera 
also offered UC services from its networks and this meant that customers 
were not required to make extra investments. 
The UC productization project was complicated; including many formal 
vendor evaluations, different standards, three organizational changes, 
many internal political conflicts, and different objectives in the 
technology, business and product dimensions. It was also considered that 
the top management was not fully committed to the project. There were 
agreement negotiations where the middle management was on their own 
crusade to have a new type of vendor to implement the service (while 
earlier vendors were the known incumbents, Ericsson etc.). Also, the 
cooperation and persuasion of the ‘old’ units, especially the mobility unit 
in Sweden (and to some extent, the broadband unit), was seen to be very 
difficult. However, at the same time, the relations with Sonera’s external 
partners were seen to be very smooth and professional. The project took 
about two years. 
The goal of the project was to productize an internet-based, rich unified 
Sonera Communications Solution package for SME companies, to replace 
the bulk of Sonera’s earlier services. These services were MobiCentrex, the 
Sonera Communications Solution, Privatel, Corporate Call, Opal (fixed 
Centrex service), and the reachability services forming part of the Cid 
Company Number Service. Under UC, a customer would pay a monthly 
fee per user. The earlier services, to be replaced, were based on volume 
based billing. In other words, there were many old communications 
infrastructure applications that were to be displaced with new UC 
technology, displacing proprietary telecom infrastructure. 
 
“We now have a technological turning point which the dominant design is offered 
to customers. We already had unified messaging in the late 1990s, which 
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indicated that e-mail, voicemail and fax are to be integrated into the same end 
device” (Informant 2, Quote 9). 
 
Internal business management was seen to be a huge challenge in the 
productization of Unified Communications Interviews, internal project 
management material): 
 
“The UC project started with IES time and it was run by the broadband division, 
Sonera VIP was the commercial product. The internal fight over whether we 
would be allowed to implement it and if it would harm the mobile business was 
huge—a typical discussion in Telia. The selling of UC was a big thing for the 
Swedes, but when other players were moving and customers wanted it, finally it 
was understood (including by the Swedes) that something must be done. Then 
there were discussions over whether a net based system was okay, and it took 6 
months conversation to decide who would offer the product. This was an 
integrative product sitting between mobility and broadband, and then there was 
an agreement that broadband would offer these kinds of integrative products” 
(Informant 2, Quote 10). 
 
An internal product matrix pinpointing the UC target segment is 
presented below in Figure 17. 
 
 
Figure 17.   UC- Attractive offering area. (ComSol Product Strategy. 2008. Sonera 
internal material). 
 
Figure 17 presents the technologies on a horizontal axis and the way voice 
solutions are offered to customers. The CPE (Customer Premises 
Equipment) and Fixed Voice offering was the starting point. The 
attractive offering area, which was seen as the target, was the net based 
unified communication offerings. 
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The next quotations illustrate how Unified Communications would 
bridge many themes: partner management, ecosystem building, 
convergence and cost saving in networks, and new kinds of capabilities 
demands. Partner management was seen to be more important than it 
had been previously. 
 
“In UC innovation, beneficial partners are important. For example, we cooperate 
with Microsoft and IBM and also in this area we develop our own technology on 
the SME side. UC will bring big vendors heavily into play, we must know what 
they are offering and have good relations and cooperation, the world isn’t ready 
in this UC world. We could say that Microsoft has their contacts with customers 
and possibly some sort of dominant design, but they don’t have the network and 
connections, they always need a partner. Who wins the game is the player who 
can influence the customer with a suitable partner network and the winning 
player could also be Google” (Informant 16, Quote 10). 
 
“With regard to the customer, UC means diluting the technological difference in 
production more and more and it is going to convergence (data, mobile, fixed 
voice) but in smaller steps that had been thought. There has been research on 
convergence for at least 20 years, that mobile and Internet will converge and old 
structures will collapse, but we still have a big Mobile business and big 
unconnected Internet business. However, in the transition area things are 
happening in an evolutionary way, the big idea is, for example that when the 
mobile business is in IP (Internet Protocol), then the machines are closer to each 
other inside the company” (Informant 38, Quote 1). 
 
With the UC offering, in 2010, Sonera would finally have OCS (Microsoft’s 
product, Office Communications System) functionality, integrating IT and 
telecom. The partner chosen to deliver the solution, Telepo, was different 
and more agile than the other, incumbent, vendors. 
Unified Communications was both one entity and it had important 
separate telecom elements. IP networks were important in the creation of 
services but also from a cost optimization viewpoint. There were, 
however, contradictions in terms of identifying the strengths of telecom 
operators in UC. 
 
“UC is linked to our production vertically. The UC is so critical to us so even these 
standards like Microsoft solutions are used in our production. And we are not 
making these UC solutions from the cloud [Cloud Computing] in this stage, if 
ever. Still, of course, the buyer and IT director want to have follow up 
information on how their UC investment is doing and report that to their 
organization” (Informant 40, Quote 3) . 
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“An operator has two clear benefits from the UC offering: we have experience of 
how to attach terminal devices and manage them in offerings, and the regulation 
requires call ticketing, login info, routing information, and this is the operators’ 
area” (Informant 40, Quote 4). 
 
There were threats in the industry at the connectivity layer, that some 
player other than a telecom operator would have the key resources. There 
has been discussion concerning a revenue model between telecom 
operators and IT players and the possible role changes. Operators were 
seen as having a bit-pipe role83. 
 
“In principle, UC is made in IP networks, if we look at it as a voice application. 
UC is one way to do IP VoIP Centrex, which means its own address jungle is built 
inside an IP network. The network built creates value-added services with 
different servers wherein the control gateway is the key element. The gateway 
takes control and defines what services are to be used and where to get them, 
even from the network layer. The gateway can also be operated by Google or 
Skype. It must be noted, however, that there is a law of the jungle in these 
servers, despite which the operator must offer legacy subscriptions, and in that 
case, the operator does not make money from the value-added services. The 
positive aspect is that there will be cost savings in the future when all the traffic, 
also mobile, goes to IP, which means packet-switched traffic” (Informant 24, 
Quote 3). 
The resulting dominant design characteristics 
Sonera’s old products (MobiCentrex, Sonera’s Communications Solution, 
Privatel, Corporate Call, Opal [fixed Centrex service], and the reachability 
services that formed part of the Cid Company Number Service) were to be 
replaced with UC, and in this sense, UC actually represented a new design 
and logic to provide services and define what elements would be 
converged. In addition, the ecosystem and the customers’ buying habits 
were moving toward buying the products as a service (shared standard 
services), which meant Sonera offered and operated these services from 
its network. 
However, the definition of what UC was, was not standardized. The UC 
concept could be restricted to voice communications only, or extend to 
office communications (including e.g., e-mail). A loose definition 
provided by Gartner (2011, p.3) was: “Familiar technologies, such as 
telephony, messaging and conferencing, are being supplemented by 
rapidly developing communications applications based on fast-moving 
                                                   
83 A way of expressing Telecom Company offers only capacity, not value-added 
services. 
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networking technologies (such as presence and Session Initiation 
Protocol [SIP]) that will facilitate UC and enhance the role of 
communications in automating business processes”. 
Transforming (to following product generations) 
At the time of the present case analysis (2010), UC was offered widely in 
the telecom/ICT industry. However, there were many standards and 
definitions of the concept regarding the scope of the service. Accordingly, 
the possible transformation to the following product generations was 
conditional on the de facto standard that was still being formed. 
Table 22 summarizes the transforming, sensing, and seizing phases 
building blocks. 
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Table 22.   Transformation, sensing, and seizing activities in  Unified Communications. 
 
 
 
 
 
Building blocks   
   
Transforming 
from previous product 
generations 
Sensing Seizing 
Previous dominant logic in 
industry/company. Earlier, 
many dominant logics on how 
to integrate mobile, data, 
voice and user interfaces in 
corporate communications 
were in place. The emerging 
dominant logic in industry 
dictated that corporate 
communications would be 
fully internet-based. Sonera’s 
middle management saw the 
redesign need of the 
corporate communications 
offering. The need was to 
offer net based, and bundled 
pricing per user. This was a 
new business model, 
necessary in order to be 
competitive in the market. 
Convergence creation in 
company. Interfaces were 
built between IT systems and 
the PSTN network. IP 
networks offered capacity to 
all services. The challenges 
lay in creating service 
convergence above the IP 
transmission layer, e.g., in the 
usability of services. 
Market change in industry. 
Changing buying habits in 
B2B sourcing (e.g., earlier 
telecommunications sourcing 
as a separate function from IT 
sourcing) would need to 
change. Alliances and 
cooperative arrangements 
emerged between telcos, 
vendors, and system 
integrators (e.g., IBM, HP, 
Tieto). 
Technology change in 
industry. Data storage 
technologies capacity and 
software programming skills 
progressed. These enabled IT 
players to provide cloud 
computing services (i.e., 
producing telecom services 
substituting proprietary 
telecom technologies). 
 
Regulation in 
industry. UC 
was a 
Business 
segment 
product. It was 
not regulated, 
although some 
legislative 
norms existed. 
These were, 
e.g., call 
ticketing. 
Source of 
innovation. 
Sonera’s 
middle 
management 
found out “all” 
would be 
converged. 
Middle 
management 
identified a 
need for the 
service from 
customers. 
Equipment 
vendors 
started to have 
IP-based 
PBXs. There 
was also 
pressure from 
competitors 
that had UC 
solutions 
earlier than 
Sonera. New 
business 
models were 
found (i.e., 
bundled 
services pay 
per user) in 
order to 
compensate 
for the 
declining 
revenues from 
old business 
services. 
 
 
 
 
 
Standards in industry. 
Many standards existed in parallel; these 
would be used but they did not create the 
service as such. Telecom operators were 
forced to learn about IT houses’ offerings, 
and standard interfaces were built (e.g., 
Microsoft standards). 
Network effects.  Limited in Sonera. 
Hybrid solutions between old PBX-centric 
solutions and UC needed to be built, in 
order to have full network based offerings. 
Complementary assets. These were 
limited. Complementary assets in 
production existed in Sonera, but there 
was little support from top management to 
middle management. Product silos were 
still present in Sonera (especially in 
Swedish mobile and broadband areas). 
Further, Sonera was still learning how to 
sell service packages (exemplified by 
questions such as what part is UC and 
what part is other telecom infrastructure). 
Modularity management. Sonera tried to 
learn how to manage its customers’ total 
solution (consisting of separate services). 
Sonera tried to develop routines related to 
IT systems. 
Firm structure. IP (Internet protocol) 
opens up the telecom firms (Sonera) and 
their product structures (i.e., players other 
than telecom operators could also offer 
UC). 
Ecosystem/Partners. Management of 
partnerships, sales and marketing costs 
became important. UC solutions were 
produced with IT players. 
Innovation type. New technology to 
current and new customers. 
Technological competences. The 
competences were net based solutions, 
billing systems, and the integration of 
current and new technologies 
Appropriability for Sonera (and telcos). 
Telecom earnings were threatened. The 
operator tried to offer value-added 
services (rather than acting as a mere “bit 
pipe”) by having control of the control 
gateway in a transmission network. The 
gateway defined what services and what 
prices were offered (as IT players such as 
Google were also interested in this). The 
way of communicating was also moving to 
a partly off-line form (e.g., Facebook 
messaging), replacing telecom companies’ 
preferred form of communications, that is, 
real-time online communication (e.g., 
calling and SMS). 
 
  Analysis 
200 
 
 
4.2 Analysis of the nature of dominant designs and their 
evolution (answers to research questions) 
 
The lifecycle of the telecom industry as a whole is considered when 
analyzing the evolution of dominant designs, and also the lifecycles of the 
different sub-industries84  (Appendix 13). When I draw analyses and offer 
propositions, I elaborate on the appropriate level of analysis (i.e. industry, 
sub-industry or product lifecycle, and the particular stage of the cycles). 
I discuss the findings in relation to research questions 1-3. Research 
question 1 was as follows: What sources of innovation and what processes 
are related to (a) a multi-product firm’s successful management of its 
dominant designs and (b) successful transformation from one dominant 
design to the next? I elaborate on the sensing (sources of innovation), 
seizing and transforming activities in Sonera—and how these activities 
varied across more or less successful cases. Finally, with regard to the 
activities and building blocks of the transforming phase I focus on how 
the company moved from one dominant design to another within the 
product (development) cases. 
                                                   
84 For the purposes of this study, the concept of sub-industry has two 
meanings. First, telecommunications, being so extensive, is commonly divided 
into different product areas called sub-industries (e.g., OECD, EITO). Second, 
hierarchical networks of sub-industries are common in technological systems, 
such as “microprocessors, graphic processors, and software” in PCs (Dedehayir 
and Mäkinen, 2011, p.629). The following telecommunications sub-industries are 
referred to in this study, each of which has its own life cycle (Appendix 13): 1) 
B2B data services with the following products: DataNet, FastNet, TeleSampo, and 
TeleSampo Internet service; 2) B2B integrated voice solutions with the following 
products: the 9700 and 9800 service numbers, Corporate number (CID), 
Mobicentrex, Sonera Communication solutions, the Vipgate concept, Vipgate 
VPN; and 3) Mobile Internet with the following products: Mobile iPhone and 
Sonera Zed; Mobile services with the following products: GSM, NMT-450, NMT-
900. Unified Communications constitutes a new industry that includes all the 
above sub-industries. The sub-industries have their own lifecycles, although this 
sometimes coincides with the industry lifecycle. Hence, the only difference 
between sub-industries and industries and their related lifecycles is the level of 
analysis. I derived the sub-industry lifecycle stages by analyzing legislative 
regulation, the market structure, the number of companies, the emergence of 
standards, cost structures and levels, turnover, volumes, and price levels. 
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The second research question was: What are the relative roles of the 
sources of innovation in the successful adaptation of dominant designs 
and their ‘building blocks’ in terms of a) the process, and b) how they 
change over time? I elaborate on how these sources have shifted over 
time, and on the course of the adaptation process (VSR). I then develop a 
framework for the adaptation of dominant designs, grounded on the 
present empirical cases and their cross-validation with earlier theory and 
literature. Next I discuss the relative role of sources of innovation in 
successful adaptation. In conclusion I analyze the relationships between 
the building blocks, also elaborating on the concept of convergence. 
Finally, research question 3 was: What role does the nature of products 
as complex technological systems play in dominant-design adaptation 
processes and outcomes? I analyze how the relationships between the 
innovations are related together infrom a longitudinal view perspective 
(i.e., a portfolio analysis) including. This section is organized to analyzing 
the technological sources of technologies (included in the sources of 
innovations), the capabilities in Sonera, and the relevant legislative 
regulation. The following chapter section, includes a portfolio analysis of 
technology development and innovation types, and discusses the nature 
of complex technological systems and ambidexterity in the management 
of dominant designs. 
 
4.2.1 RQ1: What sources of innovation and what processes are 
related to (a) a multi-product firm’s successful management of 
its dominant designs and (b) successful transformation from 
one dominant design to the next? 
 
I begin this section by recalling which cases of dominant-design 
adaptation in the multi-product firm Sonera were successful, and which 
were not. This provides a basis on which to analyze successful sensing, 
seizing, and transforming in Sonera. I then proceed to analyze the 
successful transformations. 
First I show how the cases are classified as successes or failures. I 
include the success metrics of the cases, and discuss what types of 
innovations Sonera created modified and adopted in the telecom industry 
lifecycle.85  
                                                   
85 Technologies were developed during the introduction period (1980-1995), 
and the regulator did not allow full competition. The industry grew strongly in 
terms of volumes and players during the growth period (1996-2001), and 
competition was further liberalized. The number of players stabilized during the 
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mature period (2002-2007), and new product offerings were minor as far as the 
industry was concerned. Finally, new technology enabled more players from 
adjacent fields to enter the telecommunications industry during the new 
introductory period (of the industry) (2007-2010). The players in this (ICT) 
market are telecom operators, IT houses, and vendors. In addition, I have 
classified the industry life cycle as Closed (1980-1992), Semi-closed  (1993-2001), 
and Open (2002-2010). 
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Products and services86   in the lower case are failures and in the UPPER 
CASE are successes. I base my classification of the cases as a dominant 
design or not on the empirical narrative in the relevant sections on 
dominant-design characteristics in Chapter 4. I determine success in 
terms of three facets: 1) whether standard product architecture emerged 
on Sonera's market (1=yes, 0=no), 2) the degree of new-product 
profitability for Sonera, scale 0-1 (1=success, very successful), and 3) the 
degree of new-product advantage, scale 0-1 (1=success, far superior) 
(Harmancioglu et al., 2009). The cases include three innovation types: 1) 
created by Sonera in-house (local endogenous innovation) (9700, 
DataNet, FastNet, Privatel, Cid, the Vipgate concept, MobiCentrex, ZED, 
Communication Solution), 2) modified by Sonera from innovations 
created outside the company (local exogenous innovation), (9800, 
Vipgate VPN, TeleSampo, TeleSampo Internet, and Unified 
Communications), and 3) adopted/copied and implemented by Sonera 
(GSM, iPhone) (Global exogenous innovation). The last column, 
innovation type, uses Abernathy and Clark’s (1985) typology. 
I adopt the view that the industry lifecycle is external to dominant 
designs, a that view has attracted little attention in the discussion 
(Anderson & Tushman, 1990), although Klepper (1996, 1997) mentions it. 
In addition, Sonera created different innovation types at all life-cycle 
stages. This contradicts Abernathy and Clark’s (1985) view that dominant 
designs emerge only after architectural and revolutionary innovations. 
Sources of innovation and processes associated with the successful 
adaptation of dominant designs  
Sources of innovation. In order to determine the kind of processes that 
are related to a multi-product firm’s successful management of dominant 
designs, I integrate adaptation processes on the company level with the 
analysis of the industry lifecycle. These dominant-design-specific 
processes include the sources of innovation and the processes as set out in 
the sensing, seizing, and transforming (Teece, 2007) tables in the case 
study. The relevant sensing, seizing and transforming elements are 
manifested in the capabilities, organizational structures, processes, and 
managerial cognition (dominant logic) that strengthened or restrained the 
                                                   
86 For the purposes of illustrating differences in the environmental context and 
in how dominant designs were adapted (through creation, modification or 
adoption) I retain GSM, Sonera ZED and iPhone in the analysis: all three are 
discussed with regard to the history of Sonera/the industry. However, I do not 
analyze them in detail as cases (i.e. .Teece’s (2007) typology of sensing, seizing 
and transforming in Chapter 6). 
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adaptation of the dominant design. I elaborate next on the multi-product 
firm’s sources of innovation and processes in its management of 
dominant designs. Sources of innovation refer to innovative ideas in the 
sensing phase, and processes to activities in the seizing and transforming 
phases. 
Sensing activities include identifying new information and its scope. 
Scope, in turn, refers to global or local reach, in other words how novel 
the new information, or ideas, are in relation to the company’s current 
activities and business (e.g., McGrath et al., 1992). 
As the case descriptions in Chapter 4 show, Sonera had different sources 
of innovation, especially regarding the various product-development 
ideas adopted in the sensing phase. These ideation sources included the 
company’s own applied R&D activities, scientific markets and customers, 
investor and industry interests, top-management’s visions, and vendors. 
Sonera used many sources at the same time, but also on occasions 
emphasized certain sensing sources. Table 24 analyzes the sensing 
sources in the cases. 
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The sources of innovation are classified in the table 24 as follows: 1= 
source of ideas in question not used/relevant; 7=source of ideas in 
question crucial for the innovation.  
As is visible in the table 24, first of all, Sonera used the widest variety of 
sources (exogenous scientific inventions, internal R&D and selected 
technologies, new types of vendors, and market and investor needs) in the 
DataNet and Fastnet cases. In turn, sensing market needs together with 
top-management interest were especially important in the Vipgate 
concept. The main innovation sources in TeleSampo and MobiCentrex 
were R&D activities and developing standards, whereas in the Zed case 
the sensing focused on investor interest and top-management vision. 
In the following I elaborate on the possible enablers of success/failure in 
the cases. First, the innovation may be created in the R&D function, and 
diffuse to the market via top management (influenced by investors) in the 
face of strong market demand, and at the same time certain of the old 
products are cannibalized. Understanding the need to maintain 
technological superiority combined with responding to a new market 
need (technological and market discontinuity) was a very powerful 
combination that led to success in the ideation of a new service concept 
without involving other functions or top management. This was the case 
with with DataNet (a new cost-efficient technology was used to meet 
emerging needs for customer networking); as it cannibalized the DataPak 
product (old limited technology). Second, the innovation may start from a 
careful evaluation of the possibilities, after which top management 
(influenced by investors and the industry) decides whether or not to enter 
the market (TeleSampo, GSM, FastNet, MobiCentrex, TeleSampo 
Internet, and Unified Communications), also investigating the company’s 
current product portfolio and any potential cannibalization of old 
business.  The key point is that the product is not allowed to enter the 
market without evaluation. Success is most likely dependent on the 
correct evaluation (by top management) of the market need and of the 
current products’ capabilities in terms of meeting the need. These 
evaluations were challenging in the failure cases (TeleSampo, 
MobiCentrex and Unified Communications). Third, the innovation may 
emerge from the vision of top management (influenced by investors), but 
there is a danger of too fast/slow growth and a lack of capabilities, which 
led in the case of Zed, for instance, to a non-optimal productization 
process and entrance into an immature market (in which the window of 
opportunity closed). Fourth, the innovation may start from the correct 
sensing of customer needs, when Top Management support and ideation 
free resources in the company. Closest to this innovation type are 
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successful products such as Vipgate, the Cid company number service, 
Sonera’s Communications Solution, VPN, and Privatel. Lastly, innovation 
type may be merely an adoptive mode when there is such a strong global 
dominant design, and technological and market demands that there is no 
choice but to adapt to it. These are potential success cases if resources 
abound in the implementation phase. The iPhone, Internet and Unified 
Communications represent these types of innovation. In this case it was 
also important to develop the ability to work with partners. However, in 
the failed UC case there were challenges in obtaining resources for the 
project. 
It seems that using many sources of innovation in the sensing process is 
typical of a large incumbent multi-product firm with many products that 
are launched at different stages in their respective industry lifecycles. 
Companies might also realize that they cannot create all their innovations 
in-house, but also need to modify existing or simply copy/implement 
external innovations. However, in terms of success/failure cases, there are 
some typical profiles to be found. 
These notions lead to the following proposition concerning the 
identified success and failure profiles in the adaptation of a dominant 
design (i.e. creation, modification or adoption). 
Proposition 1a. The successful adaptation of a dominant design 
tends to be associated with the following profiles of innovation sources: 
1) using science, internal R&D, the market, and vendors in combination, 
and 2) using the market and top management in combination. Less 
successful adaptation tends to be associated with the following profiles: 
1) using only markets & vendors, 2) using only R&D, and 3) using both 
science & internal R&D and top management & investors in 
combination. 
The implication is that it is of minor importance to its success/failure 
whether the dominant design is created, modified or adopted. However, it 
seems that a successful profile is associated with having many innovation 
sources in combination: science, internal R&D, the market and vendors. 
Fewer sources are needed in the case of modification. A further 
implication is that certain profiles facilitate the creation of dominant 
designs. With regard to profile 3 (i.e. using science & internal R&D in 
combination), which is associated with less successful cases, it may be 
challenging to anticipate the future success of the innovation when it is 
evaluated only against the company’s current offering and there is no 
market feedback. As for profile 1 (using science, internal R&D, the market 
and vendors in combination), the key was to use many sensing sources, 
and top-management influence did not seem to be necessary for 
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successful development and commercialization. In turn, using only 
market feedback and top-management support could well have been 
enough to ensure success in some cases (GSM, Privatel, VPN, and 
Vipgate): the market uncertainty might be low and the target of 
technological development might be clear. 
Proposition 1a implicitly further elaborates the dominant-design 
typology (Tegarden et. al., 1999). It directly contributes to the theoretical 
frameworks developed by Teece (2007) and McGrath et al. (1992) in 
emphasizing the importance of sensing elements and their combinations. 
I have empirically identified the success profiles, which are not analyzed 
in the above works. 
Seizing and transforming processes. Over and beyond the initial 
sources of innovation analyzed above, I now turn to the processes 
associated with the (successful) management of dominant designs in a 
multi-product firm such as Sonera – especially when it comes to seizing 
and transforming activities. 
Sonera, as a multi-product firm, relied particularly on 1) complementary 
assets, 2) firm structure (including the SBU/functional and 
vertical/horizontal options and modularity), and 3) technological 
brokering in the seizing process. In the transformation phase, in turn, 
dominant logic and convergence management were critical in successfully 
adapting to the next dominant designs. These elements are to be found in 
the theoretical framework of this study (Figure 6 in Chapter 3). Next I 
further elaborate on their role in Sonera. 
Complementary assets are typical in large incumbent organizations, 
which tend to be multi-product firms that can use them to leverage 
innovations (Stieglitz & Heine, 2007). When such assets were used 
(service numbers, Privatel, the Cid company number service, FastNet, the 
Vipgate concept, DataNet), the dominant designs were also successfully 
adapted at Sonera (i.e. created, modified or copied/implemented). 
The structure (corporate governance) of a firm delineates its boundaries 
and internal organization. Multi-product firms in which technologies are 
or should be integrated have to choose between an SBU model and a 
functional-management model. During the case-study period there was 
also a trend to open up vertically integrated structures on the horizontal 
level, which emphasized the need for modularity in the company. 
In terms of technological brokering, Sonera had many product areas in 
its home market in which it could use technologies from other markets 
(e.g., IN, routing technologies, and voice-response unit).  
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Multi-product firms typically operate according to different dominant 
logics87  in terms of which technologies, pricing models, solutions and 
level of integration, and level of technological integration to adopt in the 
new services, which could potentially also cannibalize the old business.  
Sonera actively engaged in convergence management in the successful 
creation, modification, and copying/implementing of new dominant 
designs. At best, the following facets were associated with convergence 
management: the integration of networks and value-added business 
(service numbers), the integration of the public telephone network with 
private networks (VPN), the identification of similar usage needs that 
could be served regardless of the exact technology (Privatel, 
MobiCentrex), and the exploitation of a common umbrella brand in 
promoting several technologies (the TeleGate concept including DataNet, 
FastNet and Vipgate).  
Sonera used many seizing and transforming activities in combination, 
but also on occasions in isolation. Table 25 charts the evident usage of 
seizing and transforming activities in Sonera’s different cases.   
 
                                                   
87 Conceptualized as follows: high organizational differentiation [in strong 
dominant logic]; a high degree of difference between organizational divisions in 
terms of their overall goals, marketing and production methods, and decision-
making styles. 
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The sensing and transforming activities are coded in the table 25 as 
follows: 1= the activity is not used/relevant; 7=the activity in question is 
crucial for the innovation. 
With regard to the transformation from one dominant design to 
another, the following profiles (seizing and transforming activities) 
appear to be linked with the more successful cases of adaptation. As Table 
25 above shows, the first success pattern seems to involve technological 
brokering, seizing complementary assets, and managing convergence. 
This occurred in the successful cases of 9800, 9700, DataNet, FastNet, 
and Vipgate VPN. Technological brokering was useful in implementing 
new technologies in Sonera’s market. It may be that technological 
uncertainty made it necessary to explore new technologies and their 
application areas. In addition, complementary assets were seized and 
convergence was created according to technological and user needs. 
The second success pattern included managing organizational 
differentiation (or the absence of such differentiation in the first place: cf. 
the cases in which organizational differentiation was high), seizing 
complementary assets, and having a modular structure. A modular 
structure facilitated cooperation in different parts of the organization 
under conditions of potential differentiation. This success pattern did not 
need technological brokering because the products were sensed and 
seized internally in Sonera. Moreover, the SBU/Vertical firm structure 
was used in the first and second success profiles, thereby ensuring usage 
of the company’s complementary assets. 
With regard to the less successful cases, it seems that a 
functional/vertical (MobiCentrex) or SBU/Functional/Horizontal (UC) 
firm structure with high organizational differentiation may lead to failure. 
One reason for this is the existence of different dominant logics in the 
company, thus the innovative unit is not able to seize the organization’s 
assets because it does not belong to an influential SBU. Most of the 
productization in MobiCentrex happened in the R&D unit, and there were 
limited possibilities to diffuse the service vertically because organizational 
differentiation was high. Organizational differentiation was high in UC, 
too, and the many structural forms that were used at the same time led to 
productization challenges. 
The following proposition concerning the identified success and failure 
profiles in seizing and transforming processes derives from these notions. 
Proposition 1b. The successful creation and modification of a 
dominant design tends to be associated with the following profile: using 
technological brokering and complementary assets, and managing 
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convergence creation. The successful creation and adoption of a 
dominant design tends to be associated with the following profile: 
seizing complementary assets, managing organizational differentiation, 
convergence creation, and modularity. Less successful creation and 
modification tend to be associated with organizational differentiation 
combined with a functional/vertical and SBU/functional/horizontal 
firm structure. 
The differentiating factor related to adoption/copying is that 
technological brokering is not used in copying. However, there are 
insufficient cases (GSM, iPhone) from which to draw strong conclusions, 
and the evidence was contradictory. In turn, it may be comparatively easy 
to copy dominant designs, and therefore no factors relate to corporate 
governance in the less successful cases. Proposition 1b contributes 
directly to the theoretical frameworks of Teece (2007) and McGrath et al. 
(1992) concerning the importance of seizing and transforming elements 
and their combinations. I have empirically identified the successful 
profiles, which are not analyzed in the above works. 
Successful transformation from one dominant design to the next (RQ1b) 
I will now analyze in detail the transformation of dominant designs in the 
multi-product firm, as called for in Research Question 1(b). 
I use the term ‘reciprocation’88  (Nooteboom, 2001) in the analysis. 
Transforming means changing from exploitation to exploration activities, 
understood here as shifting from an old dominant design to a new one 
(Nooteboom, 2001, 2003; Gilsing & Nooteboom, 2006). Reciprocation 
occurs between differentiation (i.e. dominant designs diffuse into new 
segments) and novel combinations (in technologies and customer needs) 
in product trials. In other words, reciprocation is the stage of creating 
hybrid products consisting of elements from previous dominant designs 
and the new one. It is when previous dominant designs collapse, namely, 
“the phase of reciprocation forms the ‘topple point’ between exploitation 
and exploration” (Gilsing & Nooteboom, ibid., p. 5). However, at some 
point these hybrids create ‘diminishing returns’, inconsistencies, and 
added complexity, and this call for architectural innovation. In sum, the 
relevance to this study is to show from a company point of view the key 
processes driving the managers of a multi-product firm towards seeking 
to replace current dominant designs with new ones. 
                                                   
88 The Oxford English Dictionary (2014) defines the term thus: “Reflexive or 
mutual action”…” interdependent action”. 
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This section analyzes the empirical cases, situations, and explanations 
in the transition from one dominant design to the next. From a 
managerial point of view, such transitions involve discarding an existing 
dominant design, and are motivated by the fact that the market no longer 
appreciates the offering, or that the company produces current offerings 
inefficiently (and could be more efficient with a new dominant design). I 
also discuss the new dominant designs that emerged.  
First I recap the empirical cases and company histories from this 
perspective: the transformation of particular dominant designs over time, 
and the shift to new designs. I then compare the key elements in the cases 
(Table 26). 
Earlier, every voice and data connection was dedicated to its own copper 
wire and technology, and that was a heavy and expensive solution. In the 
product area of data communications (FastNet and DataNet), new 
FastNet technology and the old switched technology existed in parallel. 
This case revealed that the old technology was not capable of integrating 
technologies cost-efficiently, which was motivation for Sonera’s 
management when creating (new) dominant designs. 
Sonera had technological competences that others did not have, and this 
phenomenon started to be globalized and monetized in 1998, at the start 
of the Hype period. Thousands of people were hired during the process of 
convergence in mobile and Internet technology, for example, but the 
complex organization, or overall ‘entity’, could not be managed effectively. 
Sonera’s core business (Mobile and Data) expertise was not used 
appropriately and new competences could not be acquired from the 
market. It was too big a story [mobile and Internet] too early [no usage 
culture or end-devices, and a lack of acceptance among other telecom 
players]. The old mobile business culture and the new mobile and media 
culture existed in parallel, but there was no synergy between them. In this 
case, the mobile and Internet technologies were maturing. Sonera had 
relevant technological competence, and top management was motivated 
to create a new convergent technology, mobile Internet, based on the two 
technologies. This new dominant logic, mobile Internet, identified a need 
for new technological capabilities in Sonera and the telecom industry. 
However, these capabilities did not exist and could not be created. 
Easiness of use and customer intimacy substituted technological 
expertise (many features, support of all bandwidths, speed, and 
technology) in the market for intelligent mobile phones (smartphones, i.e. 
the iPhone). The network vendor’s (network and end device) role 
diminished. The role of the network now was simply to offer cost-efficient 
capacity, because products were no longer differentiated in terms of 
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network-based facets (e.g., capacity). In turn, the usage experience was 
differentiated in the eyes of consumers in terms of services and operating 
systems. There was a transformation from technological competence to a 
new dominant logic, namely easiness of use. 
There was also separation of the physical network, services, and 
network management with the advent of INs (Intelligent Networks). The 
first virtual closed network was accomplished. In this case management 
was motivated to create a convergent offering by means of new cost-
efficient technology. 
The Cid company number service started to get too heavy over time, too. 
Consequently, many marketing and pricing innovations were adopted, 
and dedicated systems were developed (e.g., customer-care and billing 
applications). By the 2010s the number service could be produced as part 
of UC (Unified Communications), wherein UC replaced many services 
with net-based solutions. In this case, the Cid company number turned 
out to be differentiated in too many segments, and it used too many 
complementary assets. Middle management wanted to streamline, to 
offer better usability, and to integrate Cid into Unified Communications.  
The mobile-fixed integration message in Vipgate’s concept marketing 
and on the production side was also considered too heavy, and was 
gradually substituted with the new marketing message, a one-end-device 
policy. Vipgate clearly used too many complementary assets (personnel, 
marketing, and proprietary billing systems compared to revenues), and it 
integrated too many elements. Market preferences changed to favor 
simpler and more cost-efficient solutions. Sonera was also motivated to 
streamline production in one network, instead of many.  
Many earlier services were integrated into a new net-based solution, 
Unified Communications (UC), meaning that some earlier products were 
abandoned. However, challenges arose in replacing the old way of 
producing services with UC. This case revealed the mixed motivations 
among top management when transforming to integrated services. Earlier 
products had reached their technological limit, but the new emerging 
dominant logic in UC was difficult for Sonera to understand, especially for 
the Swedish managers, and there was a fear that the old revenues would 
be cannibalized. 
The analysis reveals that elements in the transition to new dominant 
designs are associated with the limits of both the old and the new 
technology (i.e. neither is optimal: see the TeleSampo and MobiCentrex 
cases), market expectations differing from the internal reality of a 
company (e.g., Zed, Unified Communications), and the product area 
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having grown too large with too many embedded elements (e.g., Cid, the 
Vipgate concept, Zed, service numbers).  
Table 26 below shows the elements that are present in the 
transformation to the next dominant design in the different Sonera cases. 
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The elements associated with creating, modifying and adopting/copying 
the next dominant designs are coded as follows: 1= the element is not 
relevant/present; 7=the element is crucial for the transformation. 
As the Table 26 indicates, the more successful cases with respect to 
shifting smoothly from one dominant design to another seem to be 
associated with the creation of products that were integrative (i.e., 
convergent with market demand) under conditions of production 
rationalization and efficient capacity creation. These elements were 
present at least in the successful cases of DataNet, FastNet, and Vipgate 
VPN. This understanding leads to the following proposition. 
Proposition 2.  The identification and implementation of the 
potential to create cost-effective products that are integrative 
(convergent) with market demand enable successful transformation 
from previous dominant designs to new ones. This is based on the 
assumption that production rationalization leads to efficient capacity 
creation.   
Two lines of inquiry are relevant to Proposition 2: research on the role of 
changing customer preferences, and on the question of when to integrate 
or disintegrate products and services. Integration is associated with 
vertical production (Cacciatori & Jacobides, 2002; Christensen et al. 
2002). According to Tripsas (2008, p.79), “preference discontinuities can 
also be the catalyst for technological transitions”, which means that 
mainstream preferences sometimes shift radically, and new technology is 
required to meet the new demands from customers. This phenomenon 
was evident in several cases: UC, Cloud Computing, and the iPhone. The 
new customer demands influenced how the products were produced and 
commercialized to customers, which in these cases meant dominant 
designs that were created successfully when integration (convergence) 
was pursued cost-efficiently. Christensen (1997) also expressed this view, 
pointing out that technology and market need have their own 
developmental paths. If and when these paths cross there is a drastic 
change in the competitive situation, potentially leaving room for 
competence-disrupting technological discontinuities to invade the 
incumbent’s market. In the above I enhance understanding of how the 
discontinuities were seen by management, and suggest elements that are 
associated in this process as well as success factors that enable smoother 
shifting between consecutive dominant designs. I also contribute to the 
discussion on industry lifecycles (e.g., Vernon), a hitherto unnoticed 
potential new stage of the industry lifecycle: cost-effectiveness and 
convergence (technologically demanding). 
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4.2.2 RQ2: What are the relative roles of the sources of innovation in 
the successful adaptation of dominant designs and their 
‘building blocks’ in terms of a) the process, and b) how they 
change over time? 
 
Sources of innovation over time 
This sub-section analyzes how the importance of different sources of 
innovation sensed at Sonera changed over time. I refer to sensing sources 
in the cases in Chapter 4.2.1 above. I have carefully interpreted in each 
case how these different elements were present. For example, all the 
sources of innovation were of equal importance in DataNet. 
Based on the sources of innovation used and sensed in the different 
cases over time (Table 24), Figure 18 summarizes the overall development 
that seemed to take place in the prevalence of different sources between 
1980 and 2010. 
 
 
 
Figure 18. Sources of innovation in Products/Market conditions, 1980-2010 
 
Figure 18 shows the extent to which various sources of innovation were 
appreciated and used in individual products. For example, the product, an 
exogenous science orientation, developments in videotex technology, and 
knowledge of building integrative networks (data and PSTN) were the 
most important sources in TeleSampo. In terms of market conditions, this 
era of exogenous science orientation was also a closed, introductory stage 
of the industry lifecycle. On the other hand, the product at the opposite 
end of the continuum, Unified Communications, manifested market 
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feedback as a source of sensing. The overall market conditions had also 
changed, and the market was open as Unified Communications and 
iPhone started a new industry lifecycle. Indeed, an exogenous science 
orientation has often been associated with the closed-company view of 
market orientation (OVUM, 2002, p.92; Fransman, 2002b), and the use 
of market feedback with the opposite view. Internal R&D and vendor 
innovation fall between the extreme points. When a product is in the 
middle in the picture it means that all the sources of innovation had 
approximately the same importance level. This was the case with DataNet 
and FastNet, for instance. 
The development was not straightforward and simple over time, as 
there were product-development cases that came back to being more 
exogenously science oriented compared to the overall trend in the market: 
the shift to a market orientation. One case in point was the Mobile 
Centrex product: the market was moving into a growth stage and 
becoming more market-oriented, but the Mobile Centrex product was 
heavily R&D-led. 
Parallel with the change in the prevalent sources of innovation, the roles 
of the telecom operator vis-à-vis suppliers and complementors (network 
hardware, terminal devices and software) changed during the period from 
1980 to 2010. Telecom operators’ previous strengths ― network-
hardware development, sourcing and network planning as a whole ― 
turned into basic competitive requirements, and ceased to be a 
differentiating factor. At the same time, R&D efforts started to focus 
mainly on software vendors. The main reasons for this were that the 
Intelligent Network (IN), Internet Protocol (IP), the Internet, and 
legislative liberalization gradually opened up (or broke) the earlier 
monopoly market of the telecom companies. This development gave 
players other than telecom operators the opportunity also to offer telecom 
services technologically, which was manifested especially in the mobile 
business as a whole (see Chapter 2.5.7 on the Industry history and the 
iPhone) and in Unified Communications. The change meant that the 
telecom operator was not necessarily developing offerings and services in-
house using its own R&D capability. 
In sum, on the basis of the empirical evidence from the cases and the 
industry history, I offer the following observations on the implications of 
changing environmental conditions for the prevalence of different sources 
of innovation. I also give a longitudinal view of the changing importance 
of the players (see Appendix 12 the coding). 
Telecom operators were driving and defining the market in 1982, and 
then there was a gradual shift in importance to terminal devices and 
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software vendors and a decline in importance of network hardware. In 
addition, the level of R&D and of its scientific importance in projects 
diminished during the case period. There was no clear pattern in the level 
of market orientation during the early period, however. 
Complementing the analysis of R&D/science and market orientation, it 
seems that the importance of standards and in-house competences 
increased over time. These (earlier) competences included network 
planning, insourcing, piloting with vendors, in-house R&D for software 
development, testing end-devices and hardware, investment 
management, revenue growth, long-term planning, customer-ownership 
activities, delivery, distribution, switching, routing, transmission, and 
access management. 
Developing a standard was close to synonymous with developing a 
product in the era of telecom monopolies, but this was no longer the case 
in the 2000s. Nevertheless, there were many standards in Unified 
Communications for example, which required cooperation, but they did 
not fully define what the product or service was. It may be that standards 
and earlier telecom competences were no longer important to the 
incumbent creating offerings (although they could have been important to 
vendors and niche players). At the same time, these (earlier) in-house 
competences of the operator diminished. 
All in all, a clearer picture of the change factors facing the incumbent 
starts to emerge. The change concerned the telecom operator and its key 
facets in terms of productization and the other players’ roles. This leads 
me to the following proposition. 
Proposition 3. In open and horizontal market conditions, when 
monopoly markets are permanently opened up as a result of 
technological progress, (a) the source of innovation underlying 
dominant designs shifts to marketing from R&D, science and standards; 
(b) the incumbents’ role diminishes; and (c) the role of vendors and niche 
players strengthens. This development is likely to happen in subsequent 
cycles of innovation in industry lifecycles, addressing the same customer 
needs. 
Some of the products included in the analysis were created solely in 
Sonera, others were modified in Sonera, and Mobile iPhone was simply 
adopted externally. Hence, Proposition 3 applies to both endogenous and 
exogenous innovations. 
In line with Proposition 3, Christensen (1997) and Christensen and 
Rosenbloom (1995) discuss changing capability requirements following 
the progression of the industry lifecycle. They further argue that R&D is 
not the only way to create offerings when an industry matures, and that 
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customers’ needs are also important. Their key point is that new entrants 
take the market over if incumbents oversupply the current market, 
because the incumbents serve the current value web and customers with 
the best possible knowledge. The above proposition adds to this argument 
the insight that the new value web is based on market orientation, thus 
suggesting a more general, organizational facet that is more important 
than the product-related features of convenience and price (Christensen, 
1997, p.121). The above findings also contrast with what Christensen et al. 
(2002) state about “pendulum” (ibid., p. 956) switching in specialized 
firms between vertical integrated management (in conditions in which the 
technology is immature) and horizontal management (in conditions in 
which the technology is mature). The present cases rather indicate that 
there may be no pendulum swing when technological change allows the 
permanent replacement of a proprietary technology to a generic customer 
(i.e. a horizontal industry structure). In other words, the pendulum is 
associated with the emergence of a new industry lifecycle. Unified 
Communications and iPhone, which were created directly in a horizontal 
industry structure, could be used as examples. 
Further, it seems to be rare for one company to progress alone over a 
long period of time (Utterback, 1996), in other words constantly creating 
dominant designs or otherwise successful innovations. This was also true 
of the case company: following the hype of the late 1990s, the process of 
creating successful innovations stagnated in the 2000s. Klepper (1996) 
found that early entrants tended to grow larger and to spend more on 
R&D (process innovations), and subsequently had a cost advantage over 
smaller players. In other words, they have lower average costs and higher 
output, and as a consequence they can spread R&D costs and show higher 
R&D productivity. However, contradicting Klepper’s (ibid) model, this 
might no longer hold true when subsequent dominant designs are being 
built. R&D has been downsized and customer-related (e.g., marketing, 
customer service, branding) and IT-procurement costs are replacing R&D 
resources in the case company. It might be more difficult to achieve 
economies of scale and cost advantage over new entrants in these areas, at 
least for incumbent telecom operators. 
The proposition also aligns well with the classic view of dominant 
design (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; Christensen & Bower, 1996) 
according to which the players’ role changes and the focus of R&D 
development shifts to vendors as the industry matures. Complementing 
this view, the present findings enhance understanding of how and why 
this change happens. 
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Dominant-design adaptation over time (variation, selection, and 
retention)  
Next I draw together the information on changes in the adaptation of 
dominant designs in the case company and industry. In so doing I rely on 
the framework of variation, selection, and retention/transformation, 
which is the classic theory addressing evolution in this context (e.g., Van 
de Ven & Poole, 1995; McGrath et. al, 1992). 
Table 27 shows the variation, selection, and retention/transformation 
from the perspectives of Sonera and the telecom/ICT industry. I draw on 
the industry and case histories, as well as on their intertwining. I use 
McGrath et al.’s (1992) typology of variation, which addresses the source 
and scope of innovation. In terms of selection, the following questions are 
the most relevant: What are the criteria in choosing the innovative ideas 
that will be productized? What kinds of technology are preferred? 
Products that are selected internally are then subject to external selection 
on the market, as they will be evaluated and adopted (or not) depending 
on the customers and the market conditions to a certain, more or less 
favorable, degree. The selected products and services are further subject 
to retention in the company and market, or they are transformed into the 
next dominant design. Table 27 also reveals the simultaneous, partly 
conflicting cognitions and practices in a company when it comes to 
retention and transforming activities. 
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Specifically, Table 27 lists Sonera’s innovations and whether they were 
endogenous or exogenous (created, modified or copied) in the case 
column. Variation refers to the source of the innovation. Detailed 
selection criteria refer to the idiosyncratic (Dierikcx & Cool, 1989) ways in 
which the projects were selected for commercialization in each time 
period, and the criteria and targets used. The column “aggregated 
selection criteria in Sonera” (in line with McGrath et. al., 1992) groups 
these activities on a more abstract and general level, whereas the column 
“selection criteria in the market” shows the criteria according to which the 
best products and telecom operators were evaluated and adopted. The 
“detailed retention activities” column (i.e. protecting the dominant 
designs) indicates how Sonera tried to protect its business model and the 
dominant designs it created, modified, or copied, whereas the “aggregated 
retention activities in Sonera” column conceptualizes these activities in 
more general terms. The last group, transforming activities, indicates 
whether, and if so how, selected products evolved into new products and 
dominant designs, possibly affecting the whole company. These activities 
may somewhat contradict the retention activities as there may be a desire 
to transform the company and its products/services, and a desire not to 
change them. The elements in the transforming activities reflect the 
previous eras, e.g., the activities in 1982-1986 reflect the activities in 
previous periods. 
What is interesting about the VSR analysis is that it facilitates the 
studying of dynamics in that the UC case starts a new industry lifecycle. 
This point has not been documented thus far, although Utterback (1996) 
refers to the possibility that the source of innovation could be more 
heavily process-based in later rounds. Tushman and Murmann (1998) 
further note that cycles of dominant design are reinitiated at the next 
technological discontinuity, but do not specify how. In addressing these 
questions here I have explicitly separated the retention and the 
transformation activities – a distinction that is only implicit in earlier 
studies (c.f. Durand, 2006, p.60, 81). 
There were clear trends in Sonera’s VSR activities in general. In terms of 
variation, Sonera created technological standards, which peaked in 1982-
1998 and raised external market expectations in the 1999-2000 period of 
hype. As a consequence, there may even have been excessive 
innovativeness, or variation activity (cf. Vesterinen, 2009, pp. 141, 145). 
Such activities diminished in later periods, partly due to the 
organizational merger with Telia, and especially in the period 2006-2010 
appeared to be driven mainly by vendors and adjacent industries. The 
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source of innovation had shifted from technology to market needs and 
process development. 
There were three periods of selection activity. Overall, Sonera turned 
towards modifying and copying rather than creating its own dominant 
designs in the course of time89.  Its activities in 1982-1998 included 
establishing credibility and telequality90 , and developing the ability to 
create quality services in order to make customer-proof (customers 
trusted Sonera) and value propositions (in line with Huff, 1982, p.4). 
These factors were also appreciated in the market. The hype period in 
1999-2000 was a watershed (see also Vesterinen [2009], who uses the 
expression ‘juncture’). Sonera’s top management started to use its brand 
value and clout internally and externally in order to negotiate a new 
business model. The new model was not accepted in the market at the 
time due to the still viable telecom (landline and mobile) business and the 
inability of technology to create convergence between mobile and 
Internet. 
With regard to market selection, what was required of players tightened 
in the third period, 2001-2010: they were expected to offer cheap prices 
and service-level agreements. In addition, customers were reluctant to 
commit themselves to hardware investments, and demanded Cloud 
Computing-type services. Most significantly, the convergence of mobile 
and Internet was taken as a basic competitive requirement and was no 
longer a differentiating factor. The end result of this period was an 
abundance of business models and players in the era of new dominant 
design, corresponding to Unified Communications. Sonera, in turn, had 
mixed selection criteria. The company tried first to leverage its earlier 
technological expertise, and then to build technology links; however, this 
was challenging when the requirements in the market had tightened. 
Finally, Sonera needed to adapt to a new customer-service culture 
(easiness of use) and align itself with adjacent industries’ offerings. This 
contrasted with earlier periods, when it was creating standards and 
exploiting its clout given its monopoly/monopolistic position, brand, and 
reputation as a technological pioneer. 
                                                   
89 Sonera's Selection path could also be generalized to the market, although 
UMTS was a mistake and accelerated the selection trends. The overall market 
saturation and slowdown fuelled the rationalizing, and UMTS and Telia's culture 
accelerated the rationalization process in Sonera (Finland). 
90 Telequality is a way of expressing a very high standard in products and 
services. For example, faults in telephone calls were minimal ‘earlier’, i.e. one 
could call another person with 99.999% certainty. 
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In 1982-1986, Sonera used its national assets and mobile 
communications monopoly in its retention and partly interrelated 
transforming activities, but also profitably transformed to the next era, 
1987-1992, with its digitalization activities and core competences. This 
was a necessary step as the company gradually adapted to the increasingly 
competitive market. 
Sonera capitalized on emerging B2B customer processes and its 
specialized assets in 1987-1992, and again made a profitable transition to 
the next period, 1993-1998. Telecamps (the rival companies Sonera, Elisa 
and the Finnet Group) was formed during this period, and Sonera also 
realized the need for sales and segmenting practices. 
The retention tactic in 1993-1998 was to use the reputation for quality 
and the de facto dominant designs Sonera had created. Transforming to 
the next era, the hype period of 1999-2000, was challenging given the 
need to create new capabilities. The globalization idea was sound: growth 
had stopped in domestic markets and in traditional business, and 
consequently there was a need to create new growth globally. However, 
the unlearning from the old telecom world was, in retrospect, a mistake in 
Sonera, and the pressure to create new innovations was too challenging 
(see also Vesterinen, 2009, pp. 138- 141). For example, 1) capabilities such 
as system integration and software solutions were substituted for 
expertise in mobile and data technology; 2) new enabling platforms were 
substituted for integrated telecom networks; 3) business-innovation 
management was substituted for profit centers; and 4) brands were 
substituted for customers. 
During the 1999-2000 period of hype, Sonera tried to influence the 
evolution of UMTS in order to create a new telecom-led mobile Internet 
business model. This did not turn out to be a success due to a lack of 
capabilities and a misguided vision that telecom operators would create 
value-added content. Hence, the market, and Sonera in particular, went 
back into the realm of technological expertise in 2001-2005, mainly 
capitalizing on what Nokia invented in the market for mobile handsets. 
Around this time, in 2001, Sonera tried to protect assets such as its 
Intelligent Network (IN) in Vipgate and its mobile business. This did not 
succeed, but in its transition to the next era (2002-2005) it learned to use 
its buying power in a structured way, following the merger with Telia. The 
shake out of mobile service providers also helped incumbent telecom 
operators. 
In this as well as in the earlier period, Sonera tried to influence 
legislative regulators in its attempts to prevent mobile number portability, 
or at least to allow mobile 3G bundling in order to boost the usage of 
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mobile data. However, these retention tactics were not effective, and for 
the period 2006-2010 Sonera transformed itself into a customer-led and 
IT/ vendor/ handset partner engaged more and more in telecom 
offerings.   
During this last period, Sonera capitalized on its co-specialized assets 
(IP, Mobile and B2B Communication Solutions) in order to gain a role in 
this new dominant design in the industry, Unified Communications. 
With regard to the discussion on dominant design, and contrary to 
earlier thinking (e.g., Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; Utterback & 
Abernathy, 1975; Utterback, 1994), it seems that new dominant designs 
(e.g., UC in 2006-2010) start from processes91  (business-model thinking, 
pricing, co-operation with IT players, and vendor procurement 
negotiations) and an open ecosystem. Moreover, vendors have a strong 
role, product variety increases during the lifecycle, and there are many 
players involved. Suarez and Utterback (1995) also note that dominant 
designs raise the entry and mobility barriers in the industry, but this 
seemed not to be the case in Unified Communications92. 
It could be implied from the above discussion that dominant-design 
management is conditioned on industry evolution. It also sheds light on 
the nature of the shift in dominant designs over time from Sonera’s 
viewpoint. The shift included a change in players’ roles and deterioration 
in the telecom operator’s situation, thereby reflecting all innovation types 
from Sonera’s perspective: local endogenous, local exogenous and global 
exogenous. Hence the following proposition: 
Proposition 4. Driven by the industry lifecycle (i.e. market 
preferences and technological progress), new dominant designs tend to 
be more technologically progressive and process-led. This development 
facilitates the building of services based on customer and market needs, 
but also fuels the demand for capabilities in areas such as (a) software 
development, (b) managed service thinking, (c) vendor and partner 
relations, (d) value-added service creation, and (d) ecosystem creation.   
                                                   
91 According to the classic approach to dominant design, innovations start from 
the product (e.g., Utterback & Abernathy, 1975). 
92 Unified Communications operated in an IP (Internet Protocol) -enabled open 
industry in which the ‘Cloud Computing infrastructure model’ allowed new IT 
players such as Google to enter the telecom industry. Google’s business model is 
based on trial and error, financed by investors and advertisement-generated cash 
flow. This is a totally different model than the one the telecom operators used in 
that Google has no user-customers who directly pay for its services. 
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What is new in the proposition is the notion that technology 
development changes the scope of capabilities needed in the creation of 
dominant designs. Single players are challenged, and modification and 
copying are likely. 
In sum, Proposition 4 claims that responding to the industry lifecycle 
(Afuah & Utterback, 1997) is more difficult for incumbents than for 
entrants. It is challenging when sources of variation diminish, there are 
potentially multiple selection criteria in the company, and the selection 
criteria in the market are more focused. Moreover, technological progress 
facilitates the substitution of ‘open assets’ for proprietary technological 
assets. 
A framework for the adaptation of dominant designs  
The proposed abductively derived framework identifies the elements of 
the adaptation process. It derives from the previous discussion, and in 
general from the author’s understanding of how dominant designs were 
created, modified and adopted in the case company and the industry. 
The framework describes the innovation source, the building blocks of 
dominant designs and the type of innovation that is created, and how all 
these are linked, influenced by environmental factors. The outcome is a 
dominant design /converged portfolio. Further, the framework identifies 
elements in the transformation to a subsequent dominant 
design/converged portfolio, which in turn is affected by environmental 
factors and the building blocks. 
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Figure 19 thus comprises my proposed framework for the adaptation of 
dominant designs. In the following I explain how the elements in the 
framework work, link that to the theoretical discussion and point out the 
contributions. First I consider the separate elements, and then assess the 
framework as a whole. 
Sensing. First, in the sensing phase I have identified three major 
innovation sources: top management/investors, a market orientation, and 
R&D/science. These are differentiating elements, and in the cases affected 
the emergence of dominant designs in terms of capitalizing on the 
building blocks of the seizing phase. Moreover, it seems that they tend to 
differ in their capacity to exploit the company’s resources. This finding 
sheds light on the emergence of dominant designs.   
What is new in this aspect of the proposed model is that it includes the 
entire corporate perspective with its different levels and functional 
entities. The framework complements the models developed by Van de 
Ven et al. (1989) and Burgelman and Grove (2007). Van de Ven et al. 
(ibid.) consider innovators’ actions as one unit, and top-management 
intervention as a moderating factor. Burgelman and Grove (2007), in 
turn, discuss innovation units, which they describe as induced or 
autonomous depending on whether the idea comes from the SBUs or top 
management. Geels (2002) proposes a dynamic multi-level perspective on 
the emergence of technological transitions, with technological niches on 
the lowest level, socio-technological regimes on the middle level, and 
landscape development on the top level. I parallel technological niches 
with R&D and Science as an innovation source, the socio-technological 
regime with a market orientation, and landscape developments with top 
management/investors, thereby potentially bridging the gap between 
dominant-design creation on the company and on the industry level. 
Furthermore, I offer a novel interpretation of Abernathy and 
Utterback’s (1975) and Utterback and Abernathy’s (1978) seminal models 
according to which innovations characteristically follow product and 
process developmental paths [with strategizing implications], which vary 
in importance during the industry and product lifecycles. The innovation 
journey in my proposed framework can start from different sourcing 
points at different times, and only then follow the product/process 
division and paths shown in Abernathy and Utterback (1975) and 
Utterback and Abernathy (1978). This potentially offers a new perspective 
on the creation and management of dominant designs in general. The 
above-mentioned sources of innovation [R&D/science, market 
orientation, top management/investors] affect product development in 
  Analysis 
233 
 
that it does not necessarily follow the product-process continuum. This 
applies at least to incumbent players/industry, as identified in two cases 
(iPhone and UC). 
Transforming. Second, I have identified the management of 
convergence and dominant logic as the most important elements in the 
transforming stage. Interestingly enough, strategizing went on in Sonera 
in that convergence management is described a tool for creating a 
dominant design. The two sources are ex ante constructs in my 
framework, and thereby differ from Tushman and Romanelli’s (1985), 
Nooteboom’s (2000), and Gilsing and Nooteboom’s (2006) views of them 
as concepts that are external to the company and can be identified only 
after the dominant design has emerged. Dominant logic, in turn, appears 
in Schilling’s (1998) model, expressed as a failure to invest in learning and 
comprising the interplay of core capabilities and absorptive capacity. 
Suarez’s (2002) model lacks the continuity from post-dominance to the 
next dominant design, as does Lee et al.’s (1995) process model of 
strategy. The same applies to Teece’s (2007) model in that dynamism is 
not explicitly mentioned in connection with the shift from transforming to 
sensing, even though the reasoning is implicit: innovations and 
investments equip the company to transform itself. I agree with Kaplan 
and Tripsas (2008) that the sources of variation (the next dominant 
design) are inherited from old technological frameworks and 
technologies that lose their salience (ibid. p.800). In this sense the 
analysis of the transformation to the next dominant design reflects 
explanations of why new convergent offerings are made. 
Furthermore, the building blocks in this stage concern both the 
company and the industry, highlighting the interplay between managerial 
cognition and industry-level development. This leads to the next facet of 
the framework. 
Environmental factors in transforming. Third, I have identified 
technological, market, and customer discontinuities as triggers when 
determining whether a current dominant design can be retained or 
transferred to a new one. These environmental factors are associated with 
technology management, complementing the seminal work of Anderson 
and Tushman (1990) on the technology cycle (ibid., p.606) by integrating 
the views of Christensen (1997) and Tripsas (2008) on the reasons for the 
transition to the next (dominant design). The trigger of the next dominant 
design is the analysis of its strategic fit to the environment (e.g., Durand, 
2001, 2006; Zajac et al., 2000). If an organization realizes it can 
successfully master the dominant logic and the convergence challenges in 
the company, it can move on to create the next dominant design. 
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What I add to Suarez’s [2002] model), for example, is to separate the 
environmental factors into transforming and sensing/seizing phases. In 
so doing I argue that it is possible to analyze potential negative and 
positive path dependence (when environmental conditions are analyzed 
in the transforming and sensing/seizing phases, respectively)93 , and add 
the concepts competence disrupting and enhancing discontinuities to this 
element (e.g., Anderson & Tushman, 1990). 
Environmental factors in sensing/seizing. Fourth, I have identified 
standards, network effects, and the appropriability regime (including 
regulation) as the most important environmental factors. For example, 
standards can facilitate the creation of dominant designs (i.e. GSM), but 
cannot in themselves create them. In other words, customer demand is 
needed. These elements are manifestations of the economic (e.g., Arthur, 
1989; Suarez, 2002) explanation of the emergence of dominant designs. 
Again, I add a new element, the industry lifecycle. This is ignored in the 
theory of dominant design [as I interpret and elaborate on it later]: 
Anderson & Tushman’s (1990) model, for example, defines it per se. The 
industry lifecycle has the following two roles in the proposed framework. 
First, the technology may be immature in the early phase, which 
incumbents typically dominate, thus meaning that there are barriers to 
entry caused by regulations, financial constraints or capabilities (i.e. 
immature technology), for example. When subsequent dominant designs 
are created to meet the same customer need, competence-disrupting 
discontinuities may be strong enough to challenge the management of the 
company. The reasons for this include the many dominant logics, or even 
different biases in the innovation source [R&D, Market, Top 
Management/Investors], and unevenly distributed disruptions in the 
company such that the economic perspective and incumbent advantage 
                                                   
93 The target of a telecom operator is to manage path dependence, because the 
industry is capital-intensive and the basic need of customers, communication, is 
rather stable. Therefore, attempts are made to introduce new technologies to 
current customers through the old infrastructure. I found in Sonera that during 
the process of transforming to another dominant design the products were 
typically built upon each other, in other words there was path dependence. 
However, that was not always understood or acknowledged in the company 
(especially in the Hype Period), as it existed in different layers and in different 
silos: production, product management, sales and marketing. Environmental 
factors affect this transformation and path dependence. The strategic fit (Zajac et 
al., 2000) might vanish if there are strong enough discontinuities. The 
transformation phase facilitates entry into the industry, as happened in Unified 
Communications (2010). 
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may not guarantee the creation of dominant designs. A typical case in 
Sonera was Unified Communications.  Second, the industry lifecycle as a 
factor in the framework facilitates analysis of the stage in which dominant 
designs are created, something that is not explicit in the literature (e.g., 
Abernathy & Clark, 1985; Anderson & Tushman, 1990). The implication is 
that different environmental conditions also apply to dominant designs 
depending on the stage of the industry’s lifecycle. 
Seizing building blocks. Fifth, I have identified complementary assets 
(e.g., Teece, 1986), modularity management (e.g., Christensen and 
Raynor, 2003), ecosystem management (e.g., Jacobides et al., 2006; J.F. 
Moore, 1993), type of company governance (e.g., Afuah, 2001; 
Nooteboom, 1999, p.143), and technological competence/technological 
brokering (c.f. Nooteboom, 1999, p. 130) as the essential building blocks 
in the seizing phase. With regard to company governance, I parallel 
vertical governance with a closed structure, and horizontal governance 
with an open structure. The vertical and closed model was typical during 
the early lifecycle stage of an immature technology. These facets capture 
the dynamics in the process of adapting a dominant design. The use of 
complementary assets is typical of incumbents, whereas focusing on 
modularity and ecosystem management might be beneficial to entrants 
(and also to incumbents who can and wish to focus on these factors). 
Moreover, I find earlier models that lack the element of technological 
competence/technological brokering somewhat vague: it seems to me that 
successful innovations also need concrete competences in the seizing 
phase. 
Innovation type and dominant design. Sixth, linked to seizing, the 
organization creates different kinds of products (see Abernathy & Clark’s 
[1985] typology of innovation). What is explicitly stated here is that all 
innovation types have the potential produce a dominant design. This 
thinking broadens the earlier strict dominant-design and lifecycle view 
suggesting that dominant designs are created only in the era of ferment 
(Anderson & Tushman, 1990): they can also be created in the era of 
incremental change. 
The target is to create dominant designs of different types. What I add 
to the discussion are my typology of global vs. local, endogenous vs. 
exogenous, and ‘open’ vs. ‘closed’ designs, and the converged portfolio. 
‘Closed’ dominant designs belong to incumbents and ‘open’ designs to 
entrants. This new typology brings a new understanding and variety to 
existing definitions, and identifies the reasons why incumbents may lose 
their dominant designs, especially in complex technological systems (see 
sub-chapter 4.2.3 in this study). 
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The framework as a whole. The framework integrates the industry and 
the company perspectives, thereby complementing McGrath et al.’s 
(1992) model, and in addition makes a clearer distinction between 
incumbent and entrant. 
Furthermore, with regard to enablers of dominant designs McGrath et 
al. (1992) refer to selection as driving the processes , whereas these 
processes (sensing, seizing, innovation creation, the recognition of 
environmental boundaries, and transforming) are placed in chronological 
order in the proposed framework. 
In conclusion, I illustrate the descriptive power of the framework 
drawing on the empirical evidence from the cases. I explain how it works 
using TeleSampo (1987) as a case that failed to achieve a dominant-design 
status. 
TeleSampo (1987) was created in-house in Sonera, and benefited from 
earlier standards that were further enhanced in the company. The source 
of innovation was external R&D modified in Sonera, together with top-
management/Finnish political interest. However, it lacked a sufficiently 
market-based view in terms of productization. Still, there was time to 
develop the service within Sonera’s planned timetable in the early 
lifecycle stage, as well as sufficiently strong technological capabilities and 
motives on the company level. The market was clearly demanding 
convergence, in other words a pre-Internet portal, and consequently the 
implementation capability in Sonera to use complementary assets. 
However, as the appropriability regime was not optimal (earlier services 
were profitable but substitute services soon emerged on the market), 
Sonera had no complementary assets, which is why there were no 
network effects in the market or in Sonera’s internal production. In 
addition, the dominant logics in the service-number and data business 
implied skepticism about TeleSampo’s success potential, and modular 
production and resources were not transferred there from other 
businesses, for example. 
Although the market was closed and proprietary, there were still 
challenges in integrating Videotex, Data and Fixed Voice services 
[TeleSampo used a fixed-voice landline network]. 
Videotex could also be seen as competence-disrupting discontinuity. 
However, TeleSampo’s second release in 1997 was clearly based on 
market needs (pointing to the adoption of a market orientation) when the 
competence-disrupting innovation, the Internet, took the place of 
TeleSampo’s email service, known as Telebox. 
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The relative role of sources of innovation in the successful adaptation of 
dominant designs  
This sub-section concerns the role of sources of innovation as opposed to 
seizing capabilities and the industry lifecycle in the successful adaptation 
of dominant designs. 
Sources of innovation. Top management/Investors (i.e. Zed and the 
Hype period) were motivated and tried to create an ecosystem (with 
limited success). There were no complementary assets in-house, and high 
differentiation (meaning strong and different dominant logics) in the 
company. In other words, top management did not control the 
capabilities and did not make optimal use of the firm’s structure. This was 
manifest in its effort to create a mobile Internet ecosystem, and a new 
business model that was not typical of a telecom operator. As a result, 
convergence was not a success, which slowed the process of creating an 
ecosystem. 
In turn, in the case of top management combined with R&D/Science 
(TeleSampo) the capabilities were in-house. However, there was also 
differentiation in-house (i.e. strong dominant logics), and conflicting 
motivations between top management and SBU management. 
Consequently the SBU did not control the complementary assets and 
convergence did not succeed. 
In the case of R&D and the Market domain (Service numbers, DataNet, 
the Cid company number service) the competences were in-house, and 
the products succeeded. High organizational differentiation in Sonera did 
not spoil the success. 
Cases in the Top management and Market domain (VPN, Vipgate) were 
not R&D-dependent, and the competences were in-house. There was 
limited in-house differentiation inside the company, and these were 
success stories. The motivations (SBU and top management) were similar, 
the aim being to create a competitive B2B offering in the competitors’ 
geographical areas. 
The cases with a pure Market orientation varied (Sonera’s 
Communications Solution, Mobile iPhone in the Convergence period, and 
Unified Communications). Unified Communications had no capabilities 
in-house, and there was high differentiation in the company. The Swedish 
organization did not want to move to this market-orientation mode, and 
had different capabilities and motivations than the Finnish side. The 
organization in Finland became market oriented, but the diminishing role 
of R&D led to a slow and challenging project. In addition, the Finns felt 
that the firm’s structure was less than optimal. 
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Finally, when the sole source was R&D/Science (MobiCentrex) there 
was high differentiation inside the company. Top management and the 
sales organization were content with the current structure and level of 
revenue in Sonera, and did not wish to cannibalize these earnings. 
Consequently, there were no complementarities and no ecosystem 
because the R&D organization could not create them alone. 
When all the sources of innovation were present at the same time 
(FastNet, Mobile GSM services, Privatel) there was unity in the company, 
competences were in-house, complementary assets could be seized, 
convergence management worked, the structure was optimal, and the 
cases were successes. 
It seems that both top management/investors and R&D as a single 
source were deviating factors that lead to failure in creating dominant 
designs and, according to the findings, represented a different culture. 
Top-management vision in particular seemed to contradict the reality in 
the company. Conversely, when ‘more interest groups’ were involved in 
the sensing the more ‘unified corporate strategizing’ (Ch2, theoretical 
framework) facilitated exploitation of the whole company’s resources. 
Perhaps too, a market orientation as such capitalized more on sales 
organization, whereas if the product was solely R&D-led it could have 
been difficult to capitalize on the various sales units (as was evident in 
MobiCentrex and TeleSampo). A multiplicity of innovation sources 
seemed to impose limitations on the various cognitions and competitive 
tools, the motivation to acquire new technology, and consequently on the 
correct evaluation of the company’s capabilities. A case in point is the Zed 
product: top management favored ‘selling the story’ without having the 
required capabilities in the company, and furthermore, the ‘home 
organization’ was not used in the productization process. 
These findings on the sources of innovation in the process of adapting a 
dominant design (and of any innovation type) give rise to the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 5a. Through their varying relationships and usage of 
company governance and capabilities, the different innovating units 
(R&D/Science, Market orientation, and Top management/Investors) 
exploit the building blocks of dominant design differently. A market 
orientation is likely to lead to successful ecosystem creation and 
convergence, whereas R&D/Science and Top management/investors 
face challenges in managing organizational differentiation. 
The fact that the various sources of innovation tend to use the 
company’s resources differently assigns significance to the role of the 
different innovative units. In general, a market orientation (Jaworski et 
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al. 2000) and R&D (e.g., Srinivasan et al., 2004, 2006) are considered 
important. Proposition 5a also supports the view expressed by Afuah and 
Utterback (1997) and Rosenkopf and Tushman (1993) that capabilities 
need to change in the industry lifecycle. However, I argue that changing 
capabilities in the product lifecycle is difficult if the project is based in a 
very biased innovative domain, focusing on R&D in the initial sensing 
stage, for example. In other words, it is challenging to reach the 
dominant-design stage in the lifecycle of a product evolving from different 
sources of innovation. 
This view differs from the one put forward in the classic discussion on 
dominant design (Utterback & Abernathy, 1975), which is restricted to the 
changing bias from product to process innovation. According to Utterback 
and Abernathy (ibid.), the lifecycle of the strategy process proceeds from 
performance maximization through sales maximization to cost 
minimization. In my opinion, the process may also start from a different 
domain from which it may be difficult to reach the cost-minimizing stage 
(seen in the end result as dominant-design exploitation). 
The source of innovation in relation to the industry lifecycle. Some 
indicative patterns emerged concerning the influence of the industry 
lifecycle (see Appendix 13 for numerical values). More than one source of 
innovation was required in the introduction stage to ensure a successful 
project. TeleSampo was an exception: it was too early on the market 
despite having more than one innovation source. Only top management 
was pushing projects in the hype of the late 1990s, and these projects 
were not successes. Another interesting finding emerged in the case of 
MobiCentrex: R&D and Science failed as a source in the growth stage of 
the industry lifecycle. The implication here is that it does not pay to 
develop R&D internally in this stage. In turn, a market orientation was 
needed, as in the cases of Vipgate, Sonera’s Communications Solution and 
Mobile iPhone services. I analyzed all industry-lifecycle stages and 
Sonera’s cases accordingly, hence the following proposition is applicable 
to all innovation types. 
Proposition 5b. More than one innovation source is required during 
the introductory lifecycle stage because the pattern of success is not 
clear. Focusing only on R&D and Science in the growth stage leads to 
failure because of the slow and risky way of working. A market 
orientation is needed in open/horizontal market conditions because 
technological capability is not a differentiating factor. 
Fast action is needed in the growth phase, and ‘turning back’ to a slow 
R&D process might not pay off, because the market may have 
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expectations of the upcoming dominant design (cf. Christensen and 
Bower, 1996). 
Sonera has been a pioneer in the following telecom areas: the Internet, 
datacom, mobile communications, and value-added integrative services 
for the B2B segment. One factor that sets Sonera and Finland apart is the 
technologically challenging and heterogeneous market. A manifestation of 
this is that many European telecommunications manufacturers have been 
active in Finland testing their hardware. In the case of mobile business, 
for example, Siemens transferred their mobile software development to 
Turku in the 1990s. Because Finland was split into three telecom camps, 
with different network technologies, network interoperability was 
important, which was challenging technologically. Sonera was highly 
innovative in this environment, especially in the 1990s. The company 
produced first-in-the-world innovations, which were architectural and 
revolutionary in nature, and generated patent applications. In fact, these 
innovations shaped its strategy in the B2B segment, and the networking 
idea was commercialized, manifesting in managed services. Sonera also 
encouraged vendors to be active in Finland. For example, Nokia’s mobile 
business started because Sonera was a very demanding customer, urging 
Nokia to develop the mobile switch to NMT-900 (Nordic Mobile 
Telephone, 900 MHz). 
When many sources of innovation were used together, especially in 
1987-1995, the market was typically in the introduction stage, being either 
closed (in a regulative and proprietary technology sense) or semi-closed. 
The regulative authorities liberalized the market in the semi-closed phase, 
and technology became a source of competitive advantage (e.g., in GSM, 
which was a digital technology). 
It is worth elaborating more on the technological environment, which 
was heterogeneous in the eras 1987-1992 (the era of liberalization of 
telecommunications and data business) and 1993-1998 (the era of intense 
competition and growth in the mobile business), Telcos could use 
proprietary technologies, and customers and telecom operators had to 
allow data, voice, and mobile technologies to communicate. 
Consequently, the different signaling procedures needed to be 
compatible. These demands for different technologies, networks, and end 
devices to work together were especially challenging in the cases of 
Service numbers, DataNet, FastNet, Privatel, Cid, and Mobile Centrex. 
Moreover, the individual products, namely Service numbers, DataNet, 
FastNet, Privatel and Cid were very profitable to Sonera. The market was 
also closed or semi-closed. 
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The following proposition is based on the above analysis of the sources 
of innovation and conditions in the early-lifecycle stage, and of Sonera’s 
high-appropriability regime. It applies to all innovation types before the 
open-market stage: in other words, it does not apply to Unified 
Communications, which started a new industry lifecycle. 
Proposition 5c. Using many sources of innovation in combination is 
profitable in a closed or semi-closed market-introduction stage when 
R&D is in-house, and the market is heterogeneous and technologically 
challenging. 
Proposition 5c contributes to the discussion on market characteristics 
during the innovation process. According to Gatignon and Xuereb (1997), 
conditions of high market growth and tough competition require a 
stronger customer and competitor orientation. I would include the role of 
technology in the discussion. The characteristics and stage of the industry 
lifecycle do not in themselves explain success, and many sensing ideas 
should also be pursued together, especially in the introductory stage. In 
relation to the theory of dominant design, Proposition 5c points to the fact 
that the market may also be closed in the fluid stage, which thus far has 
gone unnoticed (Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Anderson & Tushman, 
1990; Utterback & Abernathy, 1975). A further insight is that the industry 
lifecycle may not start from a dominant design, meaning that the two 
concepts should be separated theoretically. 
Relationships among the building blocks  
Appendix 13 gives the results of the analysis of the relationships among 
the building blocks in the model in numerical values. I used pair-wise 
comparisons to find correlations that complemented the earlier case 
analyses. The building blocks in question are dominant logic, 
convergence, the ecosystem, standards, modularity, complementary 
assets, and network externalities. The focus is on ‘incremental building 
blocks’ and ‘discontinuous building blocks’, respectively (see the 
framework for the adaptation of dominant designs). 
Convergence. First I discuss the role of managerial convergence in the 
creation of new dominant designs. 
Convergence has been prevalent in Sonera, both in enhancing current 
offerings (e.g., the Vipgate concept) and in developing new differentiating 
offerings. 
The new insights concern the following elements, the management of 
which facilitated successful convergence: integrative capabilities, cross-
functional collaboration, redesign and new service functionality, sensing 
and visioning customers’ common usage needs, bypassing regulative 
  Analysis 
242 
 
restrictions, extending subcontracting and service management to 
offerings, the creation of new sales concepts, new cost-efficient service 
functionality, linking different technologies, and customer impact on 
defining what convergence is. 
Convergence seems to be typical of telecommunications operators. 
Some of Sonera’s products  (fixed voice and mobile voice), for example, 
were explicitly integrated in terms of technological and usage experience: 
NMT-Privatel, GSM-Privatel, NMT-GSM MobiCentrex, Sonera’s 
Communications Solution, Unified Communications, and the Cid 
Company number service. 
Convergence typically started a new developmental phase. There was 
robust evidence of this in UC, as other players were offering the same 
functionalities globally as telecom operators, also often defining what 
convergence should be in terms of technologies and products. The need 
for a converged offering was evident in 2008-2010, for example, as 
respondents in the UC case described the most demanding customer 
types in terms of what they were asking for. This was a communications 
entity (UC) that was based on presence information, which meant mobile 
communications, customer-service solutions (including service numbers 
and attendant services), and fixed-voice solutions. Its customers wanted 
to know how to communicate in the form of short messaging, UC client to 
softphone and integrating e-mail, for example, and what to do with the 
presence information. These demands clearly demonstrate the usefulness 
of compatible product silos and IT systems. In terms of market demands, 
business-productivity solutions and value-added logic replaced the earlier 
technology- and product-based logic. 
The above observations on the nature of convergence in the 
telecommunications industry lead to the following proposition. It is 
associated with local endogenous innovations, although depending on the 
capabilities of the company, it is also applicable to local and global 
exogenous innovations from an incumbent perspective, meaning that 
there is also the possibility to “rule without assets” (Jacobides et. al, 
2006) and thus to create an ecosystem. 
Proposition 6a. Converged products and convergence management 
prepare the incumbent organization to create a new dominant design. 
Actions enhancing this relationship include (a) pursuing convergence in 
educating the market, (b) being active towards legislative regulators, (c) 
creating a silo-free organizational-governance model and IT structure, 
(d) demonstrating path dependence from the old to a new offering, and 
(e) analyzing the possibilities of creating an ecosystem. 
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In the most successful example of convergence products in these cases, 
organizational learning promoting a more market-based and internally 
silo-free way of working enabled the case company to create an 
ecosystem. Supporting the above proposition, Augier and Teece (2006) 
note that functional integration is difficult when firms have internal 
boundaries or ‘silos’, claiming that integration actually constitutes a 
dynamic capability. When there has been constant restructuring of the 
management model, continuums and breaks, convergence management 
serves as a tool for organizational development (Cacciatori & Jacobides, 
2005). Overall, Proposition 6a reflects the novel finding that managing 
convergence ex ante leads to a successful dominant design, thereby 
contradicting Tushman and Romanelli (1985), for example. 
Dominant logic. Second, I raise the question of how dominant logic 
enhances or blocks the creation of convergence and an ecosystem, 
respectively. One could reformulate this by asking what it takes to create 
an ecosystem by means of convergence management. In my opinion, 
based on the case study, such creation needs open, customer-need-based 
thinking and offerings (contrary to ‘technological-silo’ thinking). Open 
cooperation between the functions and the product areas, modular IT, 
technology-management capability and the inclusion of customer 
preferences in the productization process are also prerequisites. These 
notions call for a more concrete analysis of dominant logic. 
It also seems that transitions to new technologies and products can be 
blocked if there is a strong dominant logic, meaning that current 
technologies are in use and the organization is familiar with them, and 
also if there is positive feedback from customers about current services in 
the same product category during a dominant-design-management phase 
(e.g., Christensen, 1997). There was resistance in the case companies to 
moving to new technologies in the transition to new dominant designs. In 
other words the technologies were competence-destroying to these units, 
which together with their transition technologies were related to value-
added services in the voice area, to X.25 and TCP/IP standards in data 
business, and to IP-PBX and UC in the PBX world. Thus, the transition 
was from proprietary customer-owned products and services to generic 
software as a service. 
The targets of the ‘old business’ (i.e. performance) also constrain the 
acceptance of different business models and ‘unified corporate 
strategizing’ in the evaluation or sensing phase. It seems that, to some 
extent, convergent thinking fosters new business logics (on questions 
such as what products and related organizational silos are to be 
combined, and what the new pricing mechanisms are). This phenomenon 
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was evident in Cid, which integrated many former services into one 
concept. When dominant logics appear in a company the development of 
products and resources follows that way of thinking. Different dominant 
logics were identified in the case company throughout its history (termed 
eras in this study), and there were differences in culture between Finland 
and Sweden (see especially the Vipgate concept, Cid, Unified 
Communications and Sonera Communication Solution). 
Reinganum (1985), Henderson (1993), and Rosenbloom and 
Christensen (1994) argue in general that incumbents invest less in new 
technologies because they have a relatively weaker incentive to shorten 
the length of the current stage of incumbency. This is illustrated in the 
case of Unified Communications, in which the old infrastructure and the 
old way of using services generated major earnings. Consequently, 
productization lagged two years behind what was feasible, according to 
one informant. 
Reflecting the literature and company history, and supporting 
Henderson (1993), Informant 7 said that all one’s time in the 1990s went 
toward protecting the old monopoly business, and so there was no time to 
think about innovations. Informant 29 also noted the tendency to fit the 
‘new thing’ into the old structures, which often led to rigidity and 
blindness to the new possibilities (see also Adner and Levinthal, 2008). 
Dominant logic (Huff, 1982; Bettis & Prahalad, 1986; 1995) and the 
learning loop from the market affect the kind of products on offer, 
especially integrative products and product portfolios. The dominant 
logics differ in Finland and Sweden: it is fixed and PBX-centric in 
Sweden, and mobile and network-centric in Finland. It has taken a long 
time to identify, control, and respond to these dissimilarities. 
To summarize the above discussion about the presence of a dominant 
logic in the case company and the industry (how one can observe it in 
practice), it seems that products were not developed on the basis of the 
most progressive offerings in the company. On occasions, B2B products 
were managed in accordance with functional, consumer-type processes, 
which do not take into account the special needs of the B2B segment. The 
regulator also interpreted market definitions based on products 
(Kilpailuvirasto – The Finnish Competition Authority, 1999b), not on 
offerings or true market shares within different segments, thus ‘freeing’ 
them, in a way, from earlier dominant logics. The service-usage culture 
and the operator role were different in different countries and in different 
markets. 
These notions lead to the following proposition, which offers new 
insights into which building blocks are important in achieving a dominant 
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design (e.g., Schilling, 2002; Srinivasan et al., 2004, 2006; Suarez and 
Utterback, 1995). The proposition is associated with local endogenous, 
and local and global exogenous innovations, in other words with both 
incumbents and entrants. 
Proposition 6b. A strong dominant logic blocks ecosystem creation 
and convergence management in order to secure the current business 
logic. The current business logic is secured by (a) using current 
technologies, (b) using old market definitions approved by the legislative 
regulator, (c) nurturing the current service-usage culture, and (d) not 
identifying or responding to differences in markets. 
Strong dominant logic exploits current technologies, and is not open to 
new ideas, especially those required in convergence and ecosystem 
management. This thinking reflects that of Srinivasan et al. (2004, p. 45), 
for example: “incumbent inertia and threat of cannibalization of existing 
products slows the incumbent, providing opportunities for later 
entrants”. Moreover, according to Schilling (2002), “Failure to invest in 
continuous learning processes will increase the likelihood of 
technological lockout”. However, Proposition 6b sheds new light on the 
mechanisms of dominant logic, not least by treating it as an ex ante 
construct. 
Standards, modularity, complementary assets, and network 
externalities. Third, how are standards, modularity, complementary 
assets, and network externalities linked to each other? In addressing this 
question I will first consider what the target of a telecom operator is and 
what the process underlying all its actions should be. The goal is to create 
an industrialized solution. This differs from the goals of IT-system 
integrators, which are associated with customer specificity, lower 
investments and lower average profitability. The underlying process 
activity characterizing all telecom operations is constant migration from 
old to new technology, through which customers are retained and even 
taken along to experience and accept the new. Old services need to work 
in the new applications, and that migration should be done in a cost-
efficient manner. The most obvious example in Sonera was the history 
and technological path of mobile business in 1980-2010, although other 
migration paths were present: PBX (Private Branch Exchange) business, 
VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) business, and ATM-Frame Relay. 
The above examples apply both to industry and to company processes. 
With regard to processes, Sonera established its Solution Sales unit early 
on. The target was to create a standardized modular offering. The Vipgate 
concept also effectively illustrates the network externalities and the 
scaling up of internal operations. Its activities included cross-selling, 
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developing new sales practices, IN (Intelligent Network) usage in the 
whole company, a new product-development process, and the active use 
of the Sonera brand. Successful aspects of the mobile business, in turn, 
included roaming, quality, the use of retailers, and sending a common 
message to the whole market to network with consumers together in 
order to diffuse the service. 
Complementary assets are important to incumbent or monopoly 
telecom operators, according to McGahan and Silverman (2006) and 
Stieglitz and Heine (2007). Such assets act as a shield from external 
technological shocks (from a competitor or another industry) and could 
also enhance the adoption of an in-house innovation – known as synergy 
effects. Vipgate, Service Numbers, Mobile business, and FastNet in 
particular benefited from complementary assets, manifested in activities 
such as cross-selling, one-stop shopping, wider product-portfolio 
offerings, and discount-pricing policies. These pricing policies entailed 
the evaluation of Sonera’s whole product portfolio in order to find critical 
price levels for each product. 
Modularity works on two fronts: through the management or 
orchestration (Brusoni, 2005) of production, or partnering, when the 
production is more open and external vendors are used on the one hand, 
or via the company’s internal way of working, especially in IT systems, on 
the other. Sonera’s Unified Communications offering demanded very 
good modularity processes and know-how. It was argued in the interviews 
that Microsoft worked in a release mode, and telecom operators had to 
adapt to it. The challenge in Unified Communications, which used both 
telecom operators and Microsoft products in combination, was that the 
process put even more pressure on the company to master modularity. 
Modularity enhanced convergence-management capabilities through 
more flexible service implementation achieved by means of opening the 
company internally and to external partners through the integration of 
customers’, the telecom company’s and the external partners’ IT systems. 
Increasing returns (Arthur 1989, 2001) implies a ‘bandwagon effect’, 
and in the case of adoption can emerge from learning by using, network 
externalities, economies of scale in production, informational returns, 
and technological interrelatedness. This was seen in Sonera when 
customers did not have to think about the technology used by the 
receiving partners. These factors apply to Mobile business as a whole, on 
both the production and the user side. First, a service-usage culture was 
created (GSM technologies), and when the mobile network diffused, the 
positive path-dependence enhanced the technological path from ARP-
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NMT-GSM-3G-4G. In a way, the standard-setting process helped to 
create this Mobile business. 
The above discussion about a telecom operator’s targets, 
complementary assets, modularity and increasing returns leads to the 
following proposition, which is associated with local endogenous and 
exogenous innovations just as the facets are associated with the assets 
controlled by the proprietary telecom operator. 
Proposition 6c. Standards, modularity, complementary assets, and 
network externalities have positive mutual impacts. It is beneficial to an 
incumbent telecom operator to pursue a standardized modular offering 
in order to keep and migrate its customer base. Migration is facilitated 
through the use of complementary assets such as (a) cross-selling, (b) 
technological interrelatedness, (c) brand value, (d) quality, and (e) a 
service culture. These assets enhance network externalities. 
This proposition is in line with Srinivasan et al.’s (2004) finding that 
complementary assets are beneficial in reaching network externalities. 
More recent support comes from Molina-Castillo et al. (2011), who 
parallel complementary assets with a large customer base, and Schilling 
(2002). These building blocks are 1) typical of multi-product incumbents 
and 2) synergetic. 
 
4.2.3 RQ3: What role does the nature of products as complex 
technological systems play in dominant-design adaptation 
processes and outcomes? 
 
Sources of technologies, capabilities in Sonera, and legislative regulation 
(complex technological systems) 
I will now extend the discussion on the adaptation of dominant designs to 
cover complex technological systems, giving a systemic perspective on 
innovative activities in Sonera. My analysis covers technological sources, 
legislative regulation and capability analysis on the company level. 
The analysis proceeds in three steps. First, I consider the technological 
sources by country of origin. Second, I focus on the capabilities in Sonera 
and incumbent telecom operators. My intention is to show that 
technologies may be competence disrupting, competence enhancing, or 
both. Interestingly, [converging] technologies may have different effects 
in different business areas. Third, I discuss the impact of legislative 
regulation on different technologies and businesses in Sonera and 
Finland.  
Figure 20 below shows the sources of technology by country of origin. 
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Figure 20.  Technological sources by country of origin, 1975-2010 
 
Figure 20 shows how the technologies differ in terms of country of origin. 
I refer to the empirical evidence (see Appendices 1 and 2 for the case and 
industry history) with regard to the substance of the technologies. In a 
nutshell, Internet-related technologies were pioneered in the US, and 
mobile-related technologies in Europe. Figure 21 depicts the capabilities 
in Sonera. 
 
Figure 21. Technological capabilities in Sonera, 1980-2010 
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Figure 21 shows the distribution of capabilities in the different 
organizational units. The key capabilities were in landline voice, landline 
data, and mobile technologies, and in the integration of these 
technologies especially in the B2B segment. Again I refer to the empirical 
evidence (Appendices 1 and 2) with regard to the substance of the 
capabilities.  
Figure 22 below depicts the impact of legislative regulation in Sonera 
and Finland. 
 
 
 
Figure 22. The liberalization of legislative regulation, 1980-2010. 
 
The figure 22 shows how the legislative liberalization affected the 
different organizational units. The main units were PBX (Private Branch 
Exchange), landline voice, mobile, and landline data/Internet. The effects 
of the liberalization and the timetable varied in the different units. I refer 
to the empirical evidence (see Appendices 1 and 2) with regard to the 
substance of the liberalization. 
The innovations were clearly systemic in nature. I draw an example 
from the fixed-voice business, which was regulated for a considerable 
period. Liberalization started in the mid-1990s (hence there was a lack of 
competition, new capabilities and new products). The capabilities were 
concentrated around the telephone operators’ proprietary technologies. 
However, TCP/IP technology was gradually infiltrating the fixed-voice 
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business as well. In terms of capabilities, TCP/IP was competence 
disrupting for fixed voice, and consequently the technology did not 
develop. As a result, the dominant design turned out to be ‘IP Voice’, also 
termed Unified Communications (UC). Fixed voice was thus ‘absorbed’ 
into the dominant IP technology. It would thus seem that some 
technology is so dominant that it has the capacity to ‘draw in’ adjacent 
areas and destroy previously dominant designs. 
It is evident from the above analyses (source of technology, 
technological capabilities in Sonera, regulative liberalization) that 
dominant designs emerge along a networked innovation developmental 
path that is characteristic of complex technological systems. Allow me to 
elaborate on this. When technological brokering and technological 
capabilities were aligned in Sonera, accompanied with incentives to 
innovate (the opening up of competition, pressure from the competitive 
situation, and changing customer preferences), dominant designs 
emerged. On the other hand, these conditions were not present in cases 
like Zed (technological capabilities and technological brokering in 
particular were missing), and no dominant designs emerged. In the 
successful cases there were competent people and SBUs engaged in the 
process of adapting successful dominant designs, even if some of these 
innovations were competence disrupting for other units.  In the light of 
the above discussion I offer the following proposition. 
This proposition concerns the evolution of dominant designs in an 
industry lifecycle, and therefore is associated with global exogenous 
innovations. 
Proposition 7a. In complex technological systems, dominant designs 
emerge along a networked innovation developmental path and are likely 
to have a ‘domino effect’94 . In other words, they absorb adjacent 
standards that do not develop technological capabilities, exploit 
legislative regulation or offer commercial incentives in order to develop 
dominant designs. 
Proposition 7a concerns the development of innovations in complex 
technological systems (Rosenkopf and Tushman, 1993; Abernathy and 
Clark, 1985). It incorporates the term ‘domino effect’ with specific 
                                                   
94 The domino effect is a situation in which one event causes a series of similar 
events to happen one after another. The term originates from the game 
‘Dominoes’, and “from the fact that if dominoes are stood on end one slightly 
behind the other, a slight push on the first will topple the others”. Domino theory 
is thus defined as follows: " if one act or event is allowed to take place a series of 
similar acts or events will follow” (Merriam-Webster, 2014). 
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reference to such systems, and is closely aligned with Adner and 
Levinthal’s (2002) reference to technological “invasion” as characterized 
by convergent technology and its application. What is novel is my 
conceptualization of the interplay among technology, legislative 
regulation and capabilities. 
How the nature of complex technological systems affects the emergence 
of dominant designs 
This section draws together the various strands in the above discussion to 
analyze the conditions that facilitate the emergence of dominant designs 
in complex technological systems.  
I elaborate on the question of whether or not the evolutionary (regular 
and niche) and revolutionary (architectural/ revolutionary) innovations in 
the telecom/ICT industry and Sonera became dominant designs. I also 
discuss how innovations are linked on the technological level, and identify 
the dominant players of interest. I addressed this theme in the empirical 
part of the thesis in the process of explaining the transition from earlier 
services to new ones. These themes are depicted more explicitly in Figure 
7, concerning service usage in Finland’s Telecom industry in 1980-2010, 
and in Figure 20 concerning the role of Unified Communications in the 
evolution of communications.  
Next I chart the history of the fixed-voice, fixed-data, Internet and 
mobile industries between 1980 and 2010. All these industries 
experienced both evolutionary (competence enhancing) and revolutionary 
(competence disrupting) development from the incumbent’s point of 
view. 
Intelligent network (IN) started to substitute for long-distance calls in 
the B2B sector [creating virtual private networks] in 1994, and also 
enhanced the service number business in the late 1990s. In turn, the 
cordless phone (CT2) and mobile Centrex (MobX) complemented the 
fixed PBX business, and at the same time (1995) consumers started 
substituting mobiles for fixed phones. These evolutionary developments 
(competence enhancing) were advantageous for telecom operators and 
happened in the proprietary telecom industry. However, discontinuities 
from adjacent industries were also linked with the fixed-voice business 
area. The revolution began as early as in 1975 when the TCP/IP protocol 
suite was tested: this turned out to be a clearly disruptive technology for 
the landline voice business. 
In addition, shocks such as Skype, increased computer power enabling 
Cloud Computing and IP/PBX, together with TCP/IP (e.g., Gartner, 2005; 
Martikainen, 2006) transformed the closed fixed-voice business into a 
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new open industry, namely ICT, in 2010, following its earlier transition to 
the mobile industry. Customer needs converged on both of these 
development paths in that the technology was required to create the 
convergent services. 
There was both evolutionary and revolutionary development in the case 
of fixed data, as with fixed voice. At first the data was enabled by circuit-
switched technology (x.21). Moving to packet-switched technology (x.25) 
was progress, as was the step to ATM (Asynchronous Transfer Mode), in 
which the functionality was similar to both circuit-switching and packet-
switching networks. However, this was not a winning technology. Sonera 
clearly had state-of-the art capabilities in these areas, and was able to 
create dominant designs.  
ISDN, in turn, was an attempt to rationalize the usage of both voice and 
data in the same telecom networks. These developments advanced further 
in proprietary telecom assets, and in Sonera’s innovations such as FastNet 
and DataNet, which successfully used US-based IP Data technology 
(TCP/IP). Although the DataNet product decimated earlier revenues (x.25 
based), it still managed to create a new profitable business and a new 
dominant design for a telecom operator. As was the case with fixed voice, 
here, too, the technological foundation of the revolution was the TCP/IP 
protocol. The Internet (HTTP, HTML, URL and the Netscape browser) 
accompanied with TCP/IP created the Business Internet in the mid-
1990s. This (Internet) later destroyed the telecom operators’ own content 
business, in other words it was competence destroying for TeleSampo and 
circuit-switched/packet data (e.g., TeleSampo and its email service 
[Telebox]), and later also constituted a challenge for DataNet. The closed 
data business has also transformed into a new open industry, ICT, 
enabled by Cloud Computing.  
Interestingly, the evolutionary path of mobile business was triggered by 
a failure in the telecom industry. Mobile technologies evolved gradually: 
ARP (1972), NMT-450 (1982), and NMT-900 (1986). A digital GSM 
standard was introduced in 1992, which enabled competition. However, 
this was a positive development from the telecom operators’ point of view. 
Then in the early 2000s an attempt by telecom operators seeking mobile-
data and Internet convergence to create a new closed Internet was not 
successful. Enabled by TCP/IP, players such as Apple (iPhone) went on to 
create the mobile Internet market.  
Figure 23 is a graphic illustration of technological developments in the 
telecom industry in the light of the Sonera portfolio. 
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Figure 23.   The history of the telecom/ICT industry in the light of Sonera’s offerings 
 
The closed vertical industries are classified Landline Voice, Landline Data 
and Mobile technologies in the figure 23. The elements include 
technologies, services and market events. Among the technologies, 
TCP/IP was the common denominator linking competence-disrupting 
discontinuities to incumbents. The outcome was a horizontal industry 
that enabled separate technologies to work in combination, although 
realized at different times in different industries, and a long time after the 
technological invention (see also Vesterinen, 2009, p.142). TCP/IP was 
commercialized when complementary innovations emerged and added 
capacity. The dotted lines from PSTN and PBX to Mobile in the figure 
depict the natural progression to Mobile from Fixed Voice. Competence-
disrupting discontinuities marked the transition to a new dominant 
design and industry, namely ICT. Many players were involved in this open 
horizontal industry, not only telecom players, and customer needs 
converged. 
Propositions 7b and 7c concern local endogenous and exogenous and 
global exogenous innovations, covering the whole industry lifecycle from 
1980 to 2010, and the respective cases. 
Proposition 7b. New dominant designs emerge in complex 
technological systems characterized by industry convergence when the 
new technology aligns with the capabilities and incentives of the 
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receiving unit. Incentives include liberal legislative regulation that opens 
the competition. Converging customer needs, technological interfaces, 
and synchronous discontinuities between technologies also need to be 
present. 
Anderson and Tushman (1990) found that incumbents commercialized 
both competence-enhancing and competence-disrupting innovations. 
Proposition 7b adds the insight that discontinuities may be competence-
enhancing and disruptive at the same time in different units. The decision 
to commercialize technology is thus a result of conflicting targets (units 
with the capability to commercialize the technological invention also have 
an incentive). 
The second line of research focuses on the integrative capabilities of 
incumbents (Srinivasan et. al. 2004, 2006) when there are open-industry 
conditions and a lack of capabilities and incentives to commercialize new 
technologies. Implicit in Proposition 7b is the assumption that new 
dominant designs tend to be architectural/revolutionary in nature [due to 
convergence in complex technological systems]. However, there may be a 
limit to one player’s integrating capabilities (see Srinivasan et al., 2004, 
and Klepper and Simons, 2000 in the context of one originating industry 
in the field of consumer durables). In other words, it may be that the 
dominant logics are so different in conditions of multiple-industry 
convergence and competence-disrupting discontinuity in focal companies 
and incumbent industries that incumbents or any other single player 
simply cannot bring about convergence. However, Tripsas (2008, pp.87-
88) found that new technologies invaded incumbent industries from 
different source industries, although they did not study the causes and 
incentives on the company level. 
Proposition 7c. Ambidexterity is unlikely to work in complex 
technological systems (telecom/ICT) if the service portfolio seems to be 
converging into just one offering. Many products in the telecom/ICT 
industry serve the same customer need and thus potentially use 
uniformly manageable architectures and common platforms. 
Proposition 7c is to the point with regard to managing products and the 
company as a whole in that there need to be integrated and/or chosen 
elements for the same manageable entity, not just for the separate entities 
(business units). Ambidexterity as such is thus not likely to succeed in the 
telecom/ICT industry. Platform thinking is a metaphor for the kind of 
integration that is needed: it does not refer to separate platforms for 
mature and introductory products, but to a common manageable unit 
given that there is a need and the required capabilities to build such a 
platform. An illustration from the case study supports this argument. 
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  In the hype of the late 1990s, the organization was split into 
incremental (telecom) and disruptive (mobile & media unit) elements. 
This division did not work due to the different dominant logics, whereas it 
would still have been possible to manage the whole company from the 
same platform. 
Ambidexterity is also discussed in the theoretical part of the study, the 
implication being that a company should both exploit and explore its 
portfolio of services. Proposition 7c is in contradiction to ambidexterity 
thinking given the proposed integration of the portfolio into one offering, 
namely ICT. 
  Analysis 
256 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Discussion 
257 
 
 
5. Discussion 
 
This chapter summarizes the answers to the research questions, presents 
the limitations of the study, discusses managerial implications, and 
suggests avenues for future research. 
To start, I present some views (in line with the research choices I have 
made) on what a theory is. I find the following definitions of “theory” 
from Merriam-Webster’s (2013) dictionary useful to be a starting point: 
(1) “the analysis of a set of facts in their relation to one another,” and (2) 
“a plausible or scientifically acceptable general principle or body of 
principles offered to explain phenomena.” These broad definitions are 
not far from that given by Gioia and Pitre (1990): “We broadly define 
theory as any coherent description or explanation of observed or 
experienced phenomena” (p.587). The key issue here is a coherent, 
consistent (Suddaby, 2006, p.640), and credible explanation of the area 
of investigation. In my research, I aim to show a credible model of the 
dominant design adaptation process, in the light of my empirical 
narrative and previous dominant design theory. Whetten (1989) discusses 
the building blocks of a theory and notes that these can be summarized by 
answering the questions of what, how, and why. In answering the “what” 
question, it is important to determine “which factors (variables, 
constructs, concepts) logically should be considered as part of the 
explanation of the social or individual phenomena of interest” (ibid. 
p.490). An answer to the “how” question should indicate the way in which 
factors relate to each other. In answering the “why” question, according to 
Whetten (1989), it is important to show the justification of the selection of 
factors and the assumptions of the theory. 
The next logical question to ask, then, is what constitutes a theoretical 
contribution. Whetten (1989) addresses this by stating that an answer to 
the “what” question should be comprehensive (i.e., all relevant factors are 
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included) and parsimonious (i.e., include only value-adding factors, and 
discard that which does not increase understanding). On the other hand, 
the “how” question should prompt causal explanation in order to make a 
theoretical contribution. In a nutshell, a simple theory should include 
both description and explanation (ibid. p.491). Further, in considering the 
“why” question, researchers need to clarify their logic and worldview so 
that they can effectively judge the new contribution. This is needed 
because the target should extend existing knowledge and pose altered 
views. These views can arise when an earlier theory is not internally 
consistent or when new empirical data challenges an earlier theory 
(Whetten, 1989). In a similar vein, Corley and Gioia (2011) state that a 
theoretical contribution should include originality and utility, and that 
when both are present, a greater contribution results. 
The purpose of this research was to study the process of adapting to 
dominant designs in a company, in an industry, and intertwined in a 
company and industry. In other words, the target was to investigate if 
dominant designs are born and to explore the factors influencing them. 
The main objective of the study was to understand how a company can 
create/increase the odds in creating, modify, or adopt dominant designs 
sequentially and how industry evolution affects this process (McGrath et 
al., 1992).  
I carried out a longitudinal (1980–2010) empirical case study of 
complex technological systems in telecommunications/ICT industry and 
at the case company Sonera, a telecommunications/ICT firm. 
Furthermore, I used abductive logic (Dubois & Gadde, 2002; Kovács & 
Spens, 2005), thus integrating and extending earlier research approaches 
by building a dominant design adaptation framework.  
The earlier research comprises the following six approaches. First, 
theoretical frameworks (no empirical data included) on dominant design 
building blocks have been built by McGrath et al. (1992), Lee et al. (1995), 
Suarez (2004), Schilling (1998), and Teece (2007). Second, survey 
research has been carried out by Srinivasan et al. (2004, 2006) on the 
factors that enable dominant design emergence. Third, empirical 
longitudinal case studies on strategy making and cognition in companies 
have been performed by Burgelman (1991, 2002), Cattani (2006), and 
Tripsas (1997), among others; however, these studies do not directly 
address dominant designs. Fourth, there are longitudinal empirical case 
studies of how one company and one standard (the video cassette 
business) (Cusumano et al., 1992; Rosenbloom & Cusumano, 1987) 
gained the dominant design position. Fifth, there are seminal works from 
the incumbent point of view on how to adapt to the innovation process 
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(Abernathy & Clark, 1985; Christensen, 1997; Henderson, 1993; 
Henderson & Clark, 1990). These empirical works focus on creating 
innovation typologies; however, they do not study complex technological 
systems. Finally, the seminal works on dominant design (Anderson & 
Tushman, 1990; Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Utterback & Abernathy, 
1975) center on industries and companies at a “black box” level, single 
product areas, the emergences of dominant designs, and the influence of 
dominant design on industry conditions.  
This study aimed to shed light on a gap in previous research. In so 
doing, I integrated research on the evolution of dominant design in the 
domain of complex technological systems. I identified success and failure 
patterns in the dominant design adaptation process. I found that this 
process is conditioned on the source of innovation, industry life cycles, 
and the nature of complex technological systems as such. This research 
approach led to a better understanding about the dominant design 
adaptation process. 
 
 
5.1 Research questions answered—the theoretical 
contribution of the study 
 
In this section, I present the research questions and their answers. I also 
propose a theoretical contribution in line with the criteria presented 
earlier. 
RQ1: What sources of innovation and what processes are related to (a) a 
multi-product firm’s successful management of its dominant designs and 
(b) successful transformation from one dominant design to the next? 
For RQ1 (a), I first studied the different sensing practices (i.e., using 
science, internal R&D, market, top management, investors/industry, or 
vendors) and seizing/transforming activities (i.e., using technological 
brokering, seizing complementary assets, deciding the firm structure 
[including modularity], creating convergence, and managing 
organizational differentiation) within Sonera. I then linked this analysis 
to case success/failure and proposed patterns in the dominant design 
adaptation process. As a general finding, using all sensing practices 
together does not necessarily lead to success; however, using only one or 
two practices likely leads to failure. In seizing/transforming, the challenge 
was to operate under organizational differentiation when a strictly vertical 
structure strategic business unit (SBU) was not used.  
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Second, I showed the elements of the dominant design adaptation 
process at a company. These elements are shown in sensing, seizing, and 
transforming (Teece, 2007) tables in the case study and manifested in the 
competences, organizational structures, processes, and managerial 
cognition that strengthened or restrained dominant design adaptation. 
Earlier research has focused on studying dominant designs as ex-post 
only (e.g., Anderson & Tushman, 1990) and has not empirically identified 
success/failure patterns in the elements of the dominant design 
adaptation process (Suarez, 2004). 
For RQ1 (b), I first identified the factors that lead to the collapse of a 
dominant design. I found that environmental factors had a strong role in 
the collapse of dominant designs (i.e., discontinuities in the industry). 
The change logic in the successful transition to the next dominant design 
was operationalized and given a success pattern (Nooteboom, 2000). This 
success pattern consisted of a perceived opportunity to create integrative, 
convergent products and services that have the potential for more 
efficient production. In addition, earlier research has found the element 
of convergence (Rosenkopf & Tushman, 1993) to be an ex-post construct 
and a synonym for dominant design. I have demonstrated that this 
element was the key building block in ex-ante dominant design creation 
at Sonera.  
After analyzing the sources of innovation and a multiproduct firm’s 
approach to the dominant design adaptation process, I shifted to 
investigating the evolutionary aspects of the dominant design adaptation 
framework and the effects that the aforementioned building blocks have 
on it. 
RQ2: What are the relative roles of the sources of innovation in the 
successful adaptation of dominant designs and their ‘building blocks’ in 
terms of a) the process, and b) how they change over time? 
I first analyzed Sonera and its sources of innovation in successful 
dominant design adaptation. This led to empirical evidence that the 
source of innovation has shifted away from R&D/science and toward a 
market orientation in the incumbent telecom industry and the case 
company Sonera. 
The key findings are as follows: (1) the source of innovation leading to 
new dominant designs shifted from an R&D/science orientation toward a 
customer/market orientation, as the industry evolved to be more open 
and horizontal. (2) The incumbents’ role was seen to diminish. (3) 
Technological progress enabled other companies to enter the telecom 
industry. (4) Sources of variation diminished, and selection criteria came 
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to be focused in the market, causing difficult internal selection decisions 
at Sonera. 
What, then, has caused the shift in the importance of sensing? Adner 
(2002) and Adner and Levinthal (2002) propose that the development of 
technologies allows for more customer segments to be satisfied. It seems 
that technology (e.g., TCP/IP) allows new players, along with their 
peculiar business models and strong market orientation (e.g., Google, 
Microsoft), to enter the telecom industry, thus posing a challenge to the 
business models of telecom operators. This may have a negative effect on 
incumbents’ ability to benefit from R&D investments (Klepper, 1996). 
In RQ2, the overarching theme is the changing nature of dominant 
designs in the industry life cycle. The seminal author Utterback (1996) 
addresses this question by calling for research on whether the industry 
will still face a shakeout in well-defined markets after the next wave of 
innovation (i.e., the mature stage of the earlier life cycle). However, it has 
yet to be questioned whether the next wave of innovation in the topical 
industry could start from process, and not from product, innovations. The 
variation, selection, and retention (VSR) analysis I undertook next 
clarified this. 
I elaborated changes in the dominant designs through a VSR analysis of 
Sonera and the telecom industry from 1980 to 2010. Interestingly, the 
VSR analysis offered a potential for studying dynamics, as the Unified 
Communications case starts a new industry life cycle. Although this point 
was not documented earlier, Utterback (1996) called for investigating the 
possibility that the source of the next round of innovation could be more 
process based. Moreover, responding to industry life cycle (Afuah & 
Utterback, 1997) is more difficult for incumbents than for entrants. It is 
challenging when sources of variation diminish; there may be multiple 
potential selection criteria in the company, while selection criteria in the 
market sharpen and focus. In addition, enabled by technological progress, 
so-called open assets could be substituted for proprietary technological 
assets (cf. Jacobides, Knudsen, & Augier, 2006). 
I determined how change in the stage of an industry life cycle influences 
the nature of dominant design. I analyzed the relations between Sonera’s 
innovations and the industry’s development. I found that, enabled by the 
progress of technology, new dominant designs are more customer and 
market oriented, but they also create demands for new capabilities, such 
as (1) software development, (2) managed service thinking, (3) vendor 
and partner relations management, and (4) ecosystem creation. 
Under the conditions of subsequent discontinuities in technology and 
consumer preferences, I argue that the traditional approaches to seizing 
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dominant designs are less effective and have less payoff to players at the 
same level in the value chain or value web. These traditional approaches 
include standards, network externalities led centrally by incumbents, a 
vertical company orientation, and in-house R&D. This contradicts 
Klepper’s (1997) view that large companies could capitalize on R&D-
related activities when creating dominant designs. Thus, when the 
industry matures, the initial way of pursuing dominant designs is no 
longer effective for meeting similar types of customer needs in subsequent 
dominant design life cycles (e.g., consider Unified Communications and 
the iPhone). This implies (cf. Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; Utterback & 
Abernathy, 1975) that new dominant designs are likely to arise directly 
from specific pattern elements (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978, p.154). In 
other words, the rate of major innovation is process oriented, not product 
oriented, in the new industry life cycle. 
However, it is possible that even the specific pattern facets may not hold 
for new dominant designs. Production processes have tended to be 
efficient and capital-intensive, with organizational control centered on 
structure, goals, and rules (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978, p.154). In turn, 
production processes may become more flexible and less efficient, and 
organizational control may become less formal and more entrepreneurial 
(e.g., Google’s business model). 
Having elucidated the success patterns in the dominant design 
adaptation process and the influence of industry evolution upon this, I 
proceeded to analyzing these together and building an enhanced 
dominant design adaptation framework, with implications for successful 
dominant design adaptation. In addition, the framework pinpoints the 
relevant building blocks associated with dominant designs thus shedding 
new light on the nature and substance of dominant designs.  
Regarding the dominant design adaptation process for complex 
technological systems, I (1) developed two theoretical frameworks, (2) 
evaluated the concept of dominant design, and (3) introduced the 
building blocks, including environmental boundary factors, and the 
sources of innovation. Earlier research (Lee et al., 1995; Suarez, 2004; 
Schilling, 1998) on dominant design management model building has 
treated the company as a “black box,” and has not identified the 
connections between building blocks and the process of transitioning to a 
new dominant design. 
There are several novel elements and contributions in the framework. 
The success factors (i.e., building blocks) seem to be industry life cycle 
specific. Compared to McGrath et al.’s (1992) model, my model creates a 
clearer division between incumbent and entrant. In so doing, I also 
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divided the environmental conditions into sensing/seizing and 
transforming phases. 
In addition, the proposed framework combines the entire corporate 
level for analysis. This makes the model more detailed, contributing to the 
influence of sources of sensing. This corporate view also includes sources 
of innovation: R&D/science95  (Teece, 2007), market orientation96  (Kohli 
& Jaworski, 1990; Narver & Slater, 1990), and top 
management/investors97  (Jaworski et al., 2000; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000; 
Cattani, 2006). These sources of innovation use company resources 
differently. Finally, the framework identifies the linkages between the 
dominant design building blocks, extending the work of, for example, 
Suarez (2004) and McGrath et al. (1992). 
The framework offers a new way of looking at dominant designs; the 
strategy process can be conceptualized as starting from varied domains 
(i.e., not from a product or process bias, as Utterback and Abernathy 
[1975] have conceptualized). This new conceptualization of dominant 
design may reveal the difficulties in reaching the dominant design 
industry life-cycle phase. In general, based on the empirical evidence, 
using extremely biased sources of innovation leads to failure. 
Keeping in mind that dominant designs have not been studied in 
relation to industry life-cycle stages, I elaborated the sensing success 
factors that are industry life-cycle–phase specific. More specifically, the 
introductory life-cycle stage needed more than one source of innovation 
because the pattern of success was not clear. In the growth stage, focusing 
only on R&D and science as a source of innovation led to failure, as this 
approach represents a slow and risky way of working. Under the 
conditions of an open/horizontal market, market orientation is needed 
                                                   
95 There is an active research community network that the case company uses 
when generating ideas. The progress of science is commercialized by an operator 
and plays an important role in the market and in a products’ success. R&D is 
actively undertaken by an operator and/or the science community and device 
vendors. R&D plays a significant role in a products’ success and includes active 
technology selection and many pilot projects. 
96 Market Orientation includes (1) customer orientation; (2) competitor 
orientation; and (3) interfunctional coordination. High score (7): Organization-
wide generation of market intelligence pertaining to current and future customer 
needs, dissemination of intelligence across departments, and organization-wide 
responsiveness to that intelligence (Kohli and Jaworski, 1990). 
97 Top management/investor vision and strategy lead productization, 
centralized decision making, visible political action, and active market and 
market-structure making. 
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because technological capability is not a differentiating factor. Further, 
using many sensing practices was profitable in a closed or semi-closed 
technologically challenging market (Gatignon & Xuereb, 1997), as the 
pattern of success was not clear and there was a high appropriability 
regime for innovators (Teece, 1986). 
I have grouped environmental factors in sensing/seizing as one 
dominant design building block entity, the elements of which have 
synergetic effects. This entity is typically a closed industry. A new finding 
was that the basic environmental building blocks (i.e., standards, 
modularity, complementarities, and network externalities) have a positive 
impact on each other, and this is basically the “world of incumbents.” This 
world is also typically a closed industry. This means there are barriers to 
entry; these can be caused by regulation, financial constraints, or 
capability perspectives. Further, as in Eisenhardt and Martin’s (2000) 
typology, this view applies to a moderately dynamic market. I argue that 
the incumbent operator’s target is to migrate its customer base, and this 
migration is helped by using complementary assets: (1) cross-selling, (2) 
technological interrelatedness, (3) the usage of brand value, (4) quality, 
and (5) service usage culture. The usage of these complementary assets 
enhances network externalities. 
I have grouped environmental factors in the transforming phase, in 
contrast to the other dominant design building block entity. In this 
transition, there are different factors at play that can be exploited by both 
incumbents and newcomers. These factors are changing customer 
preferences and technological progress. This notion is closely related to a 
discussion in Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) regarding how different 
kinds of dynamic capabilities are needed in relation to market dynamism. 
During the field study, various tradeoffs were identified in dominant 
design management (from market-based changes and from the company 
management point of view). These tradeoffs were conceptualized mainly 
as convergence98 and as dominant logic99. At Sonera and in the incumbent 
industry, convergence and the change of dominant logic challenged and 
posed threats to the current way of working. 
                                                   
98 Conceptualized as follows: The company appreciates convergent products. It 
has convergent products and offerings. 
99 Conceptualized as follows: Organizational differentiation is high (in strong 
dominant logic). The degree of difference between organizational divisions in 
terms of their overall goals, marketing and production methods, and decision-
making styles are high. 
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Related to transforming, convergence is seen as beneficial to 
incumbents’ ability to operate in complex technological systems, thus 
slowing down later entrants (Srinivasan et al., 2004, 2006). The most 
important building blocks leading to the successful creation of the new 
dominant design were generally identified as related to convergence 
management: (1) educating the market; (2) being active toward legislative 
regulators; (3) creating a silo-free organizational structure that challenges 
the extant dominant logics of different product areas; (4) demonstrating a 
path away from depending on the old offering to a new one; and (5) 
analyzing the potential to create an ecosystem. 
These adjacent elements, convergence (Rosenkopf & Tushman, 1993) 
and dominant logic, contribute a fresh perspective on when to create new 
subsequent dominant designs. In addition, organization type (e.g., SBU 
organization, silo-free organization, and modularity) and managerial 
cognition boundaries were of central importance. In particular, one 
failure was portfolio management without a converging plan or a 
platform. These elements manifested in Sonera’s case as the preserving of 
the old public switched telephone network (PSTN) business; a new, 
cautious unified communications strategy; investments in only market-
oriented processes (e.g., customer service); and different organizational 
cultures and market situations that led the company to be vulnerable to 
vendors and adjacent industry players. However, the convergence is not 
always needed and appreciated in the market (Adner, 2002). Under these 
conditions, the organization type was not critical100.  These findings (i.e., 
the company’s internal organizing and its effects on convergence 
management) complement each other and create a bridge for the 
company structure discussion (i.e., vertical/modular). These discussions 
are found in the work of Williamson (1971, 1991, and 1999), Christensen 
and Raynor (2003), Cacciatori and Jacobides (2005), Jacobides (2005), 
and Jacobides et al. (2006) regarding creating dominant designs. A key 
finding was that a vertical SBU is beneficial when creating new dominant 
designs, which are convergent in nature. 
Finally, in terms of dominant design building blocks, the case study also 
allowed the identification of a positive feedback loop among standards, 
modularity, complementary assets, and network externalities. 
                                                   
100 Conceptualized in this study as follows: Market preference types are the 
following (incremental = I, revolutionary = R, convergence = C). Convergence 
means converging preferences in the market (Adner, 2002). In turn, 
revolutionary preferences means new technology and new market is created. 
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Up to this point, I analyzed the dominant design adaptation process in 
an evolutionary way and determined success/failure patterns. In these 
analyses, I found the paths that led the incumbent to adopt, more than 
create, dominant designs. However, I wanted to investigate whether there 
was some common enabler of this. Therefore, I analyzed the cases as 
complex technological systems and product portfolios in RQ3. 
RQ3: What role does the nature of products as complex technological 
systems play in dominant-design adaptation processes and outcomes? In 
Chapter 4.2.3, I have empirically shown how the innovation process 
works in complex technological systems. I first identified the sources of 
technologies, Sonera’s capabilities, and legislative regulation events in 
order to find links between these factors. Earlier research (e.g., Suarez, 
2004) has merely shown conceptual dominant design frameworks. In this 
longitudinal case study, however, I have explained the source of 
innovation (i.e., technological discontinuity) and capabilities as well as 
the incentives at the company level to start the innovation process. 
Technological discontinuities can be simultaneously competence 
enhancing and disrupting for different units in the company. The 
converged portfolio analysis showed how the innovation process was 
carried out in complex technological systems. It is interesting to note that 
as technologies develop, they enable convergence (Adner, 2002). Here, 
the main findings revealed that (1) the birth of dominant designs is a 
networked innovation path, and (2) in complex technological systems 
characterized by industry convergence, new dominant designs are born 
when new technology aligns with the capabilities and incentives of the 
receiving unit. The incentive can be, simply, a liberal legislative regulation 
that opens up competition. In addition, converging customer needs, 
interfaces with technologies, and synchronous discontinuities between 
technologies need to be in place (contributing to Adner & Levinthal, 
2002). 
The final contribution in relation to research question three discusses 
ambidexterity (e.g., Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996). Earlier research has 
applied the notion of ambidexterity (i.e., a capability to perform tasks 
using either hand) to the dominant design discussion. In this area, it 
relates to carrying out exploitation and exploration (March, 1991; 
Nooteboom, 2000) at the same time as a way of creating new dominant 
designs. I have demonstrated through empirical case history that 
dominant designs have a trend toward convergence. In this situation, it 
might be harmful to separate a focal market into different goals and the 
company into different organizational control structures. This is because 
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common platforms, architectures, and organizational control structures 
are needed in dominant design creation. 
In general, this study contributes to and introduces a  view that the 
dominant design adaptation framework- sensing, seizing and 
transforming –is beneficial to integrate variation, selection, and the 
retention view of evolution. In addition, dominant design can also be 
local; this study indeed identifies relevant dominant design building 
blocks that help shed light on the nature and evolutionary characteristics 
of dominant designs. 
Table 28 contains a summary of the theoretical contributions of the 
study, listing the key authors. I separate each discussion and theme. 
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Table 28.  Theoretical contribution on dominant design discussion. 
 
Key authors Contribution RQ Propos
ition 
Phase 
Teece (2007); Suarez (2004); 
McGrath (1992) 
Identified sensing, 
seizing/transforming success 
profiles. 
RQ1a 1a, 1b Sensing 
Gilsing and Nooteboom 
(2006); Cacciatori and 
Jacobides (2002); 
Christensen (1997); 
Christensen et al. (2002) 
Specified the enablers of 
transition to the next DD 
(convergence). 
RQ1b 2 Transfor
ming 
Abernathy and Utterback 
(1978); Abernathy and Clark 
(1985); Henderson (1993); 
Tushman and Anderson 
(1986); Christensen (1997); 
Christensen et al. (2002); 
Utterback (1996); Klepper 
(1996, 1997); Utterback 
(1996) 
New dominant designs are 
market oriented and more 
technologically progressive; 
the DD process at a 
company and industry 
changes after many 
subsequent rounds (waves 
of innovation) of 
discontinuities. 
RQ2 3, 4 Sensing 
(3); 
Seizing 
(4) 
Tegarden et al. (1999) New DD typology offered: 
endogenous, global 
exogenous, local exogenous 
(to closed, semi-closed, 
open industry conditions). 
RQ2   
Lee et al. (1995); Suarez 
(2004); Schilling (1998); 
McGrath et al. (1992) 
The dynamic integration of 
the DD adaptation process at 
a company with industry life 
cycle ex-ante. 
RQ2   
Abernathy and Utterback 
(1975, 1978); Teece (2007) 
Sources of innovation 
conditioned with industry life 
cycle, with success patterns 
identified. 
RQ2 5a, 5b, 
5c 
Sensing 
Tushman and Romanelli 
(1985) 
Identification of the role of 
convergence in DD creation. 
RQ2 6a Transfor
ming 
Srinivasan et al. (2004); 
Schilling (2002) 
Determining the DD building 
blocks’ linkages that lead to 
successful DD creation. 
RQ2 6b, 6c Seizing 
(6c); 
Transfor
ming (6b) 
Rosenkopf and Tushman 
(1993); Srinivasan et al. 
(2004); Klepper and Simons 
(2000) 
Complex technological 
systems analysis revealed a 
networked view of an 
innovation path. In this path, 
a “domino effect” (i.e., 
winning technologies absorb 
others) is present in DD 
creation under certain 
conditions. 
RQ3 7a, 7b Transfor
ming 
Tushman and O'Reilly (1996); 
March (1991) 
Ambidexterity may not hold 
in the telecom business, 
where there is a possibility to 
use shared platforms for the 
same customer need. 
RQ3 7c Transfor
ming 
McGrath et al. (1992); Durand 
(2006);  Anderson and 
Tushman (1990); Teece 
(2007) 
Dominant design adaptation 
framework- sensing, seizing 
and transforming integrated 
to variation, selection and 
retention 
RQ1, 
RQ2, 
RQ3 
  
Srinivasan et al. (2004); 
Schilling (2002): Suarez 
(2004) 
Dominant design can be also 
local; identified relevant DD 
building blocks that shed 
light to the nature and 
characteristics in an attempt 
in creating DD 
RQ1, 
RQ2, 
RQ3 
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5.2 Managerial implications 
 
The practical objective of this study was to understand how the dominant 
design adaptation process is carried out over time. A related objective was 
to determine how the importance of the dominant design building blocks 
changes over time. This included investigating how capabilities change 
within the company and which capabilities are appreciated by the 
industry. I point out four key implications for management. 
First, in general, the presented dominant design adaptation framework 
highlights (1) the elements essential to judging whether a design has the 
potential to become dominant and (2) how the variation, selection, and 
retention processes characterize the management of dominant designs. In 
the long term, this process has considerable influence on the “freedom to 
innovate,” meaning that variation and selection seem to be focused within 
the course of the industry life cycle. In the short term, these influences are 
difficult to notice. 
Second, this framework serves as a tool for analyzing competitors’ 
actions. In other words, it helps reveal who has the needed dominant 
design elements as well as their advantageous management capabilities 
(Abernathy & Clark, 1985). Moreover, it serves as a tool to help firms 
decide whether they have the resources needed to create dominant 
designs (Tegarden et al., 1999)—and if dominant design creation should 
even be a target for them. Simply copying dominant designs might be 
enough. 
Third, the dominant design framework puts innovation management in 
one format, ensuring that the whole company is speaking one language 
and helping to achieve a more holistic view of running and developing the 
business. In addition, as recognized in this study, the sources of 
innovation have three powerful entities: R&D, market, and top 
management/investors. If the management of a firm is not balanced in 
this regard, the innovation journey could end in failure (Polley, Garud, & 
Venkataraman, 1999). Likewise, the governance model is not trivial. In 
fact, there may be “a best place to innovate” (i.e.., the SBU), thus avoiding 
the challenges in ambidextrous management. 
Fourth, the framework may reveal clues regarding the appropriate time 
to end some production and technology line. For example, when customer 
preferences change significantly in a specified market, the new dominant 
design may gain market acceptance. Therefore, running the old 
infrastructure in parallel may be too costly. 
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5.3 Limitations of the study 
 
This research has certain limitations. First, concerning the metrics of the 
study, the subjective measures of success could be substituted with 
objective measures. However, establishing an objective evaluation of life-
cycle stages could be challenging. In addition, the numerical values used 
to judge dominant design factors were based on the researcher’s opinion. 
The results could change if these are judged differently. However, the 
historical narrative and case studies are in line with the numerical values, 
constituting a robust historical description. Further, careful analysis was 
conducted based on interviews, company archives, and participant 
observation. 
Second, the case study depicted only one company and industry in the 
Finnish market. Although the findings of the study may be generalizable, 
such efforts should be taken cautiously. Nonetheless, similar findings may 
be found in other contexts, such as capital-intensive, technology-based 
industries where products and services constitute the offering. 
Third, the analysis stage would have been helped by control data (i.e., 
data from other actions and products during the case years), enabling a 
clearer view of the relative position of the cases studied. After all, the 
number of dominant designs and successful innovations are less 
numerous compared with the whole portfolio of projects and products in 
the company. 
Finally, this study established (1) a dominant design management 
framework, (2) a new dominant design typology, (3) a change in the 
dominant design management framework and the payoff of the building 
blocks, and (4) the role of complex technological systems as such. In this 
sense, the contribution may seem somewhat fragmented. However, the 
thread connecting these elements is an investigation of a change process 
within an incumbent telecom company and industry. The same 
fragmentation is present in other co-evolutionary (Lewin & Volberda, 
1999; Volberda & Lewin, 2003) works, where the changed VSR process is 
studied in a company, in an industry, and within a company and industry 
together. 
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5.4 Future research 
 
In terms of future research, four tracks are offered: 
Operative excellence and metrics. In the future, researchers should 
investigate specific themes more deeply (e.g., analysis of the dominant 
design building blocks), especially as they relate to financial and strategic 
marketing tools. 
What are the marketing actions, for example, that influences the 
phenomenon of increasing returns? What type of business strategy is 
needed to ensure that the key elements of dominant design (e.g., 
modularity management) are enhanced and can be used to benefit the 
company? It would be interesting to assess the costs, as well as the cost 
and revenue typologies, of various dominant design elements in industry 
life-cycle stages at the start of the productization process. Are all elements 
necessary, and how profitable is it to pursue these?    
Development of the company and dominant designs. In general, 
researchers could aim to determine the actual triggers that start the 
creation of dominant designs across the whole industry (and in other 
industries, such as capital-intensive, technology-based industries, where 
products and services constitute the offering) and how companies react to 
these triggers. 
Dominant designs and industry landscape. Future research could 
address the relative importance of having a dominant design (e.g., how 
many there are in industries) and whether they are they global or local. In 
addition, it may be worthwhile to investigate the interplay between 
dominant design elements (e.g., can the niche player skip some element, 
and must an incumbent manage all of the elements?) 
Changing dominant designs. This study proposed that subsequent 
dominant designs are market and process oriented. Future research could 
explore this point in more detail. For example, how are successive 
dominant designs created? Are the products and services path dependent, 
and why? What are the related mechanisms of interest? Defining the level 
of path dependence is of central importance to the 
telecommunications/ICT industry as well as other industries. This would 
extend the co-evolution research into other industries that have complex 
technological systems. 
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Appendix 
1. Sonera’s strategic decisions 1977–2010 
 
1977. Pekka Tarjanne is appointed Director General of Posts and Telegraphs of 
Finland. 
1980. The decision is taken to adopt the Nokia DX 200 digital hub for voice 
landline communication in the Korppoo municipality, so creating a digital 
network (IDN). 
Sonera decides to build a MUX (Multiplexing) network alongside the general 
data transmission to rationalize usage of capacity. 
1981. Sonera Research Center replaces separate telephone laboratories. 
– The pilot scheme on a separate data network starts after a 10-year planning and 
development phase. 
1982. Sonera begins development of a videotex system and the creation of the 
pre-internet-based ecosystem. 
1983. Sonera embarks on GSM design work and takes the decision to transition 
to GSM. 
1984. Pekka Tarjanne notes that the new telecommunications bill failed to 
resolve the dispute between Sonera and local telephone companies over the 
division of work (especially on data business). 
1985. Aulis Salin is appointed Chief Director of Telecom in Sonera. 
–Regional Teledistricts are transformed to profit centers in Sonera. 
–Local switching centers start to be digitalized to create new services. 
–Sonera continues to develop ISDN (integrated services telecommunication 
networks), and participated in the design of the network to draft international 
recommendations. 
–The first 927 service equipment (freefone) is introduced to start value added 
business in the landline voice arena. 
1986. Sonera orders NMT-900 center (mobile business arena) from Nokia. 
1987. Sonera’s organization becomes profit center based: centers are divided by 
products. 
–Sonera decides to commercialize the 2Mbit Voice Access product (landline) to 
compete in big cities. 
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–Enterprise Networks Ltd (Sonera’s subsidiary for the large corporate segment) 
applies for a license. 
The decision is taken to invest in the development of remote fiber optic network 
transmission (instead of radio links and coaxial cables). 
1988. Enterprise Networks Ltd is founded. 
–Sales of phones boom nationwide following liberalization of ownership of 
terminal equipment and traffic agreements (tie-in sale practice was ended). 
–Sonera decides to start Internet services to B2B segment. 
1989. Sonera decides to cooperate with start-up vendors, e.g., Cisco. 
–Expansion and growth begin in contact center arena (customer service). 
–Data Business Area begins the “Star Wars” project to attack competitive fields 
with the best possible new technology. 
– Sonera opposes the granting of a license to Radiolinja (a rival mobile operator, 
Elisa camp) in Finland. 
–Sonera decides to apply for a license to provide regional services (landlines) in 
competitors’ areas. 
–Sonera begins import of telecommunications equipment (e.g., NMT-phones, 
TeleSampo end devices, PBXs). 
–Sonera creates an internal data network linking IP and IBM solutions to create 
future customer data networks. 
1990. Ten regional offices and twelve new profit center areas are set up to 
strengthen the commercial approach. 
–Customer relations way of working is prioritized (decisions on increasing the 
role of Solution sales, IP design, emphasis on Top customers, service 
development roadmaps). 
–Deputy General Director Aulis Salin presents Sonera’s vision of the 1990s: a 
focus on development and aggressive behavior, customer satisfaction, and the 
availability and quality of service. 
–It is decided to make the Post and Telecommunications Office a public utility. 
–Sonera imports Canadian Northern Telecom’s Meridian 1 telephone exchange 
to attack the B2B segment. 
1991. Martis vendor was chosen at FastNet productization, prolonging the Star 
Wars project. 
–Idea emerges of separating Sonera’s physical network and services with 
software. 
–It is decided to nationalize the Post and Telecommunications Office. 
–Sonera announced 158 million Finn marks will be invested in local networks in 
metropolitan areas in 1992–1996. 
–Sonera decides to invest in an Intelligent Network (Nokia Tandem database to 
DX 200 switches). 
–Sonera reduces its regional telecommunication structure from ten to six units. 
–A Service Development Unit is founded to design and develop Sonera’s 
business-to-business services and complex systems management. 
–New distribution channels are acquired in the end devices arena with the 
acquisition of Rinox and Mobitele companies. 
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1992. Sonera’s business plan 1993–1997 is ratified. It prioritizes the competition, 
telecommunications becoming real business activities, and EC legislation. 
–Sonera decides to set up the TeleGate marketing process combining products 
for the TOP 3000 segment. 
–Sonera targets workforce reductions from 9000 to 6000 by the end of 1993. 
1993. Aulis Salin becomes President and CEO of Sonera. 
–Sonera tenders to build a GSM network in Turkey (Turckell). 
–Sonera invests in the PBX product segment during a recession, in contrast to 
other operators. 
–The decision is taken to invest in the local network in competitor’s major cities. 
1994. Switchboard operations are concentrated entirely to Sonera’s subsidiary, 
Tele Communications Company Ltd. 
–Parts of the former state enterprises were made for each a separate company. 
–Segmentation is applied to four key areas: industry, public administration, 
banking and trading sector. 
–Sonera embarks on UMTS (3G) mobile networks research. 
1995. The network operator/service provider interface is separated in Sonera and 
leads to the rise of customer offering thinking. 
–Sonera decides to press ahead with organizational changes in 1996 (seven 
divisions); and emphasizes it will prioritize sales and marketing, and network 
and service layer separation. 
–R&D investments approved in Intelligent Networks and their applications, the 
development of broadband ATM networks, mobile communications, and 
multimedia in new services. 
–Sonera launches Internet service to consumer market (consumer ISP). 
1996. Sonera took part in the implementation of the world’s largest ATM network 
(the Social Insurance Institution, Finnish pension fund) in conjunction with IBM 
Corporation. 
–Mobile business is separated into network and service business. 
– The ATM network begins to be used as Sonera’s internet services platform and 
intranet services to corporate customers commence. 
1997. The company focuses its efforts on comprehensive service and product 
packages and improving quality, e.g., with the Surfnet self-service portal. 
–Sonera sees an opportunity for growth in international operations (globally 
expanding markets for mobile communications and data and media 
communications). 
–Sonera agrees a joint development programme with Japanese company NTT 
DoCoMo to develop UMTS. 
–Sonera founds two subsidiaries in Germany for data services and electronic 
payment. 
–R&D investments are made in mobile communications and multimedia, 
intelligent network technology, software based management, and information 
systems. 
1998. Sonera is listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange. 
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–Sonera forms a joint venture with Hansenet, in Hamburg Germany to develop 
landline telecommunications and the VPN business. 
–Telecom Finland becomes Sonera Ltd on April 15. 
–Sonera is concentrating on customer focus, R&D, and the business 
opportunities arising from the convergence of telecommunications and 
information technology. 
–Sonera commits to grow in its core businesses: mobile, data and media 
communications and to seek cooperation models that support growth based on 
the company’s expertise in these areas. 
–Sonera increased its holding in Turkcell ( a Turkish mobile operator) and 
Pannon (a Hungarian mobile operator), and acquired a 19.4% holding in US GSM 
operator Aerial. 
–Sonera concludes Finland’s first mobile call service operator agreement with 
RSL COM Finland Oy. 
–Sonera purchases a majority holding in the joint marketing company of the 
Päämies chain. 
–Sonera submits an application to the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications for an UMTS license for Finland. 
1999. Sonera is listed on the Nasdaq stock exchange in the USA. 
–Sonera decides to adopt a global service provider strategy (Smart Trust, Zed). 
–Sonera Solutions is founded, a strategic move toward offering comprehensive 
solutions for the B2B segment. 
–Primatel is sold, meaning all Sonera’s fieldwork and maintenance activities are 
now outsourced. 
–Sonera acquires more than 20% of 724 Solutions Inc. to develop Smart Trust. 
–Sonera purchases a 9% share of Powertel, a US company that provides GSM 
based PCS services. 
–Sonera announces the acquisition of 37% of Talentum Oyj (a Finnish company) 
to create its own content services. 
–Sonera’s introduces a new business unit, the Mobile & Media unit and Telecom. 
--Sonera forms a joint venture in Italy (with telecommunications operator 
Tiscali) to provide directory services. 
–Sonera buys 15% of Xfera in Spain, which is applying for 3G licenses in Spain. 
–Sonera investigates joining a consortium led by Virgin Ltd, which is applying for 
a 3G license in the United Kingdom. 
–Sonera announces plans to buy 34% of Digita, a subsidiary of the Finnish 
Broadcasting Company. 
–Sonera’s Smart Trust business invests in partnerships with Leonia Bank and 
TietoEnator to become the first company worldwide to offer banking services 
based on digital signatures used in WAP phones. 
–Sonera makes a cooperation agreement with Equant on data services that offers 
comprehensive international data network services to Sonera’s business 
customers worldwide. 
–PBX business is expanded to a managed service (i.e., SIP product). 
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2000. Sonera participates in 3G auctions in several countries: Spain, Italy, and 
Germany. 
–Sonera decides to sell its holdings in US mobile operators and to shift the focus 
of its operations to the third-generation mobile market in Europe (particularly 
Germany). 
–A new departure for Sonera when it decides to begin developing and offering 
new services for other operators and service providers. 
–Sonera decides that carrying voice or leasing a network no longer suffices as a 
foundation for growth, and that the new growth factors be located outside the 
traditional field of operations. 
–Mobile product projects to B2C field drive stock market visibility. 
–Sonera Plaza rolled out the Sonera Internet PC service package, comprising a 
computer and an internet subscription bundled together in a three-year license 
agreement. 
–Kaj-Erik Relander becomes President and CEO of Sonera. 
–Aimo Eloholma becomes acting CEO of Sonera. 
–Sonera expands its GPRS network to cover the entire Finnish territory. 
--Sonera decided to retreat UMTS concession projects in the longer without 
success. 
2001. Harri Koponen becomes President and CEO of Sonera. 
–Organizational change sees the creation of ‘One Sonera’, P & L responsibility 
passes to the sales unit and products have a minor role. 
–Sonera downgrades the Service Businesses (Zed, Smart trust, Plaza) and focuses 
on projects that exploit its domestic customer solutions. 
–Sonera makes a share offer: holding two existing shares entitles subscribers to 
one new share at EUR 2.70. 
–Sonera and Auria (telco operator in Turku, Finland) become partners. 
–Sonera begins to carry telephone traffic via its new IP-based backbone network. 
–Plan emerges to make the Ethernet IP (link) migration in the R&D unit to 
streamline technological solutions. 
2002. Telia and Sonera merged. 
–Anders Igel becomes TeliaSonera’s President and CEO. 
–Tapio Hintikka becomes Chairman of TeliaSonera’s Board of Directors. 
–TeliaSonera’s management team positions divided equally between Sweden and 
Finland. 
–TeliaSonera announces that Sonera’s 3G investments are making a huge loss, 
and that Telia’s investments in international network capacity services were a 
failure. 
–TeliaSonera adopted a Fast Follower strategy manifesting in reduction in R&D, 
a focus on customer service and being a service company. 
–Sonera announces that profitability will be improved through synergy benefits, 
but through cost-efficiency (i.e. synergy in size, not in business). 
2003. Decision that Nordic and Baltic States are TeliaSonera’s home market 
spurs a focus on those territories. 
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–TeliaSonera’s vision 2010 states: “Simplicity makes everything possible”; 
technology is invisible, services should be easy to use. 
–Corporate management function is founded (Harri Koponen to lead). Targets 
creating a new Telco, an IP-ICT-Service integrator type of operator. 
2004. Finnish country organization (Sonera) adopts the mobility of the dominant 
mindset in B2B segment, the next step would be all-IP and integrated 
communication solutions (Swedish Country Management does not agree with 
this, however). 
–Finland (Sonera) decides to introduce a cheap service operator: Tele Finland 
–A Focused Service Portfolio (FSP, technological products were in a key role in 
business classifications) project starts in TeliaSonera. 
–Some R&D activity is transferred from in-house development to cooperation 
projects with customers, suppliers, universities, and research institutions. 
–Tapio Hintikka resigns as the Chair of TeliaSonera’s Board of Directors. 
2005. Finland defended its mobile market position leading to 20% price erosion; 
Anders Igel notes Finland is a failure in the mobile business due low profitability. 
–Focus on mobile business in Finland shifts from a market share battle (with 
price competition) to one over customer loyalty, quality and services. 
–TeliaSonera declares it is in the middle of a major transformation that focuses 
on mobile and internet-based services (the migration from fixed to mobile and 
internet-based services). 
–A strategic renewal of TS’s R&D is initiated. TS aims to have cost-efficient 
innovative service development by establishing partnerships with key external 
competences and resources across the globe and the required local value-chain 
actors (e.g. IP multimedia communication). 
–Investments in MegaFon (Russia’s third largest mobile operator). 
–Distribution of additional capital to shareholders through an extraordinary 
dividend. 
–In Sonera, the project portfolio guidance role is growing in importance, and will 
lead to the introduction of product control matrices, product silos, strong 
decision point (DP) process management, boards and the matrix model, and the 
project management model, TS Promo. 
2006. Distribution of additional capital to shareholders through an extraordinary 
dividend and increase of an ordinary dividend. 
–TeliaSonera undertakes a European telecommunications market consolidation 
to spur economies of scale and growth. 
–The number of Finns in TeliaSonera’s management team drops to two. 
–Mobile R & D is centralized to Sweden (including Finnish R&D). 
–Sales management is strengthened and centralized to Sweden. 
–The mobile data service Connect and the mobile portal SurfPort are launched in 
anticipation of the increased use of mobile data. 
–Mobile prices are stabilizing and then increasing in Finland (due to new price 
plans, an opening charge, and a flat monthly fee). 
–Bundled packages (3G phones and calls, video calls, music and mobile TV) are 
introduced. 
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–Integrated Enterprise Services organization ( IES)) is founded to build the 
leading Nordic and Baltic IT and telecom system integrator. 
–Acquisition of Cygate, a leading supplier of secure and managed IP-network 
solutions and system integration in the Nordic market. 
–Sonera’s unified communication products offering is launched; Telepo is the 
selected vendor (a fast agile new player). 
2007. Lars Nyberg becomes CEO of TeliaSonera. 
–TeliaSonera decides to add value with marketing and partnership competence, 
plans to introduce exclusive iPhone services. 
–TeliaSonera announces five focus areas: the migration of Swedish fixed voice 
customers, participation in growing markets to boost cash-flow, improve B2B 
sales process, and be a world-class service company and lower costs. 
–Company announces mobile handset browsers and increasing functionality are 
driving content services. Handsets also become more capable of using different 
networks (e.g., GSM, GPRS). 
–Company announces the value chain has more players than telecom operators. 
–Company announces the technology drivers are IP-telephony and higher 
network speeds in mobile, and the increased capacity of end devices. 
–Broadband Services (an organization unit in TeliaSonera) separated from 
traditional and IP-based services. 
–Globalization and IP-development forces TeliaSonera to radically increase use 
of open platforms from vendors, third parties, and software oriented solutions. 
The solutions are driven by market demand and with partners and end users the 
target is to get an early proof of the concept and reduced time to market. 
R&D and sales functions are centralized to Sweden. 
–A managed hosting specialist company, Crescom is purchased. 
–Sonera increased its prices for mobile services in Finland. 
2008. Integrated Enterprise Services is discontinued as a separate business area. 
–The number of Finns in TeliaSonera’s management team falls to one. 
–TeliaSonera applies for 4G licenses in Sweden, Norway and Finland and plans 
to launch 4G commercially as one of the first operators in the world in 2010. 
–TeliaSonera chooses Ericsson to supply the initial 4G city network in Stockholm 
and Huawei for the network in Oslo. 
–In R&D, to reduce risk and ensure easy to use services a proactive engagement 
of end users in all R&D phases becomes mandatory. 
–Sonera switches from volume-based to time-based pricing for mobile data 
services in Finland (Flat price). 
2009. R&D efforts to roll-out 4G. 
–Sonera announces plans to charge mobile data users a variable fee (charging for 
access, consumption, and speed). 
–The strong growth of mobile data confirms the importance of a business model, 
as a consequence correct mobile data pricing is vital for telecom companies. 
2010. The business service portfolio is further developed with an emphasis on 
cloud-based functions. 
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2. Key industry events 1977–2010 
 
Technology. 
1977. X.25 is an ITU-T [Telecommunication Standardization Sector in the 
International Telecommunication Union] standard protocol suite for packet 
switched wide area network (WAN) and is used widely in data communications 
(substituting circuit switched data transfer). 
1980. SS7. Signaling System No. 7 (SS7) is a set of telephony signaling protocols 
used to set up most of the world’s public switched telephone network (PSTN) 
telephone calls. Rich digital call-related services can be developed, when 
signaling and using telephone channels are separated. Replaced earlier R2 
signaling procedures. 
1981. MUX. Sonera’s MUX [Multiplexing] network, a packet-based data network 
that used a new node developed by Sonera and Martis was launched. A packet-
based data network replaces circuit switched data transfer. 
1982. TCP/IP. Transmission Control Protocol and Internet Protocol typology (a 
networking model). TCP/IP provides end-to-end connectivity specifying how 
data should be formatted, addressed, transmitted, routed and received at the 
destination. In 1982, the US Department of Defense declares TCP/IP the 
standard for all military computer networking. 
–NMT 450. NMT (Nordic Mobile Telephony) 450 standard is introduced. 
–AT&T introduces Toll Free Service Numbers in USA. 
–Minitel. Minitel, a videotex online network [pre-World Wide Web online 
services], is launched throughout France. 
1983. DID. Telecom operator provides Direct Inward Dialing to commercial 
customers’ extensions without the need for attendants. Only a limited number of 
subscriber lines are needed, a predecessor of call center functionality. 
1986. NMT-900. Nordic Mobile Telephony 900 standard [900 MHz] is 
introduced, where Nokia made  a NMT-900 switch. 
1987. ISDN. Integrated Services for Digital Network is a set of communication 
standards for simultaneous digital transmission of voice, video, data, and other 
network services over the traditional circuits of the public switched telephone 
network. It is defined in CCITT in 1988. 
–2 Mbit Voice access (R2). 2 Mbit digital subscriber line (consisting of 30 
customer channels to landline voice communication) is productized in Sonera. 
1988. Cisco (US data communications start-up company) enters the routing 
technology field. Sonera uses its router in DataNet. A router is a device that 
forwards data packets between computer networks. 
1992. ATM. Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) is “a telecommunications 
concept defined by ANSI and ITU (formerly CCITT) standards for carriage of a 
complete range of user traffic, including voice, data, and video signals.” Sonera is 
the first Telco in the world to implement this network. 
–GSM. Global mobile telephony [digital] standard is implemented in Sonera. 
1993. IN. Intelligent network (included in SS7 architecture) becomes the 
standard network architecture. The intelligence is provided by network nodes on 
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the service layer, distinct from the switching layer of the core network, as 
opposed to solutions based on intelligence in the core switches or telephone 
equipment. 
1994. CT2-CT3. A cordless telephony standard. CT2-CT3 technology is a pre-
stage of mobility in PBX. However, it is not successful due limited mobility and 
functionality. 
1995. VoIP. Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) is a methodology and group of 
technologies for the delivery of voice communications and multimedia sessions 
over Internet Protocol (IP) networks. 
1996. HTML. HyperText Markup Language (HTML) is the main markup 
language that can be displayed in a web browser. 
HTTP. The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is an application protocol for 
distributed, collaborative information systems. HTTP is the foundation of data 
communication for the World Wide Web. 
URL. A uniform resource locator is a specific character string that constitutes a 
reference to a resource. URLs are commonly used for web pages (http:). 
1997. UMTS. The standard is introduced (but is not yet in commercial use). The 
Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) is a third-generation 
mobile cellular system for networks based on the GSM standard. 
GSM WAP standard in use. Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) is a technical 
standard for accessing information over a mobile wireless network. A WAP 
browser is a web browser for mobile devices such as mobile phones that uses the 
protocol. 
2000. The general packet radio service (GPRS) standard is introduced. GPRS is a 
packet oriented mobile data service on the 2G and 3G cellular communication 
system’s global system for mobile communications (GSM). 
11 Mbit Voice Access. High capacity subscriber line is introduced for landlines. 
2004. Cisco enters the IP-PBX technology field. An IP (Internet Protocol) PBX 
(Private branch exchange) is a PBX that provides audio, video, and instant 
messaging communication through the TCP/IP protocol stack for its internal 
network and interconnects its internal network with the (PSTN) for telephony 
communication. 
–Microsoft and Nortel provide a server to IP/PBX. 
2007. Ethernet [a family of computer networking technologies for local area 
networks (LANs)] - IP transmission in trunk networks. Gradual migration to all-
IP system, this is done by majority of operators, Sonera is among the first. 
–iPhone. Apple introduces the iPhone. Intelligent mobile phone capacity and 
usability increases. 
–LTE/4G. The long term evolution (LTE) standard is introduced. LTE is a 
telephone and mobile broadband communication standard, increasing capacity 
and speed; all traffic is in data technology. The world’s first publicly available 
LTE service was launched by TeliaSonera in Stockholm and Oslo on December 
14, 2009. 
–WLAN. A wireless local area network (links two or more devices using a 
wireless distribution method) usage is increasing. 
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2009. Google Wave. A VoIP application introduced by an internet player. 
2010. SaaS, PaaS, IaaS. Software as a service , Platform as a service (PaaS), 
Infrastructure as a service (IaaS). These technologies refer to Cloud Computing 
phenomena, where IT and Telecommunication services are provided virtually. 
Regulation. 
1984. Telecommunications law proposal enters preliminary debate in the Finnish 
parliament. It aims to reverse earlier monopolies in the Finnish market. 
1985. Datatie is founded [Elisa camp], a competitor to Sonera in the data 
business and later in the landline trunk call business. 
1987. Telecommunications law is passed. Competitive licenses now available to 
pursue telecommunications business. 
–Datatie and Corporate Networks Ltd [Sonera’s subsidiary] are granted 
nationwide licenses. 
1994. National and international landline calls are fully liberalized. 
First service providers are granted a license. 
1995. It becomes possible to buy landline access capacity from competitors. 
–The great numbering reform; abandoning of numbering areas. 
1996. Operators are obliged to lease network capacity to other operators. 
–Network operator/ service operator split into separate companies is made 
mandatory. 
2001. 3rd mobile operator [DNA] is given an operating license. 
2003. Mobile number portability is allowed in the market, causing price 
competition and record levels of churn. 
2006. 3G subscription and mobile handset bundling is allowed to boost mobile 
data usage. 
Competition and Appropriability regime. 
1977. Time-based/ data usage based business model profitable and accepted in 
the market. 
1985. Digitalization of the telecom network switches and usage of fiber cables 
made local telcos like Datatie competitive. 
1992. Radiolinja enters the mobile market with GSM technology. 
1993. Exotic players enter the trunk call business (e.g., Telivo, a state owned 
electricity company). 
1994. First commercial consumer-focused mass market ISPs [Internet Service 
Provider] launch (Eunet, Scifi). 
HPY (Elisa is founded)- Helsinki Telephone association’s operations are 
privatized. 
1996. Finnet alliance (local landline telcos) is established. 
1998. Mobile service operators enter the market: Telia Mobile, RSL Com and 
Saunalahti. 
1999. Mobile Tele 2 service provider enters the market. 
MTV 3 [Finnish Commercial TV] ISP enters the market. 
Elisa leaves the Finnet Group. 
2000. Sonera is a market leader in all major businesses, number two in local 
landline voice. New entrants enter the market. 
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Jippii ISP goes public. 
Sonera buys Turun Puhelin (a large local area landline Telco). 
2003. ACN (mobile service provider) enters the market. 
More players enter the B2B service operator market (also IT houses). 
2004. Saunalahti [a large mobile service provider] exits Sonera’s network; a price 
war between service/ virtual service providers and the incumbents ensues. 
2005. ACN and Tele 2 exit the market. 
Cisco enters the IP-PBX business arena threatening Sonera’s PBX earnings. 
2007. A large national competitor to Elisa and Sonera, the DNA company, enters 
the market. 
Five large local telecom companies leave the Finnet Group. 
B2B landline voice is still important, but there is no willingness to pay for it. 
Packet/Bundle/Offering value/ user based business model is dominant but not 
profitable to telecom operators. 
Services are becoming more complex; consequently sales, marketing and 
customer service investments are necessary. 
2008. DNA starts to offer B2B services. 
SaaS/ UC service providers enter to telecom/ ICT market; the telcos’ business 
model is threatened [content can be produced with control gateways in the 
network, e.g. by such players as Google]. 
2009. Software companies, internet players, manufacturers, content distributors 
and telecom companies operate in the same industry. 
Customers and markets. 
1984. Microcomputers enter the market (e.g. IBM PC, Nokia MikroMikko). 
–Networking idea appears in data services (corporate networks). 
–Decentralized data processing appears along with networked personal data 
processing (Hewlett-Packard). 
1985. The mobility trend starts in companies (Finland). 
1989. Development of the contact center business. 
1990. Open client/ server systems (Hewlett-Packard). 
1995. The mobility boom starts in the consumer segment (Finland). 
1996. Internet boom hits the market. Netscape (a US internet company and web 
browser) is founded. 
1999. Internet and mobile players’ stock valuations hit a high. 
2000. Internet and mobile players’ stock valuation is lifted by the financial 
sector. Market sentiment is at its peak. 
2003. Consumerization phenomena (e.g. Skype). 
2004. Full mobility trend hits Finnish companies. 
2005. The Service Level Agreement (SLA) becomes a norm in 
telecommunications. 
–Usage of mobile data is increasing with the arrival of push-mail in mobile, 
smartphones, USB devices to laptops, improved mobile data speed, and packet-
based pricing. 
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2006. The Information Technology Infrastructure Library [ITIL] standard, a set 
of best practices for IT service management, spreads to the telecommunications 
sector in organizational buying behavior. 
2009. Mobile data usage in laptops and mobile devices rockets with the arrival of 
the iPhone (i.e., better screens). 
–New types of convergence applications emerge, e.g., IP-TV (Television usage 
with internet connection). 
2010. Unified Communication and Cloud Computing trends emerge in the B2B 
segment. 
 
3. Organization charts and units 1984-2010 
 
1984-1987   
Radio Unit Tele technical unit Tele unit 
 
1987-1989   
Radioservices Trunk network services Datatransmission services 
Mobile phone services, 
mobile value added 
Trunk network building and 
development, local network 
activities support, basic 
services, corporate services 
Data transmission, Telex, 
Telematics 
 
1990 CUSTOMERS   
BUSINESS 
SERVICES 
*Major accounts 
*Yritysverkot Oy 
*Data services 
*Telex services 
*Telematic 
services 
*Enhanced 
services 
*Business 
systems R&D 
MOBILE 
COMMUNICATIONS 
*Mobile telephone 
services 
*Radio services 
*Paging services 
*Telepoint 
BASIC 
NETWORKS 
*Trunk network 
services 
*International 
REGIONAL 
SERVICES 
*Ahvenanmaa 
*Eastern Finland 
*Central Finland 
*South-Western 
Finland 
*Pirkanmaa 
*Southern Finland 
*South-Eastern 
Finland 
*Lapland 
*Oulu 
*Vaasa 
*Customer 
premises equipment 
*Cable TV 
*Information and 
Operator services 
Telecom 
Research Centre 
Telecom 
Engineering 
  
 
 
1994 Aulis 
Salin, 
Head 
  Sales and 
Marketing 
(Aimo 
Eloholma 
   
Basic 
net-
works 
(Juhani 
Vienola
) 
Mobile 
communi
-cation 
services 
(Aimo 
Koski) 
Value 
adde
d 
servi-
ces 
(Heik-
ki Äy-
väri) 
Access 
network
s and 
special 
areas 
(Mikko 
Pirinen) 
Consumer 
(Mauri 
Metsäranta
) 
Small & 
Medium sized 
comp. 
(Eila 
Rummukainen
) 
Busines
s (Pekka 
Takala) 
Network
s (Jukka 
Kämäri) 
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1998 Aulis 
Salin 
      
Mobile 
communic
ations 
(Matti 
Makkonen
) 
Internat
ional 
operati
ons 
(Kaj-
Erik 
Reland
er) 
Soner
a 
Soluti
ons 
(Jukk
a 
Leino
nen) 
Busine
ss and 
Reside
ntial 
service
s 
(Jukka 
Kämäri
) 
Network 
services 
(Eila 
Rummuk
ainen) 
Media 
communic
ations 
(Juha 
Varelius) 
Sonera 
System
s 
(Jaakk
o 
Nevanli
nna) 
Constru
ction 
and 
Mainten
ance 
(Pekka 
Kuuston
en) 
 
2000 Head Kaj-Erik Relander 
Mobile & Media (Kaj-Erik Relander) 
*Sonera mobile operator business/ 
domestic/global (Matti Makkonen) 
*Sonera Services (Juha Varelius) 
*Sonera Enabling Technologies (Harri 
Vatanen) 
Telecom (Aimo Eloholma) 
*Sonera Entrum Ltd (Aimo Eloholma) 
*Sonera Carrier networks Ltd (Jaakko 
Nevanlinna) 
*Sonera Solutions Ltd (Arvo Kukko) 
*Telering Ltd (Aimo Heikkinen) 
*Primatel Ltd (Pekka Kuustonen) 
 
 
2002 Anders Igel     
Marketing, 
Products 
and 
services 
(HQ) 
Networks 
and 
Technology 
(HQ) 
Sweden Finland Norway, 
Denmark 
and Baltic 
countries 
International 
 
2006 Anders Igel   
Mobility services 
(Kenneth 
Karlberg) 
Broadband services 
(Anders Bruse) 
Integrated 
Enterprise Services 
(Juho Lipsanen) 
Eurasia (Erdal 
Durukan) 
 
2009 Lars Nyberg   
Business Area 
Mobility services 
Business Area 
Broadband Services 
Business Area 
Eurasia 
Sales Division 
Business 
Services 
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4. Critical success factors for Business Communication Services 2008. 
 
 
5. Mobile market share development 2000-2005. 
 
 
 
6. Mobile EBITDA rates 1997-2005, Sonera Finland 
 
Year 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 
EBITDA-
% 
44 44 47 47 50 47 45 43 20 26 32 31 33 31 32 
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7. ENS SWOT 2003 
 
Opportunities 
* Increasing demands for efficiency, 
independence of  time and place  -> 
opportunity for wide range of 
communication  centric services 
* Growing outsourcing trend and 
customer´s awareness of service  
opportunities -> services gain ground in 
expense of in-house solutions 
* Telecoms and IT convergence as well as 
technology development (terminals, 
broadband) offers expanded business 
opportunities in services 
* IP voice enables us to compete in new, 
formerly regulated situations. 
* SME segment is underserved and offers 
major potential for operators 
* Service packaging and ease of use 
Threats 
* Regulation & competition legislation will 
cause structural changes in business 
environment -> rapid revenue/profit 
erosion, tighter competition 
* New competition like systems integrators 
and specialized VAR´s or technology 
vendors penetrate into telecommunication 
services 
* Disruptive technologies enables new 
competition (eg. VoIP) or new cost 
structures 
* Lack of competences and resources in 
software and IT areas -> sales, 
development and production 
* Inability to combine customer orientation 
and product/process approach to maximize 
customer satisfaction and cash flow 
Strengths 
* Unique position as “new Telco” -> 
capability for customer-oriented, 
integrated service concept development 
* Wide know-how of various technologies 
and ability to implement and integrate 
* Credibility as leading player on the 
market: broad customer base, well 
positioned product mix, trustworthy image 
* Experience and learning from the most 
advanced Telco market in the world. 
* The best coverage pan-
Nordic/nationwide: services, distribution 
and maintenance. 
* Profitability of business enables inputs to 
the product development. 
Weaknesses 
* Product development process too slow 
* Ability to turn competences to work from 
vertical product dimension toward 
integrated services 
* Lack of resources in mobile internet 
development and software/IT areas 
* B2B and related product strategy 
communicated too vaguely 
* Market credibility in IT intensive service 
areas -> critical mass not reach yet 
* Partnering is crucial in new product 
development and sales, but lack of 
partnering culture and partner management 
skill exists today 
 
8.Leading the convergence, internal strategy, 2008. 
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9. FastNet structure. 
 
 
 
10.Enterprise Management Team 1999 scenario work 
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11. Telecom players’ consolidation scenario 1999. 
 
 
 
12.Case facets coding 
 
Level of exogenous science usage. Main sources: (Teece, 2007). 
High score (7): There is an active research community network that the case company 
uses when generating ideas. The progress of science is commercialized by an operator and 
plays an important role in the market and in a products’ success. Low score (1): Research 
community play no role in productization, science progress is no success factor for 
products from the operator point of view. 
Level of internal R&D and selection of new technologies. Main sources: (Teece, 2007). 
High score (7): R&D is actively undertaken by an operator and/or together with the 
science community and device vendors. R&D plays a significant role in a products’ 
success, and there is active technology selection and many pilot-projects. Low score (1): 
R&D is bought as a turnkey solution from vendors and has a minor role in the products' 
commercial success. No pilot projects are made, operations are reactive and also cost-
efficient. 
Level of external supplier and complementor usage (end device and software). Main 
sources: (Teece, 2007). High score (7): Terminal devices and external software vendors 
(mobile handsets, PCs, software programming skills) play a strong role in operator's 
productization and service experience. Low score (1): Terminal devices and external 
software vendors (mobile handsets, PCs, software programming skills) have no strong role 
in operator productization and service experience. 
Level of external supplier and complementor usage (network hardware). Main 
sources: (Teece, 2007). High score (7): Network end device (routers, PBX, telephone 
switches, transmission protocols) vendors have a strong role in telecom operators' 
productization and service experience; the operator does technological specs (which define 
the features of the product) with the vendors. Low score (1): Network end device vendors 
have a minor role in the telecom operator's productization and service experience; the 
telecom operator chooses standardized solutions. 
  Appendix 
318 
 
Level of market orientation. Main sources: (Kohli and Jaworski, 1990; Narver and 
Slater (1990)- i) customer orientation; ii) competitor orientation; and iii) interfunctional 
coordination. High score (7): Organization-wide generation of market intelligence 
pertaining to current and future customer needs, dissemination of the intelligence across 
departments, and organization-wide responsiveness to that intelligence (Kohli and 
Jaworski). Low score (1): No organization-wide generation of market intelligence 
pertaining to current and future customer needs, no dissemination of the intelligence 
across departments, and no organizationwide responsiveness to the dissemination. 
Level of top management/ Investors role. Main sources: Jaworski et al. (2000), Tripsas 
and Gavetti (2000), Gattani, G (2006). High score (7): Top management/ Investor vision 
and strategy lead productization, centralized decision making, visible political action, and 
active market and market-structure making. Low score (1): Top management vision and 
strategy have a minor role in productization. Productization is operative management by 
middle managers. No role in political action and no target to be a market maker. 
Level of complementary asset usage in the  seizing phase. Main sources: Teece (1986), 
Stieglitz, N., Heine, K. (2007), Suarez, FF (2004). High score (7): Specialized and co-
specialized assets (for example customers, distribution, service, and complementary 
technologies) play an important role, and company has used these assets to create synergy. 
Low score (1): Generic assets are used only in a minor way, and there is no synergy. 
Level of standards usage. Main sources: Palmberg and Martikainen (2003). Shapiro 
and Varian (1999). Srinivasan et al. (2006). High score (7): Standards play an important 
role in the birth and  management  of dominant design. Standards enhance and fasten 
dominant design emergence, and the company has learned from the standardization 
process and defined its standards. Low score (1): Standards play a minor role in the 
dominant design's birth and management. Standards do not enhance and fasten dominant 
design emergence, and the company has not learned from the standardization process and 
has not defined its standards. 
Level of network externalities usage. Main sources: Srinivasan et al. (2004), Suarez FF 
(2004), Arthur, B.W. (2001), Dranove, D. and Gandal, N (2003), Majumbar, SK., 
Venkataraman S. (1998). High score (7): Network effects play an important role in 
products’ diffusion, and company has made use of network effects in productization. Low 
score (1): Network effects play a minor  role in product's diffusion and company has not 
made use of network effects in productization. 
Modularity. Main sources: Jacobides, Christensen, Afuah. High score (7): A company 
has modular production and open interfaces to third parties. Low score (1): A company 
has integrated production and has closed interfaces to third parties. 
Dominant logic. Main sources: Miller, D., Friesen, PH. (1977). High score (7): 
Organizational differentiation high. The degree of difference between organizational 
divisions in terms of their overall goals, marketing, and production methods, and decision 
making styles are high. The more disparate the divisions, the higher the score. The value is 
reasoned together for how differentiation has affected the particular project; if a project 
has organizational differentiation, it may suffer from resources. Source: Miller and Friesen 
(ibid.) Low score (1): Organizational differentiation low. The degree of difference between 
organizational divisions in terms of their overall goals, marketing and production 
methods, and decision-making styles. The more unitary the divisions, the lower the score. 
The value is reasoned together with how the differentiation has affected the particular 
project; if a project has  low organizational differentiation, it may benefit  from resources. 
Source: Miller and Friesen (Ibid.) 
Ecosystem. Main sources: Srinivasan et al. (2006). High score (7): High number of 
firms in the value net; an ecosystem and partners are needed in service creation. Low 
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score (1): Low number of firms in the value net; an ecosystem and partners are needed in 
service creation.  
Convergence. Main sources: Adner, R. High score (7): Company appreciates convergent 
products. It has convergent products and offerings. Low score (1): Company does not 
appreciate convergent products and offerings , and company does not have convergent 
offerings.  Also Miller and Friesen (1977), Integration of decisions. Are actions in one area 
of the firm complementary or supportive of those in other areas (i.e., divisions, functions) 
or are they conflicting and mutually inhibiting? High integration results in (or from) a 
concerted and well-coordinated strategy, while low integration might be manifested by 
fragmented or clashing tactics (e.g. acquiring new companies when there is an inadequate 
ability to finance or run them and selling products that compete against each other), ibid. 
p. 277. 
Innovation type. Source: Abernathy and Clark (1985). Domain of innovative activity. 1. 
Technology/ Production (Design/ embodiment of technology, production systems/ 
organization, skills (labor, managerial/ technical, materials/ supplier relations), capital 
equipment, knowledge and experience base, Ibid. p. 5). 2. Market /Customer. Relationship 
with customer base, customer applications, channels of distribution and service, customer 
knowledge, modes of customer communication. (Ibid. p. 5). Architectural innovation: 
Disrupt existing/ create new markets/ customer linkages. Disrupt/ obsolete existing 
technology/ production competence. Niche creation innovation: Disrupt/ create new 
markets/ customer linkages. Conserve/ entrench existing technology/ production 
competence. Regular innovation: Conserve/ entrench existing technology/ production 
competence. Conserve/ entrench existing markets/ customer linkages. Revolutionary 
innovation: Conserve/ entrench existing markets/ customer linkages. Disrupt/ obsolete 
existing technology/ production competencies. 
Closed industry. Competition not feasible due proprietary technologies, legislative 
regulation does not allow competition. 
Semi closed industry. Competition limitedly feasible due general technologies, 
legislative regulation does not allow competition to some extent. 
Open industry. Competition feasible due transferable technologies, legislative 
regulation allows competition. 
Global exogenous innovation. Innovation diffuses globally and is created outside a focal 
firm or incumbent industry. 
Local exogenous innovation (de facto standards). Innovation is adapted and modified 
to a local market from external sources to a focal company or incumbent industry. 
Local endogenous innovation. Innovation is created by a focal company or incumbent 
industry. 
Technology influence on competences (D=disrupt, E=enhance, M=mix). Source: 
Tushman and Anderson (1986). Disruption. New skills, abilities and knowledge are 
needed. Enhancement. Improvements are build on existing know-how. 
Market preference type (Incremental=I, revolutionary= R, convergence =C) 
Converging preferences in the market (Adner, 2002). Revolutionary. New technology and 
new market created. 
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14.Interview questions 
 
Round 1.  9/2009-12/2009. Product area: (B2B) Communication Business 
(Mobile/ Data/ Fixed Voice) – 1990-2010 
 
Industry change (technology, regulation, customers, product definition) 
• Industry life-cycle description 
• The concept and change in value creation 
• Sonera’s key resources and critical success factors 
• Marketing strategy ; (How is this strategy understood)? 
• Innovation types used in Sonera (Moore typology) 
• Path dependency- How would you describe your organization’s ability to 
learn from its history (resources, customers, processes, projects)? 
• Functional management- How would you describe the most important 
processes undertaken in Sonera and their dependencies? 
• How has the substance of your customer offerings changed? 
• Convergence- how would you describe it and its effect over time? 
• Feedback and controlling/controls (feedback controls?)  What are these 
measures and how have these changed? 
Round 2. General questions/ product specific. 
Value proposition of the product, key resources, and key processes 
• Substitutes and complements for the product; competitors 
• Actions made to  case products for a life-cycle picture (Moore); Production, 
Product, Sales innovations; Development of segmentation 
• Is there a dominant design and how would you define that design? How  is 
dominant design  acquired and how can it be measured? What is the target? The 
change process in the B2B Integrated Communications area? 
• What are operators’ most important/ largest factors of production, and 
related life-cycle development? 
• Operator/ vendor/ service partner roles (What is the value network)? 
• Technological disruptions- How would you classify these? Competence 
complements/ supplements; Competence destroying/ enhancing disruptions? 
• What is the driver of the life-cycle migration of production? 
Round 3. Specifications. 
Below are the definitions of dominant design. Describe whether you have 
experienced  dominant design, based on the criteria below or other reasons. 
• Dominant design exists in a technological class when  the majority of 
designs have the same technologies for the core components. 
• The shift occurs from radical to evolutionary product innovation and 
product architecture is stable. 
• 50% market share is present  for at least 4 years 
• The emergence of a dominant design apparently changes the nature of 
competition (within the corresponding industry). 
• Example of a dominant design: the Windows operating system 
(dominating OS/2 and Mac) 
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• Your product: Why has that offering been successful or not?(internal 
factors- business case/ management cognitive factors/ processes/ system seller/ 
system integrator working model; external factors- environmental factors)- 
evidence and metrics) 
• How is it possible to create a dominant design? (Causal mechanisms [why 
a particular design approach rather than another emerges as the dominant 
design], e.g. the best technological compromise, economies of scale and (scope)- 
first mover advantages, network externalities, strategic maneuvering (coalitions, 
R&D collaborations, pricing, licensing, or other) 
• How and in what dimensions is the sustainability and protection of 
dominant design possible? What is the role of architectural innovation in 
systemic business? What is the role of modularity and interdependence in 
systemic business? What is the role of current customers in managing dominant 
designs? Is dominant design tradable? Can dominant design emerge already at 
the vendor level? What are operators’  strengths (market making? investment 
policy? forecasting? benchmarking?) 
• What trade-offs do business logics bring to dominant design management? 
What do good margins make available? How can a business  proactively manage 
a life-cycle? 
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